Notice Entry of OrderCal. Super. - 6th Dist.May 24, 201818CV328673 Santa Clara - Civil System System CIV-1 30 A‘I'I'ORNEY 0R PARTY WITHOUT ATrORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): T Y Elspeth V. Hansen (SBN 29 1 2 1 93) E'egtm"wéfig mg“ f CA‘Mayer Brown LLP y uper'or °u ° ’ Two Palo Alto Square, Suite 300, 3000 El Camino Real county 0f santa Clara, Palo Alto, CA 94306 0n 10/30/2019 2:04 PM TELEPHONE No; (650) 33 1_2000 FAx Mo (Optionau:(650) 331_2060 Reviewed By; System Systen E-MA'L ADDRESS (OP'i°"B’)-' EHansen@mayerbrown.com Case #1 8CV328673 ATTORNEY FOR (Name):Abbott Laboratories; St. Jude Medical. LLC: Terumo Medical Corp. Envelope: 35881 07 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa Clara STREET ADDRESS: 191 North First Street MAILING ADDRESS: 191 North First Street CITYANDZIP CODE: San Jose, CA 951 13 BRANCH NAME Downtown Courthouse - Civil Division PLA'NT'FF’PET'T'ONER: Lawrence and Elena Hasha DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Arash Padidar, et a1. 3 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT CASE NUMBER= OR ORDER 18-cv-328673 (Check one): UNLIMITED CASE E LIMITED CASE (Amount demanded (Amount demanded was exceeded $25,000) $25,000 or less) TO ALL PARTIES : 1. A judgment, decree. or order was entered in this action on (date): October 10, 2019 2, A copy of the judgment. decree, or order is attached to this notice. Date: 10/30/20 1 9 Elspeth V. Hansen ’W VW/ I(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF I V I ATTORNEY I I PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY) (SIGmTURE) Fig.1 of 2 Form Approved for Opliunal Use www.caurflnfcvca gov Judicial Council o'camomia NOTICE 0F ENTRY 0F JUDGMENT 0R ORDER ClV-130 [New January 1. 2010] p-A NNNNN'NNNNHwH'~HH~e-HH ooqcxmh-wtoh-toxoooxloxmdxwmr-o \O'ooql-oxLAAwN i L E OCT I 0 2019 SUPERIOR COURT 0F CALIFORNIA ' COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA LEAWRENCE HASHA, et~al., . ' - Case N0. 18-CV-328673 Plaintiffs, . , . ORDER RE: MOTION T0 QUASH W' _ V _ AND DEMURRER ' AgaASH PADIDAR, ct a1., Defendants, The following matters came on for hearing before the Honorable Mark H. Pierce on September 26, 2019, at 9:00 am. in Department 2: (1) the motion by defendant Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) to quash service of summons; and (2) the demurrer by defendants I Terumo Medical Corporation (“Terumo”), St. Jude Medical LLC, St. Jude Medical, Inc., and Aliobott to the third cause of action of the second amended complaint (“SAC”) of plaintiffs- LaEWLvrence Hasha (“Lawrence”) and Elena Hasha (collectiVely, “P1aintiffs”).1 The matters having beien submitted, the Court finds and orders as follows: l 1 At times, the Court refers to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (20(0) 81 Cal“App4th 1131, 1136, fi1. 1.) 1 ORDER RB: MOTION TO QUASH AND DEMURRER NNNNNNNNNr-An-AHr-tr-In-tp-ar-xmr-t H \OOOQQUI-hUJN A |__1 Factual and Procedural Background This action arises but of interventional radiology procedures performed on Lawrence by. zarious doctors over the course oftwo days in March 201 7. (SAC, 1H} FR-2, FR_-5, IT-l, & GN- L) Plaintiffs allege that they did'not consent to the procedures, they were misled as t0 who would conduct the procedures, and the doctors failed to adequately treat and obtain care for gawrence. (Id. at 1H] FR-2, FR-3, FR-4, IT-l, & GN-l .) As a result, Plaintiffs suffered injuries. (Id. atW 11, FR-6, IT-l, & GN-l.) Plaintiffs further allege that they were injured by defective. A Angio-Seal devices that werel'used in the procedures. (Id. at 1H} Prod. L-l-‘Prod. L-7.) Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC against numerous diefendants, including Abbott, Terumo, St. Jude Medical LLC, and St. Jude Medical; Inc. Elzollectively, “DefendantS”), alleging causés of actidn for: (1) fraud; (2) ‘Violation ofthe - onsumers Legal Remedies Act; (3) products liability; (4) battery; (5) breach of fiduciary duty;C 66) general negligence; (7) elder abuse and neglect; (8) general negligence; and (9) general ne gligence. ‘On May 29, 2019, Abbott filed the instant motion to quash service ofSummons. That séffne day, Defendants .filed the pending demurrer. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the demurrer on September 13, 2019. On September 19, 2019,'Defendants filed a reply in support of their _ demurrer. . . Discussion I. Motion to Quash Abbott moves to quash service of summons on the ground that this Court does not have , I personal jurisdiction over it, an Illinois corporation. (See Code Civ.‘ ProcL, § 418.10, subd. ‘ (a)(l).) A. Legal Standard California courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not. inConsistént With the Constitution of this state or ofthe United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410. 