Memorandum Points and Authorities

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.July 2, 2019

m b) KOOO\~30\ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. heal Twel- 1255 Treat Boulgvald s ' 60uu 6 l) Walnoa Cleek. CA 9159? 9253321168 WILLIAM HAYS WEISSMAN, Bar No. 178976 wweissman@littler.com CHAD D. GREESON, Bar No. 251928 cgreeson@littler.com LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. Treat Towers 1255 Treat Boulevard Suite 600 Walnut Creek, CA 94597 Telephone: 925.932.2468 Fax N0.: 925.946.9809 Attorneys for Defendants SOHAIL ASLAM, IJAZ ANWAR, AJIT MEDHEKAR, PAYACTIV, INC., AND SAFWAN Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 9/18/2019 6:00 PM Reviewed By: M Vu Case #1 9CV350776 Envelope: 341 0326 SHAH SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA PEDRO IBARRA, Case No. 19CV350776 Plaintiff, - ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE PIERCE, DEPT. 2 v. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND PAYACTIV, INC, a Delaware AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF Corporation, SAFWAN SHAH; SOHAIL DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER ASLAM; IJAZ ANWAR; AJIT MEDHEKAR; and DOES 1 - 25, inclusive, DATE: TIME: Defendants. DEPT. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// January 7, 2020 9:00 am. Complaint Filed: July 2, 2019 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES iSO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER .b \oooxloku: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. Teal ' II cur. I255 hem aoulevam Suite 600 Wafnu! Creek. CA 94597 925.932. 463 II. III. IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT 0F FACTS ............................................................................................... ; ...... 1 A. The Complaint ............................................................................................................. 1 B. Defendants Satisfied the Statutory Meet & Confer Requirements to Demurrer ......... 1 ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 1 A. Legal Standard ............................................................................................................. 1 B. Plaintiffs Whistleblower Retaliation Cause of Action Fails ..... '. ................................. 2 1. The Complaint does not allege a specific state or federal Violation ................ 2 2. The alleged “disclosures” are not protected whistleblowing activity .............. 3 3. Debatable differences of opinion are not protected disclosures ...................... 4 4. The time between the alleged whistleblowing and the adverse action is insufficient to establish causation and a valid ciaim ........................................ 4 C. Plaintiff’s Disability Discrimination Causes 0f Action Fail ........................................ 5 D. The Failure to Accommodate or Engage in the Interactive Process Claims Fail ........ 7 E. Plaintiff’s FEHA Causes of Action for Harassment and Discrimination Fail ............. 9 F. The Harassment Claims Against Shah, Aslam, Anwar & Medhekar Fail ................. 10 G. Plaintiff’s Failure to Prevent Harassment of Discrimination Fails ............................ 11 H. The Eighth Cause 0f Action for FEHA Retaliation Fails .......................................... 11 I. The Ninth Cause 0f Action for Wrongful Termination Fails .................................... 12 J. The Tenth Cause of Action for IIED Fails ................................................................. 13 1. A personnel management decision cannot support a valid IIED claim ......... 13 2., The Exclusive Remedy rule bars Plaintiff’s IIED cause 0f action ................ 13 K. The Eleventh Cause of Action for Declaratory and Inj unctive Relief Fails .............. 15 CONCLUSION.......- ............................................................................................................... 15 i. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER A \OOOHGKA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. Treat Tater: 1255 Treat Boulsvaud Suile 660 Walnut Cleek, C-A 91591 925 9322458 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE Cases Accardi v. Super. CL, 17 Cal.App.4th 341 (1993) ..............................................................................................................7 Blank V. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311 (1985) .......................................................................................................................2 Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228 (1997) ..............................................................................................................7 C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. C0,, 163 Ca1.App.3d 1055 (1984) ...........................................................................................................2 Cansino v. Bank ofAmerica, 224 Cal.App.4th 1462 (2014) .......................................................................................................... 5 Cardellini v. Casey, 181 Cal.App.3d 389 (1986) ........................................................................................................... 15 Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist, I48 Cal.App.4th 922 (2007) ............................................................................................................2 Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam) ....................................................................................................4 Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, 43 Ca1.3d 148 (1987) ..................................................................................................................... 14 Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App.4th 968 (2004) ........................................................................................................ 1, 2 Faust v. Calif Portland Cement Co. , 150 Cal.App.4th 864 (2007) ............................................................................................................ 6 Fermino v. Fedco, Ina, 7 Cal.4th 701 (1994) ...................................................................................................................... 14 Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. , 214 Cal.App.3d 590 (1989) .............................................................................................................4 Green v. State ofCal. , 42 Cal.4th 254 (2007) ......................................... - ............................................................................. 6 Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Ina, 74 Cal.App.4th 215 (1999) ............................................................................................................ 12 ii. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER ADJN NONLII 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITYLER MENDELSON. P.C. real ?owets I256 flea! Boulevam Suite 90-3 walnutCleek, CA 91597 925 932 2456 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED) PAGE Holland v. Union Pac. RR. C0., 154 Cal.App.4th 940 (2007) .......................................................................................................... 10 Jadwin v. County ofKern, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129 ................................................................................................................. 