Request Judicial NoticeCal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 20, 2019Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 6/5/2019 4:40 PM Reviewed By: L. Quach-Marcellana Case #19CV344918 Envelope: 2973293 19CV344918 Santa Clara - Civil lO ll 12 13 l4 15 l6 l7 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2. Notice 0f Pendency 0f Action, True and correct copies are attached hereto as Exhibit B-l through B-12. Original Recording (April 26, 2019 and May 1, 201 9) . 5401 Claremont Avenue, Oakland, California (#2019076979 Alameda County Official Records) B-l 118 Telles Lane, Fremont, California (#2019079598 Alameda County Official Records) B-2 10410 N. Stelling Road, Cupertino, California (#24168989 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-3 . 26 Alpine Avenue, Los Gatos, California (#24168990 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-4 7825 Lilac Court, Cupertino, California (#24168991 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-S 10191 Santa Clara AV., Cupertino, California (#24168992 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-6 and' 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. Second Recording May 20, 2019 5401 Claremont Avenue, Oakland, California (#2019093484 Alameda County Official Records) B-7 118 Telles Lane, Fremont, California (#2019093485 Alameda County Official Records) B-8 10410 N. Stelling Road, Cupertino, California (#24183363 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-9 26 Alpine Avenue, Los Gatos, California (#24183366 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-10 825 Lilac Court, Cupertino, California (#24183365 Santa Clara County Official Records) B-1 1 10191 Santa Clara Avenue, Cupertino, California (#24183364 Santa Clara County Official Records) 2 DEFENDANT DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) lO ll 12 13 l4 15 l6 l7 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3. BGJAssocz'ates v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 4th 952, reported decision. A true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit C. Dated: Jun'e 4, 2019 /i I,//v,, ; V, By: V fl, V/ Wilfiam B. Clayto , Jr.” Attorney for Def’ dant DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC 3 DEFENDANT DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) Exhibit B-1 ‘ I r,‘ \ ;/ > RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F 2019076979 04/26/2019 03:30 PH AND WHEN RECORDED 7 . figflgggLugfic‘ORDs 0F ALAHEDA COUNTY RETURN T0: RECORDING FEE: 95.“ am Ullllllill/flll!(WWII. "Hill”!!! "MI 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 ' ‘ Mountain View, California 94040 ll 3 PGS ’17 ., DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) 1 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalciclo@bwslaw.com 2 Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffi'unti@bwslaw.com 3 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 4 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 5 , Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 7 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ll 12 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL 'AS TRUSTEES OF THE 13 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE OF PENDENCY 0F ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, 17 A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 18 A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU l9 and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO . 23 AGARWAL 'AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 24 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior 25 Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hercinafier-described real property, 26 which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a 27 contractual lien on the hereinafter-described real property. 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS & MP #4347'7794-7797 Vl _ 1 _ SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001 ‘ Anomm AT uw NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS)MOUNTAIN VIEW H \DOONQUIAWN NNNNNNNNn-h-dn-t-tu-An-n-HHt-t “O‘MAWNHOOWVQMAWN-Ao 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 6: SORENSEN, LLP ' ATTODINEYS AT LAW MuuNTMN VIEW The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding is located in the City of Oakland, County of Alameda, State of California, and is more particularly described as 5401 Claremont Avenue, Oakland, CA 94618, Assessor’s Parcel Number 14-1273-16. Dated: April 26, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 3%?” Douglas WD Cnelo Brian M. A nti Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES 0F THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUSTZ, 2001 MP #4847-7794-7797 VI - 2 - 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) Exhibit B-2 RECORDED AT REQUEST OF AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN T0: 2019079598 05/01/2019 10:09 9H OFFICIRL RECORDS 0F ALHHEDR COUNTY HELISSR UILK RECORDING FEE: 95.00 lllllfllllllfl'll Ill ll Ifll‘ll Wlla Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 _ H" Mountain View, California 94040 I ma a FW DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) H Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 ‘ Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 \OOOflQM-PUJN SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA HH HO ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE OF PENDENCY 0F ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) Plaintiffs, t-At-t-t-A MANN V. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Hflt-At-A OWQQ Defendants.NO N H NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELONN AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, NN Ah.) 2001 has filed a proceeding against the abovc-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior N {II Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hercinafter-described real property, NO\ which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a Nfl contractual lien on the hereinafier-described real property. 28 BURKE, WHLIAMS 8r MP #48l4-7193-8965 vl _ 1 _ SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001“W‘ ”L” NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (us PENDENS)MOUNTAIN VIEw \u/ l The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding 2 is located in the City of Fremont, County of Alameda, State of California, ‘and is more 3 particulafly described as 118 Telles Lane, Fremont, CA 94539, Assessor’s Parcel Number 513- 4 0401-073-02. 5 6 Dated: April 30, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 7 g ag’W. ielo 9 Brian M. A ti Attorneys fo Plaintiffs 10 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO . AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 11 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED 12 AUGUST 2, 2001 13 14 15 l6 l7 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLMMS & MP #4814-7193-8955 v1 - 2 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001 Ammm Ar “w NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS)MOUNTAIN VIEw Exhibit B-3 RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN T0: Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 __._.._._.___ ___..----.... -__ __.__.-- 24168989 Re ina Rlcomendras Sagia Clara County - Clerk-Recorder 05/01/2019 12:01 PM Titles: 1 Pages: 3 Fees: 116.00 Taxes: 0 Total: 116.00 Illl W'afl‘fimlh'flh'flm-fflm fh'fiih'lrl'fl'flvh Il Ill DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) M&CJJN '\D 00 \l ON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “”sfiigpl‘ééfi'fii‘fi “ ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW L v l $0 #24168989 Page 2 ofs Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs' ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY 0F SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE 0F PENDENCY OF ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafier-described real property, which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a contractual lien on the hereinafier-described real property. MP “825-64814557 v1 _ 1 _ 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) ‘ j 7/ BC #24168989 Page 3 ofs 1 The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding 2 is located in the City of Cupertino, County of- Santa Clara, State of California, and is more 3 particularly described as 10410 N. Stelling Road, Cupertino, CA 95014, Assessor’s Parcel 4 Number 326-30-094. 5 6 Dated: April 30, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 7 8 9 . 10 QEQITIEIYS Ifcfiggltkig/SAL AND NEELo n figfifimfififi‘éSrlTEESTOfiXFED 12 AUGUST 2, 2001 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 V 23 24 25 26 27 28 Bum, WILLIAMS gr MP #48254431-7557“ - 2 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-000] ”0'1“" M “W NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS)MOUNTAIN Vltw Exhibit B-4 RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F ' fl u "- fl AND WHEN RECORDED 24168990 RETURN T°= §§2t2"%123:°c";::e;a3mermemr Douglas'W. Dal Cielo, Esq. msnms 12‘“ P” Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP Titles: 1 Pages: 3 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 seem. 115.00 Mountain View, California 94040 RE??? $16.00 Illl HJ'JH‘M'I'MF'III'H'FHI IHL‘IIJHI I'JMWFMW. ll Ill DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) OOQQUIAUJN 0 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ””s'L‘féJ‘s’éLE'QE‘S“ AnonNEIs Ar LAW MuUN'lAm Vlew > ' i/ Too #24168990 Page 2 of 3 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attomeys for Plaintifl's ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT 0F THE STATE 0F CALIFORNIA ' COUNTY 0F SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELo Case No. 19cv34491 8‘ AGARWAL As TRUSTEES 0F THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) Plaintifi‘s, V. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior Court affecting the title t0, and the right to possession of, the hereinafter-described real property, which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a contractual lien on the hereinafter-described real property. MP #4831-6774-8757 vl _ 1 .. 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) A 0 0° \l.O\ U! 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ””sfl‘fiéfiiéhf‘firé“ Arrolusvs AT LAw MOUNTAIN Vutw ,3 ' Too #24168990 Page 3 of 3 The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding is located in the City of Los Gatos, County of Santa Clara, State of California, and is more particularly described as 26 Alpine Ave., Los Gatos, CA 95030, Assessor’s Parcel Number 529- 37-042. Dated: April 30, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP Douglas W Cielo Brian M. ti Attorneys or Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 By: MP #4831-6774-8757 vl - 2 - 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) Exhibit B-5 r' \ I RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN T0: Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 f’ 72> 24168991- Regina flleomendras Santa Clara County - Clerk-Recorder 05/01/2019 12:01 PM Titles: 1 Pages: 3 Fees: 116.05 Taxes: 0 Total: 118.00 Illl HJ'JHIT‘FW h'flh WW IEMI'IH'M‘J'HJ MM I| |l| DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) \J 7/ >30 #24168991 Page 2 of 3 1 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) A E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com 2 Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 b.) Attorneys for Plaintifi‘s ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 \DWQONLIIA SUPERIOR COURT 0F THE STATE 0F CALIFORNIA 10 ' COUNTY 0F SANTA CLARA 11 12 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELo Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL As TRUSTEES 0F THE 13 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) Plaintiffs, I4 15 v. 1 6 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, 17 A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 18 A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU 19 and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO 23 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES 0F THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 24 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior 25 Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafier-described real property, 26 which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a 27 contractual lien on the hereinafier-described real property. 