Request

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 28, 2017

WV-700 Request to Renew Restraining Clerk stamps below when form is filed. Order plover) (fka Episcopal Senior via Communities Communities) etitioner (if any for this case): s T Diamond ' Jr State Bar No.: 131525 Goldfarb & Lipman LLP ou have a lawyer, give your lawyer's information.): (T) Petitioner (Em a. Name: Co Lawyer for P Name: Jame Firm Name: b. Address (Jf y Address: ]300 Clay Street, Eleventh Floor City:Oakland State: CA Zip:94612 Telephone: (510) 836-633 6 Fax: (510) 836-10 3 5 Court name and street address: E-Mail Address: jdiamond@goldfarblipman (2) Employee (Protected Person) Full Name: Sandeep Virk corn Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara 191 N. First Street San Jose, CA 95113 Fill in case number: (a) Respondent (Restrained Person) Full Name: Joseph L McInerney Address (if known): 1022 West Taylor Street City:San Jose State:CA Zip: 95126 Case Number: 17CH007456 (4) Request to Renew Restraining Order I ask the court to renew the Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (Form WV-130). A copy of the order is attached. a. The order ends on (date): 4 / J 8 / 2 O b. W This is my first request to renew the order. Ll] The order has been renewed imes. c. I want the order to be renewed for [X]three years LJ other (specify): d. I ask the court to renew the order because (explain below): &l Response is stated in Attachment 4d. The declarations in Attachment 4d show that Respondent remains obsessed with the Employee. Moreover. renewal of the restraining order for 3 more years is amply warranted by the facts set forth in the Court of Appeal opinion showing misconduct since 2009 It is the only way to prevent further stalking and harassment. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information above is true and correct. Date: 1/31/2020 James T Diamond. Jr Type or print your name This is not a Court Order. Judicial Council of California, www.courts.ca.gov New January 1, 2012, Mandatory Form Code of Civil Procedure, $ 527.8(k) CEB' Essential cab.con [@]Forms Request to Renew Restraining Order (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-7O0, Page 1 of 1 1423 Covia / Mcinerney Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 1/31/2020 11:38 AM Reviewed By: M. Sorum Case #17CH007456 Envelope: 3967834 17CH007456 Santa Clara - Civil M. Sorum Copy of Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing dated 4/18/17 (Form WV-130) 2 0 orkpl i l est r e ft ear F m V-1 - WV-1 30 Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearin (i) Petitioner (Employer) a. Name:Episcopal Senior Communities Lawyer for Petitioner (if any, for this case): Name: James T Diamond, Ir .State Bar No.: 131525 Firm Name: Goldfarb & Lipman LLP b. Your Address (If you have a lawyer, give your lawyer's information): Address: 1300 Clay Street, Eleventh Floor City:Oakland State:CA Zip:94612 Telephone: (510) 836-6336 Fax: (510) 836-1035 E-Mail Address: jdi amond@ga1 dfarhl i pman com (2) Employee (Protected Person) Full Name: Sandeep Virk Pi.i&gg\'woke form is tiled, t s w_gal n17 {:.4 Fill in court name and street address: Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara 191 N. First Street San Jose, CA 95113 Court fills in case number when form is filed. (a) Respondent (Restrained Person) Full Name: Joseph L Mcinerney Description: Case Number: 17-CH-007456 Sex: (XIM ]F Height: 5'11" Weight: 180 Date of Birth:.6./25/1943 Hair Color: Gray Eye Color: Unkn Age: 73 Race:Caucasian Home Address (if known): 30 East Rosemary Street, #335 City: San Jose State: CA Zip:95112 Relationship to Employee: former tenant of former employer G) D Additional Protected Persons In addition to the employee, the following fam.ily or household members or other employees are protected by the temporary orders indicated below: Full Name Age Household Member? Relation to Employee Yes LE]No Jes J No ryes LT No LJ Additional protected persons are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 4. (s) Expiration Date This Order, except for any award of lawyer's fees, expires at: [a y[igfao a widiiif am. L pm If no expiration date is written here, this Order expires three years from the date of issuance. A led@d af+er Covorct to Corl 0/shodte . This is a Court Order.. Judicial Council of California, www.courts.ca.gov Revised January 1, 2017, Mandatory Form Code of Civil Procedure.§§ 527.8 and 527.9 Approved by DOJ Essential pat Forms }J Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 1 of 6 ) 1408 Northern California Pre '3 C; nber: 1-3 CH-007456 (6) Hearing a. There was a hearing on (date): 4/18/11.--- at(time):9:0.a.m, in Dept.:20 Room:. (Name of judicial officer): Han Carrie Zepeda made the orders at the hearing. b. These people were at the hearing: (1) (X] Thie petitioner/employer representative (name): en Yeung (2) (Xl The lawyer for the petitioner/employer (name): Tames Diamond. (3) (X) The employee (4) D The lawyer for the employee (name): (S) X] The respondent (6) ] The lawyer for the respondent (name): D Additional persons present are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 5. c. (_] The hearing is continued. The parties must return to court on (date):.at(time):. The court has granted the orders checked below. If you do not obey these orders, you can be arrested and charged with a crime. You may be sent to jail for up to one year, pay a fine of up to $1,000, or both. (7) Personal Conduct Orders a. You are ordered not to do the following things to the employee (] and to the other protected persons listed in@) : (1) ~ Harass, molest, strike, assault (sexually or otherwise), batter, abuse, destroy personal property of, or disturb the peace of the person. (2) ~· Commit acts of violence or make threats of violence against the· person. (3) ] Follow or stalk the person during work hours or while going to or from the place of work. (4) Contact the person, either directly or indirectly, in any way, including, but not limited to, in person, by telephone, in writing, by public or private rail, by interoffice mail, by e-mail, by text message, by fax, or by other electronic means. (S) (I Enter the person's workplace. (6) ~Take any action to obtain the person's address or locations. If this item i.s not checked, the court has found good cause not to make this order. (T) ] Other (specify) (_J Other personal conduct orders are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 7a(7). b. Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or a process server or other person for service of legal papers related to a court case is allowed and does not violate this order. Revised January 1, 2017 Essential fJ Forms Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 2 of 6 )) 1406 Northern California Pre 4 IC ,mber; 1 17-CH-007456 Stay-Away Order % Yoa must sty at teas 39O (I) ~ The employee (2) I Each other protected person listed mo@ (3) The employee's workplace (4) " The employee's home (5) The employee's school 6) C The employee's children's school yards away from (check all that apply): (7) El The employee's children's place of child care (8) [Zl.The employee's vehicle,_ g/»»A». I (9) [1 Other (specify): u)0v± a&Ro i Tao N. Faur±t $1. ,2Dz C# 5,% 0,TD;ra sk, Sae@g b. This stay-away order does not prevent you from going to or from your home or place of employment. f9 //7 G) No Guns or Other Firearms and Ammunition a. You cannot own, possess, have, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or in any other way get guns, other firearms, or ammunition. b. If you have not already done so, you must: (1) Sell to or store with a licensed gun dealer or turn in to a law enforcement agency any guns or other firearms in your immediate possession or control. This must be done within 24 hours of being served with this Order. (2) File a receipt with the court within 48 hours of receiving this Order that proves that your guns have been turned in, sold, or stored. (You may use form WV-800, Proof of Firearms Turned In, Sold, or Stored for the receipt.) c. 0 The court has received information that you own or possess a firearm. i@) costs You must pay the following amounts for costs to the petitioner: Item Amount s s sS 0 Additional amounts are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 10. s s $ (11) other Orders (specify)» gag,JAQg»Jg%JQgAJJJgg [j Additional orders are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment I1. Revised January t, {2017 Essential J Forms Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 3 cl 6 -» 1408 Northern California Pre 5 1-C6 .mber: 1-17-CH-007456 (12) Mandatory Entry of Order Into CARPOS Through CLETS This Order must be entered into the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS) through the California Law Enforcement Telecomunications System (CLETS). (Check one): a. ] The clerk will enter this Order and its proof-of-service form into CARPOS. b. ~he clerk will transmit this Order and its proof-of-service form to a law enforcement agency to be entered into CARPOS. c. D By the close of business on the date that this Order is made, the petitioner or the petitioner's lawyer should deliver a copy of the Order and its proof-of-service form to the law enforcement agency listed below to enter into CARPOS: Name of Law Enforcement Agency Address (City, State, Zip) 0 Additional law enforcement agencies are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 12. @ Service of Order on Respondent a. ] The respondent personally attended the hearing. No other proof of service is needed. b. D The respondent did not attend the hearing. (I) D Proof of service of form WV-110, Temporary Restraining Order, was presented to the court. The judge's orders in this form are the same as in form WV-110 except for the expiration date. The respondent must be served with this Order. Service may be by mail. (2) LI The judge's orders in this form are different from the temporary restraining orders in form WV-I 1O. Someone- but not the petitioner or anyone protected by this order---must personally serve a copy of this Order on the respondent. @ No Fee to Serve (Notify) Restrained Person The sheriff or marshal will serve this Order without charge because the Order is based on unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or stalking. 