2, 3, 5 Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal.App.4th 55 (1996) .............................................................................................................. 13 Kacludz‘s v. GTE Sprint Communications Corp, 806 F.Supp. 866 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ................................................................................................. l4 Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC, 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 38-39 ................................................................................................................... 5 Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trustfor S. Cal. , 144 Cal.App.3d 222 (1983) ............................................................................................................. 2 Lawrence v. Bank ofAm. , 163 Cal.App.3d 431 (1985) ............................................................................................................. 2 Love v. Motion Industries, Inc. , 309 F.Supp.2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2004) .............................................................................................2 Lui v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 211 Cal.App.4th 962 (2012) .......................................................... I.................................................. 8 MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn, 7 Cal.App.4th 618 (1992) .............................................................................................................. 15 Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space C0,, Inc. , 29 Cal.App.4th 1718 (1994) ...................................................................................................... 8, 10 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Ina, 549 U.S. 118 (2007) ....................................................................................................................... 15 Miklosy v. The Regents ofthe Univ. ofCal. , 44 Cal.4th 876 (2008) .................................................................................................................... 14 Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corp, 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 228-29 (2017) ............................................................................................... 13 Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Community College Dist. , 202 Cal.App.4th 832 (2012) ........................................................................................................ 3, 4 iii. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER OOQOU't-b \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UTTLER MENDELSON. P.C. heal Tn 1|!I ~ 1255 "ea! Boulevald Suns 600 Walnul Cleek. CA 9459.7 925 932.2153 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES I (CONTINUED) PAGE Morgan v. Regents 0f Univ. ofCalz’f, 88 Cal.App.4th 52 (2000) ........................................................................................................ 2, 4, 7 Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations Ca, 36 Cal.App.4th 1607 (1995) .................................................................................................. 7, 8, 10 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Seru, 81 Cal.App.4th 39 (2000) ................................................................................................................ 2 Rodriguez v. Lockheed Missiles & Space C0. , 265 F.3d 890.897 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................... 8 Romano v. Rockwell Inl’l., Ina, 14 Cal.4th 479 (1996) ............................................................................................................ 7, 9, 10 Scotch v. Art Inst. ofCal. , 173 Cal.App.4th 986 (2009) ...................................................................................................... 6, 12 Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d. 1 (1990) ........................................................................................................................ 14 Swanson v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 232 Ca1.App.4th 954 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 8 Traverso v. Dept. 0f Trans., 87 Cal.App.4th 1142 (2001) ............................................................................................................ 2 Veronese v. Lucasfilm Ltd. , 212 Ca1.App.4th 1 .......................................................................................................................... 11 Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmerica, 21 Ca1.3d 943 (1978) ..................................................................................................................... 15 Wilson v. County 0f0rcmge, 169 Cal.App.4th 1185 (2009) .......................................................................................................... 8 Wysinger v. Automobile Club ofSouthern California, 157 Cal.App.4th 413 (2007) ............................................................................................................6 Yanowz’tz v. L ’Oreal USA, Ina, 36 Ca1.4th 1028 (2005) .................................................................................................................. 11 Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 1116 (1989) ........................................................................................................... 8 iv. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER A \OOONQQJI 10 11 12 13 -l4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ’28 UTTLER MENDELSQN. P.C. heat cm: I255 flea! Boulevard Suile 600 Walnul Creek, CA 9:597 925.932.2453 ‘ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED) PAGE Zelig v. County ofLos Angeles, 27 Ca1.4th 1112 (2002) .................................................................................................................... 2 Zumbrun v. USC, 25 Cal.App.3d 1 (1972) ................................................................................................................... 2 S‘t'atutes 28 U.S.C. § 2201 .................................................................................................................................. 15 Cal. Code Regs., tii. 2, § 10005(d)(3) & (4) .................................................................................... 9, 11 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10005(d)(6) .................................................................................................. 12 California Workers’ Compensation Act .............................................................................................. 13 Code Civ. Pros. § 430.10(e) ................................................................................................................... 1 Code Civ. Proc. § 1060 ........................................................................................................................ 15 Code 0f Civil Procedure section 430.41(a) ............................................................................................ 1 Evid. Code §§ 452-453 ..................................................................................................................... 5 Fair Employment and Housing Act ....................................................................................................... 