10.) “The federal C0 nstitutio'n permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ifthe defendant has' sufficient _‘minimum contacts’ with the forum such that ‘maintenance of the suit does not . 2 I ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH AND DEMURRER H N ‘ N N N N N N N N H 1-t n-t I-I r-I p-d r- p-I p-A p-u 00 \l O\ LII -P DJ N H O \O GO Q O\ (J‘I -b U.) N F“ O \OQOQ'QMAUJN C) ffend “traditional notions of fair play and substantiai justice.” [Citations.]’ ” (DVL Inc, v. Super. CL (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1089-1090, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) The “minimum contacts" doctrine embraces two types ofpersonal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. (Vans Companies, Inc. v. Seabesz‘ Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 l Cal‘.4th 434, 445.) General jurisdiction exists Where the defendant’s contacts in the forum are so n o substantial, continuoUs and systematié” that there need not be any relationship between the lleged causes ofaction and the defendant’s relationship to the forum. (Ibid.) Specific ----a: ‘urisdiction‘‘results when the defendant’ s contacts with the forum state, though not enough toh- sfubject the defendant to the general jurisdiction ofthe forum, are sufficient to subject the (iiefendant to suit in the forum on a cause of action related to or arising out of those Contacts.” (iSonora Diamond Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 536.) > A defendant may move to quash service of the summons on the, ground the court lacks fiersonal jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(I).) When a defendant challenges Qarsonal jurisdiction by filing a motion to quash,-the plaintiff opposing the motion has the initial burden 0fproving, by a preponderance .of the evidence, the factual bases justifying the exerbise cgfjurisdiction. (ViaVz’ew, Inc. v. Retzlajj’(2016) 1~ICall.App.5th 198, 209-210; BBA AViatz'on PLC 11:. Supef. Ct. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 421, 428-429 (BBA).) “The plaintiffmust do more than nilerely allege jurisdictional facts; plaintiffmust provide affidavits and other authenticated documents demonstrating competent evidence ofjurisdictional facts. [Citation.]” (BBA, supra, p-n 90 Call.App.4th at pp. 428-429; Strasner v. Touchgtone Wireless Repair &.Logistz°cs, LP (2016) 5‘ Cal.App.5th 215, 221-222 [“The plaintiff must provide Specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or Ivague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts; [Citation.]”].) “If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case that the' egxercise ofjurisdiction would be unreasonable. [Citation]” (BBA, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 429; Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1054, 1062.) 3 ORDER RE: MOTION To QUASH AND DEMURRER \OOOQQUI-PDJNh-t N [\J N N N N N l\) N v-I r-A p-A n-t r-t b-I r-i‘H H I-n OO N ON kit A UJ-N H O \O OO Q O\ U1 -b U.) NJ‘ O B; Merits of the Motion Here, Piaintiffs did not file any opposition to the motion. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to meet their initial burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual bases justifying the exercise ofjurisdiction over Abbott. - I I Accordingly, Abbdtf’s motion t0 quash service 0f summons is GRANTED. II. Demurrer ' Deféndants demur to the third cause of action of the SAC on the grounds of uncertainty Lnd failure to allege facts Sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See Code CiV. ProC., 430.10; subds (e) & (f).) “1 A. Request for Judiéial thice ' Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice bf matters reflected in: (1) the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) premarket approval (“PMA”) database listihg for the Angio-Seal device; (2) the FDA PMA approval listing database listing for changes to the Angio-Seal device; (3) documents filed With the United States Securities and Exchange Commission; and (4) a press release issued by Terumo. Defendants assert that matters reflected. in the FDA PMA database listings for the Angio-Seal device and the documents filed with the United States securities and iExchange Commission are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sectiOn 452, subdivisions I . (c) and (h).