Response Reply

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 9, 2015

A flak)! 10 11 12 13 l4 15 16 17 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Kevin R. Allen (SBN 237994) ALLEN ATTORNEY GROUP 2121 N. California Blvd., Suite 290 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Ph: (925) 695-4913 Fax: (925) 334-7477 kevin@allenattorneygroup.com Attorney for Plaintiff David Markevitch IN THE SUPERIOR COURT IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION) DAVID MARKEVITCH, an individual Case No. 1-15-CV-277789 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF DAVID MARKEVITCH’S vs. REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR (1) ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS, (2) PAGANO & KASS, PC, a Professional PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, AND (3) Corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, ISSUANCE OF JUDGMENT inclusive; Hearing Date: October 28, 2016 Defendants. 3:132: 49:00 a.m. By FAX Judge: Hon. Derek Woodhouse _i_ Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff David Markevitch is entitled as a matter of law to his reasonable fees and costs] as well as prejudgment interest on the principal obligation from the date it was due in January 2012. Defendant’s arguments that the fee award should be reduced due to partial success are unavailing. As reflected herein, where claims are interrelated the Court is required to determine whether Plaintiff achieved the result he was seeking. Plaintiff’s complaint demanded a $169,844.18 referral fee pursuant to various legal theories. He was awarded this exact amount by the jury verdict. He was successful and is entitled to his full fee award obtaining that verdict. Defendant next claims that Plaintiff’s hours were unreasonable. The fee applied for is not disproportional t0 the amount of the verdict. Furthermore the amount of the lodestar is a direct reflection of and in proportion t0 the litigation decisions Defendant made in this case. For example, Defendant chose to file a series of unnecessary and unsuccessful motions, each of which required Plaintiff to prepare and file an opposition. Defendant chose to contest all but one tentative ruling denying their various motions, requiring Plaintiff to prepare and argue at the hearing. Defendant propounded a punishing amount of discovery - over eighty special interrogatories, over eighty requests for production of documents, in addition to general and employment form interrogatories, and requests for admission. Plaintiff had no choice but to respond to this discovery. Defendant refused to admit facts that it later stipulated t0 at trial, including the obvious fact that Plaintiff referred his law school roommate Louis Morin to Pagano & Kass. At every opportunity Defendant chose to make Plaintiff work for the victory, no matter how small. It cannot now complain that Plaintiff’ s hours are excessive or that it is somehow unfair to compensate Plaintiff for its time. Finally, the very fact that Plaintiff’ complaint sought the same referral fee amount that was awarded by the jury verdict years later shows the amount was ascertainable as a matter of law. Prejudgment interest is appropriately awarded under such circumstances. I Plaintiff has incurred an additional $18,l 12.50 in lodestar and $1,1019.15 in costs since he filed his Motion for Prevailing Party Fees/Costs. See Dec]. of Kevin Allen ISO of Reply (“Allen Decl.”) at 1H] 10-12. Plaintiff asks that the Court add these amounts to the award as they were necessary and reasonable and incurred in order to draft this reply brief as well as oppositions t0 Defendant’s ex parte application to sever fees and costs, and its two voluminous post trial motions. Allen Decl., 1} 13. _ 1 _ Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment $ “mm 10 11 12 13 14 15 l6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. LABOR CODE SECTION 218.5 APPLIES TO AN ORIGINATION OR REFERRAL BONUS CONTAINED IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT Defendant claims that the origination bonus 0r referral fee owed to Plaintiff pursuant t0 his employment contract was not a “wage” because Plaintiff’s marketing efforts were “outside the scope of his employment” and in the capacity of a “contractor.” These argument fail as a matter of law and also contradicted by the evidence. Section 218.5 expressly applies to “any action” based on the nonpayment of wages or benefits? “Any action” includes claims for breach of contract 0r, more specifically, a bonus or referral fee arising from an employment contract. If the Legislature had intended to exclude contract-related employment claims from the reach of section 218.5, it could have easily and expressly done so. Notably, the Legislature expressly specified section 218.5 is inapplicable to actions brought by the California Labor Commissioner, to a surety issuing a bond, t0 an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien, and to an action for which attorney fees are recoverable under section 1194. See Earley v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Ca1.App.4th 1420, 1427 [“Section 218.5 entitles the prevailing party, in any action for ‘wages,’ to a mandatory award of costs and attorney fees”]. A referral fee to an employee for bringing a client to firm is clearly a wage provided to Plaintiff for performing labor for Pagano & Kass. Labor Code Section 200 (a) defines “wage” as “all amounts for