6 Fair Employment and Housing Act .................. - ..................................................................................... 7 FEHA ................... t ...... _ .................................................................................................................. passim Gov. Code § 12960(b) ............................................................... -....................................................... 9, 11 Gov’t Code, § 12490(n) ......................................................................................................................... l Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq..................................................................................................................... 1 Gov’t Code § 12940(a) .......................................................................................................................... 1 Gov’t Code § 12940(h) .......................................................................................................................... 1 Gov’t Code, § 129400) .......................................................................................................................... 1 Gov’t Code § 129400) and (k) ............................................................................................................... 1 Govt Code§ 12940(m) ..................................................................................................................... 1, 8 Gov’t Code § 12940(n) .......................................................................................................................... 6 v. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER mflmtJI-h \D 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. P,C. heat Iowan 1255 hea: Boulevald S ' €00ulle " Walnut Creek. CA 9-359? 925 932.2Jii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED) PAGE Gov’t. Code §§ 12960, 12965(b) ........................................................................................................... 7 Gov’t Code § 12960(d) ........................................................................................................................ 10 Government Code section 12490, subdivision (m) ................................................................................ 8 Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) .............................................................................. 1 1 Government Code section 12940 subdivision (n) .................................................................................. 8 Lab. Code § 1102.5 ...................................................................................................................... passim Lab. Code §§ 3600-3602, 5300 ............................................................................................................ 14 Lab. Code §§ 3602(a), 5300 ................................................................................................................ 13 Labor Code section 1102.5(b) ................................................................................................................ 2 Labor Code section 3601 ..................................................................................................................... 14 Workers’ Compensation Act ................................................................................................................ 14 Vi. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 UTTLER MENDELSON. 9.0. heat 7ewwww 1255 nea‘: Boulevavd ' 6Smite 00 Walnut Creek, CA 9459.7 925 932.2138 I. INTRODUCTION This case involves a laundry list of absurd employment claims from a disgruntled former employee, terminated for legitimate business reasons after his position was eliminated. The causes of action in the Complaint fail to state facts sufficient t0 constitute a cause 0f action. As discussed below, the Court should sustain Defendants’ demurrer to all of the causes 0f action without leave to amend. II. STATEMENT 0F FACTS A. The Complaint The Complaint, filed on July 2, 2019, contains eleven causes of action: (1) whistleblower Violation [Lab. Code § 1102.5]; (2) disability discrimination [Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq.; (3) failure to accommodate [Gov’t Code § 12940(m)]; (4) failure to engage in interactive process [Gov’t Code, § 12490(n)]; (5) race harassment [Gov’t Code, § 129400)]; (6) race discrimination [Gov’t Code § 12940(a)]; (7) failure to prevent or correct discrimination 01' retaliation [Gov’t Code § 129400) and (k)]; (8) retaliation [Gov’t Code § 12940 (h)]; (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (1 1) declaratory and injunctive relief. (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice “RFJN”], Ex. 1, Complaint [“Compl.”].) B. Defendants Satisfied the Statutory Meet & Confer Requirements to Demurrer Prior to filing this demurrer, counsel for Defendants met and conferred in good faith with Plaintiff’s counsel as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.4l(a). Defendants complied with this section by providing Plaintiff‘s counsel with the defects in the Complaint along with supporting legal authority. Defendants’ counsel then met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel by telephone on September 4, 2019, to discuss these defects. Defendants’ counsel followed up with Plaintiff’s counsel telephone and letter again on September 10, 2019. However, Plaintiff’s counsel refused to amend the defects in the Complaint, resulting in this demurrer and corresponding motion to strike. (See Declaration of Chad D. Greeson (“Greeson Decl.”), pp. 1-3, W 1-9.) III. ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (2004); Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e) (“the pleading does 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DBFBNDANTS’ DEMURRER 1 hot state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”). The burden 0f proof is on Plaintiff to show 2 a viable claim. Zumbrun v. USC, 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 (1972); Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 31 1, 318 3 (1985). To survive a demurrer, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each 4 cause of action as alleged against each named defendant. Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 81 5 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 (2000). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court treats “the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” Zelz'g v. County ofLos Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126 (2002); see Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trustfor S. Cal, 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 228 (1983) (“contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or \OOOQON law alleged in the complaint are not considered in judging its sufficiency”). “Doubt in the complaint 10 may be resolved against plaintiff'and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist.” C & H Foods Co. 11 v. Hartford Ins. Ca, 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062 (1984). 12 In deciding Whether to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend, the Court must determine 13 whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. Donabedian, 1 16 14 Cal.App.4th at 976. Leave to amend is not appropriate ifno liability exists as a matter oflaw. Traverso 15 v. Dept. QfTrans., 87 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1144-45 (2001); Lawrence v. Bank 0fAm., 163 Cal.App.3d 16 431, 436 (1985). 