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS & MP ”4820'2263'7973 V1 ., 1 _ SonuNsaN, LLP 07693-000l ""°“"‘“ " “w NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (us PENDENS)Mounnm VIEW x) 300 #24168991 Page 3 of 3 1 The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding 2 is located in the City of Cupertino, County of Santa Clara, State of California, and is more 3 particularly described as 7825 Lilac Court, Cupertino, CA 95014, Assessor’s Parcel Number 4 359-03-028. 5 , 5 Dated: - April 30, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 7 8 By: DUWg'Es W. a‘kCielo 9 Brian M. A ti Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1° ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELo AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES 0F THE 11 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED 12 AUGUST 2, 2001 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS at Mp #4320-2263-7973 vl . 2 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001 ‘"°“"“‘ M “W NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (us PENDENS) MOUNTAIN VIEW Exhibit B-6 __._.--_ ___.b- RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F E4]. G-gggz AND WHEN RECORDED Regina fllcomendras Cl k R rder RETURN T0: Santa Clara County - er - 80° 05/01/2019 12:01 PM Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. nues: 1 Pages: 3 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP Feesfi 115.00 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Rig? g?tsm M°untamvlewfiahf°mla 94°40 Illlmwnmwm'wmA-mwm Inn DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pcndens) ©00NQUI-bWN'fl NNNNNNNND-Ir-I-hflp-uH-g-gflfl QQMAmNr-‘owmflmmbwwflo 28 BURKE, WlLLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP AfiORNEVS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW '/ '> 1/ \DC #24168992 Page 2 ofs Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP [503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV34491 8 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES 0F THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE 0F PENDENCY OF ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) Plaintiffs, V. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES l through 150, inclusive, Defendants. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES 0F THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior Court afi'ecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafter-described real property, which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a contractual lien on the hereinafier-described real property. MP #4825-0799-7589 vl _ 1 - 07693-000l NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) N \DOOQQMAB) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ““sfl‘iéi‘s’éfi'fii‘é“ Anomevs Ar LAw Mouunm Vlrw 7" E 7’ Eoc #24168992 Page 3 of3 The real preperty or interests in real property subject to and afl‘ected by said proceeding is located in the City of Cupertino, County of Santa Clara, State of California, and is more particularly described as 10191 Santa Clara Avenue, Cupertino, CA 95014, Assessor’s Parcel Number 326-22-036. Dated: April 30, 2019 BURKE; WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP ”aw By: / D'Buglas WI. Hal Cielo Brian M. Affi'unti Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 MP #4825-0799-7589 VI .. 2 .. 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) Exhibit B-7 \OOOQG 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BUSRJSggéLE‘QXS “ ATTORNEYS AT LAw MOUNTAIN Vle Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 \2 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Plaintiffs, V. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID PERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 19CV3449 1 8 NOTICE 0F PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) \_/’ \ RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F ' " 2019093484 05/20/2019 01 :35 PM AND WHEN RECORDED . OFFIcmL RtCORDs FQfiLAMEDn COUNTY RETURN To: "Ekéagaoliawewgéflax 98 w Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 COPY of dooument 90 be recorded Has not been compared with Original DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) \ 1 \v’ 1 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com 2 Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com ' 3 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 4 . Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 7 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 11 12 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 13 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE OF PENDENCY 0F ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, l7 A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 18 A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU 19 and DOES l through 150, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO 23 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 24 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior 25 Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession 0f, the hereinafter-described real property, 26 which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a 27 contractual lien on the hereinafter-described real property. 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS & MP #4847-7794-7797 v1 - 1 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001“W "T ”W NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS)MOUNTAIN VIEW flOer-QUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW \1 \_ The real property 0r interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding is located in the City of Oakland, County 0f Alameda, State of California, and is more particularly described as 5401 Claremont Avenue, Oakland, CA 94618, Assessor’s Parcel Number 14-1273-16. Dated: May 20, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP K’“ By: W DBnglas W. ielo Brian M. Af . 5&1? Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 MP #4847-7794~7797 v1 _ 2 .. 07693~0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) \DOONONU‘I-h 10 11 12 13 14 15 l6 17 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS S: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MnUNTAIN Vmw \«1’ PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200, Mountain View, California 94040-3270. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On Max 20, 2019, I placed with this firm at the above address for deposit with the United States Postal Service a true and correct copy of the within document(s): NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [5401 Claremont Avenue, Oakland, CA 94618 Accessor’s Parcel Number 14-1273'-16] in a sealed envelope, postage fully paid, addressed as follows: VIA CERTIFIED MAIL N0. 7018 0680 0000 4684 1344 RETUMD RECEPTREQUESTED DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS LLC 2059 Camden Ave Suite 154 San Jose, CA 95124 Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be deposited with the United States Postal Service on this date. I declare under penalty of petjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on May 20, 2019, at Mountain View, California. Helen Lee \ MP #4829-2191-5287 v1 PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL Exhibit B-8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEw Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP , 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. Case N0. 19CV344918 NOTICE 0F PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) "" 2019093485 05/20/2019 01135 PH RECORDED AT REQUEST 0F I OPEEégLufififiomgaoF nmneon COUNTY AND WHEN RECORDED NERECORDH‘. agggwa\ 98 .00 4 PGS Wmm mm IMgmmlwwum Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 dedCOPY o? decument to befecor. I Has not been compared wnth Ongmal DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) 1 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com 2 Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com 3 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP . 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 ' 4 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 7 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 11 12 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV3449] 8 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 13 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE 0F PENDENCY OF ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, 17 A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 18 A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU 19 and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO 23 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 24 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior 25 Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafter-described real property, 26 which is now pending. The purpose of this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a 27 contractual lien on the hereinafter-described real property. 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8t MP#4814-7193-8965v1 - 1 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001“mm "T “w NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) MOUNTAIN Vuzw 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW The real property or interests in real prOperty subject to and affected by said proceeding is located in the City of Fremont, County of Alameda, State of California, and is more particularly described as 118 Telles Lane, Fremont, CA 94539, Assessor’s Parcel Number 513- 0401-073-02. Dated: May 20, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP By: DoLuElas W. a1 dielo Brian M. Af unti Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 MP #4814-7193-8965 v1 .. 2 .. 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) N \OOOfiQM-RDJ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS K: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LA MOUNTAIN Vmw \V \x PROOF OF SERVICE‘BY CERTIFIED MAIL I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200, Mountain View, California 94040-3270. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On Max 20, 2019, I placed with this firm at the above address for deposit with the United States Postal Service a true and correct copy ofthe within document(s): NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [118 Telles Lane, Fremont, CA 94539 Accessor’s Parcel Number 513-0401-073-02] in a sealed envelope, postage fully paid, addressed as follows: VIA CERTIFIED MAIL N0. 