0] Number of pages attached to this Order, if any: _ Date: » .Lis&,% at {) } /Garlozsaped Revised January 1, 2017 Essential J Forms Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 4 of 6 ) 1408 Northern California Pre 6 11 .. ,1mber: ~ 7 -CH-007456 You Cannot Have Guns or Firearms You cannot own, have, possess, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or otherwise get guns, other firearms, or ammunition while this Order is in effect. If you do, you can go to jail and pay a $1,000 fine. You unust sell to or store with a licensed gun dealer or turn in to a law enforcement agency any guns or other firearms that you have or control as stated in item(9). The court will require you to prove that you did so. Enforcing the Restraining Order This Order is enforceable by any law enforcement agency that has received the Order, is shown a copy of the Order, or has verified its existence on the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS). Agencies are encouraged to enter violation messages into CARPOS. If the law enforcement agency has not received proof of service on the restrained person, and the restrained person was not present at the court hearing, the agency must advise the restrained person of the terms of the Order and then must enforce it. Violations of this Order are subject to criminal penalties. Start Date and End Date of Orders This Order starts on the date next to the judge's signature on page 4 and ends on the expiration date in item(5) on page l. If the Protected Person Contacts the Restrained Person Even if the protected person invites or consents to contact with the restrained person, this Order remains in effect and must be enforced. The protected person cannot be arrested for inviting or consenting to contact with the restrained person. The orders can be changed only by another court order. (Pen. Code, $ 13710(b).) Conflicting Orders-Priorities for Enforcement If more than one restraining order has been issued, the orders must be enforced according to the following priorities: (See Pen. Code, $ 136.2, Fam. Code, 5$ 6383(h)(2), 6405(b).) 1. EPO:If one of the orders is an Emergency Protective Order (form EPO-OOl) and is more restrictive than other restraining or protective orders, it has precedence in enforcement over all other orders. 2. No Contact Order: If there is no EPO, a no-contact order that is included in a restraining or protective order has precedence over any other restraining or protective order. 3. Criminal Order: If none of the orders includes a no contact order, a domestic violence protective order issued in a criminal case takes precedence in enforcement over any conflicting civil court order. Any nonconflicting terms of the civil restraining order remain in effect and enforceable. 4. Family, Juvenile, or Civil Order: If more than one family, juvenile, or other civil restraining or protective order has been issued, the one that was issued last must be enforced. Revised January 1, 2017 Essential ] Forms Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 5 of 6 ) 1408 Northern California Pre 7 le-: ,IJumber; 1-17-CH-007456 Clerk's Certificate [seal] (Clerk will fill out this part.) -Clerk's Certificate I certify that this Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing is a true and correct copy of the original on file in the court. THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT I8 A CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THIS OFFICE APR 1 6 th)'®'- (_']erk, by.--,eDUty Revised January 1,2017 Essential Forms Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 6 of 6 1408 Northern California Pre 8 ATTACHMENT 4D DOCUMENTS DOCUMENT Declaration of Konni Stalica Declaration of James T. Diamond Exhibits A Exhibit B Exhibit C PAGE NUMBERS 11 13 15 23 30 1423\05\2753492. l E T , BE eclar o 0 onni eclar o e . xhibit xhibi xhibit O l4 2 92.l Attachment 4D Declaration of Konni S. Stalica 10 t h e t eclar t o 0 onni . c O ATTACHMENT 4D DECLARATION OF KONNI STALICA IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO RENEW WORKPLACE VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDER I, KONNI ST ALICA, declare as follows: 1. I am an Assistant employed by Goldfarb & Lipman LLP. I make this declaration based on my own personal knowledge, and if called to testify could testify competently thereto. 2. I listened to and transcribed a voicemail message which was left by a person who identified himself in the message as Joseph L. Mcinerney. The message was left on the voicemail of James Diamond, one of the attorneys at my firm, on December 23, 2019 at approximately 1 :06 p.m. 3. The following is a true and correct transcription of Mr. Mclnerney's voicemail message: This is Joseph Mcinerney (408/509-7475). I'm calling to you about what we discussed previously. I want to settle this case and I want to be done with it. I'm tired of the case and Sandee is having a very detrimental effect on me. I haven't seen her now or even heard from her in 3 years and I want to know cuz I know what her attitude was, maybe it's not the same as it was. I want to patch it up with her. I'll accept anything that's acceptable to her -you know, living together or just seeing each other. But you know, this is the last person that I'm gonna have a relationship with or a potential relationship with, and since I know what her attitude was and I also know that I would not even approach her unless I thought she was interested in me. I want to settle this case once and for all and working it out with her, the sooner the better. Because it's pulling me down and keeping me down. So call me back at 408/509-7475. Joseph Mcinerney I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 24th day of January 2020 at Oakland, California. , on Ska, KONNI S. STALICA 1423\05\2747354. l II Attachment 4D Declaration of James T. Diamond, Jr. 12 t h ent eclarat 0 e . i ond, . ATTACHMENT 4d DECLARATION OF JAMES T. DIAMOND, JR. IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO RENEW WORKPLACE VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDER I, JAMES T. DIAMOND, JR. declare: 1. I am a partner in the law firm, Goldfarb & Lipman LLP (the Firm"). The Firm is general counsel to Petitioner Covia Communities ("Covia"). I make this declaration in support of Covia's request to renew the workplace violence restraining order against respondent Joseph Mclnerney, dated April 18, 2017, that is currently in effect. 2. On or about December 23, 2019, Mr. Mcinerney left a voicemail message on my work voicemail. I asked my assistant, Konni Stalica, to transcribe Mr. Mclnerney's voicemail message, and her declaration contains a true and correct transcription of the statements made by Mr. Mcinerney in his voicemail message. 3. On December 17, 2019, I attended the oral argument on Mr. Mcinerney's appeal of the workplace violence restraining order currently in place. We ordered a tape of the hearing and asked a court reporting company to prepare a transcription of the oral argument. A true and correct copy of excerpts of the transcript of the oral argument is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 4. Mr. Mclnerney made the following statements at the oral argument, referring to Ms. Virk, the employee who needs protection from Mr. Mclnerney: THE POINT IS THERE WAS NEVER REALLY A RELATIONSHIP WITH HER BECAUSE IT NEVER GOT OFF THE GROUND BECAUSE SHE IS NOT STABLE, AND I'VE GOT TO SAY THAT BECAUSE I WOULD LIKE TO WORK IT OUT WITH HER. AT AGE 76, YOU HA VE TO GRAB ONTO WHATEVER YOU CAN, AND THIS COULD BE ACTUALLY THE END OF MY ABILITY TO OBTAIN A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY PARTY. Exh. A at 6: 10-15. Mr. Mclnerney stated further that it remains his position that he is free to take pictures of Ms. Virk, even after she has told him she did not want him to take pictures of her, because he claims her workplace is a "public place." Id. at 6:16-7:5. 5. This court also granted a previous petition for a workplace violence restraining order 1423\05\2747993. I 1 3 against Mr. Mclnerney filed by Ms. Virk's prior employer. A copy of this court's prior workplace violence restraining order, dated February 18, 2014, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 6. A true and correct copy of the Court of Appeal's opinion affirming this Court's April 28, 2017 workplace violence restraining order is attached hereto as Exhibit C. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed January 24, 2020 at Oakland, California. {leis® 1423\05\2747993. l [H Attachment 4D Exhibit A to Declaration of James T. Diamond, Jr. 15 t h e t xhibi 0 eclar o 0 . i ond, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 FIRST APPELLATE DIVISION, COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DIVISION 4 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO COVIA COMMUNITIES, PLAINTIFF & RESPONDENT, ) vs. NO. Al54836 JOSEPH MCINERNEY DEFENDANY & APPELLANT. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2019 20 APPEARANCES: 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 FOR PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT: 523 W. COVIA COMMUNITIES JOSEPH MCINERNEY First Legal Deposition Services 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1 423\05\2752 740 1 1 2 3 4 DIVISION 4 5 REPORTER: 6 TIME: 7 8 APPEARANCES: 9 10 11 12 13 CASE NUMBER: CASE NAME: SAN FRANCISCO, CA A154836 Covia v. Mcinerney TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1 7, 2019 JUSTICE MARY J. GREENWOOD KAREN D. SCHIFF AS HERETOFORE NOTED. COURT OFFICER: PLEASE RISE. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, PLEASE BE SEATED AND AGAIN WELCOME. ONE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN HEARD THIS 14 MORNING, BUT BECAUSE WE'VE HAD A CHANGE OF PANEL, I'M GOING TO 15 CALL THE REMAINDER OF THE CASE, HAVE COUNSEL ·OR PARTIES 16 IDENTIFY THEMSELVES, AND PROVIDE TIME ESTIMATES TO THE COURT. 17 18 19 21 23 25 27 28 WE HAVE THREE CASES REMAINING. PEOPLE VERSUS PATRICK VERAZZO [PHONETIC]? DO WE HAVE COUNSEL HERE? MR. BAZIL WILLIAMS: BAZIL WILLIAMS [PHONETIC] FOR 20 RESPONDENT, YOUR HONOR. MR. JARROD BYERS: JARROD BYERS (PHONETIC] REPRESENTING 22 MR. VERAZZO. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: ALL RIGHT. MR. BYERS, YOUR TIME 24 ESTIMATE PLEASE, SIR? MR. BYERS: I WOULD ESTIMATE FIVE MINUTES WITH FIVE 26 MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: THANK YOU, SIR. AND MR. WILLIAMS? MR. WILLIAMS: ABOUT FIVE MINUTES, YOUR HONOR. First Legal Deposition Services 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1 423\05\2752 740.1 17 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 JUSTICE GREENWOOD: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. COVTA [PHONETIC) COMMUNITIES VERSUS JOSEPH MCINERNEY? MALE VOICE 1: YOUR HONOR, CAN WE PUT IT OFF UNTIL THE END OF THE HEARING BECAUSE I HAVE A - AFTER - - AND IT'S - - SO I'D BE THE OFFICIAL TO CONCLUDE THE HEARING TODAY WITH THIS CASE AND NOT DO A - -. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: MR. MCINERNEY? YOU ARE MR. MCINERNEY? MR. MCINERNEY: YES, YOUR HONOR. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: ALL RIGHT. AND, SIR, YOU'RE REQUESTING THAT YOU'D BE CALLED LAST? MR. MCINERNEY: YES. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: I'LL ACCOMMODATE THAT REQUEST. COUNSEL, ARE YOU PRESENT? MR. JAMES DIAMOND: JAMES DIAMOND FOR COVIA. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: ALL RIGHT. MR. MCINERNEY, YOU'VE REQUESTED 15 MINUTES. IS THAT CORRECT? MR. MCINERNEY: WELL, I'D SAY LESS THAN 15 MINUTES. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU. AND, MR. DIAMOND? MR. DIAMOND: PROBABLY LESS THAN - -. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. GIVE ME JUST ONE MOMENT, PLEASE. (DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD.) JUSTICE GREENWOOD: I THINK ACTUALLY IN CONSULTING WITH THE OTHER JUSTICES, MR. MCINERNEY, I THINK WHAT WE'LL DO IS WE'LL CALL YOUR CAST FIRST, SIR. SO IF YOU WANT TO STEP FORWARD, LET'S JUST CALL THIS CASE OUT OF ORDER. THE FINAL First Legal Deposition Services 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1423\05\2 752740.1 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 THEY ARE REQUIRED THAT THE PETITION NOT BE VERIFIED, BUT THE FACT OF THE CASE SAYS IT IS REQUIRED TO BE VERIFIED. AND THE SECTION IS 527 OF THE CODE ASSUMES - - WHICH AUTHORIZES THE FILING OF A DECLARATION. AND INITIALS ARE NOT-- JUSTICE GREENWOOD: [INTERPOSING) EXCUSE ME, SIR. IT'S YOUR POSITION THAT THAT SECTION APPLIES TO RESTRAINING ORDER REQUESTS? MR. MCINERNEY: 527. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: ALL RIGHT. MR. MCINERNEY: IN FACT, YES. IF YOU READ THE STATUTE, UNDER 527.8(C)--(7) (C)--OR RATHER IT'S (E), IT SAYS "UPON FILING A PETITION FOR AN INJUNCTION OF THIS SECTION, THE PETITIONER MAY OBTAIN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN 14 ACCORDANCE WITH SUBDIVISION A OF SECTION 527." AND 15 SUBDIVISION A OF 527 CLEARLY INDICATES THAT IF AT THE TIME OF 16 THE HEARING IT'S NOT SERVED, THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, ON 17 THE--I MEAN AS FAR AS SERVED WITH POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, THAT 18 THE MATTER SHOULD BE CONTINUED. 19 BUT I'D ALSO WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THERE'S AN ISSUE OF 20 PERSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DOCTOR--WITH MR. 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 GEORGE LUCAS. THEE GEORGE LUCAS, BUT THIS IS WHAT CAME UP. THE COURT HAS TO--HAS TO-- JUSTICE GREENWOOD: [INTERPOSING) ARE YOU OKAY? MR. MCINERNEY: IF YOU'LL--IF I'M PERMITTED TO LEAN, I 25 MEAN IT WOULD MAKE IT A LOT EASIER. JUSTICE GREENWOOD: THAT'S FINE . . MR. MCINERNEY: THE COURT HAS INDICATED THAT--ASKED THE QUESTION "MS. VIRK, DID YOU HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH GEORGE First Legal Deposition Services 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1423\05\2752740. I 1 6 1 2 \ 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LUCAS?" SHE SAID, "NO, I DIDN'T." DID YOU RECEIVE ANY MONEY ON THE BASIS THAT YOU HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM? NO. ACTUALLY, THIS WAS DOCTORED BY THE PETITIONING PARTY'S COUNSEL BECAUSE HE HAS IT WRITTEN TILL--THE COURT THEN PROCEEDED TO ASK MS. VIRK THE FOLLOWING: "MS. VIRK, DID YOU HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. MCINERNEY?" MS. VIRK, "NO." DID YOU EVER RECEIVE ANY MONEY ON THE BASIS YOU HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM? MS. VIRK, "NO." THE POINT IS THERE WAS NEVER REALLY A RELATIONSHIP WITH HER BECAUSE IT NEVER GOT OFF THE GROUND BECAUSE SHE IS NOT STABLE, AND I'VE GOT TO SAY THAT BECAUSE I WOULD LIKE TO WORK IT OUT WITH HER. AT AGE 76, YOU HAVE TO GRAB ONTO WHATEVER YOU CAN, AND THIS COULD BE ACTUALLY THE END OF MY ABILITY TO OBTAIN A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY PARTY. BUT ALSO I WOULD STATE THAT SHE MAKES A BIG ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A LAW REGARDING PROHIBITING TAKING PICTURES OF A PERSON WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT, SO THERE IS NO SUCH LAW. AND I'D LIKE TO BRING THE COURT TO THE ATTENTION OF SANDERS VERSUS AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT AT 20 CAL.4TH 907, PAGE 914, IT SAYS "THE FIRST ELEMENT, WE STATED, IS NOT MET WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAS MERELY BEEN OBSERVED OR EVEN PHOTOGRAPHED OR RECORDED IN A PUBLIC PLACE. THE PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THE DEFENDANT PENETRATED SOME ZONE OF PHYSICAL OR SENSORY OF PRIVACY SURROUNDING OR OBTAINED UNWANTED ACCESS TO DATA BY PLAINTIFF. THE TORT IS PROVEN ONLY IF THE PLAINTIFF HAD AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF SECLUSION OR SOLITUDE IN THE PLACE, CONVERSATION OR DATA First Legal Deposition Services 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1423\05\2752740. I 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ' 9 ' 10 \ 11 ' 12 \ 13 14 15 \ 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SOURCE." NOW THE PARTY IS THAT THE WAS A SECURITY OFFICER AT TOWN PARK TOWERS AND SHE WAS TN A PUBLIC PLACE PERFORMING SECURITY DUTIES AT THE DESK. AND I SAY--UH, I GOT OUT OF THE HOSPITAL A WEEK AGO SO I HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETELY REPAIR. I WENT THROUGH THE PAPERS WHICH I HADN'T EXAMINED MAYBE IN SIX MONTHS. THAT'S THE TIME THAT I WROTE THE LAST BRIEFS. I SAY CONSISTENTLY IS THAT IF YOU WANT TO GO INTO COURT AND MAKE AN ACCUSATION, YOU HAVE TO VERIFY IT. THE VERIFICATION IS A DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY. IT HAS TO BE--IT HAS TO HAVE A SIGNATURE. THE DECLARATIONS MADE IN THIS CASE WERE NOT BY SIGNATURES; WERE MADE BY INITIALS. NOW INITIALS CAN BE ANYBODY'S NAME AND, YOU KNOW, HOW CAN YOU GET SOMEBODY FOR PERJURY IF IN FACT THEY SIGN A DECLARATION WITH INITIALS INSTEAD OF A SIGNATURE? AT CCP 446 AND 2015.5 THE COURT SAID A DECLARATION BE MADE WITH A SIGNATURE, A NAME, AND ALL THESE THINGS. NOW THE POINT IS THAT THE COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION OF THE CASE BECAUSE THE SIMPLE FACT IS THAT THE ALLEGATION, WHATEVER THE MERITS OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT, THEY DIDN'T OCCUR ON THE PREMISES OF THE PETITIONING PARTY. THEREFORE THERE IS AN ISSUE OF JURISDICTION RIGHT FROM THE OFFSET, AND I WOULD REQUEST OF THIS COURT THAT THEY DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OR REFER IT BACK TO THE COURT. NOW, IF THEY--AFTER THE--IF COUNSEL AND MS. VIRK WAS TO FILE A DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THEY NEED TO DO IT WITH A SIGNATURE. HAS MY TIME BEEN REACHED? First Legal Deposition Services 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1423\05\2752740. l 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I 1 12 13 14 FIRST APPELLATE DIVISION, COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DIVISION 4 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO COVIA COMMUNITIES, PLAINTIFF & RESPONDENT,) vs. JOSEPH MCINERNEY DEFENDANY & APPELLANT. NO. Al54836 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 15 I, KAREN D. SCHIFF, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I DID TO 16 THE BEST OF MY ABILITY CORRECTLY REPORT THE PROCEEDINGS 17 CONTAINED HEREIN AND THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES 1 THROUGH 18 13, INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT 19 TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND TESTIMONY TAKEN IN THE 20 MATTER OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 21 2019.DATED THIS 17TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2020. 