‘De'fendants contend that the press release issued by Terumo is judicially noticeable finder Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). I . | The FDA PMA database listings for the Angio-Seal device are proper subj ects ofjudicial otice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) as the FDA-‘s approval of the Angio-1'1 _ ESeal device, and changes thereto, constitute official acts. (See Pe0ple v, Mbrales (2018) 25 :Cal.App.5th 502, 5 12, fn. 7 [taking judicial notice ofmaterials 'on‘an official government Website, which discussed official acts].) I The documents filed With the United States Securities and Exchange Commission are not roper subjects ofjfidicially notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (é) and (h). ' H L) First, Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) only authorizes a court to take judicial Hnotice of “[o]fficia1 acts ofthe legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United 4 I I ’ - ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH AND DEMURRER \DOO‘QQU‘t-PUJNr-t oosloxm.->mNHo-\ooo\r0\u1.hwwk--o k ,tates and of any state of the United States.” Under this subdivision, a court may take judicial fi rn Lotice of officiai correspondence and documents prepared by agencies and officials. (Field v."S ?owen (201 1) 199 Cal.App.4th 346, 370, fn. 5.) In contraét, information and documents prepared y private parties and on file with a state agency are not subject to judicial notice as official acts. People v. Thacker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 594, 596-599; accord Hughes v. Blue Cross ofN. w-m-'--A---~rr'-mh.. ?al. (1989) 215 Ca1.App.3d 832, 856, fn. 2 (Hughes).) Thus', the documents filed with the United tates Securities and Exchange Commission cannot be judicially noticed under Evidence Code ection 452, subdivision (c). I Second, Evidence'Co'de section 452, subdivision (h) authorizes judicial notice of “[flacts d propositions that are not reasonably subj ect to dispute and are capable of immediate and --- ‘~---------~m--rn-- accurate determination by resort t0 sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” “These 1 elude, for example, facts Which are Widely accepted as established by experts and specialists in ’ 3 e natural, physical, and social sciences which can be verified by reference to treatises, :ncyclopedias, almanacs and the like or by persons learned in the subject matter.” (Gould v.fh MarylandSound Industries, Inc. "(1995) 31 Ca1.App.4th 1137, 1145; accord Hughes, supra, 215 .a1.App.3d at p.856, fn. 2.) ' n: ' The documents filed with the United States Secuiities and Exchange Commission do not )-k T11 Within this subdivision as a general matter or under the particular circumstances presented hfre. The mere fact that the filings, and their contents, are publicly available on websites does ITt demonstrate that they are not reasonably subject to dispute. (See Huiz‘t v. Southern Cal. Gas 0. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1604, fn. 10 (Haiti) [a court‘hmay not rely on the mere fact ' i formation is published on a website for the proposition that the information is not reasonably Thubject to dispute].) While 'it might be appropriate in some circumstances to take judicial notice fthe existence of a website itself, the same is not true of its factual content especially since mo r-IDefendants do not establish that the contents of the filings are not reasonably subject to dispute Lnd are capable 0f immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonablym ‘0 disputable accuracy. (See Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. oquualz'zatz’on ‘ (2008) I60 Ca1.App.4th 5 14, 5 19 [declining to take judicial notice of materials contained on'the 5 ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH AND DEMURRER H N N N N N N N N N I-‘ H 1-A p-A r-l H r-I n-t p-A n-I \oooqoxmAwJQ A f I t g . [Website pages ofthe American Coal Foundation and the U.S. Department ofEnergy]; sée also )uronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717,‘ 737 [declining to take judicial notice 0f general information on “Nurse Practitioner Practice” posted oh the California Board of Registered Nursing website].) Thus, the documents filed with the United States Securmes and Exchange Commission cannot be judicially noticed under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). For the same reasons, the press release issued by Terumo is not a proper subject of ‘ udicial notice under Evidence Code seétion 452, subdivision (h). (See Huitz‘, supra, 188 “a1 App.4th at p. 1604, fn. 10 [a court may'not rely on the mere fact information is published on a website for the proposition that the information is not reasonably subject t0 dispute].) Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. The request is DENIED as to the dbcuments filed With the United States Seéurities and Exchange Commission and the press release issued'by Terumo. The request is GRANTED as to the FDA PMA database listings for the Angio-Seal device. B. Legal Standard QonseqUCntly, The fimction of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency 6fa pleading. (Trs. OfCapz'z‘al Wholesale Elec.