7018 0680 0000 4684 1337 RETURNRECEIPTREQUESTED DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS LLC 2059 Camden Ave Suite 154 San Jose, CA 95124 Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be deposited with the United States Postal Service on this date. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed 0n May 20, 2019, at Mountain View, California. Helen L'ee MP #4829-21915287 v2 PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL Exhibit B-9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 6t SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAw MOUNTAIN VIEW Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF ,THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. Case N0. 19CV3449 1 8 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) RECORDED AT REQUEST OF AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 24183363 Reg lna fllcomendras Santa Clara Count - Clerk-Recorder 05/20/2019 01:58 N CONFORMED COPY Copy of document recorded. Has not been compared with original. DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) 1 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) ' E-mail: ddalciel‘o@bwslaw.com . 2 Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) , E~mailz baffrunti@bwslaw com 3 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP , 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 - 4 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 ARVIND K AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 7 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 11 12 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO > Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE ' 13 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, 17 A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 18 A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU 19 and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO 23 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 24 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior 25 Court affecting the title. t0, and the right t0 possession 0f, the hereinafter-described real property, 26 which is now pending. The purpose 0f this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a 27 contractual lien 0n the hereinafier-described real prOperty. 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS: MP #4825-6431-7557 v1. - 1 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001 momvs AT LAw NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) MOUNTAIN VIEW / \A/ \ 1 The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding 2 is located in the City of Cupertino, County of Santa Clara, State 0f California, and is more 3 particularly described as 10410 N. Stelling Road, Cupertino, CA 95014, Assessor’s Parcel 4 Number 326-30-094. 6 Dated: May 20, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 7 Attorneys for laintiffs 10 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL As TRUSTEES 0F THE 11 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS & MP #4825-6431-7557 v1 - 2 ~ SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001“W" “T “w NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) MOUNTAIN VIEW flm 9 10 11 12 l3 14 15 l6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIHw PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200, Mountain View, California 94040-3270. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On May 20, 2019, I placed with this firm at the above address for deposit with the United States Postal Service a true and correct copy of the within document(s): NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [10410 N. Stelling Road, Cupertino, CA 95014 Accessor’s Parcel Number 326-30-094] in a sealed envelope, postage fully paid, addressed as follows: VIA CER TIFIED MAIL No. 7018 0680 0000 4684 1306 RETURNRECEIPTREQUESTED DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS LLC 2059 Camden Ave Suite 154 San Jose, CA 95124 Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be deposited with the United States Postal Service on this date. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws ofthe State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on May 20, 2019, at Mountain View, California. Helen Le; MP #4329-2191-5237 v3 PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL Exhibit B-1O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS s: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Plaintiffs, V. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 19CV344918 NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) \/’ RECORDED AT REQUEST OF AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 , __\ ) 24183366' Re ma fllcomendras Sarfla Clara Count; - Clerk-Recorder 05/20/2019 01:58 H CONFORNED COPY C of document recorded. Hggynot been compared with original. DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) A 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20' 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B”s“§§g£éh5‘€§3 “ ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN Vle \OOONQKII \,/ Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 ' I g/ SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Case No. 19CV344918 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafter-described real property, which is now pending. The purpose of thifi proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a contractual lien on the hereinafter-descnibed real property. MP #483 l-6774-8757 v1 _ 1 .. 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B”£§:f£éh5‘€i‘§ 8‘ ATTORNEYS AT LAw MOUNTAIN Vluw \/ The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding is located in the City of Los Gatos, County 0f Santa Clara, State of California, and is more particularly described as 26 Alpine Ave., Los Gatos, CA 95030, Assessor’s Parcel Number 529- 37-042. Dated: May 20, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP By=%\Y Do‘lfglas W. D l Ci‘élo Brian M. Affrunti Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 MP #4831-6774-8757 vl .. 2 _ 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) \OOGQONUI$ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BUSE‘SEQJX‘ELNi'L‘Efig‘ r‘hmmm: AT LAW ‘\IuUNT.\IN Vu~zw J \ ; _ / PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County, California. Iam over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200, Mountain View, California 94040-3270. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On Max 20, 2019, I placed with this firm at the above address for deposit with the United States Postal Service a true and correct copy of the within document(s): NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [26 Alpine Ave., Los Gatos, CA 95030 Accessor’s Parcel Number 529-37-042] in a sealed envelope, postage fully paid, addressed as follows: VIA CER TIFIED MAIL N0. 7018 0680 0000 4684 1351 RETURNRECEIPTREQUESTED DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS LLC 2059 Camden Ave Suite 154 San Jose, CA 95124 Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be deposited With the United States Postal Service on this date. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on May 20, 2019, at Mountain View, California. Helen Lee MP #4829-2 191-5287 v4 PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL Exhibit B-11 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BUSROKSgNVZéLNE‘CXS & ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW 7) Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. Case N0. 19CV3449 1 8 NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) RECORDED AT REQUEST OF AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 \// 24183365 Regina Alcomendras Santa Clara Count - Clerk-Recorder 05/20/2019 01:58 EH CONFORMED COPY Copy of document recorded. Has not been compared with original. DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP Anomavs AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEw Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafter-described real property, which is now pending. The purpose qf this proceeding is to enforce an agreement for a contractual lien on the hereinafter-described real property. MP #4820-2263-7973 v1 _ 1 - 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) \/’ 1 The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding 2 is located in the City of Cupertino, County of Santa Clara, State of California, and is more 3 particularly described as 7825 Lilac Court, Cupertino, CA 95014, Assessor’s Parcel Number 4 359-03-028. 5 6 Dated: May 20, 2019 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 8 By: V' (x. 4 ”~" Dofigfis W. Dal dielo 9 Brian M. Affrunti Attorneys for Plaintiffs 10 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 1 1 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED 1 2 AUGUST 2, 2001 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Mpit4320-2263-7973 v1 _ 2 _ BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW 07693-0001 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL 2 3 I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County, California. I am over the age 0f eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200, Mountain View, California 94040-3270. 5 I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On Max 20, 2019, I placed 6 with this firm at the above address for deposit with the United States Postal Service a true and correct copy of the within document(s): 7 8 NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [7825 Lilac Court, Cupertino, CA 95014 9 Accessor’s Parcel Number 359-03-028] 10 in a sealed envelope, postage fully paid, addressed as follows: 1 1 VIA CERTIFIED MAIL N0. 7018 0680 0000 4684 1320 12 RETURNRECEIPTREQUESTED 1 3 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS LLC 14 2059 Camden Ave Suite 154 San Jose, CA 95124 1 5 16 Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be deposited with the 17 United States Postal Service on this date. 18 I declare under penalty of perj ury under the laws ofthe State of California that the above is true and correct. 19 20 Executed on May 20, 2019, at Mountain View, California. 21 ALLM 22 Helen Lee 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 6t SORENSEN, LLP ATToNNHVS Ar LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW MP #4829-2 191-5287 v5 PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL Exhibit B-12 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E-mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, Plaintiffs, v. DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU and DOES 1 through 150, inclusive, Defendants. Case N0. 19CV344918 NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) V/fi RECORDED AT REQUEST OF AND WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: Douglas W. Dal Cielo, Esq. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 Mountain View, California 94040 \/..4 24183364 Regina nlcomendras Santa Clara Countx - Clerk-Recorder 05/20/2019 01:58 M CONFORMED COPY Co of‘ document recorded. Hagynot been compared with original. DOCUMENT TITLE(S) NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (Lis Pendens) 1 Douglas W. Dal Cielo (SBN 157109) E~mail: ddalcielo@bwslaw.com 2 Brian M. Affrunti (SBN 227072) E-mail: baffrunti@bwslaw.com 3 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200 4 Mountain View, CA 94040-3270 Tel: 650.327.2672 Fax: 650.688.8333 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 7 AGARWAL FAMILY 'l‘RUS'l‘ DATED AUGUST 2, 2001 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 11 12 ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO Case No. 19CV344918 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE 13 AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED NOTICE 0F PENDENCY OF ACTION AUGUST 2, 2001, (LIS PENDENS) 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS, LLC, 17 A NEVADA LLC; DAVID HERRERA, APEX DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 18 A NEVADA LLC, ERIC FOGELSONG, DAN NOBLE, MICHAELA ROUSSEAU 19 and DOES l through 150, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO 23 AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 24 2001 has filed a proceeding against the above-named Defendants in Santa Ciara County Superior 25 Court affecting the title to, and the right to possession of, the hereinafter-described real property, 26 which is now pending. The purpose of this pfoceeding is to enforce an agreement for a 27 contractual lien on the hereinafter-described real,property. 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS gt MP #4825-0799-7589v1 - 1 - SORENSEN, LLP 07693-0001AW“ “L” NOTICE 0F PENDENCY 0F ACTION (LIS PENDENS) MOUNTAIN VIEW 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS «S: SORENSEN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW MOUNTAIN VIEW \j' The real property or interests in real property subject to and affected by said proceeding is located in the City of Cupertino, County 0f Santa Clara, State 0f California, and is more particularly described as 10191 Santa Clara Avenue, Cupertino, CA 95014, Assessor’s Parcel Number 326-22-036. Dated: May 20, 2019 By: BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP L/ Dodélas W. D 1C Brian M. Affr ti elo Attorneys for Plaintiffs ARVIND K. AGARWAL AND NEELO AGARWAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE AGARWAL FAM AUGUST 2, 2001 MP #4825-0799-7589 v1 - 2 .. 07693-0001 ILY TRUST DATED NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) \DOOfiQUI-b 10 11 12 13 14 15 l6 l7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BURKE, WILLIAMS 8r SORENSEN, LLP ATTuRNIiVs AT LAW MnuNrAlN VII-iw PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1503 Grant Road, Suite 200, Mountain View, California 94040-3270. I am readily familiar with this firm’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On Max 20, 2019, I placed with this firm at the above address for deposit with the United States Postal Service a true and correct copy of the within document(s): NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [10191 Santa Clara Avenue, Cupertino, CA 95014 Accessor’s Parcel Number 326-22-036] in a sealed envelope, postage fully paid, addressed as follows: VIA CERTIFIED MAIL N0. 7018 0680 0000 4684 1313 RETURNRECEIPTREQUESTED DMJ HOME SOLUTIONS LLC 2059 Camden Ave Suite 154 San Jose, CA 95124 Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be deposited with the United States Postal Service on this date. ' I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on May 20, 2019, at Mountain View, California. Kjggfi/ky Helen Lee MP [14829-2 191-5287 v6 PROOF OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL Exhibit C 952 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Ca1.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] [No. B131248. Second Dist., Div. Four. Oct. 21, 1999.] W BGJ ASSOCIATES, LLC, et a1., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; M232, LLC, Real Party in Interest. SUMMARY. \ Joint venturers brought an action against their partners for breach of oral contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and other causes for which they sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that defendants wrongfully acquired for themselves real property that was the subject of their joint venture with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ action included allegations that supported a constructive trust on the property, and they recorded a notice of lis pendens (Code Civ. Proc., § 405 et seq.). The trial court granted defendants’ motion to expunge the lis pendens on the ground that plaintiffs’ pleading did not contain a real property claim (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.31). (Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. SC055775, Stanley M. Weisberg, Judge.) The Court of Appeal denied plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandate, holding that the trial court properly expunged the lis pendens, in light of the clear judicial policy to interpret narrowly the lis pendens statute in construc- tive trust cases in order to prevent its possible abuse to coerce settlement. When a pleading combines theories of liability for monetary damages and for a constructive trust, the plaintiffs should not be able to maintain "a lis pendens. (Opinion by Vogel (C. S.), P. J., with Hastings and Curry, JJ., concurring.) - ‘ HEADNOTES Classified to California Digest 0f Official Repoxts (1) Lis Pendens § 5-Operati0n and Effect-Statutory Interpreta- tion-Legislative Intent.--The lis pendens statute (Code. Civ. Proc., § 405 ct seq.) was revised in 1992. The Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of California proposed the revision and submitted a report to the Legislature. The comments in the State Bar report were relied upon by the Legislature and indicate the legislative intent. ,u .xg '3 rt .'-:.». > EXHIBn‘ c ~ BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 953 75 Cal.App.4th 952;» 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] (2) Lis Pendens § 8.6-Expungement-Review.--A motion to expunge a lis pendens under Code Civ. Proc., § 405.31, is like a demurrer, in that it involves only a review of the adequacy of the pleading to determine if a real property claim has been pleaded to support the lis pendens and normally should not involve evidencé from either_ side. Ordinarily a reviewing court will not consider evidence, arising after the trial court ruling, involving facts open to controversy that were not placed in issue or resolved 'by the trial court. (3a-3d) Lis' Péndens §4-Proceedings to Which Doctrine Applies- (4) Real Property Claim-Application to Pleading Alleging Liability for Monetary Damages and for Constructive Trust.-In an action brought by joint venturers against their partners for breach of oral contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and other causes, for which plaintiffs sought compensatory and‘punitive damages, in which plaintiffs in- cluded allegations that supported a constructive trust on the property and accordingly recorded a notice of lis pendens (Code Civ. Proc., § 405 et seq.), .the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion to expunge the lis pendens on the ground that 'plaintiffs’ pleading did not contain a real property claim (Code Civ. Proc., §405.31). The defini- tion of “real property claim” i'n Code Civ. Proc., §405.31, which is required to support a lis pendens, neither includes nor excludes claims of constructive trust or equitable lien. When a pleading combines theories of liability for monetary damages and for a constructive trust, the plaintiffs should not be able to maintain a lis pendens, given the clear judicial policy to interpret narrowly the lis pendens statute in constructive trust cases in order to prevent its possible abuse to coerce settlement. [See 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Actions, § 372.] Lis Pendens §4+Proceedings to Which Doctrine Applies.-A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice; Its effectis that anyone acquiring an interest in the property after the action was filed will be bound by the judgment. The history of lis pendens legislation shows a legislative intent to restrict the common law notion of constructive notice. This is because of the ease with which a lis pendens can be recorded and the serious consequences flowing from it. Once a lis ‘pendens is filed, it clouds the title and effectively prevents the property’s transfer until the litigation is resolvedor the lis pendens is expunged. Accordingly, lis pendens is a provisional remedy which should be applied narrowly. A 954 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Ca1.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] (5) ' (6) lis pendens notice’may be recorded in an action which has a real property claim (Code Civ. Proc., §405.4). Case law has not provided any abstract definition of “real property claim,” but certain types of actions Clearly do or do not affect title or possession. At one extreme, a buyer’s action for specific performance of a real property purchase and sale agreement is a classic example of an action in which a lis pendens is both appropriate and necessary. At the other extreme, an action for money only, even if it relates in some way to specific real property, will not support a lis pendens. '[See Weil & Brown, Cal; Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The'Rutter Group 1999) 1111 15:27-15:44. Sec also 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) § 82123.] Lis Pendens §4-Proceedings to Which Doctrine Applies-Action Where Plaintiff Alleges Constructive Trust.--Strong policy concerns favor a restrictive application of lis pendens. Because the recording of a lis pendens places a cloud upon the title of real property until the pending action is ultimately resolved, the lis pendens procedure is susceptible to serious abuse, providing unscrupulous plaintiffs with a powerful lever to force the settlement of groundless or malicious suits. Therefore, in approaching actions in which a plaintiff alleges a con- structive trust, the courts have consistently cschewed an approach which would transform lis pendens into a money collection remedy without any of the protections of the attachment statutes. An overbroad definition of an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property would invite abuse of lis pendens. Therefore, lis pendens is not available in a fraud action seeking money damages, with addi- tional allegations urged to support the equitable remedies of a construc- tive trust or an equitable lien. Real Estate Sales § 56-Actions, Remedies, and Proceedings-Joint Venture-Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Constructive Trust.-When partners or joint venturers have agreed t0 buy a specific parcel of real property, and one partner or joint venturer, in breach of a fiduciary duty, wrongfully acquires it in his or her own name, the other partner or joint venturer may bring an action to impose a constructive trust and require the wrongdoing partner or joint venturer to convey the appro- ' priate share of the legal title. COUNSEL Greg David Derin; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow and Dana F. Gardner for Petitioners. 'BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 955 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Ca1.Rpu.2d 693 [0a. 1999] No appearance for Respondént. Hillel Chodos and Deborah Chodos for Real Party in Interest. OPINION VOGEL (C. S.), P. J.