22 23 24 25 26 27 KAREN D. SCHIFF First Legal Deposition Services 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 219, Los Angeles, CA 90014 855-348-4997 1 4 23\0 5\2 752 740.1 Attachment 4D Exhibit B to Declaration of James T. Diamond, Jr. 23 t h e t xhibi 0 eclar t 0 . i ond, Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearin (T) Petitioner (Employer) a. Name:Northern California Presbyterian Homes &Services Lawyer for Petitioner (if any for this case). Name: James T Diamond Jr, State Bar No.:131525 Firm Name: Goldfarb & Lipman LLP b. Address (If you have a lawyer, give your lawyer's information.): Address: 1300 Clay Street 11th Floor City:Oakland State:CA Zip:94612 Telephone:510,/836-633.6. Fax: 510/836-1035 E-Mail Address: jdiamond@goldfarblipman.com (2) Employee (Protected Person) Full Name: Sandeep Virk (3) Respondent (Restrained Person) Full Name: Joseph Mcinerney Description: Clerk stamps date here when form is tiled. Us I "7n » :,8 #.4Jg »a,,_ "a et address;---- > Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara Civil Division 191 N. First Street San Jose, CA 95113 Fill in case number: Case Number: 114CH005337 Sex: [Xt M (3F Height:s!11w Weight1@0 Date of Birth:.6/25/1943 Hair Color: Gray Eye Color: unkn Age: 70 Race:Caucasian Home Address (if known): 30 East Rosemary Street it335 _'ity! 22ckkk Uk.as---- State:CA Zip;9Dyl_l2 Relationship to Employee: former tenant of emp (4)I Additional Protected Persons In addition to the employee, the following family or household members or other employees are protected by the orders indicated below: Full Name 8ge Household Member? Relation to Employee ]Yes CT No ]Yes J No Yes CJ No D Additional protected persons are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 4. (5) Expiration Date This Order expires at: Time:.(lam.(lp.m. or [Kl midnight on (date): >.t"-' If no expiration date is written here, this Order expires three years from the date of issuance. ; This is a Court Order. Judicial Council of California. www.co:uts.ca.gov Worknlace v··1olence Restra·,n,·n~ Order Revised January 1, 2012, Mandatory Fomy t? $%.%.S'Bess sszs as9 After Hearing (CLETS-WH ·) [E) [«i i i- vorkplace Violence Prevention) 1408/16 Mc1nern?f WV-130, Page 1 of 6 ➔ Case Number: 114CH005337 (6) Hearing a. There was a hearing on (date). 2/18/14 at(time);gm in Dept.:4 Room: - (Name of judicial officer): SCRATES PMAN(OUKIAN made the orders at the hearing. b. These people were at the hearing: (L) (X] The petitioner/employer represented by (name): Ken Yeung (2) [XI The lawyer for the petitioner/employer (name): James T Diamond Jr (3) (X] The employee (4) L] The lawyer for the employee (name). )The respondent (6) D The lawyer for the respondent (name): J Additional persons present are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 6. c. D The hearing is continued. The parties must return to court on (date):at (time).· _ ·To the Respondent: The court has issued the orders checked as granted below. If you do not obey these orders, you can be arrested and charged with a crime. You may be sent to jail for up to one year, pay a fine of up to $1,000, or both. (7) d Personal Conduct Orders a. You are ordered not to do the following things to the employee (] and to the other protected persons in@): (1) GO Harass, molest, strike, assault (sexually or otherwise), batter, abuse, destroy personal property of, or I disturb the peace of the person. (2) ~ Commit acts of violence or make threats of violence against the person. (3) q3 Follow or stalk the person during work hours or while going to or from the place of work. (4) ~ Contact the person, directly or indirectly, by any means, including but not limited to, in person, by telephone, in writing, by public or private mail, interoffice mail, by e-mail, by text message, by fax, or by other electronic means. (5) ~ Enter the person's workplace. o) 8 Take any action to obtain the person's addresses or locations. If this item is not checked, the court has found good cause not to make this order. (7) D Other (specify): D Other personal conduct orders are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 7a(7). b. Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or a process server or other person for service of legal papers related to a court case is allowed and does not violate this order. This is a Court Order. Revised January 1, 2012 Workplace Violence Restraining Order WV-130, Page 2 of 6 After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) 3 (Workplace Violence Prevention) 1408/16 McInern? Gase Numoer: 114CH005337 (8) stay-Away Order a. Youmust stay at least LU yards away from (Check all that apply). (1) ~ a)y (3) ~ « 0 (5) D (6) 0 ? The employee (7) D The employee's children's place of child care Each other protected person listed in(@) (8) (KP The employee's vehicle The employee's workplace (9) (] Other (specify): The employee's home The employee's school The employee's children's school b. This stay-away order does not prevent you from going to or from your home or place of employment. (9) No Guns or Other Firearms and Ammunition a. You cannot own, possess, have, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or in any other way get guns, other firearms, or ammunition. b. If you have not already done so, you must: (1) Sell to a I icensed gun dealer or tum in to a law enforcement agency any guns or other firearms in your immediate possession or control. This must be done within 24 hours of being served with this Order. (2) File a receipt with the court within 48 hours of receiving this Order that proves guns have been turned in or sold. (You may use Form WV-800, Proof of Firearms Turned In or Sold, for the receipt.) c. D The court has received information that you own or possess a firearm. (io) c costs You must pay the fol lowing a.mounts for costs to the petitioner: ltem Amount Item Amount s s s 130 $ s s D Additional items and amounts are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 10. (11) other Orders «pecif)»» LJ Additional orders are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 11. This is a Court Order. Rovised January 1, 2012 Workplace Violence Restraining Order wv-13o, Page 3of6 After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) 1408/16 McInernlo Gase Number; 114CHO 053 3 7 To the Petitioner: (12) Mandatory Entry of Order Into CARPOS Through CLETS This Order must be entered into the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS) through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). (Check one): a. The clerk will enter this Order and its proof-of-service form into CAR.POS. b. 9" The clerk will transmit this Order and its proof-of-service form to a law enforcement agency to be entered into CARPOS. c. By the close of business on the date that this Order is made, the petitioner or the petitioner's lawyer should deliver a copy of the Order and its proof-of-service form to the law enforcement agency listed below to enter into CARPOS: Name of Law Enforcement Agency Address (City, State, Zip) D Additional law enforcement agencies are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 12. (is) service of Order on Responden a g Bo the respondent and the employee attended the hearing. No other proof of service is needed. b. D The respondent did not attend the hearing. (l) l Proof of service of Form WV-110, Temporary Restraining Order, was presented to the court. The judge's orders in this form are the same as in Form WV-1IO except for the expiration date. The respondent must be served with this Order. Service may be by mail. (2) D The judge's orders in this form are different from the temporary restraining orders in Form WV-110. Someone-but not the petitioner or anyone protected by this Order-> must personally serve a copy of this order on the respondent. (14) No Fee to Serve Respondent The sheriff or marshal will serve this Order without charge because the Order is based on unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or stalking. G:v Number of pages attached to this Order, if any: _ Date: .Judicial SOCRATES P MANOUKIAN This is a Court Order. Revised January 1, 2012 Workplace Violence Restraining Order wV.13o, Page 4ot6 After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) ➔ (Workplace Violence Prevention) 1408/16 McInern&&/ Gase Nuoer; 114CHO05337 Warning and Notice to the Respondent You Cannot Have Guns or Firearms You cannot own, have, possess, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or otherwise get guns, other firearms, or ammunition while this Order is in effect. Ifyou do, you can go to jail and pay a $1,000 fine. You must sell to a licensed gun dealer or turn in to a law enforcement agency any guns or other firearms that you have or control as stated in item (9). The court will require you to prove that you did so. Instructions for Law Enforcement . Enforcing the Restraining Order This Order is enforceable by any law enforcement agency that has received the Order, is shown a copy of the Order, or has verified its existence on the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS). If the law enforcement agency has not received proof of service on the restrained person, and the restrained person was not present at the court hearing, the agency must advise the restrained person of the terms of the Order and then must enforce it. Violations of this Order are subject to criminal penalties. Start Date and End Date of Orders This Order starts on the date next to the judge's signature on page 4 and ends on the expiration date in item(5) on page 1. Arrest Required If Order Is Violated If an officer has probable