17 B. Plaintiff’s Whistleblower Retaliation Cause of Action Fails 18 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, Plaintiff must 19 show he engaged in protected activity, was later subjected to adverse employment action, and a causal 20 link exists between these events. Morgan v. Regents of Univ. ofCalzf, 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69 (2000). 21 1. The Complaint does not allege a specific state 0r federal violation. 22 Labor Code section 1 102.5(b) requires the disclosure of a state or federal violation. Labor Code 23 § 1102.5(b); Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist, 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 933 (2007); Love v. 24 Motion Industries, Ina, 309 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1 134 (ND. Cal. 2004) (“Plaintiff’s disclosure does not 25 meet the standard for protected activity under Section 1102.5(b), because the disclosed activity does 26 not violate any federal or state statute, rule, or regulation”). An employee engages in protected activity 27 under Labor Code section 1 102.5(b) when he discloses reasonably based suSpicions of illegal activity. 28 Jadwin v. County 0f Kern, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1154 (citing Mokler v. County 0f Orange, 157 LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. 2heal Tam: 1255 Taeal Boulevalo ' 600 wa'"°éf:€§:f£§”” MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITlES ISO'DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER #w GUI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. PC. «sitar: Cal.App.4th 121, 138 (2007)). The employee must also reasonably believe he was disclosing a Violation 0f state or federal law. Jadwz'n, 610 F.Supp.2d at 1154 (citing Patten v. Grantjoz'nt Union High School Dist., 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1386 (2005)). To have a reasonably based suspicion of illegal activity, the employee must be able to point t0 some legal foundation for his suspicion-i.e., some Violation of state or federal law violated by the conduct disclosed. Jadwin, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1154 (citing Love, 309 F.Supp.2d at 1135). I Here, Plaintiff fails to expressly reference any statute, rule, or regulation that could support any claim that illegal activity occurred. Rather, he simply alleges that “in approximately 2016” he told the Defendants that PayActiv’s business model allowed customers to access unpaid, unearned income, which he claims is a credit term that requires disclosures. (Compl., 1] 23). Plaintiff also alleges that he raised concerns about data encryption. (Id.) Plaintiff also ailegedly emailed Defendants reiterating his “earlier and additional concerns” regarding PayActiv’s business model, but he fails to mention what, if any, additional concerns were raised. (Id, 1] 24.) These allegations do not constitute protected disclosures under section 1 102.5 because he fails to establish that allowing customers t0 access unpaid, unearned income is illegal, requires disclosures, and the failure to make them is illegal, or even that no disclosures were made. Moreover, he fails to explain what laws were violated under his data encryption concerns. A Violation of Labor Code section 1 102.5 requires Plaintiff to actually plead the how Defendants’ conduct violates a state or federal law; he fails to do so. 2. The alleged “disclosures” are not protected whistleblowing activity. Even if the complaint could be construed to allege some violation of law, the first cause of action still fails because Plaintiff fails to allege he actually made a “disclosure.” An employee’s report t0 his supervisor about the supervisor’s own wrongdoing is 'not a “disclosure” and is not protected whistleblowing activity, because the employer already knows about its wrongdoing. Mize~Kurzman v. Marin Community College Dist, 202 Cal.App.4th 832, 858-859 (2012). “Criticism delivered directly to the wrongdoers does not further the purpose of either the federal WPA 0r the California whistleblower laws to encourage disclosure of wrongdoing to persons who may be in a position to act to remedy it.” Id. at 859. Here, Plaintiff allegedly made his alleged “disclosures” t0 Shah, Aslam, and Anwar. (Comp1., 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER OONJQLII-hww \D 1o 11 12 13 14 15 ‘16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. PAC. heal Towel: 125$ Flea! Boulevald Suite Gan WalnurCleek. CA 94597 925 932.258 1H} 23-24.) The person Plaintiff told are the same individuals who he accuses of the wrongdoing. Under Mize~Kurzman Plaintiff‘s complaints to the individuals who are accused of wrongdoing is not a disclosure. As such, Plaintiffcannot state a valid claim for retaliation under Labor Code section 1 102.5 because he did not engage in any protected whistleblowing activity. 3. Debatable differences of opinion are not protected disclosures. Debatable differences of opinion concerning policy matters are not protected disclosures under Labor Code section 1102.5. “Disclosures related to the wisdom or efficacy 0f a policy are subjectto the debatable policy matters limitation, where there is no claim that the disclosure was made because the employee reasonably believed the policy violated a statute, rule or regulation.” Mize-Kurzman, 202 Ca1.App.4th at 854. As the court explained: [W]e do not intend to convey the idea that any mere thought, suggestion, or discussion of an action that someone might consider to be a violation of a law, rule, or regulation is a justification for a whistleblower complaint. Discussion among employees and supervisors concerning various possible courses 0f action is healthy and normal in any organization. It may infact avoid a violation. Id, at 859-860 (quoting Reid v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. , 508 F.3d 674 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (italics in original). At most, the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint relate to debatable differences of opinion regarding internal policy matters because the Complaint lacks specific reference to a Violation 0f state and federal law. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “disclosures” are not protected under Labor Code section 1102.5 and do not give rise to an actionable whistleblower retaliation claim. 4. The time between the alleged whistleblowing and the adverse action is insufficient to establish causation and a valid claim. To establish causation solely with timing evidence, the adverse employment action must follow ,“within a relatively short time” after the protected activity. Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615 (1989); Morgan, 88 Cal.App.4th at 69. The Supreme Court has held that an employment action taken 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (“The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action 4 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DBFENDANTS’ DBMURRER vaw \OOOQONKJ} 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTL ER MEN DELSON. P.C. Ila (‘3‘ u e Walnu! Cleek. CA 9159? 925 932.2153 as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very 01036.