Minute Order

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.May 11, 2018

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER J. Cyril Johnson Family Limited Partnership vs CITY OF Hearing Start Time; 9:00 AM MOU NTAIN VIEW et al 18CV328188 Hearing Type: Hearing: Demurrer Date of Hearing: 12/13/2018 Comments: Heard By: Zayner, Theodore C Location: Department 6 Cou rtroom Reporter: Reporter Pro Tempore Cou rtroom Clerk: Maggie Castellon Cou rt lnte rprete r: Court Investigator: Parties Present: Future Hearings: Garrett, William Robert Attorney Exhibits: - Jessica M. Taka no for: Defendant(s), San Antonio Center via courtcall. Amin AI Sa raf for Defenda nt City of Mou nta'ln View. Pro tem Reporter: Cammie Bowen Stipulation to pro tem reporter is signed 'In cou rt. Tentative ruling is contested by defense cou nsel. Tentative ruling is adopted as follows: |. Backgrou nd This lawsuit arises from a dispute over the development of a shopping center in Mou ntain View, California. Plaintiff]. Cyril Johnson Family Limited Partnership (the Johnson Family Partnership ) owns one of the parcels upon which the shopping center was built and alleges several entities, with approval from defendant the City of Mou ntain View, developed the shopping center as it now sta nds without its consent. In 1962, the owners of 13 contiguous pa rcels of real property executed and recorded a Reciprocal Parking Agreement (the Original Agreement ) for the purpose of developing a shopping center now known as San Antonio Center on the |a nd bou nded by West El Camino Real, San Antonio Road, California Street, and Showers Drive. (Comp|., 24 32 & Ex. A [Original Agreement].) J. Cyril Johnson Investment Corporation (owned by its namesake) and Va||ey Title Company owned two of these parcels of Ia nd, namely parcels 12 and 13. (Comp|., 22 23 & Ex. A at pp. 4 5.) Valley Title Compa ny held title to parcel 13 in escrow for Mr. Johnson and his business partner; it transferred title to them in 1975. (Comp|., 23.) The Johnson Family Partnership alleges it owns pa rcel 13 as the successor of Mr. Johnson and his business partner. (Compl., 4.) The Johnson Family Partnership also alleges it has the right to review and consent to proposed changes to the design and composition ofthe shopping center. (Compl., 40.) The Original Agreement included an illustrated development plan. (Compl., Ex. A.) The Ia ndowners agreed not to modify the pa rking lots, thoroughfa res, and storefronts that were originally constructed in conformity with that development plan without first obtaining written consent from several of the other owners, including Mr. Johnson and his company. (Compl., 42 43 & Ex. A at pp. 6 8.) According to the Johnson Family Partnership, it is now entitled to exercise these consent Printed: 12/13/2018 12/13/201 8 Hearing: Demurrer - 18CV328188 Page 1 0f 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER rights as the successor to Mr. Johnson, but has been denied the opportunity to do so. (Comp|., 40.) In 2011, a real estate developer that had acquired several of the constituent parcels Merlone Geier Partners began the process of obtaining zoning ancl building approval from the City of Mou ntain View for two phases of redevelopment at the shopping center. (Comp|., 50 60.) During this process, and as required by the City of Mou ntain View, Merlone Ge'Ier Pa rtners procu red and recorded three sepa rate amendments to the Original Agreement. (Comp|., 50 60 & Exs. B D.) The Johnson Family Partnership alleges Merlone Geier Partners and other new Ia ndowners, particularly defenda nts San Antonio Center, LLC, San Antonio Center ll, LLC, Machado-San Antonio Pa rtners, LLC, FR San Antonio Center, LLC, Federal Realty Pa rtners, |nc., and Federal Realty Partners L.P., (collectively, Developers ), amended the Original Agreement without its knowledge or consent and deprived it of its right to review ancl consent to any proposed redevelopment. (Comp|., 49, 58, 63 68.) It also alleges the City of Mou nta'In View negligently approved of the redevelopment without obtaining a title report or addressing inconsistencies in the pa perwork presented to it for approval. (Comp|., 59 62.) The Johnson Family Partnership asserts causes of action against Developers and the City of Mou ntain View (the City) for: (1) quiet title (against Developers); (2) declaratory relief (against Developers and the City),- (3) injunctive relief (against Developers and the City),- (4) sla nder of title (against Developers),- (5) breach of contract (against Developers),- (6) fraud (against Developers),- (7) contractual interference (against Developers); and (8) negligence (against the City). It seeks equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Currently before the Cou rt is the City s demurrer to the complaint and each claim asserted against it therein. ||. Demurrer The City demurs to the complaint as well as the second, third, and eighth causes of action on the grounds of uncertainty ancl failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. A. Uncertainty A demurrer on the ground of uncertainty tests whether a pleading is ambiguous, uncertain, or unintelligible. (See Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (f).) [D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are gra nted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defenda nt cannot reasonably respond. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) A demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made. (Butlerv. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145 46.) The City argues the entire complaint is uncertain because the Johnson Family Pa rtnership does not allege with clearness or precision that it, in fact, owns Parcel Thirteen. (Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 16:3 4.) The City s apparent position is not that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible within the meaning of the statute, but rather that the Johnson Family Pa rtnership must allege evidentiary facts about how it acquired title to parcel 13. This argu ment is unavailing for several reasons. First, the City s argument concerns whether the Johnson Family Pa rtnership must allege more facts with particula rity as distinct from whether the facts alleged are ambiguous or unintelligible. |t can undoubtedly be ascertained from the pleading that the Johnson Family Partnership is alleging it owns parcel 13, ancl so there is no basis for concluding the complaint is ambiguous in that rega rd. Second, the City provides no legal to authority to support the proposition that a plaintiff must allege evidentiary facts about title to real property. As a general rule, a plaintiff need not allege each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff s proof. [Citation.] (Ferrick v. Santa Clara University (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1341.) Accordingly, the City s argument is contrary to fu ndamental principles of pleading. Based on the foregoing, the City does not demonstrate the complaint or any claim asserted against it therein Printed: 12/] 3/20] 8 12/] 3/20] 8 Hearing: Demurrer - 18CV328188 Page 2 0f 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER 'Is uncertain. Accordingly, its demurrer on the grou nd of uncertainty is OVERRULED. B. Failure to State Sufficient Facts In general, a complaint must contain [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, 'In ordinary ancl concise Ia nguage. (Davaloo v. State Farm lnsura nce Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 415, quoting Code Civ. Proc., 425.10, subd. (a)(l).) This fact-pleading requirement obligates the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that as a whole apprise[ ] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) Thus, a demurrer on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action tests whether the plaintiff alleges each ultimate fact essential to his or her cause of action. (See C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Ca|.4th 861, 872, citing Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) The City adva nces distinct arguments concerning the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the second, third, and eighth causes of action, each of which is addressed below. 1. Second Cause of Action The second cause of action is for declaratory relief. A party may seek declaratory relief in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties. (Code Civ. Proc., 1060.) To state a claim for decla ratory relief, a plaintiff must simply allege facts showing there is an actual controversy; he or she need not allege facts showing entitlement to a favorable decla ration. (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire and Ma rine lnsu ra nce Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 29.) Strictly spea king, therefore, a demurrer is not the appropriate wea pon with which to attack the merits of a claim for declaratory relief. (Sicilia no v. Fireman s Fund Insurance Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 745, 755.) Nevertheless, the City argues there is no controversy alleged with respect to it. Its supporting reasoning is not a model of cla rity. |t asserts there is no controversy because it complied with two distinct conditions of approval for Developers zoning permit that its City Cou ncil adopted. Condition No. 11 states: Owners shall sign and be a party to an agreement (or amendment of an existing agreement), subject to the City s approval and recorded to run with the Ia nd, which provides for easements, covenants, and conditions relating to applicable parking, vehicle access, pedestrian access, utility use, surface stormwater drainage, and other uses between the subject properties and the existing San Antonio Center properties east of the project. The agreement, together with all attachments, must be submitted to and approved by the Community Development Department and the City Attorney s Office prior to approval of the pa rce| map. (Comp|., 53.) Condition No. 31 states: All above-grade and at-grade parking shall be accessible to other properties in the San Antonio Shopping Center in accordance with the existing Reciprocal Pa rking Agreement as stated in the San Antonio Center Precise Plan. (Comp|., 56.) The City states asserts because it approved of the amendments to the Original Agreement, it complied with Condition No. 11. |t also states there is no allegation that it failed to comply with Condition No. 31. The problem with its argu ment is that it is fu ndamentally unclear how that shows there is no controversy alleged. The City does not clearly tether its argument to the allegations in the pleading. Its argument, in fact, appears to be based on a misapprehension of the complaint. Contrary to what the City appears to assu me, the Johnson Family Pa rtnership is not alleging there is a dispute because it failed to approve Developers application. The Johnson Family Partnership alleges there is a controversy specifically because the City improperly approved of the amendments without adequate investigation and despite facial defects and inconsistencies in the application. (Comp|., 50 62.) Thus, the City s argument is ina pt. Printed: 12/13/2018 12/13/201 8 Hearing: Demurrer - 18CV328188 Page 3 0f 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER In conclusion, the City does not demonstrate no controversy has been alleged sufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief. The demurrer to the second cause of action 'Is therefore OVERRULED. 2. Third Cause of Action The City argues the Court should sustain the demurrer to the third cause of action for injunctive relief because the Johnson Family Partnership does not allege facts to support its claim for such relief. An injunction is an equitable remedy. (Salazarv. Matejcek (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 634, 647.) To properly plead facts for injunctive relief, the complaint must plead (1) the elements of a cause of action involving the wrongful act sought to be enjoined and (2) [t]he grou nds for equitable relief ofthis kind, 'I.e., a showing of inadequacy ofthe remedy at law. [Citation] (|bid.) The City asserts the complaint contains no allegation that a legal remedy is inadequate as necessary to support a claim for injunctive relief. The City is correct that the Johnson Family Partnership does not allege there is no adequate remedy at law. In opposition, the Johnson Family Pa rtnership does not dispute this fact or argue that the facts alleged otherwise show there is no adequate legal remedy despite the absence of an explicit allegation of that ultimate fact. Instead, the Johnson Family Partnership argues it alleges entitlement to ma ndamus relief. This argument is not actually responsive to the argument adva nced by the City and is not otherwise persuasive. Although not clearly articulated by the Johnson Family Pa rtnership here, it appears to be arguing it adequately pleads entitlement to a traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. That statute authorizes a cou rt to issue a writ of mandate to compel a local official to perform a ministerial duty, which is an act that a public officer is obligated to perform in a prescribed manner required by law when a given state of facts exists. (Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 128 29.) A court may issue the writ if there is: (1) a clear, present, ministerial duty on the part of the respondent and (2) a correlative clea r, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (Id. at p. 129.