labor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard 0f time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method 0f calculation.” The term “wages” includes “not only the periodic monetary earnings of the employee” but all “other benefits to which he is entitled as a part of his compensation." Dept. 0f Industrial Relations, DLSE v. UI Video Stores, Inc. (1997) 55 cal.App.4th 1084, 1091. Labor Code Section 200 (b) defines “Labor” broadly t0 include any “labor, work, or service whether rendered or performed under contract, subcontract... or other agreement if the labor to be paid for is 2 Labor Code Section 218.5 states, in relevant part: “In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages... the court shall award reasonable attomey’s fees and costs to the prevailing party if any party to the action requests attomey’s fees and costs upon the initiation of the action.” -2- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment $035) \DOOQQU’I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 performed personally by the person demanding payment.” Here the agreement giving rise t0 the bonus was an employment agreement3 and the bonus promised therein was only available if Plaintiff had agreed to accept the offer letter’s terms. See Ex. “P” at p. 3 [“Provided the terms stated herein are agreeable to you, please sign the letter in the area provided... “]4 The contract required Plaintiff to personally perform a service for the company in order to receive this compensation, i.e., he was required to refer a client to the firm. The employment agreement described this referral fee as “a tangible benefit for the referral of [new] business to The Firm.” Id. B. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS FULL LODESTAR FOR SUCCESSFULLY OBTAINING A VERDICT FOR THE FULL REFERRAL FEE PROVIDED FOR BY HIS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 1. Full Compensation for His Lodestar is Appropriate as Plaintiff Was Successful Obtaining 100% of His $169,844.18 Referral Fee 5 As a preliminary matter Defendant’s Opposition incorrectly argues that, even if Plaintiff prevailed and Labor Code Section 218.5 applies, a fee award in this matter is directionary and that the court may “deny fees altogether.” See Opposition at p. 5:26-27. This is an incorrect reading of the law. Attorneys fees in an action for unpaid wages are not discretionary. Labor Code Section 218.5 states the court “shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.” Labor Code Section 218.5. A court may reduce a fee award where party pursues distrinct and unrelated claims, some of which it prevailed on and some of which it did not, but only to the extent that the party did not otherwise obtain the entire relief it sought through the successful action. The case law describing the circumstances for when such a reduction is appropriate makes it clear that Plaintiff should not 3 The accepted Employment Agreement was admitted into evidence at trial as Plaintiff‘s Exhibit “2.” A copy 2f the Employment Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit “P.” All Exhibits are to the Allen Decl. The signature page for Plaintiff, entitled “Acknowledgment of and Agreement with Initial Terms of At-Will Employment” indicated that by signing Plaintiff “represents and warrants that he has read and considered each and every term 0f the above offer and hereby signs this portion of the letter to significant his consent to the terms and conditions of the offer.” Ex. “P” at p. 4. Furthermore the offer indicated it “is revocable, until accepted in writing, and does not create the permanent right to employment.” Id. Defendant did not contest the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff. -3- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment AWN 10 11 12 13 14 15 l6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 be subject to a reduction in this case since he obtained almost 100% 0f the relief sought in this action, i.e., a verdict for $169,844. 1 8 as requested in his complaint over two years ago. Plaintiff’s- Complaint alleged five causes of action:6 (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Late Payment of Wages in violation of Labor Code Sections 201-204; (3) Late Payment Penalties At Termination in violation of Labor Code Section 203; (4) Fraud; and (5) Unfair Business Practices (Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq). Four of the claims overrlapped -Breach of Contract, Late Payment of Wages, Fraud, and Unfair Business Practices - as they sought the same remedy of a $169.844.18 referral bonus Plaintiff was owed under his employment contract with Pagano & Kass. The only real additional remedy sought by the complaint was by way of the fourth cause of action for Late Payment Penalties (Labor Code Section 203).7 This claim was dismissed by way of demurrer at the very start of the litgation. A party is rarely successful on every single claim presented in a complaint. Where there is partial success the trial court is required to perform a two-step analysis as set forth in Harman v. City & County ofSan Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 69 Cal.Rptr. 3d 750. This analysis, which is referred to as the “Hensley Analysis,”8 involves first determining the degree of interrelatedness between the successful and unsuccessful claims. The Harman court explained the rationale for this first step: Attorney's fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not a110wed.