cause· to believe that the restrained person had notice of this order and has disobeyed it, the officer must arrest the restrained person. (Pen. Code,§§ 836(c)(l), 1370l(b).) A violation of the order may be a violation of Penal Code section 166 or 273 .6. Agencies are encouraged to enter violation messages into CARPOS. Notice/Proof of Service The law enforcement agency must first determine if the restrained person had notice of the orders. Consider the restrained person served (given notice) if (Pen. Code, $ 836(c)(2)): • The officer sees a copy of the Proof of Service or confirms that the Proof of Service is on file; or • The restrained person was at the restraining order hearing or was informed of the order by an officer. An officer can obtain information about the contents of the order and proof of service in CARPOS. If proof of service on the restrained person cannot be verified and the restrained person was not present at the court hearing, the agency must advise the restrained person of the terms of the order and then enforce it. If the Protected Person Contacts the Restrained Person Even if the protected person invites or consents to contact with the restrained person, this Order remains in effect and must be enforced. The protected person cannot be arrested for inviting or consenting to contact with the restrained person. The orders can be changed only by another court order. (Pen. Code,§ 1371 0(b).) .This is a Court Order. Revised January 1, 2012 Workplace Violence Restraining Order WV-13o, Page 5 of6 After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) ➔ (Workplace Violence Prevention) 1408/16 McInerne28 case Numoer; 114CH005337 Conflicting Orders A protective order issued in a criminal case on Form CR-161 takes precedence in enforcement over any conflicting civil court order. (Pen. Code,§ 136.2(e)(2).) Any nonconflicting terms of the civil restraining order remain in full force. An Emergency Protective Order (Form EPO-001) that is in effect between the same parties and is more restrictive than other restraining orders takes precedence over all other restraining orders. (Pen. Code, § I 36.2.) Clerk's Certificate [seal} (Clerk will fill out this part.) -Clerk's Certificate- I certify that this Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing is a true and correct copy of the original on file in the court. (Clerk,by.,Deputy This is a Court Order. Revised January 1, 2012 Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-WHO) (Workplace Violence Prevention) WV-130, Page 6 of 6 1408/16 McInerne29 Attachment 4D Exhibit C to Declaration of James T. Diamond, Jr. 30 t h e t xhibi eclarat 0 . i ond, . O Filed 12/18/19 Covia Communities v. Mcinerney CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1 15. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COVIA COMMUNITIES, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. JOSEPH McINERNEY, Defendant and Appellant. H04494 1 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 17CH007456) Respondent Covia Communities (Covia) contracts to provide services at Town Park Towers, an apartment complex where appellant Joseph Mcinerney lived until he was evicted in 2013. In 2014, the owner of Town Park Towers, Northern California Presbyterian Homes and Services (Presbyterian), obtained a three-year workplace violence restraining order against Mcinerney after he stalked and harassed S.V.1 S.V. was an employee who worked at Town Park Towers, first for Presbyterian, and then for Covia. Just over a month after the first restraining order expired, Covia sought a second restraining order against Mclnerney, alleging he had resumed stalking and harassing S.V. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Covia 's petition and issued a second, three-year restraining order against Mclnerney. Mclnerney, proceeding in propria persona, has appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. ' To protect personal privacy interests, we refer to the protected party and witnesses by their initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).) 31 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. First Restraining Order In February 2014, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, the trial court issued a three-year workplace violence restraining order (the first restraining order) against Mclnerney.2 Mclnerney appealed the issuance of the first restraining order. In an unpublished opinion, this court recited the background of that order as follows: "On January 10, 2014, Presbyterian filed a petition for a workplace violence restraining order(§ 527.8) against Mclnerney. The petition alleged that [S.V.], a security guard at the Town Park Towers apartment complex, was in need of protection from Mclncmcy because he was stalking and harassing her. "Attached to the petition was a signed declaration from [S.V.] detailing the alleged harassment. [S.V.] started working at Town Park Towers in 2009. Shortly after she began working at the apartment complex, Mclnerney started engaging in substantial unwelcome conduct towards her. At the time, Mcinerney was a tenant at the complex. [S.V.] said that Mcinerney followed her, made suggestive comments to her, and took photos of her with his camera without her permission. Mclnerney would sometimes wait in the parking lot before she began her shift and would follow her into the offices. Town Park Towers began the process of evicting Mclnerney from his apartment in 2012, and [S.V.] said that Mclnerney became less aggressive toward her after the eviction process began. [S.V.], however, recounted one incident where Mclnerney appeared at Town Park Towers, informed [S. V.] that he was moving out, and then proceeded to take pictures of her even after [S.V.] told him to stop. [S.V.] called the police and an officer took Mclnerney away. [S. V .] was unaware of any criminal proceedings that may have come from the incident. After he was evicted, Mclnerney came to the apartment complex twice and stared at [S.V.] through the window for approximately IO minutes until another 2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 32 employee asked him to leave. Another time, Mclnerney came by the apartment complex asking for [S.V.]. "After Presbyterian filed its initial petition, the trial court granted its request for a temporary restraining order against Mclncrney and a hearing was scheduled. Mclnerney filed several oppositions to Presbyterian's section 527.8 petition. "The hearing on the petition was held on February 18,2014. [S.V.] was present at the hearing and testified that Mclnerney had been following her, staring at her, and making inappropriate comments to her since she began working at Town Park Towers. [S.V.] stated rhat Mclnerney's behavior had continued for about four years. In response to [S.V.]'s testimony, Mclnerney made a few arguments to the trial court, asserting that he did not believe that [S.V.)'s declaration was truthful. "Afterwards, the trial court granted Presbyterian's petition for a workplace violence restraining order and issued an injunction prohibiting Mcinerney from going within 50 yards of Town Park Towers and [S.V.) for three years." (Northern California Presbyterian Homes and Services v. Mclnerney (May 12, 2016, H041335) [nonpub. opn.] [at p.1].)° The first restraining order expired on its own terms on February 18, 2017, B. Second Restraining Order The trial court issued a second, three-year restraining order against Mclnerney on April 18, 2017 (the second restraining order). Covia (formerly known as Episcopal Senior Communities, or ESC) filed the petition for workplace violence restraining orders against Mclncrney on March 28, 2017, again listing S.V. as the employee in need of protection. After the first restraining order was issued, Presbyterian contracted with 3 "Citation of our prior unpublished opinion docs not violate California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) because '[w]e... cite the decision to explain the factual background of the case and not as legal authority.' [Citation.]." (The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Com. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 945,951, fn. 3.) 3 33 Covia to provide management services at another apartment complex, Shires Memorial; S.V, worked for Covia at Shires Memorial, but frequently attended meetings and trainings at Town Park Towers, the location of her supervisor, K. Y., a Presbyterian employee. Covia submitted declarations from S.V. and KY. with the petition, as well as a declaration from J.M., a maintenance mechanic at Town Park Towers. JM. declared that on February 24, 2017, a security guard notified J.M. that a man was at the front reception desk of Town Park Towers, asking about a Presbyterian employee. When J.M. approached the man, who he later learned was Mcnerney, Mclnerney asked for information about S.V., inquiring whether she still worked at Town Park Towers, and if not, where she was working now. J.M. described Mclnerney as "really persistent, asking for information on [S.V.] and her whereabouts for ten minutes." JM. then asked Mclnerney to leave, indicating he could not provide information about the staff. K. Y. declared that Mcinerney returned to Town Park Towers on March 13, 2017; staff notified K.Y. that Mclnerney was in the building, but he exited before K.Y. could speak to him. K.Y. caught up to Mclnerney in the parking lot, asking Mclnerney why he came to the building; Mclnerney informed K.Y. he wanted to see S.V. At one point during their conversation, Mclnerney told K.Y. "words to the effect that since [Presbyterian] does not have a restraining order