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 states the writ must be issued in a|| cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary cou rse of law. Although the statute does not expressly forbid the issuance of the writ if another adequate remedy exists, it has long been established as a general rule that the writ will not be issued if another such remedy was available to the petitioner. (Flores v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 206 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) The Johnson Family Partnership clearly is not seeking a writ of mandate. |n addition to the fact that it has not filed a verified petition for a writ of ma ndate (see Code Civ. Proc., 1086), it specifically asks for an injunction and not a writ (Comp|., 90). Additionally, because the issuance of a writ of mandate, like the issuance of an injunction, depends on the unavailability of an adequate legal remedy, the Johnson Family Pa rtnership also fails to allege facts showing entitlement to a writ of ma ndate for the same reasons articulated above. Consequently, its argu ment is not persuasive. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the third cause of action is sustainable. If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment. (City of Stockton v. Su per. Ct. (2007) 42 Ca|.4th 730, 747.) Here, the cause of action for injunctive relief is incapable of amendment because it is not actually a cause of action. (Allen v. City of Sacra mento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 65.) With that said, the Johnson Family Partnership may obtain an injunction if it is otherwise entitled to that remedy. (See ibid.) Accordingly, although the Johnson Family Pa rtnership may not amend this particular claim in the form in which it is pleaded, it may otherwise allege new facts elsewhere in the pleading to support a prayer for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend consistent with the limitation herein. Printed: 12/1 3/20] 8 12/1 3/20] 8 Hearing: Demurrer - 18CV328188 Page 4 0f 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER 3. Eighth Cause of Action The eighth cause of action is for negligence. The City argues this claim is subject to demurrer because the Johnson Family Pa rtnership does not identify a statutory basis for its claim and allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Tort Claims Act. In opposition, the Johnson Family Partnership essentially concedes these arguments are meritorious and seeks leave to assert an inverse condemnation claim. (Opp. at p. 6:15 22.) |t is true that a public entity can only be held liable to the extent provided by statute. (Gov. Code, 815.) In other words, a claim against a public entity must be based on a statutory duty and not a common law duty. (Washington v. Cou nty of Contra Costa (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 890, 895 96.) Statutory claims must be pleaded with particula rity, and so a plaintiff must specifically allege the statute upon which his or her claim against a public entity is based. (lbid., citing Brenneman v. State of California (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 812, 816 17.) As the Johnson Family Partnership concedes, it does not identify the statutory duty upon which its claim against the City is based. Accordingly, the allegations in the eighth cause of action are deficient. The City is also correct that before filing a civil action for damages against a public entity, a plaintiff must present an administrative claim to the entity that sets forth, among other things, [a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. (Gov. Code, 910, 945.4.) If a plaintiff does not allege facts showing compliance or an excuse for noncomplia nce with the claim presentation requirement, his or her cause of action is subject to demurrer on the grou nd of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (State of California v. Su per. Ct. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243; accord Nasrawi v. Buck Consulta nts, LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.) The Johnson Family Partnership does not allege it complied with the claim presentation requirement. |t appears to concede both that it did not do so and cannot timely do so at this junctu re. (See Gov. Code, 911.2 [time for presenting claim].) Thus, the demurrer is sustainable on this additional basis. In opposition, the Johnson Family Pa rtnership seeks leave to amend the complaint to assert a claim for inverse condemnation instead of negligence. Here, there is no basis for concluding the Johnson Family Pa rtnership cannot possibly state a claim for inverse condemnation. (See City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 747.) Indeed, as it points out, such claims are not subject to the claim presentation requirement discussed above. (Patrick Media Grou p, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Com. (1991) 9 Cal.App.4th 592, 607, citing Gov. Code, 905.1.) Consequently, leave to amend is warranted. |n conclusion, the City s demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend. 4. Entire Complaint The City s demurrer is also directed to the entire complaint as a whole. A demurrer to a complaint as a whole is sustainable only if no cou nt of the complaint states facts sufficient to entitle [the plaintiff] to relief on any theory. (Warren v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 29.) As reflected above, the demurrer is not sustainable with respect to the second cause of action. Consequently, the demurrer to the entire complaint is OVERRULED. - ooOoo - Printed: 12/13/2018 12/13/20] 8 Hearing: Demurrer - 18CV328188 Page 5 0f 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Printed: 12/13/2018 12/13/201 8 Hearing: Demurrer - 18CV328188 Page 6 0f 6