‘ Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) .221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621 .) (CC [a] demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as niay be considered under the doctrine ofjudicial notice’ [citation].” (Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. S}iate (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d‘349, 353; see Code Civ. Pro.c;, § 43 0.30, subd._ (a).) “ ‘It is not the orédinary function ofa demurrer to test the truth of the .;.-allegations [in the challenged pleading] . orl the accuracy with Which [the plaintiff] describes the defendant’s conduct. ..’ [Citation] ’ Thus, ‘the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may ber. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.-App.4t‘h 949, 958.) Hgwever, while “[a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] comentions, deductions or conclusions of law or fact.” (George v. Automobile Club ofSouthem Cflzhfomz’a (201 1) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.) 6 ORDER RE: MOTION To QUASH AND DEMURRER \OOOQQMADJNr-s IN N N N N N N N N I-l )-~ v-I :- h-t n-a r-I 1-: |- o-I C. Merits of the Demurrer ' As a preliminary matter, given the Court’s ruling On Abbott’s motion t0 quash service of summons, the demurrer to the third cause of action is MOOT to the extent it is brought by Abbott. Next, the Couxt turns to the merits ofthe demurrer to the extent it is brought by the Lmaining Defendants, Terumo, St. Jude Medical LLC, and St. Jude Medical, Inc. In the third cause of action for products liability, Plaintiffs allege they were injured on of about March 7 through 9, 201 7, by three Angio-Seal devices. (Complaint,W Prod. L-l &'Prod.. L- 7.) Each of the Angio-Seal devices bore a St. Jude Medical label and reference number. (Id. at 1] JProd. L~l .) The products were allegedly defective when they left Defendants’ control, and each "UO‘O‘ 0f the Defendants knew the products would be purchased and used Without inspection for defect. (12d. at 1] Prod.‘ L-2.) At the time of injury, the products were being used in the manner intended Defendants. (Ibid) Plaintiffs were allegedly purchasers of the products, users Qfthe products, standers to the use of the product, and “[the] Patient in whom product was deployed.” (Id. at 1}__._._%_._- ..§<........_ . 3d. L-3.) Plaintiffs allege that their injuries were the proximate result ofthe strict liability of ._ . .._.__|:S thé‘ Defendants who distributed, “manufactured[,] _or assembled the product[s].” (Id. at 1H} Prod. L-4 & Prod. L-7.) Plaintiffs further allege that their injuries were the prOXimate resfilt 0f the negligence of Defendants, who owed them a duty. (Id. at ‘fl Prod. L-S.) Lastly; Plaintiffs allege that their injuries were the proximate result of a breach of express and implied warranties by D :Lcudants. (Id. at 1] Prod. L-6.) Terumo, St. Jude Medical LLC, and St. Jude Medical, Inc. argue, among other things, that the third cause of action fails because its allegations are uncertain and Plaintiffs do not plead P sufficient facts to support their theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. i This argument is welI-taken. With respect to Plaintiffs’ strict liability theory, Plaintiffs do neg} plead adequate facts regarding the nature ofthe defect and, consequently, it is unclear Whiether Plaintiffs are alleging a design defect, a manufacturing defect, 0r 'both. (See County of Saiia ta Clara v. Super. Ct. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 126 [the pleading must contain sufficient a171 icularity and precision to acquaint the defendants with, the nature, source and extent of the l . i i 7 . ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH AND DEMURRER \DOOQONLh-PUJNH [\J N N N [\J N N [\J N i-A.H H In-A I-A w-l )-A p-A b-A n-A OOflQM-FWNHOCOOQQM-PUJNF-‘O .-O .__.._.<.___._-. .._........ u ...__._... ..__ .__..|-d. I l l, I? 0' ause of action]; see also Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Ca1.4th 465, 479 (Merrill) [a laintiffmay base a products liability claim on a defect in either the design or manufacture of a filaroduct].) Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege that their injuries were caused by the alleged iefect in the Angio-Seal devices; instead, they merely allege‘ they were injured by the defective Iliaroducts. (See Milwaukee Electric Tool'Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1993) 1'5 Ca1.App.4th 547, 559 [a laihtiffmust plead that he or she was injured as a result of .a defect in the product]; see also "Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 347 [the plaintiff‘s injury must have been caused by defect in the product].) Regarding Plaintiffs’ negligence theory, Plaintiffs fail to allege that .the alleged defect 1n , | l am E t1:1e Angio--Seal devices was due to Defendants’ negligence; rather, Plaintiff’s merely allege that eir injuries were caused by Defendants’ negligence. (See Merrill, supra, 26 Ca1.4th at p. 479 [‘g‘Under a negligence theory, a plaintiffmust also prove ‘an additional element, namely, that the dE feet 1n the product was due to negligence of the defendant. ’ ”] .) Finally, with respect to Plaintiffs’ breach ofwarranty theory, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts 1'6 Sh;Q‘ is 1i C is a1. 'hfi A slflowing that they were in privity With Defendants or that some exception-to the general rule guiring privity in an action for breach of expresslor implied warranty applies. (See Burr 'v. erwin Williams C0. (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 682, 695-696 [the general rule is that privity of c(pntract required in an action for breach of either express or implied warranty]; accord Blanca v. Bg‘xter Healthcare Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1039, 10584059.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue their allegations are sufficient to state a claim for products [bility,:_jhig1flighting the fact that they used a Judicial. Council form complaint. But Judicial Juncil form complaints are not invulnerable to demurrer, and in some cases, such as this, more required. (See Esparéa v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (201-6) 3 Ca1.App.5Ith 547, 555; see :3 People ex rel.-Depz‘. ofvTransporz‘atz'on v. Super. Ct. (1992) 5 Ca1.App.4th 1480, 1484)n 8 ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH AND DEMURRER H \oooqoxufihmw NN'MNNNM‘NNHH~_HHHHH'HH ooxloxmAmNJ-«oxoooqoxmhmmkao ~a- V g___._ Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 90 days’ [edica1, Inc. ctober , 2019 057 10 2mg -ave to amend, to the extent it is brought by Terunio, St. Jude Medical LLC,» and St. Jude Mark H. Pierce V Judge ofthe Superior Court 9 ORDER RE: MOTION To QUASH AND DEMURRER ClV-130 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Lawrence and Elena Hasha CASE NUMBER?- 1 8-cv-328673 DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Arash Padidar, et al. PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER (NOTE: You cannot serve the Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order Ifyou are a party In the action. The person who served the notice must complete thls proof of service.) 1 . | am at least 18 years old and not a party to this actlon. | am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took place. and my residence or business address is (specify): Mayer Brown LLP Two Palo Alto S uare, Suite 300, 3000 El Camino Real Palo Alto, CA 94 06 - 2. | served a copy of the Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order by enclosing it in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid and (check one): a deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service. b. placed the sealed envelope for collection and proceSsing for mailing. following this business's usual practices. with which | am readily familiar. On the same day correspondence is placed for collection and mailing. it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service. 3. The Notice of Entry of Judgment or Orderwas mailed: a. on (date): 10/30/2019 b. from (city and state): PaIO Alto, CA 94306 4. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows: a. Name of person served: c. Name of erson served: Stephen Kent Rose Josepfi S. Picchi/Aaron T. Schultz Street address: Post Office Box 29393 Street address: 2300 Contra Costa Blvd. Ste. 350 City: San Francisco City: Pleasant Hill State and zip code: CA 94129 State and zip code: CA 94523 b. Name of person served: d. Name of person served: Bradford J. Hinshaw Jonquil L. Whitehead, Esq. Street address: 12901 Saratoga Avenue Street address:11‘| N. Market Street, Ste. 300 City: Saratoga City: San Jose State and zip code: CA 95070 State and zip code: CA 951 13 Names and addresses of additional persons served are attached. (You may use form POS-030(P).) 5. Number of pages attached 1 l declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: 10/30/2019 Mary Hasegawa ’ W #MWA (TYPE 0R PRINT NAME 0F DECLARANT) I JATURE 0F DECLANKNT) Page 2 of 2 C'V-WDINEWJanuaw 1- 2°10! NOTICE 0F ENTRY 0F JUDGMENT 0R ORDER Names and addresses of additional persons served: e. Name of person served: James Zenere 1033 Willow Street San Jose, CA 95125 N m and addresses of additional persons served: e. Name of person served: James Zenere 1033 Willow Street San Jose, CA 95 125