‘ [Citation] ‘Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff‘s various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.’ [Citation] Apportionment is not required when the issues in the fee and nonfee claims are so inextricably intertwined that it would be impractical or impossible to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units." (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Ina, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 158-159.)... In the present matter the breach of contract, unpaid wages, fraud and UCL claims all involved an identical “common core of facts.” All four claims required Plaintiff to show that 6 See Ex. “Q” 7 The late payment penalty claim under Labor Code Section 203 would have only been worth an additional §1 1,538.46 ($75,000 salary / 2080 hours = $36.06 hourly rate; times 8 hours a day; times 30 days penalty). Hensley v. Eckerhart, (1983) 461 US 424. -4- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance ofJudgment 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant promised him a referral fee for originating business as set forth in his employment agreement; that he originated business for the firm; that the firm generated business from the referral for Which it was paid fees; and the amount of the referral fee owed to Plaintiff. These four claims were so “inextricably intertwined” that they required same discovery and required Plaintiff to present virtually identical evidence at trial. Because 0f this it would have been virtually impossible to track hours separately for these claims and Plaintiff cannot go back and extricate the amount 0f time spent on each of the claims. Allen Decl., 11 3. With the exception of Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Nonsuit made during trial all 0f the motions filed by Defendant in this action attacked multiple claims in the Complaint such that it would be impossible t0 separate Plaintiff‘s time into time spent on compensable and non-compensable units.9 Since the successful and unsuccessful claims are interrelated the trial court should perform the second step of the Hensley Analysis: If successful and unsuccessful claims are found to be related, the second step of the two-part analysis in limited-success cases requires the court to still evaluate the “significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” (Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40.) If the plaintiff obtained “excellent results,” full compensation may be appropriate....If there was only “partial or limited success,” full compensation “may be excessive....in this step of the Hensley analysis, “The trial court ‘should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.’ [Citation.] The court may appropriately reduce the lodestar calculation ‘if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.’ [Citation.] The decision emphasized, ‘the most critical factor is the degree 0f success obtained. Id. at 760-761 (emphasis added.) Plaintiff obtained full success with the sole exception of not being able to collect late payment penalties under his third cause of action under Labor Code Section 203.10 The remaining causes of action for Breach of Contract, Fraud and Unfair Business Practices claims all sought the 9 These motions attacked only the fourth cause of action for fraud. Plaintiff’s lodestar reflects that he spent approximately fifteen hours opposing/arguing the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and two hours ogposing/arguing the Motion for Directed Verdict. Allen Decl., 11 4. See, infla, FN 6. The late payment penalties claim cannot be said to have required much if any additional discovery or significant time not otherwise required by the remaining claims. Furthermore the Labor Code Section 203 claim was dismissed in May 2015 as a part of a demurrer that was one of the first filing in this case and which attacked multiple causes of action of the complaint such that the time could not be segregated out accurately. -5- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 same relief, i.e., payment 0f the $169.844.18 referral bonus. Plaintiff obtained a jury verdict in his favor in exactly the amount he sought vis a via those claims. He should not be punished for purusing multiple thoeries to obtain that result, particulualry as the interconnectedness of those theories and their supporting evidence means there was little to no wasted effort caused thereby. The cases cited by Defendant do not support its argument in any way. Indeed, none of the cases involve Labor Code Section 218.5, a plaintiff in a employment dispute, or a plaintiff who secured thefull amount 0f the damages he sought in his case. In Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 31 Ca1.App.4th 173, 177, the Appellate Court actually afi‘irmed an award of full fees despite the fact that it found the plaintiffs’ case “was largely unsuccessful” as “they prevailed on only one of the six causes of action. . ..the one that alleged that they did not receive a ‘fair trial’ at the May 28, 2002 city council meeting. .. [and] lost on the other five causes of action, which alleged that an environmental impact report (EIR) was required. . ., that the City’s general plan was invalid, that the project was inconsistent with the general plan, that the project violated city planning and zoning ordinances, and that the city did not follow the procedure specified in those ordinances when it approved the project.” In Lyons v. Chinese Hosp. Ass ’n (2006) 136 Ca1.App.4th 1331, the Appellate Court determined that the trial abused its discretion in not awarding fees and costs to the plaintiff who only obtained injunctive relief. It remanded the cases to the trial court and expressed no opinion whatsoever on the amount of a rasonabe fee in the action. Id. at p. 1152.” 