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 0 ’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. C0., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (3-month period insufficient); Richmond v. ONEOK, Ina, 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (3-month period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-1 175 (7th Cir. 1992) (4-month period insufficient». Plaintiff allegedly raised concerns to Defendants Shah, Aslam, and Anwar in “approximately 2016.” (Compl., 1f 23.) His employment was terminated on December 4, 2017, allegedly in retaliation for his disclosures described in paragraph 23 of the Complaint. There is n0 indication of any adverse employment action closely after Plaintiffexpressed his concerns in “approximately 2016.” The alleged disclosures predated the alleged adverse action by a period of 12-23 months. This fails t0 satisfy the legal test of close temporal proximity t0 establish causation for a prima facie case of retaliation. According to governing case law, more than three months is insufficient to establish causation based 0n temporal proximity. Plaintiff will argue that he repeated his disclosures 0n 0r about November 12, 2017, but there are no allegations to suggest that the November 2017 disclosures differed in any material respect from those made in “approximately 2016.” Reiterated “disclosures” cannot give rise to whistleblower retaliation as a matter of law. Jadwin, 610 F.Supp.2d at 1155-1 156 (no evidence that physician’s alleged whistleblowing about deficiencies in required documentation was a motivating reason behind employer’s adverse action because physician raised similar concerns before and months elapsed from report to adverse action). For all of these reasons the Court should sustain Defendant’s demurrer t0 Plaintiff s first cause of action for whistleblov'ver retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 without leave to amend. Plaintiff cannot now truthfully amend this claim based on the allegations set forth in the original complaint, which are subject to judicial notice. Evid. Code §§ 452-453; Cansz‘no v. Bank ofAmerica, 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474 (2014) (rejecting allegation contradicted by judicially noticed facts); Kalnoki v. First American Tricstee Servicing Solutions, LLC, 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 38~39 (disregarding plaintiffs’ conflicting allegations in original and subsequently amended complaints). C. Plaintiff’s Disability Discrimination Causes of Action Fail T0 succeed on his disability claim, Plaintiff must establish that that: (1) he suffered from a 5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER LHTLER MENDELSON. P.C. heal Towel: ‘hWN \JQU‘I 10 11 12 13 14 1'5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 llllllll disability; (2) he was “otherwise qualified” to do his job; and (3) he was subjected to adverse employment action because of his disability. Faust v. Calif Portland Cement Ca, 150 Cal.App.4th 864, 886 (2007); see also Green v. State ofCal. , 42 Cal.4th 254, 257, 260 (2007). T0 prevail on a failure to accommodate claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), plaintiff must prove: (l) that he suffered from a disability; (2) that he was qualified t0 perform the essential functions of the position; and (3) that PayActiv failed to “reasonably accommodate” his alleged disability. Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal., 173 CaI.App.4th 986, 1009-1010 (2009). T0 establish that he was a “qualified individuals,” Plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he was “able to perform the essential functions of [his] job with or without accommodation.” Green v. State 0fCal., 42 Cal.4th at 260. Failure to engage in a good faith interactive process is an independent cause of action under FEHA. Gov’t Code § 12940(n); Wysinger v. Automobile Club ofSouthern California, 157 Ca1.App.4th 413, 425 (2007). To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive process should have occurred. Scotch, 173 Ca1.App.4th 986, 1018-1019. Plaintiff allegedly took medical leave due t0 stress and provided Defendants with a note from his doctor placing him offwork through December 1, 20 1 7. (Comp1., 11 24.) He claims to have received a letter stating that his employment was being terminated effective December 4, 2017. He relies solely 0n these facts to support his causes of action for disability discrimination (second), failure to reasonably accommodate (third), and failure to engage in a good faith interactive process (fourth). However, these causes of action fail to state sufficient facts t0 constitute a cause 0f action. The Complaint lacks any Specific allegations demonstrating that Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability. Moreover, there are no facts regarding the disability in question, the nature of his stress, or whether his stress was work-related. The Complaint does not include any allegation that Plaintiff notified Defendants of a qualifying disability, or that he requested an accommodation, and if so, to whom, when, and what kind. Plaintiff does not identify a reasonable accommodation or indicate when the interactive process should have occurred. Plaintiff also fails to allege that he disclosed a qualifying disability to Defendants. The only fact disclosed to Defendants according to the Complaint was a 6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER LITTLER MENDELSON. RC. Tleal Intel: AWN KOOOQQM 10 I 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Suite 600 muCreek CA 9459? 925 93222433 doctor’s ndte stating that Plaintiff was off work until December 1, 2017. (Compl.,fl 23-24.) Absent facts that the Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s alleged disability or any physical limitations associated with that disability, Defendants cannot be held liable for disability discrimination. Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236-37 (1997) (“An adverse employment decision cannot be made ‘because of” a disability, when the disability is not known to the employer. . . . [a] plaintiff must prove the employer had knowledge of the employee's disability when the adverse employment decision was made.”); Prilliman v. UnitedAz'r Lines, Inc., 53 Cal.App.4th 935, 950-951 (1997) (employer had an affirmative duty t6 offer other job opportunities once it knew about the employee’s disability.) Accordingly, the Court should sustain this demurrer to the second, third, and fourth causes of action for failing to state sufficient facts t0 constitute a cause 0f action. D. The Failure t0 Accommodate 0r Engage in the Interactive Process Claims Fail _ It is well-settled that under FEHA, the employee “[u]nder the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the employee must first exhaust their administrative remedy provided by the statute by filing a complaint With the Department of Fair Employment & Housing [“DFEH”] and must obtain from the [DFEH] a notice of right to sue in order to be entitled to file a civil action in court based on violations ofthe FEHA.” Romano v. Rockwell Int’l., Inc. , 14 Cal.4th 479, 492 (1996); Gov’t. Code §§ 12960, 12965(b). The scope 0f the administrative charge defines the scope of subsequent litigation, and allegations in a civil complaint outside that scope are barred due t0 failure to exhaust. Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations C0. , 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (1 995). In order to exhaust administrative remedies as to a particular unlawful act, the claimant must specify that act in the administrative complaint, even if the complaint specifies other cognizable wrongful acts. Id. The failure to comply with this requirement is a jurisdictional defect that bars any FEHA claims. Morgan, 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 63; Accardi v. Super. CL, 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 349 (1993). In other words, the failure to timely file an administrative complaint with the DFEH is grounds for dismissal of an action for violation of the FEHA. Okoli, 36 Cal.App.4th at 1612-1613. Here, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the third and fourth causes of action in the Complaint for failure t0 reasonably accommodatevand failure to engage in a 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER 1 good faith interactive process. Expanding the scope of the civil complaint is not permitted where, as 2 here, “the difference between the charge and the complaint is a matter of adding an entirely new basis 3 for the alleged discrimination.” Okoli, 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 161 5 ( 1 995); Martin v. Lockheed Missiles 4 & Space C0,, Ina, 29 Ca1.App.4th 1718, 1724 (1994). 5 Under Government Code section 12490, subdivision (m), it is an unlawful practice “to fail to 6 make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or 7 employee unless the employer demonstrates that doing so would impose an undue hardship.” Gov’t 8 Code § 12940(m). This is a separate and distinct cause 0f action from disability discrimination or 9 failure to engage in the good faith interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation. Lui 10 v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 970 (2012). 11 Similarly, the interactive process as mandated by subdivision (n) of section 12940 of the 12 Government Code is a separate duty imposed on an employer in addition to the duty to provide a 13 reasonable accommodation. Wilson v. County 0f0range, 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193 (2009). Simply 14 put, failing t0 accommodate and failing t0 engage in a good faith interactive process are separate, 15 independent causes of action. Lui, 211 Cal.App.4th at 970; Swanson v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 16 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 964, (2014), as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 23, 2014). 17 Further, while the law does not require that every allegation in a civil suit be precisely set forth 18 in the preceding DFEH charge, in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the allegations contained 19 in the charge need t0 be sufficiently similar to the civil complaint, such that the DFEH’S investigation 20 into the charge is likely to have addressed'the allegations in the civil suit. Rodriguez v. Lockheed 21 Missiles & Space Ca, 265 F.3d 890.897 (9th Cir. 2001); Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 22 1116, 1123 (1989). 23 FEHA claims in a civil suit can only be based on specific acts alleged in the DFEH complaint. 24 Here, Plaintiff‘s DFEH Complaint lacks any specific allegations regarding a request for an 25 accommodation or a failure to engage in an interactive process. In fact, Plaintiff’s DFEH charge does 26 not reference these causes of action at all. (Defendants’ RFIN, Ex. 2, “DFEH Complaint”) Therefore, 27 the Court should sustain Defendant’s demurrer as to the third and fourth causes of action for failing to 28 accommodate or engage in the interactive process without leave to amend. LIITLER MENDELSON. P.C. 8I al 74v us1e .r i255 heal Baulevard Suile 660 w"""§z°s'§°a'§i”fsam” MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. heal Inna: OO\]O\Ul-b \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 l255 hea! Bouievauj Suuuuu fl 925 932.2458 E. Plaintiff’s FEHA Causes 0f Action for Harassment and Discrimination Fail A DFEH complaint “shall set forth the particulars” of the practices alleged to have violated FEHA. Gov. Code § 12960(b). In addition, a DFEH complaint “shall . . . contain other information as may be required by the department [i.e., the DFEH].” By regulation adopted in 201 1, the DFEH states that an administrative complaint filed to obtain an immediate right-to-sue letter “shall” contain, in addition to other requirements: “(3) a description of the alleged act 0r acts 0f discrimination, harassment or retaliation; and (4) the date 0r dates each alleged act of discrimination, harassment or retaliation occurred, including the date of the last or most recent alleged act.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10005(d)(3) & (4). None 0f the allegations 0f harassment, discrimination, or retaliation in Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint satisfy these basic requirements. Rather, the DFEH complaint merely alleges in very general terms that derogatory comments were made on a constant basis, but no specific dates are alleged. More > importantly, as expressly required by the DFEH regulations, no explanation of the date of the last or most recent alleged act is set forth. This makes it impossible to establish whether the DFEH Complaint was timely filed. The operative civil Complaint appears to allege that conduct to support Plaintiff’s claim for race-based discrimination and harassment occurred in 2016 around the time of the presidential election, but no other details are provided. (Compl., 1] 19~20; DFEH Complaint.) Here, Plaintiff‘s DFEH Complaint was filed on February 12, 2019. (Compl., 1] 5; DFEH Complaint.) His last day of employment was on 0r about December 4, 2017. (Compl., 1] 24.) The limitations period begins t0 run when the adverse action occured. Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Ina, 14 Cal.4th 479, 493-494 (1996). Thus, his harassment and discrimination claims began to accrue on December 4, 2017, and expired on December 4, 201 8. Consequently, Plaintiffs claims for harassment and discrimination based on race are time barred on the face of the Complaint as Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts excusing him from complying with his administrative exhaustion requirements. Although not alleged, Plaintiff and Defendant PayActiv stipulated to a tolling agreement for 115 days from October 25, 2018, to February 12, 2019. (Greeson Decl., 1] 9.) However, even if the Court were to consider a tolling period of 1 15 days as to Defendant PayActiv, the facts alleged in the DFEH Complaint and the operative civil Complaint are not timely because there is no specific 9 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER ooqomgwm \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. Treal Tent: I255 heat Boutevam Suite 600 Walnul CIeek, CA 91597 925.932.2438 discriminatory or harassing conduct alleged t0 have occurred in the relevant period from October 25, 2017, to the date of Plaintiff’s termination on December 4, 2017. Moreover, these defects cannot be cured because Plaintiff cannot timely amend his DFEH Complaint t0 allege any harassing or discriminatory conduct falling within this relevant period against any of the named Defendants. As a result, Plaintiff‘s claims for harassment and discrimination based on race a_re barred by FEHA’S one-year statute of limitation to file an administrative complaint, and the corresponding one- year statute of limitation to file a civil claim. The Court should sustain the demurrer as to these causes of action against Defendants without leave to amend. F. The Harassment Claims Against Shah, Aslam, Anwaf & Medhekar Fail For similar reasons, the Complaint fails t0 state a cause of action for racial harassment against the individual Defendants Shah, Aslam, Anwar, and Medhekar. Plaintiff must plead and prove exhaustion of administrative remedies. Holland v. Union Pac. RR. Ca, 154 Ca‘l.App.4th 940, 946 (2007). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to filing a civil suit and failure t0 d0 so is grounds for dismissal ofthe FEHA claims. Okolz', 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (1995); Martin, 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724 (1994). The administrative complaint must be filed within one year of the date of the last Unlawful practice (Gov’t Code § 12960(d)), and the limitation period begins to run when the adverse action (i.e., termination) actually occurs. Romano, l4 Cal.4th 479, 493-494 (1996). Plaintiff was terminated on or about December 4, 2017 (Compl., 11 24; DFEH Complaint) and he filed “verified charges of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”)” on February 12, 2019. (Compl., 1] 5.) Since Plaintiff was terminated on or about December 4, 201 7, he had one year from that date to file a DFEH complaint against Defendants Shah, Aslam, Anwar, and Medhekar. Unlike PayActiV, these individual Defendants were not parties to a Telling Agreement. (Greeson Decl., 1! 9.) Thus, Plaintiff was required to file a DFEH complaint against the individual Defendants on or before December 4, 2018. Here, the DFEH Complaint was filed on 0r about February 12, 2019. Additionally, the DFEH Complaint is fatally defective as to Defendant Ajit Medhekar because he is not named. Therefore, he should be dismissed from any statutory causes of action under FEHA for failure t0 exhaust. Furthermore, the Complaint lacks any allegations of fact that would excuse Plaintiff from 10 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER £11th KOOOQQ 10 11 12 13 14 15 I6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UTTLER MENDELSON. P.C. heal Your: 1255 hes! Boulevald Suite €00 Walnut Creek. CA 9:591 9258322458 complying with his administrative exhaustion requirements as it relates to these individual Defendants. Consequently, it is evident from the face 0f the Complaint and the facts subject to judicial notice that Plaintiff failed t0 file a DFEH complaint against the individual Defendants within one year of the alleged adverse employment action. There is no conceivable way Plaintiff Can cure this defect, as the individual Defendants were not parties to any Telling Agreement, and there is no equitable basis to extend the applicable statute of limitation under the facts and circumstances here. Therefore, the Court should sustain the demurrer as to the fifth cause 0f action for race-based harassment against Defendants Shah, Aslam, Anwar, and Medhekar without leave to amend. G. Plaintiff’s Failure to Prevent Harassment of Discrimination Fails The seventh cause of action for failure to prevent racial harassment 0r race discrimination is also fatally defective. Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m), prohibits an employer from failing t0 take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination. “This provision creates a statutory tort action with the usual tort elements [duty of care to plaintiff, breach 0f duty, causation, and damages]. Veronese v. Lucasfilm Ltd, 212 Cal.App.4th 1, 28 (citing Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist, 63 Ca1.App.4th 280, 286 (l 998) and Chin et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 201 1) 1] 7.671 , p. 7-1 09.) c The DFEH Complaint does not state any “particulars” of a failure to prevent claim, nor does it describe any alleged failure to prevent or the date or dates such failure to prevent occurred, as required. Gov. Code § 12960(b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10005(d)(3) & (4). As above, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative requirements for this cause of action, and the defect in his DFEH Complaint can no longer be remedied by amendment. The demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend. H. The Eighth Cause of Action for FEHA Retaliation Fails To establish a prima facie case 0f retaliation under FEHA, Plaintiffmust first show that he: (1) engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’s action. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Ina, 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1044 (2005). Plaintiff’s DFEH Complaint does not set forth the “particulars” ofthe practices alleged to have violated FEHA. Gov’t Code § 12960(b). The DFEH Complaint provides: Complainant experienced 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER AWN \JON IO 11 12 13 14 15 16 I7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C. Treat Y 11111 Walnul Cleet. CA 94591 925 932 2458 retaliation because complainant reported 0r resisted any form of discrimination or harassment . . . and as a result was terminated . . . .” (Comp1., Ex. A, 2/12/2019 DFEH Complaint.) This statement does not satisfy the description of “the date and type of protected activity in which the complainant engaged” as required by the applicable regulations. Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2, § 10005(d)(6). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant PayActiV retaliated against him for opposing unlawful discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff claims t0 have frequently complained t0 PayActiv’s management about discrimination and harassment. (Comp1., at fl 22.) He also allegedly raised concerns about PayActiV’s discriminatory hiring practices on multiple occasions. (Id) However, the Complaint fails to allege when Plaintiff engaged in this alleged protected activity. T0 establish a prima facie case for retaliation under FEHA, plaintiff must establish a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action, with close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action. Scotch, 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1020. One cannot determine when Plaintiff’s opposition activity occurred in the DFEH Complaint or the civil Complaint. Thus, one cannot determine whether any close temporal relationship exists between the opposition activity and the adverse action to establish the causation element 0f a FEHA retaliation claim. The Complaint fails to allege facts constituting a cause 0f action for retaliation under FEHA, and this cause of action cannot be salvaged by amendment due to the underlying deficiencies in the DFEH Complaint. The Court should sustain the demurrer to this cause of action without leave t0 amend. I. The Ninth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination Fails Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is based upon the same allegations relied 0n to support his statutory claims. (Compl., 1H] 103-109.) Because Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is derivative of these statutory claims, the public policy claim either rises or falls with the statutory claims. See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Ina, 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 (1999) (where plaintiff‘s “FEHA claim fails, his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails”). Here, Plaintiff cannot state valid statutory claims against Defendants for the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the derivative cause of action for wrongful termination in Violation of public policy also fails. 