- INTRODUCTION The plaintiffs brought an action which included allegations supporting a constructive trust on a parcel of real property, and recorded a notice of ' pendency of action (lis pendens). (Code Civ. Proc., §405 et seq.)1 On the defendants’ motion the trial court expunged the lis pendens nOticc pursuant to section 405.31 on the ground that plaintiffs’ pleading does not contain a “real property claim” within the meaning of the lis pendens statute. Th9: plaintiffs have petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its,expungement of the lis pendens notice. Review by extraordinary writ is expressly provided in section 405.39. We issued an order to show cause to address an issue of continuing interest: the circum- stances under which an allegation supporting a constructive trust will sup- port a lis pendens. We conclude the trial court properly expunged the lis pendens. For purposes of the lis pendens statute, this action, against partners/joint ventur- ers, and a third party, for usurping to themselves the partnership’s/joint venture’s opportunity to purchase the disputed property, should be inter- preted as primarily for money damages even though it also includes a request to impose a constructive trust on the property. In light of the clear policy of the courts to narrowly interpret the lis pendens statute in construc- tive trust cases in order to prevent its possible abuse to coerce settlement, plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain a ’lis pendens. PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND (l) The lis pendens statute was revised in 1992. The Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of California proposed the revision and submitted a report to the Legislature. The comments in the State Bar report were relied upon by the Legislature and indicate the legislative intent. (Hunting World, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 67, 71-72 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 923]; Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1864 [37 1AlI further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 956 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct 1999] Cal.Rptr.2d 63]; Historical Note, 14 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1999 supp.) § 405, p. 149; see California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].) These comments (hereafter cited as Comment) are reproduced under the applicable sections in both Deering’s and West’s Annotated California Codes. (14 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1999 supp.) § 405.1 et seq., p. 150 et seq.; Deering’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1999 supp.) § 405.1 et seq., p. 62 et seq.) The 1992 legislative revision, however, took no position and left to future judicial development the precise issue involved here, the circumstances under which a pleading supporting a constructive trust as to real property constitutes a “real property claim” so as to justify a lis pendens. “Current law is in conflict regarding the availability of the lis pendens procedure in cases claiming a constructive trust or equitable lien. [Citations.] The defini- tion of ‘real property claim’ neither includes nor excludes claims of con- structive trust or equitable lien. Instead, the law in this area is left for judicial development.” (Comment to §‘405.4.) Section 405.4 provides, -“ ‘Real property claim’ means the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect- (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property . . . .” This section “defines the type of claim which must be pleaded to support a lis pendens. If the pleading filed by the claimant does not properly plead a real property claim, the lis pendens must be expunged upon motion under CCP 405,31.” (Com- ment to § 405.4.) , Section 405.31 provides, “In proceedings under this chapter, the court shall order thenotice expunged if the court finds that the pleading on which the 'notice is based does not contain a real property claim.” This section “concerns pleading. Prior law became confused because of failure of the I courts to distinguish between allegations (pleadings) and evidence. This section concerns judicial examination of allegations only. Judicial examina- tion of factual evidence is separately governed by CCP 405.32. [11] . . . The analysis required by this section is analogous to, but more limited than, the analysis undertaken by a court on a demurrer. Rather than analyzing whether the pleading states any claim at all, as on a general demurrer, the court must undertake the more limited analysis of whether the pleading states a real property claim.” (Comment to § 405.31.) In contrast to such demurrer-like review of whether the “pleading” states “a real property claim,” section 405.32 provides an entirely separate ground of attack in the trial court on a lis pendens notice, an evidentiary hearing on \ BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT . 9S7 75 Ca1.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] the probability the proponent will be able to establish a valid real property claim. It provides, “In proceedings under this chapter, the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not establishedvby a‘ preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” This section “expressly concerns factual merit. Provi- sion for a demurrer-like review 0f the pleading is preserved in CCP 405.31.” (Comment to § 405.32.) The present case involves only the demurrer-like review pursuant to section 405.31 of whether the pleading states a “real property claim.” (§§ 405.4, 405.31.) In the trial court, the defendants’ motion to expunge the lis pendens notice was based solely on the pleading pursuant t0 section 405.31. The defendants expressly disclaimed an evidentiary hearing on the probable validity of the real property claim pursuant to section 405.32. The parties’ moving and opposing papers addressed only the pleading. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to expunge the lis pendens notice, on the ground that the “[c]omp1aint does} not involve a real property claim.” The. plaintiffs promptly filed the present writ petition to review that order. After' receiving a preliminary opposition from the real pany in interest, we issued an order to show cause to review that order. The formal opposition subsequently filed by the real party attempts to inject new evidentiaty matter into this writ proceeding. It contends that, I “after the hearing on the motion to expunge, discovery has shown that all of the claims on which the lispendens is based are totally fictitious and without any substantive merit as a matter of law.” (Italics omitted.) It offers to this ‘ court over 450 pages of “exhibits” in opposition to the petition, consisting of papers and evidentiary exhibits in support of a motion for summary judg- ment in the trial court. Seven pages of its formal oppositiOn in this court are devoted to an' argument that, “[o]n the merits, the undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiffs are unable to prove their claims . . . as a matter of law; therefore, the lis pendens was properly expunged.” In their reply in this court, the plaintiffs object to consideration of the real 'party’s evidentiary material. They point out that the ruling under review was based solely on the pleading, and that the trial court did not consider the evidentiary matter cited by the real party, it having been produced after the ' ruling under review? - (2) We agree with plaintiffs, and shall not consider any evidentiary matter. This proceeding involves a demurrer-like review 0f the trial court’s ruling which was based solely on the pleading pursuant to section 405.31. ZThe trial coui‘t subsequently denied the real party’s motion for summary judgment. 95,8 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [0ct. 1999] Evidence extrinsic to the pleading cannot be considered on demurrer. (Ex- ecutive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 ' Cal.App.3d 496, 499 [193 Cal.Rptr. 377]; Bach v. McNelis» (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 864 [255 Cal.Rptr. 232]; Comment to § 405.30 [“A motion to expunge under CCP 405.31 . . . involves only a review of the adequacy of the pleading Iand normally should not involve evidence from either side”]; Cal. Lis Pendens Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1997) § 3.14, p. 105.) Ordinarily a reviewing Court will not consider evidence arising after the trial court ruling, involving facts open to controversy which were not placed in issue or resolved by the tn'al court. (Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1526-1527, fn. 3 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 94]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 56(c) [record on a petition for a writ of mandate involves documents submitted to the trial court supporting and opposing the ruling under review].) FACTS The pertinent facts, therefore, are those alleged in the complaint, which are assumed to be true for the'purpose of the demurrer-like ruling under section 405.31. (Comment to. § 405.31; Deane v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 292, 294, fn. 1 [210 Cal.Rptr. 406].) Plaintlfiiv. There are 'three named plaintiffs: Robert Goldman (Goldman); Jerome Janger (Janger); and BGJ Associates, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (BGJ), formed by Goldman, Janger, and defendant Maynard Brit- tan (Brittan). ' ‘ Defendants. There 'are three named defendants: M2B2, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (M2B2), formed by the officers of Budget Rent a Car of Southern California; Brittan; and Jeff Wilson (Wilson). Summary The basic theory of plaintiffs’ action is that Brittan, Goldman, and Janger formed BGJ as a joint venture to buy certain real properties jointly with M2B2, but that Brittan and M232, in breach of their fiduciary duties, together with Wilson, wrongfully acquired the properties for themselves, to the exclusion of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert multiple causes of action for breach of oral contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust, enrichment, inten- tional'and negligent interference with contractual relations, inducing breach BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 959 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] of contract, and imposition of constructive trust. As t0 most of these causes of action, plaintiffs allege that defendants acquired the properties as con- structive and involuntary trustees for plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ prayer for relief requests compensatory and punitive damages and/or orders compelling defendants to convey to BGJ and/or Goldman and Janger an interest in a described portion of the properties and possession thereof. Detailed Allegations The dispute concerns two parcels of real property which had been in- cluded among four parcels in a railroad right-of-way running along Santa Monica Boulevard i_n the City of Beverly Hills. The properties were owned by Southern Pacific Transportation Company, whose successor in interest was Union Pacific Railroad. “Parcel 1” and “Parcel 2” are west and east of the intersection of Santa Monica and Wilshire Boulevards. Wilson owns real property adjacent to Parcel 1. Brittan owns real property adjacent to portions of Parcel 1, and he had filed a lawsuit against the railroad asserting a prescriptive easement over a portion of Parcel 1. Janger was Brittan’s attorney in the lawsuit against the railroad. In 1995 and 1996 Goldman was engaged in negotiations to purchase all four parcels from the railroad. Goldman discussed with Wilson a possible joint venture to develop the easterly portion of Parcel 1 in conjunction with the Wilson property adjacent to Parcel 1, and Wilson expressed interest in such a venture. Goldman and the railroad reached agreement and opened an escrow, but the escrow failed to closevdue to the railroad’s inability to deliver the agreed title, ' In 1997 Brittan discussed with the railroad the possibility of settling his lawsuit by acquiring title to the portion of Parcel 1 over which he asserted an easement. The railroad was unwilling to sell only the portion of Parcel l in which Brittan was interested, but indicated it might be willing to sell to Brittan all of Parcels 1 and 2. Brittan’s attorney, Janger, was aware of Goldman’s prior efforts to pur- chase all four parcels, which included Parcels 1 and 2. At Janger’s sugges- tion, Brittan, Goldman, and Janger met in August 1997 to discuss a possible joint effort by Brittan aind Goldman to purchase Parcels 1 and 2. Goldman told Brittan about ‘a potential joint venture with Wilson. Goldman and Brittan agreed to explore the possibility of acquisition of Parcels 1 and 2 by Brittan and/or a group of which Brittan was a member. Janger opened negotiations with the railroad. 960 ‘ BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Ca_LRptr.2d 693 [Oct. I999] The railroad disclosed that it was also negotiating with other parties to sell Parcels 1 and 2. These included Wilson and Budget Rent a Car (Budget). Budget was interested in Parcel 2, which was adjacent to its existing car rental property. ' ' With the consent of Brittan, Goldman called Wilson to see if Wilson was interested in joining with Brittan and Goldman to acquire Parcels 1 and 2. Wilson said he and Budget were already prepared to make a joint offer. to purchase Parcels 1 and 2. But Wilson suggested that Wilson and Goldman meet with Budget to explore a possible joint effort with Budget. Wilson later indicated a disinterest in pursuing the purchase from the railroad until the railroad accomplished a “swap” of certain interests with the Beverly Hills Land Company which would enable the railroad to Convey a 98.2 percent interest in Parcels 1 and 2. About December 1, 1,997, Brittan, Goldman, and Janger agreed that Janger should join the Brittan/Goldman group as a principal, and that Brittan, Goldman, and Janger would each be one-thir'd participants in a joint effort to acquire Parcel 1 from the railroad. By December 16,’ 1997, Goldman had successfully negotiated the terms of an agreement with Budget by which Brittan, Goldman, Janger, and Budget would jointly offer to purchase Parcels 1 and 2, with the understanding that Budget would acquire Parcel 2, paying a substantially higher price per square foot than the price attributable to Parcel 1. On December 17, 1997, Budget’s principals met with “its new partners,” and on December 18 Budget advised the railroad it would be participating “with the Brittan group” to purchase the property. On January 8, 1998, the railroad indicated its willingness to enter a purchase agreement with Budget and the Brittan] Goldman/Janger group. Brittan understood that a condition of the purchase and sale was his dismissal of his lawsuit against the railroad and execution of a release, which Brittan agreed to furnish. On September 20, 1998, the railroad advised that it had executed an agreement with Beverly Hills Land Company to swap certain interests, thereby assuring the railroad’s ability to convey a 98.2 percent interest in Parcels 1 and 2 which the railroad had agreed to sell to Budget, Brittan, Goldman, and Janger. v On September 23, 1998, Brittan, Goldman, and Janger agreed among themselves to “be equal partners and proceed with the transaction.” They agreed: (A) they would form a limited liability company for the purpose of entering the purchase agreement with the railroad and with Budget; (B) each BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT _ . 961 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] ‘of them would make an initial capital contribution of $40,000, of which $104,693 would be used as a deposit in escrow for the purchase from‘ the railroad along with Budget, the balance to be used for expenses relating to “due diligence” investigation of potentials for development; (C) if the limited liability company proceeded with the purchase, .each of them would contribute one-third of the balance of the purchase price required of the limited liability company, and share equally in its profits and losses; (D) Brittan would deposit into escrow a dismissal of his lawsuit against the railroad and a release; and (E) upon acquiring title to Parcel 1, the limited liability company would deed to Brittan the‘easement rights he sought in the lawsuit against the railroad. Brittan, Goldman, and Janger agreed among themselves to work out in good faith an arrangement with Bn'ttan, who desired to obtain sol'e title to that portion of Parcel 1 adjacent to the Brittan property for a smaller price per square foot than the price per square foot for the entire Parcel 1. On; September 25, 1998, Janger “filed an LLC-l with the California Secretary of State, thereby creating BGJ.” I The officers and directors of the company which owns Budget formed defendant M2B2 for the purpose of entering with BGJ an agreement to purchase Parcels 1 and 2 from the railroad and a “closing and tenancy in common agreement.” On November 6, 1998, negotiations were completed on a purchase and sale agreement and escrow instructions relating to the sale of Parcels 1 and - 2 by the railroad to BGJ and M2B2, and the closing and tenancy in common agreement between 'BGJ and M2B2. Execution copies of these documents were sent to BGJ] - On November 9, Brittan (who had independent counsel), Goldman, and Janger orally agreed among themselves to perform all the duties and obliga- tions required of BGJ including that Brittan would deposit into escrow his dismissal of the lawsuit against the railroad and a release, each would make an immediate capital contribution of $40,000, of which $104,693 would be a deposit in escrow, and they reconfirmed their September 20 agreement. Pursuant to the November 9 oral agreement, BGJ forwarded executed copies of the purchase agreement and tenancy agreement to the railroad and to M2B2 respectively, Brittan, Goldman, and Janger made immediate capital contributions of $40,000 each, of which $104,693 was deposited in escrow, and Goldman and Janger on behalf of BGJ made further due diligence investigations. ’ The purchase agreement with the railroad provided that (A) either BGJ or M2B2 could elect to “opt out” of the purchase agreement by 5:00 p.m. on 962 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] December 21, 1998, leaving the other party with the right to purchase, Parcels 1 and 2 for its own benefit, and (B) escrow would close on December 30, 1998. Meanwhile, between November 9 and November 29, 1998, Brittan, Gold- man, and Janger discussed their o'ral operating agreement and agreed “that Goldman and Janger would proceed as the sole members of BGJ, and Brittan would be given an option to purchase certain property west of Charleville, adjoining the Brittan Property, at a favorable price.” On December 6, 1998, Goldman had a conversation with Wilson concern- ing potential development of the Wilson preperty in conjunction with the portion of Parcel 1 adjacent to the Wilson property. In that conversation Wilson opined that BGJ was paying too much for Parcel 1. On December 7, 1998, Goldman related that information to Brittan and Janger. Goldm‘an and Janger said they were having second thoughts about the purchase and might, as the majority members of BGJ, elect not to proceed with the purchase agreement when the December 21, 1998, opt-out deadline arrived. Brittan told them that if they elected not to proceed he had other potential investors who might proceed with him and would like the opportunity to discuss it with other inVestors. Goldman and Janger told Brittan that he did not have permission to negotiate, without their participation, any terms of the pur- chase agreement with the railroad or the tenancy agreement with M2B2, but that if on December 21 they elected not to proceed, and Brittan had other investors willing to go forward, they would “step aside upon reimbursement of their due diligence costs and payment for the reasonable value of Janger’s legal services.” Brittan agreed to these terms. On December 8, 1998, Janger informed M2B2’s in-house counsel that it was likely BGJ would elect not to proceed with the purchase when the December opt-out deadline arrived. M2B2’s counsel asked if M2B2/Budget could approach Brittan and Wilson about going forward with them. Janger stated that he and Goldman had no objection to such discussions, provided ' that no agreement be reached unless Goldman and Janger did, in fact, elect I on December 21 not to proceed, and that MZBZIBudget not negotiate with the railroad without Goldman’s and Janger’s participation. On December 14, 1998, Brittan advised Janger that because Janger and Goldman had, allegedly, “passed” on the purchase, Brittan intended to proceed to acquire the property without Goldman’s and Janger’s participa- tion. Janger replied that he and Goldman had not yet “passed,” that they had until December 21 to make further due diligence investigation and decide whether to proceed with the purchase. Brittan stated he had investors willing BGJ Ass'OCIATEs v. SUPERIOR COURT 963 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] to step 'into Goldman’s and Janger’s shoes, and Brittan “admitted later in that same conversation that he had, in fact, negotiated a new deal with Wilson pursuant to which Brittan would acquire the portion of Parcel 1 adjacent to the Brittan Property at a price which Goldman and Janger had not been willing to assign to that portion of the property, and Wilson would acquire the balance of Parcel 1.” Janger warned Brittan that Goldman and Janger had not yet opted out of the purchase and that Brittan should not consummate any new arrangements until Goldman and Janger made their final decision. On December 15, 1998, Goldman and Janger decided to proceed with the purchase. When Janger on that date notified Brittan, Brittan indicated he would refuse to perform his part of the November 1998 oral operating agreement with Goldman and Janger. When Janger on December 15 in- formed M2B2 of the intention to proceed with the purchase rather than to opt out on December 21,- M2B2 responded that M2B2 had already made a new deal with Brittan and Wilson. On December 16, M2B2 informed BGJ that it would “close the Purchase Agreement without the participation of BGJ.” On plaintiffs’ information and belief, 'M2B2 refused to close the transaction with BGJ because M2B2 “had entered into a new and different agreement with Brittan and Wilson pursuant to which Brittan and Wilson would contribute BGJ’s portion of the purchase price for Parcels, 1 and 2, Brittan would deposit the Release and Dismissal in escrow for the benefit of M2B2, and Brittan and Wilson would then be granted an interest in M2B2,_which would be converted into ownership of Parcel 1, or they would otherwise be deeded Parcel 1, on or after the close of escrow.” On December 23 and December 29, 1998, M2B2 notified the railroad that Brittan’s release and dismissal would be deposited into escrow only if the railroad deeded the property to M2B2 alone, to the exclusion of BGJ. BGJ did not opt out of the purchase agreement by the December 21, 1998, deadline. Subject only to Brittan’s depositing his dismissal and release into escrow, BGJ ‘was ready, willing, and able to‘close the purchase agreement and tenancy agreement by 'the December 30 closing deadline. Goldman and Janger were ready, willing, and able to perform all terms of the November oral agreement with Brittan. Despite‘Goldman’s and Janger’s demands upon him, Brittan refused to deposit his dismissal and release into escrow for the benefit of BGJ. On plaintiffs’information and belief, Brittan, Wilson, and M2B2 agreed among themselves that Brittan would refuse to deposit his dismissal and release into the escrow, thereby disabling BGJ from perform- ing its obligations under the purchase agreement; in return, upon the contri- bution of Brittan and Wilson of BGJ’s portion of the purchase price, M2B2 agreed to grant them an interest in M2B2 which would result in their ownership of Parcel 1 or' a direct interest in Parcel 1. 964 _BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] On December 23, 1998, counsel for Goldman and Janger notified the parties that Goldman and Janger were ready, willing, and able to deposit the required funds in escrow, demanded that Brittan deposit the dismissal and release, “and serv[ed] notice that anyone purporting to take title to any portion of Parcel 1 would do so as a constructive trustee for BGJ, Goldman and Janger.” On plaintiffs’ information and» belief, on or before January 11, 1999, Brittan deposited into the escrow his dismissal and release for the benefit of M232 only; title to Parcels 1 and 2 vested in M2B2; and in consideration for Brittan’s and Wilson’s contributions of BGJ’s portion of the purchase price and Brittan’s deposit of his dismissal and release, M2B2 granted Wilson and Brittan an interest either in'M2B2 or in Parcel 1. On plaintiffs’ information and belief, “BGJ’s deposit of $104,693 was credited to M2B2 against the purchase price for Parcels 1 and 2, and that the benefit of such credit was realized or will be realized by Brittan and/or4Wilson when they acquire title to some or all of Parcel 1.” ' Relief Requested in Complaint . Plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 26, 1999, and recorded a notice of pendency of actiOn, as to Parcel 1, on January 27, 1999. They alleged the following 11 causes of action and prayers for relief: First: Goldman and Janger against Brittan for breach of oral contract; for compensatory damages. . Second: Goldman-and Janger against Brittan for breach of fiduciary duty; for compensatory and punitive damages. Third: BGJ against M2B2 for breach of fiduciary duty; for compensatory and punitive damages. ' ‘ Fourth: BGJ, Goldman, and Janger against M2B2, Brittan, Wilson, and Does 1-35, for unjust enrichment; defendants “would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the benefits which they have achieved by their wrongful conduct. Consequently, said defendants hold whatever interest they may have acquired in Parcel '1, or in any entity possessing an interest in Parcel 1, as constructive and involuntary trustees for the benefit of BGJ, Goldman and ' Janger. [11] . . . Said defendants should also be required to disgorge and surrender any and all economic advantage which they have achieved by virtue of their wrongful conduct.” Fifth: Goldman and Janger against M232, Wilson, and Does 1-35 for intentional interference with contractual relations; for compensatory 'and BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIQR COURT 965 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] punitive damages and “whatever interest they have acquired in Parcel 1, or in any entity possessing-an interest in Parcel 1, as constructive and involun- tary trustees for the benéfit of Goldman and Janger” (constructive trust allegation). . Sixth: Goldman and Janger against M2B2, Wilson, and Does 1-35 for negligent interference with contractual relations; for compensatory damages and constructive trust. \ I I Seventh: BGJ against Brittan, Wilson, and Does 1-35 for intentlonal interference with contractual relations; for compensatory and punitive dam- ages and constructive trust. Eighth: BGJ. against Brittan, Wilson, and Does 1-35 for’ negligent inter- ference with contractual relations; for compensatory damages and construc- tive trust. I Ninth. Goldman and Janger against M2B2, Wilson, and Does 1- 35 for inducing breach of contract, for compensatory and punitive damages and constructive trust. V Tenth: BGJ against M2B2, Brittan, Wilson, and Does 1-50'for imposition . of a constructiVe trust; “By virtue of the agreements . it was understood and agreed that BGJ and M2B2 would proceed to acquire Parcels 1 and 2 and divide those-parcels with BGJ owning an undivided 98.2% interest in Parcel 1, and pending the division of the parcels, granting BGJ the exclusive right to control and develop Parcel 1, as between BGJ and M2B2”; as a consequence of the conduct [of defendants], “BGJ has been wrongfully deprived of the right to own, control or develop Parcel 1”; defendants “hold their interest in Parcel 1, 'and any interest which they may have acquired relating to Parcel 1, as constructive trustees for the benefit 0f BGJ.” Eleventh: Goldman and Janger3 against M2B2, Bn'ttan, Wilson, and Does 1-50 for imposition of a constructive trust; as a consequence of defendants’ conduct, “Goldman and Janger have bee'n wrongfully deprived of their right to Own or control an undivided 98.2% interest in Parcel 1 as members of BGJ and/or partners of Brittan”; defendants “hold their interest in Parcel 1, and any interest which they may have acquired relating to Parcel 1, as constructive trustees for the benefit of Goldman and Janger.” As to those causes of action which included an allegation of a constructive trust, thev prayer for relief requests “an order compelling defendants to 3Thc complaint in the 11th cause 0f action refers to “Plaintiffs Goldman and Brittan,” an obvious clerical error. ‘/’ 966 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] convey [to BGJ, or to BGJ, Goldman, and Janger, or to Goldman and Janger] their interest in Parcel 1,” and “an order granting [to BGJ, or to BGJ, Goldman, and Janger, or to Goldman and Janger] possession of Parcel 1.”4 Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (3a) Defendants moved pursuant to section 405.31 to expunge the lis pendens on the ground that the complaint did not allege a real property . claim. Defendants asserted that the allegations of the complaint do not entitle any of the plaintiffs to “legal title” or possession, and.that the action is- essentially for money damages. They cited Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 3O Cal.App.4th 1850, which holds that allegations of the equitable remedy of a constructive trust, even if colorable, will not support a lis pendens if those allegations act only as a collateral means to collect money damages. Plain- tiffs replied that unlike Lewis, the claims of wrongful conduct in' this case relate to the specific property which is the subject of the lis pendens, and that they are not seeking the property as collateral for money damages but rather, -“[p]laintiffs want the property for which they bargained.” Defendants replied that the gravamen of the action‘is for money damages, not “specific perfor- mance.”5 The trial court by minute order ruled: “[Defendants’ motion] is granted. Lewis v. Superior Court . . . is controlling. Complaint does not involve a real property claim.” DISCUSSION V Legal Background (4) As this court summarized in 'Urez Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1144-1 145 [235 Cal.Rptr. 837]: a lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice. Its effect is that anyone acquiring an interest in the property after the action was filed will_be bound by the judgment. The history of lis pendens legislation shows a legislative intent to restrict the common law notion of constructive notice. This is because of the ease with which a lis pendens can be recorded “For the purpose of the present petition for a writ of mandate, real pany M282, the only defendant responding-to the petition, admits the following allegations of the petition: the separate deal closed; M232 acquired the railroad’s 98.2 percent interest in Parcels 1 and 2 on January 11, 1999; M232 subsequently transfelred interests in Parcels l and 2 to Brittan and Wilson; M2B2 is in the process of applying for governmental approval to permanently divide Parcels 1 and 2 into three separate lots, and once this is accomplished defendants have agreed that Wilson and Brittan will be the sole owners of Parcel 1, which BGJ was to have acquired under its agreement with M2B2. . ' 5The present actionis not for specific performance, and the railroad is not a party, but for lis pendens purposes plaintiffs analogize their claim to a specific pelformance action. BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 967 V I 75 Cal.App.4th 1952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] and the serious consequences flowing from it. Once a lis pendens is filed, it clouds the title and effectively prevents the property’s transfer until the . litigation is resolved or the lis pendens is expunged. Accordingly, lis pen- dens is a provisional remedy which should be applied narrowly. A lis pendens notice may be recorded in an action which has a “real property claim,” which is defined by statute as “the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect . . . title to, or the right to possession of,‘ specific real property.” (§ 405.4.) The statute‘provides no further definition of “affect . . . title to, or the right to possession of,” specific real property, nor has case l'aw provided any abstract definition. (Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1145; Cal. Lis Pendens Practice, supra, §§ 3.15, 3.20, at pp. 105-106, 111.) Case law has determined that certain types of actions clearly do,- or clearly do not, affect title or possession. (Cal. Lis Pendens Practice, supra, §§ 3.20-3.40, at pp. 111-123; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group" 1999) 1111 15:27-15:44, pp. 15-5 to 15-9 (rev. #1 1999); 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) § 8:123, pp. 501-507;) At one extreme, “[a] buyer’s action for specific performance of a real property purchase and sale agreement is a classic example .of an action in which a lis pendens is both appropriate and necessary.” (Cal. Lis Pendens Practice, supra, § 3.21, at p. 112; Hilberg v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 539, 542 [263 Cal.Rptr. 675]; Stewart Development C0. v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 266, 272-273 [166 Cal.Rptr. 450].) At the other extreme, an action for money only, even if i_t relates in some way to specific real property, will not support a lis pendens. (Ziello v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 321, 332 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 251]; Deane v. Superior Court, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d 292, 297.) ‘ (3b) Cases in' which the plaintiff seeks a constructive trust relating to real property have been troublesome, in part because of the wide'variety of circumstances in_ which a constructive trust may be an appropriate remedy. (La Paglia v. Superior ‘Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1327 [264 Cal.Rptr. 63].) “A constructive trust is not a true trust but an equitable remedy available to a plaintiff seeking recovery of specific property in a number of widely differing situations. The cause of action is not based on the establishment of a trust, but consists Of the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or other act that entitles the plaintiff to some relief. That relief, in a proper case, may be to make the defendant a constructive trustee with a duty to transfer to the plaintiff.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Plead- ing, § 796, p. 252, italics in original.) Two early cases took the position that an action in which the plaintiff seeks a constructive trust on specific real property clearly “affects” title to or BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 969 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] means to collect money damages.’ ” ’(Id. at p. 1320, fn. 8.) In Wardley Development Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 391, a judgment debtor transferred cash to the real party in interest, who used it to purchase real property. The judgment creditor was not entitled to a lis pendens, because the creditor’s only interest in the property was as collateral to secure money damages. (Id. at pp. 394, 396.) In La Paglia v. Superior Court, supra, 215'Ca1.App,.3d 1322, funds wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff Rey’s predecessor were used to buy the property. “Rey does not claim any present right to title or possession of the property over which it seeks to impose a trust. . . . Rey claims an interest in the defendant’s property only to the extent the monies it alleges were wrongfully obtained have been invested therein.” (Id. at p. 1327.) In Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, the wrongdoer used misappropriated funds to buy the property. “The fact that someone buys property with stolen money does not make the victim the owner of that property as a matter of real property law.” (Id. at p. 1863.) (5) In rejecting Coppinger’s broad interpretation of whether a construc- tive trust “affects” real property for purposes of a lis pendens, the later cases were guided by strong policy concerns favoring a restrictive application of lis pendens. Courts have long recognized that “[b]ecause the recording of a lis pendens place[s] a cloud upon the title of real property until the pending action [is] ultimately resolved . . . , the lis pendens procedure [is] suscep- tible to serious abuse, providing unscrupulous plaintiffs with a powerful lever to force the settlement of groundless or malicious suits.” (Malcolm v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 518, 524 [174 Cal.Rptr. 694, 629 P.2d 495]; see also id. at p. 523.) In Hilberg v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 539, 542, the court stated, “We cannot ignore as judges what we know. as lawyerswthat the recording of a lis pendens is sometimes made not to prevent conveyance of property that is the subject of the lawsuit, bu’t to coerce an opponent to settle regardless of the merits. . . .” (Citation omit- ted.) “The financial pressure exerted on the property owner may be consid- erable, forcing him to settle not due to the merits of the suit but to rid himself of the cloud upon his title. The potential for abuse is obvious.” (La Paglia v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1326.) We have stated, “It must be borne in mind that the true purpose of the lis pendens statute is to provide notice of pending litigation and not to make plaintiffs secured creditors of defendants nor to provide plaintiffs with additional leverage for negotiating purposes.” (Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, _l90 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149.)” Therefore, in approaching the constructive trust cases, the courts have “consistently eschewed” an approach which would “transform [lis pendens] into a money-collection remedy without any of the protections of the attach- ment statutes.” (Lewisv. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 1864.) ‘ 970 . BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. ,1999] “Overbroad definition of ‘an action . . . affecting the title or the right of possession of real property’ would invite abuse of lis pendens.” (Burger v. Superior Court, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018.) For such reasons, we declared in Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, that lis pendens is not available in what “is essentially a fraud action seeking money damages with additional allegations urged to support the equitable remedies of a construc-, tive trust or an equitable lien.” (190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149, italics added; see also Hunting World, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 67, 73-74 [lis pendens held proper in an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance; distinguishing cases in which “. . . constructive trust or equitable lien causes of action were appended to lawsuits centering on money damages” (italics in original)].) In determining Whether the claims in the pleading affect title to or possession of specific real property the courts have not interpreted “affect” literally; they have looked instead to the substance of the dispute. The issue presented is a question of law for the appellate court’s de novo review. (Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149.) ' . Application t0 This Case (3c) The basic theory of plaintiffs’ case is that plaintiffs had a joint venture agreement with Brittan and M2B2 to buy the subject property, but Brittan and M2B2, in breach of their fiduciary duties, together with Wilson, wrongfully acquired the subject property forthemselves to the exclusion Of plaintiffs. ' (6) Where partners or joint venturers have agreed to buy a specific parcel of real property, 'and one partner Or joint venturer, in breach of a fiduciary duty, wrongfully acquires it in his‘own name, the other partner or joint venturer may bring an action to impose a constructive trust and require the wrongdoing partner or joint venturer to convey the appropriate share of the legal title. (Koyer v. Willmon (1907) 150 Cal. 785, 787-788 [90 P. 135]; Jafie v. Heficner (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 512, 516 [343 P.2d 374]; Sadugor v. Holstein (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 477, 481, 483 [18 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Assum- ing the truth of plaintiffs’ allegations, as we must in this demurrer-like context, plaintiffs may be entitled to imposition of a constructive trust requiring the defendants to convey to plaintiffs the share of the legal title plaintiffs would have acquired had not the defendants breached their duties toward plaintiffs. ' _ (3d) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a constructive trust is not determinative of whether plaintiffs may maintain a lis pendens. (Burger v. Superior Court, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018.) But this case is unlike any of the cases in BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 971 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] the line from Burger to Lewis, because here plaintiffs do not seek a construc- tive trust remedy “solely” as “collateral” for money dar'nages. In part they seek to be awarded title to the same specific real property, the property they bargained for, which is the subject of the same wrongful conduct giving rise to the constructive trust remedy in the first place. (See La Paglia v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1327, noting the distinction.) They analogize to a specific performance action, which unquestionably supports a lis pendens. They say the only difference here is'that plaintiffs were deprived of the specific property by the wrongful conduct of their own copurchasers rather than of a defaulting seller. But on the other hand, in the specific performance analogies cited by plaintiffs, the action was solely for specific performance. (Hilberg v. Supe- rior Court, supra, 215~Cal.App.3d 539, 541; Nash V. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 690, 692 [150 Cal.Rptr. 394].) Plaintiffs’ complaint has 11 causes of action. Only the 10th and 11th causes of action focus nanowly on imposition of a constructive trust. The other causes of action seek compen- satory and punitive damages on fraud and tort theories, or a combination of_ compensatory and punitive damages with imposition of a constructive trust. Plaintiffs say that at this pleading stage they are not required to elect between inconsistent remedies, and they are reserving their options. It is apparent that, depending on market conditions, or circumstances affecting the particular parcel of property, or other tactical considerations, plaintiffs may ultimately decide, if they prevail, that they prefer to be compensated by money damages rather than trans’fer of title to the property. The question presented is whether plaintiffs are entitled to maintain a lis 'pendens on the property in the meantime. We conclude that in the particular circumstances of this case they may not. Plaintiffs contend that they have pleaded one ,or more causes of action which state a real property claim within t_he meaning of section 405.4, and that the lis pendens statute makes no provision requiring them to elect remedies between alternative causes of action. We do not hold that the lis pendens statute requires an early election of remedies between monetary damages or a constructive trust. But what the Legislature has done in section 405.4 is to leave to the courts to determine in particular cases whether a claim supporting a constructive trust will justify the maintenance of a lis pendens. (Comment to §405.4 [“The definition of ‘real property claim’ neither includes nor excludes claims of constructive trust or equitable lien. Instead, the law in this area is left for judicial . development.”].) In determining this issue on a case-by-case basis,_ the courts havé been restrictive because of well-known' dangers that the lis pendens procedure can be abused to coerce a defendant to settle a claim. The courts \fl " \A /’ 972 BGJ ASSOCIATES v. SUPERIOR COURT 75 Cal.App.4th 952; 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 [Oct. 1999] have looked to the substance of the dispute to determine whether it is ' “essentially”, a fraud action seeking money damages, with constructive trust allegations “appended.” (See Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149; Hunting World, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 73-74.) In a case such asr this where the pleading combines theories 0f liability for monetary damages and for a constructive trust, we hold that plaintiffs should not be able to maintain a lis pendens. The danger is too» great that a lis pendens, which effectively renders the property unmarketable, will have the coercive effects condemned by‘ the cases. - DISPOSITION The order to show cause, having served its purpose, is discharged. The petition for a writ of mandate is denied. The parties shall bear their own costs. ' Hastings, J., and Curry, J., concurred. Petitioners’ application for review by, the Supreme Court was denied January 13, 2000.