2. Plaintiffs Work in the Case Was Necesarry and Appropriate and A Response to Defendant’s “Scorched Earth” Litigation Tactics Defendant next argues that the fee award should be reduced because some of the hours in Plaintist lodestar were, in Defendant’s view, not “reasonably spent” on the litigation. This claim is ironic insofar as Defendant appears to have defended this case with the aim of creating as much H The plaintiff in Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (2000) 79 Ca1.App.4th 1127 pursued causes of action for negligent operation of a motor vehicle, general negligence, battery, conversion, forcible repossession in violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) FDCPA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She prevailed on her FDCPA claim and was entitled to prevailing party fees for that work. Since she spent a “bulk” of her time on the other claims it was appropriate to reduce the overall award. -6- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment work as possible and Plaintiff’s counsel did everything it could to litigate this case in an efficient and economical manner. Plaintiff did not file a single motion in the case before trial whereas Defendant filed five unsuccessful motions that Plaintiff had to oppose and argue against, i.e., demurrer (mostly denied May 7, 2015), a motion to reclassify as limited jurisdiction (denied June 23, 2015), a motion for summary judgment (denied February 23, 2015), a motion for judgment on the pleadings (denied July 20, 2016), and, just recently, an ex parte application to sever the fees/costs from the present motion (denied October 11, 2016). The accusations that certain hours were unreasonable lack merit. For the convenience of the 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Court Plaintiff will respond to the most significant 0f Defendant’s attacks: '2 Time Spent Responding t0 Discovery (Opposition at p. 827-12): Defendant propounded a voluminous amount of discovery and Plaintiff had t0 respond to it. It is unclear why Plaintiff should not be compensated for responding to discovery. The fact that Defendant drafted a meet and confer letter does not mean the responses were inadequate 0r that Plaintiff’s hours were unreasonable. And the fact that Plaintiff supplemented its discovery after receiving a meet and confer letter, instead of wasting time on additional meet and confer letters or forcing a motion to compel, should be commended and is actually an example 0f efficiency in the case. Time Spent Meeting and Conferring With Pagano & Kass On Its Discovery (Opposition at p. 8:13-18): Defendant did not produce a single document in this case and refused to extend the motion to compel deadline on its responses thereby cutting off any further meet and confer. Plaintiff was able to gather sufficient evidence via depositions which was more efficient than a motion to compel. Time Spent Opposing Motion to Reclassify (Opposition at pp. 8: 19--:24) It is not unreasonable that Plaintiffs counsel spent upwards of two full days (18. 1 hours total)” opposing this motion. He had to perform legal research, drafted the opposition paperwork and proofread/format it prior to creating a table of contents and table of authorities. He also had to cause it to be filed and served. He had to review the tentative ruling and, since Defendant contested the TR denying the motion, prepare for and attend the hearing in San Jose. Defendant could have chosen not to file the motion. Since it did, Plaintiff had to respond and he, in fact, prevailed on the motion. Time Spent Opposing Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings (Opposition at pp. 8:25-9z3): Defendant wrongfully attributes approximately twelve hours to this motion (see entries dated 6/27, 7/6, 7/19, 7/20) which were actually spent performing trial preparation. It was not unreasonable to spend less than two days (twelve-hours) reviewing the 12 13 Allen Decl., 1N Defendant propounded 85 Special Interrogatories, 84 Requests for Production, in addition to Requests for Admissions, Form-Interrogatories-Employment, Form Interrogatories-General. Allen Decl., 11 5. $9,502.50/$525= 18.1 hours _7_ Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance 0f Judgment .b flow 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 motion, preparing an opposition, filing and serving the opposition, and preparing for hearing. Furthermore Defendant could have chosen not to file the motion. Since it did, Plaintiff had to respond and he, in fact, prevailed on the motion. ° Entry on January 28, 2016: There is nothing unreasonable about this entry. Defendant portrays this 2.1 hour entry as “picking up deposition transcripts.” Defendant ignores the fact that the time entry indicates Plaintiff reviewed the deposition transcripts for both Mr. Kass and Mr. Pagano, drafting a consent form for Louis Morin, and exchanged multiple emails with David Markevitch and Mr. Morin. ' Meet and Confer Letter to Pagano & Kass Re Depositions (Oppositions at p. 9:22-27): Defendant’s refilsed t0 answer various questions at deposition which