12 MEMORANDUM OF POiNTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER WVQUI~§WN \O ‘ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LITILER MENDELSON. P.c. heat Ionls l255 Flea! Bcuievald Suile 60-3 Warm” Cwek. CI 94597 92$ 932.2158 J. The Tenth Cause of Action for IIED Fails l. A personnel management decision cannot support a valid IIED claim. The elements of a prima facie case 0f intentional infliction 0f emotional distress (“IIED”) are as follows: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention 0f causing, or reckless disregard 0f the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corp, 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 228-29 (2017). To be considered outrageous, the conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. California courts have held that “managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds ofhuman decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity ofsociety. Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Ca1.App.4th 55, 80 (1996). In other words, “a simple pieading 0f personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.” Id. Moreover, “[i]fpersonnel management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for discrimination.” Id. Here, the acts alleged in the eleventh cause 0f action are identical to those alleged in the first through ninth causes of action, and all concern an alleged adverse employment action. (Compl., 1] 1 10- 111.) Termination of employment is a personnel management activity insufficient to support an IIED claim, even'if improper motivation is alleged. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of IIED, and the Court should sustain Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action. 2. The Exclusive Remedy rule bars Plaintiff’s IIED cause of action. Plaintiffs tenth cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“HED”) fails because the exclusive remedy rule under California workers’ compensation law prohibits such a claim. The California Workers’ Compensation Act provides a detailed and comprehensive system of remedies for work related injuries that are the “sole and exclusive remedy” for such injuries, and are available only in proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Lab. Code §§ 3602(a), 5300. Subject to only limited exceptions, none of which are relevant here, workers’ compensation is the only remedy available to injured employees against the employer responsible for ' 13 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER UTTLER MENDELSON. P.C. I l Tower: OONONUI-b KO 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 lea I255 Iteai Soulevaw Sulle ‘ Walnul Creek. CA 925 932 2158 9459.7 injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment,” including mental injuries. Lab. Code §§ 3600-3602, 5300; Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d. 1, 16, 18 (1990). “Workers’ compensation liability, ‘in lieu of any other liability whatsoever’ will exist ‘against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out 0f and in the course of the employment.’ ” Fermino v. Fedco, Ina, 7 Cal.4th 701, 708 (1994) (emphasis added). Labor Code section 3601 provides that unless an employee’s injury is caused by a willful and unprovoked act of aggression or intoxication, the exclusive remedy for an injured employee against the employer or any other employee ofthe employer acting within the scope ofhis employment is Workers’ Compensation. Kacludz’s v. GTE Sprint Communications Corp, 806 F.Supp. 866, 870 (N.D.’ Cal. 1992) (California’s workers” compensation system provided exclusive remedy for employee’s IIED claim). The California Supreme Court has held that IIED claims related to an employee’s termination, and even for alleged whistleblower retaliation, are barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Miklosy v. The Regents of the Univ. 0f Cal, 44 Cal.4th 876, 902-03 (2008) (Act preempted plaintiff employees’ claims for IIED allegedly suffered as a result of employer’s whistleblower retaliation); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 160 (1 987) (claims are» barred by the Act “when the misconduct attributed to the employer is actions which are a normal part of the employment relationship, such as demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices”). And, an employee cannot “avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor Code by characterizing the employer’s decisions as manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotionai disturbance.” Id. Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. The only presumable basis for plaintiff” s emotional injury is the termination of his employment. Terminations, demotions, and criticism of work are all a “normal pan of the employment relationship.” Cole, 43 Cal.3d at 233. Plaintiff cannot avbid the exclusive remedy rule by alleging the emotional distress stems from an unlawful retaliation 0r a wrongful termination. Plaintiff makes n0 allegations that his emotional distress was caused by Defendants’ “willful and unprovoked aggression or intoxication.” Thus, the exclusive remedy rule bars Plaintiffs IIED claim. /// 14 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER \DOONQMAWNv-I NNNNMNNpr-ao-Ab-Av-tr-an-tp-AHH QQM-PWNMOOOONONM#WNHO 28 .JTTLER MENDELSON. 9.0. Ylea Town:l . i255 heal chflam Sane 600 Walnux Cveek. CA 9459.7 925.932.2453 K. The Eleventh Cause of Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Fails Generally, the elements 0f declaratory relief are: (1) a person interested under a written instrument (such as a deed 0r will), (2) actual controversy, and (3) request for a declaration of rights and duties. Code Civ. Proc. § 1060; Cardellz'm‘ v. Casey, 181 Cal.App.3d 389, 395 (1 986); Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmerz’ca, 21 Ca1.3d 943, 947 (1978) (“A complaint for declaratory relief is sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence 0f an actual controversy relating t0 the legal rights and duties 0f the respective parties under a written instrument and requests that these rights and duties be adjudged by the court”). Federal law is similar. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Ina, 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007). Here, there is no allegation in the Complaint of any written instrument between Plaintiff and PayActiv or any of the individual Defendants for which declaratory relief would be appropriate. (See generally, Compl.) To the extent that this cause of action seeks a declaration that PayActiV is a creditor under federal law (see Compl. 1] 121), there are n0 allegations in the Complaint of any actual controversy between PayActiv and Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action for injunctive relief is entirely derivative of his underlying claims. Further, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn, 7 Cal.App.4th 61 8, 623 (I992). Thus, the Court should sustain Defendants’ demurrer. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court sustain the Demurrer to all 0f the causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants further request that the Demurrer be sustained without leave to amend, since the defects identified claims cannot reasonably be cured. / WILLIAM HAYS EISSMAN CHAD D. GREESON LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. Attorneys for Defendants SOHAIL ASLAM, IJAZ ANWAR, AJIT MEDHEKAR, PAYACTIV, INC., AND SAFWAN SHAH Dated: September 12, 2019 4834-6324-4965! 081758. 1004 15 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER