Hearing DemurrerCal. Super. - 6th Dist.February 11, 2019SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Jane Doe et al vs Union School District et al Hearing Start Time: 9:00 AM 19CV343088 Hearing Type: Hearing: Demurrer Date 0f Hearing: 08/11/2020 Comments: Heard By: Barrett, Thang N Location: Department 21 Courtroom Reporter: Courtroom Clerk: Donna O'hara Court Interpreter: Court Investigator: Parties Present: Future Hearings: Allard, B. Robert Attorney Gilbert, Kevin Ellsworth Attorney Schumb, Christopher Ely Attorney Weatherford, Natalie L Attorney Exhibits: - Court Reporter, Sheila Pham Counsel and Court reporter ae present via court call. Before the Court is the demurrer and motion t0 strike by defendant Union School District ( District ). N0 one called t0 contest the Tentative Ruling. The tentative ruling is adopted. See below for ruling. The court will prepare the order. Before the Court is the demurrer and motion t0 strike by defendant Union School District ( District ). Factual and Procedural Background Plaintifflane Doe 2 ( Plaintiff) brings an action against District and a former teacher ( Teacher ), defendant Samuel Neipp, for damages arising from Teacher s sexual abuse 0f Plaintiff at Dartmouth Middle School, one of District s schools. Plaintiff filed a complaint against District and Teacher on February 13, 2019. On November 21, 2019, the Court consolidated Plaintiff s action with the following cases for all purposes, except trial: (1) Jane Doe v. Union School District, et al. (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case N0. 19-CV- Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 1 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER 343088); and (2) Jane Doe 1 and 2 v. Union School District, et al. (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case N0. 19-CV-348167). On December 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint ( FAC ). The proposed FAC was attached as Exhibit 1 t0 the motion. Plaintiff asked that ifthe motion was granted, the first amended complaint be deemed the operative pleading and deemed filed as 0f the date the motion was granted. According to a minute order dated January 23, 2020, Plaintiff s motion was unopposed and granted by the court (Hon. Mark H. Pierce).2 According t0 the allegations 0f the FAC, Teacher repeatedly sexually abused Plaintiff over a three-year period at her middle school, causing her severe emotional distress and injury. (FAC, 1, 3, 8-13, 15-20, & 28.) Prior t0 Teacher s abuse of Plaintiff, District personnel had notice that Teacher previously engaged in the same grooming type behavior, including sending flirtatious and sexual text messages t0 minor female students, but District failed t0 supervise Teacher t0 prevent the same grooming and abusive conduct directed at the Plaintiff. (Id. at 14.) Additionally, prior to Teacher s abuse of Plaintiff, District allegedly 2 A few clays later, a proposed order submitted by Plaintiff was rejected by the court clerk because it lacked the necessary cover sheet. On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed another proposed order. A rejection letter concerning this second proposed order was filed 0n February 13, 2020, but this rejection letter indicated that there was [n]o need to resubmit as the filing in the same envelope will be accepted by the court. T0 date, it appears n0 other action has been taken 0n the second proposed order which stands as having been filed 0n February 5, 2020. The court will process this proposed order pursuant t0 Code 0f Civil Procedure section 635 as Judge Pierce is not available at present to sign it. knew of other student and parent complaints 0f serious misconduct made against Teacher, yet District failed t0 properly and adequately investigate those complaints and failed t0 take appropriate disciplinary action against Teacher. (Id. at 48-50.) Had District properly investigated, supervised, trained, and monitored Teacher s conduct, it would have discovered Teacher was unfit t0 be employed as a teacher. (Id. at 52.) By failing t0 adequately supervise, monitor, 0r investigate, District allegedly allowed Teacher t0 continue his predatory conduct towards underage students, including Plaintiff. (|bid.) Furthermore, District allegedly engaged in a cover-up of Teacher s prior sexual abuse 0f minor, female students beginning in early 2009 and continuing during the time that Plaintiff was being abused by Teacher 0n the District campus. (Id. at 24-29.) As a result 0f District s cover-up ofTeacher s prior sexual abuse, Plaintiff was sexually abused. (|bid.) Based 0n these allegations, the FAC alleges causes 0f action for: (1) sexual abuse 0f a minor (against Teacher); (2) intentional infliction ofemotional distress (against Teacher); (3) sexual harassment (against Teacher); (4) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention (against District); (5) breach 0f mandatory duty t0 report suspected child abuse (against District); (6) negligent failure t0 warn, train, 0r educate (against District); (7) negligent supervision of a minor (against District); and (8) negligence. In addition t0 general and special damages, Plaintiff also seeks an award 0f treble damages against District under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1. Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 2 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER On May 1, 2020, District filed the instant demurrer and motion t0 strike. Plaintiff filed papers in opposition t0 both matters 0n July 29, 2020. On August 4, 2020, District filed replies in support 0f its demurrer and motion t0 strike. Discussion I. Demurrer District demurs t0 the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes 0f action, as well as Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1, 0n the ground 0f failure t0 allege sufficient facts t0 constitute a cause 0f action. (See Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) A. Legal Standard The function 0f a demurrer is t0 test the legal sufficiency 0f a pleading. (Trs. Of Capital Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621.) Consequently, [a] demurrer reaches only t0 the contents 0f the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine ofjudicial notice [citation]. (Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 349, 353; see Code Civ. Proc., 430.30, subd. (a).) It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the [ ] allegations [in the challenged pleading] 0r the accuracy with which [the plaintiff] describes the defendant s conduct. [ ] Thus, [ ] the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed t0 be true, however improbable they may be. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958, internal citations and quotations omitted.) However, while [a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] contentions, deductions 0r conclusions 0f law 0r fact. (George v. Automobile Club 0f Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.) B. Request for Treble Damages District demurs t0 Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1, arguing that the request should be dismissed because such damages are precluded under Government Code section 818. The proper procedural vehicle t0 challenge the propriety 0f a remedy is a motion t0 strike, not a demurrer. (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 384-385, disapproved 0f 0n other grounds in ZB, NA. v. Super. Ct. (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8; Kong v. City 0f Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained t0 part 0f a cause 0f action 0r t0 a particular type 0f damage 0r remedy ].) Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 3 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Here, District improperly attempts t0 challenge the propriety 0f a sought-after remedy, treble damages, by way 0f demurrer. Notably, District appears t0 recognize that its demurrer is procedurally defective as it also brings a motion to strike Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1. Accordingly, District s demurrer t0 Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 is OVERRULED. C. Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes 0f Action District argues the fourth cause 0f action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, the sixth cause 0f action for negligent failure t0 warn, train, 0r educate, and the seventh cause 0f action for negligent supervision 0f a minor fail t0 state a claim because they are duplicative or redundant 0f one another as well as the fifth cause 0f action for breach 0f mandatory duty t0 report suspected child abuse. Even assuming for the sake 0f argument that the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes 0f action are duplicative 0f each other and the fifth cause 0f action, redundancy is not a ground 0n which a demurrer may be sustained. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 890 (Blickman); see Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Los Angeles County (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1368 [indicating same]; see also Code Civ. Proc., 430.10 [setting forth the grounds for demurrer].) While some cases indicate that duplicative causes 0f action may be disregarded 0r stricken (see e.g. Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1658, Careau & C0. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App3d 1371, 1395, & Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water Dist. 0f So. California (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1370), the Sixth District Court of Appeal has held that the fact that causes 0f action are duplicative is not a ground 0n which a demurrer may be sustained (Blickman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 890). The court explained that [a] quartercentury ago the code authorized a motion t0 strike irrelevant and redundant matter from a pleading. [Citation] (Id. at p. 890, original italics.) But the parallel provision now empowers the court only t0 [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, 0r improper matter inserted in any pleading. (|bid., quoting Code Civ. Proc., 436, subd. (a).) The elimination 0f the reference t0 redundancy may have rested 0n the irreproachable rationale that it is a waste 0f time and judicial resources to entertain a motion challenging part 0f a pleading 0n the sole ground 0f repetitiveness. (See Civ. Code, 3537 [Superfluity does not vitiate. ].) (Blickman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) The court opined that redundancy is the sort 0f defect that, if it justifies any judicial intervention at all, is ordinarily dealt with most economically at trial, 0r on a dispositive motion such as summaryjudgment. (|bid.; see also Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Ca|.4th 317, 349-350 [0n a motion for summary judgment the California Supreme Court stated that where breach 0f an actual term is alleged, a separate implied covenant claim, based 0n the same breach, is superfluous ].) This Court follows the Sixth District s guidance and declines t0 sustain the demurrer 0n this basis.3 (See McCallum v. McCallum (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 308, 315 [as a practical matter, a superior court ordinarily will follow an appellate opinion emanating from its own district].) Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 4 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER District also argues the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes 0f action fail t0 state a claim because Plaintiff alleges those claims as common law claims and does not identify the particular statutory basis for those causes of action. California s Government Claims Act creates a comprehensive statutory scheme regarding governmental liability and immunity. (Tuthill v. City 0f San Buenaventura (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1089.) This scheme precludes a finding 0f liability against public entities without express statutory authorization. (|bid.) [|]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or enactment [citations], and t0 state a cause 0f action every fact essential t0 the existence 0f statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence 0f a statutory duty. [Citations.] Since the duty 0f a governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment, the statute 0r enactment claimed t0 establish the duty must at the very least be identified. (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App3d 792, 802; Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183 [ [D]irect tort liability 0f public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them t0 be liable, or at least creating some specific duty 0f care].) Here, the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes 0f action d0 not satisfy the heightened pleading standard because the claims d0 not identify the statutory basis for liability against District, a governmental entity. In the subject causes of action, Plaintiff does not cite any statute whatsoever, let alone a statute that provides for a claim 0f injury against a governmental entity. Thus, the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes 0f action fail t0 state a claim. Consequently, District s demurrer t0 the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes 0f action is SUSTAINED, with 10 days leave to amend. 3 The Court acknowledges the Fourth District has affirmed decisions by lower courts sustaining demurrers to duplicative causes 0f action. (See e.g., Palm Springs Villas || Homeowners Assn. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290, citing Award Metals, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135 (Award Metals) [finding cause of action add[ed] nothing to the complaint by way 0f fact 0r theory. ].) Yet, District does not discuss these cases, the soundness 0f their reasoning, 0r their applicability here. (See e.g., Award Metals, supra, 228 Cal.App3d at p. 1135 [holding demurrer lies t0 duplicative cause 0f action], citing Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 498 [holding trial court properly sustained demurrer without leave t0 amend t0 cause 0f action c0mbin[ing] all the preceding causes, alleging they are joint and concurrent causes 0f plaintiffs damages because it was not a recognized cause 0f action].) Accordingly, the Court will not follow these decisions. ||. Motion t0 Strike District moves to strike Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1. A. Request forJudiciaI Notice Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 5 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER In connection with her opposition, Plaintiff asks the Court t0 take judicial notice 0f various legislative materials regarding Assembly Bill N0. 218. When determining whether certain relief provided by a particular statute should be considered punitive 0r exemplary damages under Government Code section 818, a Court may properly consider legislative materials, such as legislative committee reports and analyses. (Marron v. Super. Ct. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1065 (Marron) [reviewing the Senate Rules Committee s analysis 0f a bill]; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Super. Ct. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 261, 269-270 (LA MTA) [reviewing reports by the Senate Rules Committee and the Assembly and Senate Judiciary Committees as well as arguments in favor 0f the bill before the Assembly Subcommittee 0n the Administration ofJustice]; see Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial lrr. Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1425 1426 [a court may take judicial notice 0f legislative materials indicative 0f the intent 0f the Legislature as a whole, such as legislative committee reports and analyses, and testimony 0r argument t0 either a house 0f the Legislature 0r one 0f its committees, including statements pertaining to the bill s purpose]; see also People v. Super. Ct. (Ferguson) (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1532; People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1444, fn. 6.) Thus, the Court may properly take judicial notice 0f the various legislative materials regarding Assembly Bill No. 218. Accordingly, Plaintiff s request forjudicial notice is GRANTED. B. Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, a court may strike out any irrelevant, false, 0r improper matter inserted into any pleading 0r strike out all 0r part 0f any pleading not drawn 0r filed in conformity with the laws 0f this state, a court rule, 0r an order 0f the court. (Code Civ. Proc., 436.) The grounds for a motion t0 strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters 0f which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., 437, subd. (a).) In ruling 0n a motion t0 strike, the court reads the pleading as a whole, all parts in their context, and assuming the truth 0f all weII-pleaded allegations. (See Turman v. Turning Point 0f Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63, citing Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) C. Treble Damages District argues Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1 is barred by Government Code section 818, which prohibits awards against public entities 0f punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294 or other damages imposed primarily for the sake 0f example and by way of punishing the defendant. District states Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1 allows treble damages unless such an award is prohibited by Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 6 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER another law. District contends that treble damages, by their very nature, are undeniably intended t0 punish a defendant and, therefore, barred under Government Code section 818. In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1 are, at least t0 some extent, punitive in nature. But Plaintiff asserts that treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1 are not simply and solely punitive 0r exemplary. Plaintiff argues the legislative history 0f Assembly Bill 218, which added the treble damages provision t0 Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1, demonstrates that treble damages are also needed t0 fully compensate victims of sexual assault. 1. Government Code section 818 Government Code section 818 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision 0f law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 0f the Civil Code 0r other damages imposed primarily for the sake 0f example and by way of punishing the defendant. Government Code section 818 in context means that a plaintiff who alleges injury caused by a public entity may be entitled t0 actual damages for that injury, but not punitive damages. [Citations.] [Citation] Punitive damages and compensatory damages serve different purposes. [Citations.] Compensatory damages are intended t0 redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason ofthe defendant's wrongful conduct. [Citations]. [Citation] In contrast, punitive damages operate as private fines intended t0 punish the defendant and t0 deter future wrongdoing. [Citation] In determining compensatory damages, [a] jury s assessment 0f the extent 0f a plaintiff s injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression 0f its moral condemnation. [Citations.] [Citation] Punitive damages are not compensation for loss 0r injury. [Citations.] Punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship and be proportionate t0 the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff (i.e., compensatory damages). [Citations.] Therefore, section 818 0f the Government Code, in referring t0 damages imposed primarily for the sake 0f example and by way 0f punishing the defendant contemplates punitive damages [that] are designed t0 punish the defendant rather than t0 compensate the plaintiff. Punitive damages are by definition in addition t0 actual damages and beyond the equivalent 0f harm done. [Citations.] [Citati0n.] (Marron, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1059 1060.) Compensatory damages are described in Civil Code section 3333: For the breach 0f an obligation not arising from contract, the measure 0f damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount [that] will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated 0r not. (Italics added.) Those damages compensate the victim for injury suffered. [Citation] [Citation] (Marron, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 7 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER In sum, Government Code section 818 was not intended t0 proscribe all punitive sanctions. [Citation] Rather, damages which are punitive in nature , but are not simply 0r solely punitive in that they fulfill legitimate and fully compensatory functions, have been held not t0 be punitive damages within the meaning 0f section 818 so as t0 preclude their enforcement against public entities. (LA MTA, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) 2. Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1 [O]n October 13, 2019, Assembly Bill N0. 218 (Assembly Bill 218) was signed into law. Assembly Bill 218 significantly amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Among other things, it lengthened the time within which an action for damages resulting from childhood sexual assault must be brought t0 22 years from the date the plaintiff attains the age 0f majority 0r five years from date the plaintiff discovers 0r reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury 0r illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault (Code Civ. Proc., 340.1, subd. (a)); it added a provision for recovery 0f treble damages from a defendant who is found t0 have covered up the sexual assault 0f a minor (|d., subd. (b)); and it raised t0 40 years the age for cut-off of a plaintiff s ability t0 sue third party defendants (|d., subd. (c).) (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 423.) Directly relevant here is subdivision (b), which provides: (1) In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result 0f a cover up may recover up t0 treble damages against a defendant who is found t0 have covered up the sexual assault ofa minor, unless prohibited by another law. (2) For purposes 0f this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort t0 hide evidence relating t0 childhood sexual assault. (Code Civ. Proc., 340.1, subd. (b).) The comments in the initial Assembly Committee on the Judiciary analysis of Assembly Bill 218 begin by stating: Childhood sexual abuse continues t0 ruin children s lives and continues t0 shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue t0 abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help 0f third parties who either choose not to get involved 0r actively cover-up the abuse. Whether the abuse occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, 0r a religious institution, too many children have been victims 0f abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime 0f damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state s statute 0f limitations restricts how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort t0 allow more victims 0f childhood sexual assault t0 be compensated for their injuries and, t0 help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 3 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER this bill extends the civil statute 0f limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives old claims for three years, and eliminates existing limitations for claims against public institutions. This bill applies equally t0 abuse occurring at public and private schools and applies t0 all local public entities. Lastly, the bill allows a victim 0f childhood sexual abuse t0 recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant 0f a prior sexual assault of a minor. (Assem. Com. 0n Judiciary, Analysis 0f Assem. Bill N0. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), March 8, 2019.) The comments continue by noting that the bill author wrote the following in support of the bill: AB 218 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports league, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault 0f additional children. The bill would allow for recovery 0f up t0 treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both t0 compensate victims who never should have been victims and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought t0 light and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen t0 protect the perpetrators 0f sexual assault over the victims. (Assem. Com. 0n Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), March 8, 2019.) The comments in the analysis further state that: The bill also exposes those who cover up the sexual abuse 0f children t0 additional punishment. In addition t0 extending the statute 0f limitations for childhood sexual assault, reviving old claims, and removing the protections 0f the GTCA from local public entities, this bill allows a victim 0f childhood sexual assault t0 recover tremble [(sic)] damages against a defendant if the victim s assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant 0f a prior sexual assault 0f a minor. For example, if the defendant moved a perpetrator t0 another location without notifying authorities 0r gave the defendant a positive job recommendation without disclosing the sexual assault accusations, and the victim was assaulted as a result, the victim could recover treble damages. The victim would, 0f course, first have t0 prove the case. (Assem. Com. 0n Judiciary, Analysis 0f Assem. Bill N0. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. 5e55,), March 8, 2019.) The comments then reviewed the arguments in support and in opposition t0 Assembly Bill 218. Amongst the arguments in support 0f the bill were arguments by the National Association 0f Social Workers, California Chapter ( NASW ). The NASW asserted that: [C]urrent law imposes restrictive limits on the survivors of sexual assault and does not provide an effective deterrent 0r sufficient remedy against those who Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 9 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER covered up sexual assaults, allowing for more children t0 be victimized. NASW supports the bill expansion 0f access t0 justice for victims 0f childhood sexual assault by removing the current time limits placed 0n victims, while increasing the amount of damages a victim may recover from those who sought to cover up the abuse. We urge you t0 help victims 0f childhood sexual assault hold their abusers accountable for their despicable past acts. Thereafter, a Senate Committee 0n Appropriations report noted that the treble damages provision would be amended t0 permit a victim t0 receive up to treble damages if it is proven that the cover up resulted in the assault unless it is prohibited by another law. (Sen. Com. 0n Appropriations, Rep. 0n Assem. Bill N0. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) August 30, 2019.) 3. Analysis Here, the language 0f the statute itself as well as the legislative history indicate that the treble damages are not simply 0r solely punitive because they also fulfill legitimate and fully compensatory functions. As explained above, Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (b)(l) ) permits recovery 0f up t0 treble damages against a defendant who is found t0 have covered up the sexual assault 0f a minor by a person who is sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result 0f a cover up, unless such recovery is otherwise prohibited by law. Thus, the statute makes awards of treble damages available only t0 injured parties and measures the award by a multiple 0f the injury actually proved. (See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. (1977) 429 U.S. 477, 485 486 [ Section 4 is in essence a remedial provision. It provides treble damages to (a)ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 0f anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . Of course, treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed. [Citations.] It nevertheless is true that the trebIe-damages provision, which makes awards available only t0 injured parties, and measures the awards by a multiple 0f the injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy. ].) Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that the purpose 0f Assembly Bill 218 was t0 allow more victims 0f childhood sexual assault t0 be compensated for their injuries and[] t0 help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse . (Assem. Com. 0n Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill N0. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), March 8, 2019.) In particular, the bill s author stated that the recovery 0f up t0 treble damages was clearly needed both t0 compensate victims who never should have been victims and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen t0 protect the perpetrators 0f sexual assault over the victims. (|bid.; see Carter v. California Dept. 0f Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Ca|.4th 914, 928 [ Where an author s statements appear to be part of the debate 0n the legislation and were communicated to other legislators, we can regard them as evidence 0f legislative intent. ].) The foregoing demonstrates that the treble damages are, at least in part, remedial in nature and intended t0 more fully compensate victims 0f sexual assault. (See Marron, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1062 1063 [enhanced damages imposed t0 more fully compensate a party are not punitive damages under Government Code section 818]; see also State Dept. 0f Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 10 0f 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Corrections v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 5 Ca|.3d 885, 891 [because the enhanced damages awarded for willful misconduct 0f the employer contemplated more fully compensating the plaintiff for an industrial injury rather than penalizing the employer, the award did not violate Government Code section 818]; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Ca|.3d 30, 37 39 [ [T]he damage resulting from the deposit 0f oil in state waters is by its very nature unquantifiable. The harm caused not only t0 the waters themselves but t0 the wildlife and marine life dependent upon them as well as its pervasive and continued effect defies a general assessment 0f damages t0 say nothing 0f their calculation in terms 0f money. Thus the moneys collected civilly pursuant t0 section 13350, subdivision (a) (3), operate t0 more fully compensate the people of this state and are not beyond an amount equivalent t0 the harm clone. ].) Therefore, Plaintiff s request for treble damages is not barred by Government Code section 818. 4. Conclusion For these reasons, District s motion t0 strike Plaintiff s request for treble damages under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 340.1 is DENIED. Printed: 8/11/2020 08/11/2020 Hearing: Demurrer r 19CV343088 Page 11 0f 11