necessitated a six page meet and confer letter which was sent February 11, 2016. Plaintiff ultimately decided that it was not worth the additional time/costs to pursue vis a via a motion t0 compel which reflects an efficient use of resources in this case. ' Time Spent Meeting With Pagano & Kass While They Reviewed Deposition Transcripts on February 26, 2016 (Opposition at pp. 10:1-7): Defendants refused to order a deposition transcript or to travel to the couit reporter’s office t0 review the transcript. Plaintiff’s counsel spent $2,593 for copies of the transcripts and did not feel it was fair for Defendant t0 get a free copy. Plaintiff’s counsel was, however, willing to incur hours from his day to allow Defendant’s principals to review his copy at his office. There is nothing unreasonable in seeking compensation for this time. Defendant objects to time spent by VJ Chetty 0n August 25 and 25. Her time was not duplicitous. It reasonably takes two attorneys to try a case to a jury and Defendant cannot say otherwise as it was represented by two attorneys. Allen Decl., 1] 6. Furthermore Ms. Chetty teaches trial techniques and assisted lead trial counsel with questions regarding procedure and strategy. The fact that she did not work on the case until trial is additional evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel was litigating the case in a lean and efficient manner; if he had been attempting to pad the billings and increase the lodestar he would have brought in a second attorney at a much earlier stage of the litigation. Id. C. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF’S AWARD WERE REDUCED TO BELOW $25,000, HE SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO HIS PREVAILING PARTY FEES WITHOUT DISCOUNT The court in an unlimited case has the discretion to reduce or deny fees/costs where the judgment is $25,000 or less and thus could have been rendered in a limited civil case. CCP -8- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment OONONU‘I O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1033(a). However, even if the Court t0 award less than $25,000 such a reduction would be inapproriate in this case. When considering such a reduction courts are t0 consider plaintiff’s assessment 0f his chances of Victory when the action was filed and the amount of fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff sought $169,844.18 in his complaint and was awarded this precise amount by the jury in its verdict. Even if the Court were to disagree for some reason with the jury, it should be clear that the decision to file this case as an unlimited matter was appropriate. D. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE VERDICT AMOUNT Defendant does not dispute the amount of prejudgment interest or calutations used to reach those amounts. It instead argues it does not owe Plaintiff a referral fee of $169,844.18. However, this does not mean that the amount was not “certain or capable of being made certain by calculation.” See Civ. Code § 3287(a). Indeed, Plaintiff’s March 2015 Complaint sought the Lact amount of damages ($169,844.1815) the jury ultimately awarded Plaintiff in September 2016 ($169,844.18). Obviously the damages were certain or capable of calculation since they were in fact caluclated by Plaintiff in his complaint. Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49 CA4th 948, 961; see Stein v. Southern Calif Edison C0. (1992) 7 CA4th 565, 573. Defendant did not dispute that, if one used the dates and definitons presented by Plaintiff, the damages came out to $169,844.18 and instead disputed liability. Under such circumstances prejudgment interest should be awarded. Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 C3d 390, 402; see Boehm & Assocs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 76 CA4th 513, 516. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff hereby requests to be deemed the prevailing party and awarded his reasonable attorneys fee and costs (updated to include time spent since the 15 See Exhibit “P” [Complaint] at Paragraph 13 (“In the first twelve months after DEFENDANT was retained by Louis Morin, it generated approximately $345,022 in billings that were ultimately collected from the fee award in the Lo Jack Class Action. By applying the sliding scale of percentages to the monthly billings accrued during this twelve month period, PLAINTIFF earned and should have been paid wages in the form of a referral fee in the approximate amount of $169,944.18.” -9- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance of Judgment LAN OOQGUI CO 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 original motin was filed)” as well as $81,474.03 in prejudgment interest. He requests that judgment be entered accordingly. Dated: October 2 1 , 2016 ALLEN ATTORNEY GROUP KEVIN R. ALLEN Attorney for Plaintiff David Markevitch l6 Plaintiff has incurred an additional $18,1 12.50 in lodestar and $1,1019.15 in costs since he filed his Motion for Prevailing Party Fees/Costs. Allen Decl., 1} 10-12. Plaintiff asks that the Court add these amounts to the award as they were necessary and reasonable and incurred in order to draft this reply brief as well as the oppositions Defendant’s ex parte application to sever fees and costs and its two voluminous post trial motions. Allen Decl., 1] 13. _ 1 0- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion For Prevailing Party Fees/Costs, Prejudgment Interest, and Issuance ofJudgment