anymore, he can walk into [the) building any time wants, and he suggested that [K.Y.] call the police to kick him out." S.V. did not have any direct contact with Mclnerney between the expiration of the first restraining order and the petition for the second. However, in addition to the events described by JM. and K.Y., S.V. learned that Mcinerney "visited a house at an address [she] had only used as a mailing address to try to track [her] down"; Mcinerney did so on March 13, 2017, the same day K.Y. spoke with him in the Town Park Towers parking lot. S. V. does not know how Mcinerney found that address, as she had never lived there and only used it as a mailing address. According to S.V., Mclnerney spoke to one of the 4 34 "young residents" who lives at the house, asking whether S.V. lived there. When the resident indicated that S.V. did not live at the address, Mclnerney left a phone number where he could be reached. In support of the petition for the second restraining order, S. V. indicated that Mcinerney's conduct since the expiration of the first restraining order caused a recurrence of the fear and distress caused by the events that led to the issuance of the initial restraining order. S.V. described Mclnerney's prior conduct as having caused her great stress; at the initial restraining order hearing she testified that she would often drive home crying, she would call in sick to work due to Mclnerney's conduct, and she suffered from nightmares that something would happen if she did go to work. S.Y. noted that both during his testimony at the hearing on the first restraining order, and in the pleadings he filed to appeal the first restraining order, Mclnerney made statements that further suggested he was obsessed with S.V. At the February 18, 2014 hearing, he gave the following testimony as to why he was taking pictures of S. V.: "I did that because she wouldn't give me a picture of her own. I told her that if I lost contact with her, it would be very detrimental to me, and-because she has this magnetism. She could have been a movie star, and she's better than anybody Pve seen in a movie. [{] I'm not talking about- -I'rn not suggesting that she become a movie star, but l'm saying that she has that magnetism, which I-I seldom run into people. I told her only about four other persons." In an appellate brief filed when he challenged the first restraining order, Mclnemey described S.Y. as a "noir femme fatalee [sic). Unfortunately anyone caught in her web is likely to be strangled by sheer w exascerbation [sic] in trying to reach her. The fact of her magnetism is self-evident and respondent [Mclnerney] couldn't break free of her even if he wanted which he doesn't for obvious reasons." S.Y. declared that Mclnemey's prior behavior, coupled with the three incidents in February and March 2017, left her feeling threatened and afraid, causing her to "suffer serious emotional distress and mental suffering." She believed that Mclnerney would 5 35 continue to engage in the "stalking, hostile and intimidating conduct" towards her if the court did not again restrain him, which would cause S.V, to continue to live in fear and diminish the quality of her life. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against Mclnerney based on the allegations in the petition and supporting declarations. Covia personally served the temporary order, along with the petition and supporting declarations, on Mclnerney on April 6, 2017, giving him notice that the court would hold a hearing on the petition on April 18, 2017., Mclnerney thereafter filed a demurrer to the petition, as well as a motion to strike the petition, each of which was set for hearing in May 2017. In support of the demurrer, respondent argued that: the petition was not verified or properly executed; the petition did not state facts sufficient to support a cause of action; the petition was premature and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it; the events described in the petition pertained to Town Park Towers, not Covia/ESC; and S.V.'s signatures on two different pleadings did not match. In the motion to strike, McJnerney additionally contended the petition was not filed in conformity or drawn in conformity with the law," as the events took place at the premises of S.V.'s former employer, Town Park Towers/ Presbyterian, and not her current employer, Covia/ ESC. The trial court heard Covia's petition for a workplace violence restraining order on April 18, 2017. At the outset, McI nerney argued the trial court was required to conduct the hearing on his demurrer and motion to strike before hearing the petition. While the court indicated that neither a demurrer nor a motion to strike pertained to a petition for such a restraining order, it also confirmed it read both pleadings and would allow Mcinerney to raise any of the issues from his demurrer and motion to strike pleadings during the hearing. Mclnerney argued that the signatures S.V. provided on various pleadings did not match, that the petition and declarations were not properly verified or executed, that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because the events 6 36 did not take place at S.V.'s present place of employment, that S.V.'s testimony was falsified or given under duress, and that the court could not restrain future contact. He again objected to the court conducting a hearing on the merits of the. petition prior to the scheduled hearing on the motion to strike. Covia's attorney made an offer of proof regarding the information S.V. provided in her declaration; S.V., who was present at the hearing, confirmed that the signature on the declaration was hers, and that the information set forth in the declaration was true and correct, representing the testimony she would give if called to do so. Mclnerney testified that he did go to S.V.'s "former employer ... just after the end of the extension" and had asked K.Y. about S.V. K.Y. also appeared at the hearing, confirming that the statements he made in his declaration were true and correct; he then testified in conformance with his declaration. Mclnerney had the opportunity to question both S.V. and K.Y. S.V. denied she was coerced by Covia or its attorney into making the statements in her declaration. Mcinerney questioned S.V.'s relationship with George Lucas; S.V. confirmed that she did not have a relationship with Lucas or receive any money from Lucas.4 Mclnerney asked KY. questions to confirm whether Mclnemey entered the building; K.Y. clarified that staff members told him Mclnerney was in the building. The trial court found S.V. and K.Y. to be credible witnesses, accepting both their live testimony and the testimony in their declarations to be true and correct. The court found clear and convincing evidence of a course of conduct that caused S.V. to fear for her safety and the safety of her workplace; it also found Mclnerney's actions served no legitimate purpose. The trial court granted the restraining order, protecting S.V. and the two buildings at which she worked, Shires Memorial and Town Park Towers, as well as 4 Mclnerncy references Lucas at several points in his opening brief. It is unclear from the record or pleadings on appeal how Lucas is involved in this matter, if at all. 7 37 S.V.'s home. Mclnerney filed a timely notice of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(0).) II. DISCUSSION A. Defects in Mcinerney's Brief Covia argues Mclnerney waived most if not all of his arguments by failing to cite appropriate legal authority and/or provide argument. Where a point is merely asserted ... without any argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion." (People v. Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 768, 783, disapproved of on another ground in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, fn. 3.) "An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions. This burden requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. 'Issues do not have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are) ... waived.' [Citation.] I is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).) We acknowledge that Mclnerney is representing himself on appeal. However, he is not exempt from court rules. A party representing him or herself on appeal "is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys." (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) Like represented litigants, Mclnerney must follow the appropriate appellate procedures. (wosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) 5 The restraining order is appealable as an order granting an injunction under section 904. l, subdivision (a)(6). 8 38 While many of his arguments are perfunctory, and other claims are not comprehensible, Mcinerney's opening brief does contain some legal analysis. We therefore address the merits of those clairns.7 Mcinerney claims the petition should not have been granted because: ( 1) the court erred in hearing the petition before it heard his demurrer and motion to strike; (2) the petition for a restraining order was not verified and S.V.'s signature on the attached declaration was invalid; (3) Covia did not submit a memorandum of points and authorities with the petition; (4) the alleged harassment did not occur on Covia's premises, such that the petition was premature and the trial court was without jurisdiction; (S) the trial court improperly considered evidence relating to the first restraining order, and there was insufficient evidence of events occurring after expiration of that order to support the second restraining order; (6) the scope of the second restraining order violates Mclnerney's First Amendment rights as it precludes him from accessing the county law library; and, (7) there was an "obvious" and "deliberate miscarriage of justice" on the part of the judge. We will address these arguments in turn. "Covia notes that Mclnerney's brief on appeal contains derisive language directed toward Covia, its employees and attorney, as well as toward the trial court. There can be no doubt of the power of an appellate court to strike from its files a brief or other document containing disrespectful, scandalous, or abusive language directed against the courts, officials, or litigants, or to take such other action as the circumstances may require." (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 307, 314.) Despite some of the questionable language, we decline to exercise our discretion to strike Mclnerney's briefs. ' We will not address Mcinerney's request that we reverse the restraining order and instead order dismissal of the underlying action based on his allegation that S.V. no longer works for Covia. With limited exceptions that do not apply in this case, on appeal we disregard arguments relying on facts outside the record and matters that occurred after rendition of the order being appealed. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 [It is an elementary rule of appellate procedure that, when reviewing the correctness of a trial court's judgment, an appcl late court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered."].) 9 39 B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Second Workplace Violence Restraining Order 1. General Legal Principles "Section 527.8, the Workplace Violence Safety Act, enables an employer to seek an injunction to prevent violence or threatened violence against its employees." (City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 536.) In relevant part, section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides that [a]ny employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer." Section 527.8, subdivision (j) provides that [i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence." Under the statute, ' 'Unlawful violence' " is defined as any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self defense or defense of others." ($ 527.8, subd. (b)(7).) Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a) defines stalking in pertinent part as "[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family....° "Credible threat of violence' is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose." ($ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) " Course of conduct' is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including 1 0 40 following or stalking an employee to or from the place of work; entering the workplace; following an employee during hours of employment; making telephone calls to an employee; or sending correspondence lo an employee by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of the public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or computer email." (§ 527.8, subd. (6)(1).) In addition to the above, a petitioner "must establish by clear and convincing evidence ... that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee if a prohibitory injunction were not issued due to the reasonable probability unlawful violence will occur in the future." (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 335, fn. omitted (Scripps).) In considering a petition under section 527.8, the trial court must "receive any testimony that is relevant...." ($ 527.8, subd. (j).) "The plain language of this provision suggests that the Legislature intended to permit a trial court to consider all relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, when deciding whether to issue an injunction to prevent workplace violence pursuant to section 527.8.° (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550,557 (Kaiser).) Proceedings under section 527 .8 are intended to parallel those for general civil harassment restraining orders under section 527.6, "which are procedurally truncated, expedited, and intended to provide quick relief to victims of civil harassment. [Citations.) Indeed, a proceeding for an injunction under section 527.6 (and, correspondingly, $ 527.8), need not proceed as a 'full-fledged evidentiary hearing with oral testimony from all sides.' [Citation.] Rather, the hearing may be based on affidavits or declarations, which are themselves a form of hearsay evidence." (Kaiser, supra, at p. 557.) On appeal, we generally review an injunction issued under section 527.8 to determine whether the necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, resolving all factual conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's findings. [Citation.] However, '[t]he question 11 41 whether the order was authorized under the statute, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is reviewed de novo.' [Citation.]" (Severson Werson, P.C.v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944 (Severson).) With these principles in mind, we turn to Mclnerney's arguments. 2. Mcinerney's Demurrer and Motion to Strike Mclnerney contends the trial court erred when it proceeded with the hearing on Covia's workplace violence restraining order petition, as the scheduled hearing on Mclnerney's demurrer to the petition and motion to strike the petition had not yet taken place. On appeal, Mcnerney does not cite any legal authority supporting his contention. Neither procedure is applicable to a petition for a workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8. Under section 430.10, a party against whom a "complaint" has been filed can demur on one of several enumerated grounds, including lack of jurisdiction, if the ground for objection appears on the face of the complaint. ($$ 430.10, subd. (a), 430.30, subd. (a).) Under section 435, subdivision (b)(l), ''[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof..." Neither statute defines "pleadings." However, sections 430.10 and 435 are located within Title 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled, "Of the Pleadings in Civil Actions." Sections 420 and 422.10 within Title 6 provide the definition of pleadings. ·"The pleadings are the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, for the judgment of the Court." (§ 420.) "The pleadings allowed in civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross- complaints." ($ 422.10.) Petitions are not included in section 422.10. A party seeking a workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8 does not file a complaint seeking judgment from the court; rather, the employer files a petition seeking injunctive relief. Section 527.8 does not explicitly authorize a responding party to file a demurrer to the petition or a motion to strike the petition for a workplace violence restraining order. Nor do the statutes governing demurrers(§ 430.10) or 12 42 motions to strike ($ 435, subd. (a)(l)) include petitions in any definition of a complaint. In contrast, a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP law ($ 425.16), defines a "complaint" " to include a " cross-complaint' " and a" petition.' " ($ 425.16, subd. (h).) Cases have explicitly held that the anti-SLAPP motion to strike is available in a request for a civil harassment or workplace violence restraining order under sections 527.6 and 527.8 only because section 425.16, which describes the anti-SLAPP law, includes petitions in its definition of a complaint. (City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League (2006) 135 Cal .App.4th 606, 617, disapproved of on other grounds by City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409,420, fn. 10 [applying anti-SLAPP motion to $ 527.8]; Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635,646 [applying anti-SLAPP motion to $ 527.6].) As neither section 430.10 nor section 435 include petitions in their provisions, we conclude that such procedures are not available to challenge a workplace violence restraining order petition under section 527.8. As a result, the·trial court did not err when it proceeded with the hearing on the petition for a workplace violence restraining order prior to the date set for the hearings on Mcinerney's motion to strike and demurrer. However, even if such procedures did apply here, the trial court reviewed both the motion to strike and demurrer prior to the hearing on the petition under section 527.8, and allowed Mclnerney to present argument at the hearing on the issues raised in his demurrer and motion to strike. Although the trial court did not explicitly rule on Mcinerney's claims, we draw all reasonable inferences necessary to support the court's order, and thus infer the trial court rejccted Mcinerney 's claims of defect and objections. (Severson, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 944.) As discussed in detail below, substantial evidence supports this inference. 13 43 • 3. Covia's Petition was Appropriately Executed and Did Not Require Verification Mcinerney argues that the petition filed under section 527.8 must be verified, and the trial court's order should be reversed because the petition submitted by Covia was not verified. Construing his claim as an argument that the petition and the accompanying declaration had to be declared true under penalty of perjury ($ 2015.5), we find his argument to be without merit. The record reflects that the petition was signed by the attorney representing Covia. S.V.'s declaration was signed under penalty of perjury by S.V. herself; K.Y. and J.M. also signed their declarations under penalty of perjury. Section 128.7, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, "Except when otherwise provided by law, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit." Section 527.8 does not require verification of the petition seeking a workplace violence restraining order. The statute requires a "declaration" showing reasonable proof that an employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence in order to obtain a temporary restraining order. ($527.8, subd. (e).) Covia submitted three such declarations with its petition. Mclnerncy has not cited any additional legal authority requiring additional verification of the petition, nor are we aware of any such authority. Mcinerney claims that S.V.'s signature, which does not legibly spell out her name, is not sufficient to support her declaration, as it appears to be him to be comprised only of her initials, and not her full name. Moreover, he argues that S.V's signature is noticeably different on different pleadings, such that it must be falsified. Mcinerney raised these same claims in his demurrer, which the trial court considered as part of the hearing on the petition. Since the court granted the petition, we infer that it made a factual finding that the signature was authentic and rejected Mcinerney's claim to the contrary. We review a trial court's factual findings, express or implied, for substantial evidence. (See In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 94; SFPP v 14 44 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 461-462.) Moreover, the trial court is the final arbiter of credibility; we do not disturb its credibility findings on appeal. (Un re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.Sth 298, 319.) Aside from Mclnerney's unsubstantiated claim that S.V's signature is not genuine, there is no evidence to show that the signature was not authentic; S.V, testified to the contrary at the hearing, and the trial court found her to be a credible witness. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that the signature was genuine. 4. Section 527.8 Does Not Require a Memorandum of Points and Authorities Citing section 527,8 Mclnerney argues Covia was required to file a memorandum of points and authorities with its petition for a workplace violence restraining order. The California Rules of Court reveal the error in Mclnerney 's argument: rules 3 .1114( a)(l 0) and former 3.1152(b) (renumbered to 3.1160(b) eff. Jan. 1, 2019), explicitly exclude petitions for workplace violence restraining orders from other provisions of the statutes or rules requiring a memorandum of points and authorities. 5. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Hear the Petition Mcinerney argues the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to hear the petition, and that the petition was "premature° because the events alleged therein did not take place on Covia's premises. We disagree on both counts.9 8 This statute authorizes the issuance of a preliminary injunction at any time before judgment where appropriate. ($ 527, subd. (a).) Where the court issues a temporary restraining order without notice to a party, the party obtaining the order must serve the complaint and other pleadings, including "a copy of the points and authorities in support of the application," within a specified time. ($ 527, subd. (d)(2).) Section 527.8 does not include a similar requirement. " For the first time in his reply brief, Mcinerney claims S.V. had to file a new request under section 527.6,or seek renewal of the first restraining order pursuant to section 527.8, subdivision (k)(l), rather than seek a new workplace violence restraining order. We do not consider legal arguments raised for the first time in Mclnerney's reply 15 45 a. The Trial Court had Personal Jurisdiction Over McInerney Mclnerney argues the trial court lacked "fundamental... personal jurisdiction over the parties," without citation to legal authority or the record. Covia had the petition and supporting documents personally served on Mclnerney in California, in compliance with the notice requirements of section 527.8, thus establishing personal jurisdiction over him. (Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal. (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 610-611].) Mcinerney does not provide evidence or legal argument to suggest otherwise. b. Town Park Towers was S.V.'s ®Workplace" Mclnerney further argues the case is "premature" because none of his alleged conduct took place on Covia's property; rather it occurred at Town Park Towers, owned by Presbyterian. Mclnerney does not cite any legal authority in support of this contention. Section 527 .8 provides that an employer can seek a restraining order against unlawful violence or credible acts of violence "that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace .... " ($ 527.8, subd. (a).) The statute does not define "workplace." To interpret the statute, we must determine the Legislature's intent to effectuate its purpose, first by examining the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. (Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 540.) If the language is clear, we follow that plain meaning unless doing so would result in absurd, unintended consequences. (Ibid.) Here, the plain meaning of the term "workplace" supports the trial court's issuance of a workplace violence restraining order against Mclnerney. ·Workplace" is commonly understood as covering any place where work is performed. This is especially true where worker health and safety is concerned. (Pulaski v. California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (1999) 75 brief, as he has not identified any good cause for failing to raise the arguments in his opening brief. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4; Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 973.) 16 46 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1339 (Pulaski)) S.N.'s work was performed, in part, at Town Park Towers, as confirmed by K.Y., S.V.'s supervisor. The plain meaning of the term as used in section 527.8 does not limit "workplace" to one location. In fact, section 527.8, subdivision (a), clearly anticipates situations where an employer maintains more than one workplace, as it allows the employer to seek orders protecting other employees at other workplaces of the employer," in addition to orders protecting the subject employee. (Italics added.) Nor does the plain meaning of "workplace" require that the employer own the subject property. Section 527.8, subdivision (b)(3), defines " [e]mployer' " and [e]mployee' " by reference to Labor Code section 350, which provides that '[e]mployer' means every person engaged in any business or enterprise in this state that has one or more persons in service under any appointment, contract of hire, or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, irrespective of whether the person is the owner of the business or is operating on a concessionaire or other basis." (Lab. Code, $ 350, subd. (a).) " 'Business' means any business establishment or enterprise, regardless of where conducted." (Lab. Code,§ 350, subd. (f), italics added.) The Labor Code thus provides an employer and its business are not tied to one particular location, or to a location owned by the employer. Notably, for purposes of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Lab. Code, $ 6300, et seq.), the term" '[p]lace of employment' is defined as "any place, and the premises appurtenant thereto, where employment is carried on...." (Lab. Code, $ 6303, subd. (a).)" Substantial evidence supports a finding that Town Park Towers is one of two locations where S.V. performed her work and carried on her employment. The trial court properly determined Covia I0 ··[W]e find no sound basis for inferring that workplace' is a less inclusive term than 'place of employment' or that the two terms were not used interchangeably by the Legislature [in occupational provisions of the Labor Code]." (Pulaski, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1340.) 17 47 could seek a restraining order based on Mclnerney 's conduct carried out at Town Park Towers. 6. The Trial Court Considered Proper, Sufficient Evidence to Issue the Restraining Order In support of the petition for the second restraining order, S.V. described the events leading to the issuance of the first restraining order. On appeal, Mclnerney contends the trial court erred in considering this information, as Covia was not the petitioner in the first restraining order petition. Regarding the evidence of events occurring after the expiration of the first restraining order, Mcinerney contends there was no eyewitness testimony or documentary evidence, such as security camera footage, to support S.V.'s accusations. He thus believes the trial court erred in issuing the second restraining order. We disagree and affirm the order. Mcinerney argues the trial court could not consider the events leading to the issuance of the first restraining order because Covia was not the petitioner in that matter. However, the law is clear that the trial court can consider evidence from a since-expired restraining order in evaluating a subsequent request involving the same protected and restrained parties. "While it is true that an injunction restraining future conduct is authorized by section 527.6 only when it appears from the evidence that the harassment is likely to recur in the future [citation], in evaluating the likelihood that the harassment will continue the court was not limited to events that occurred after the first restraining order was entered. The lapse of the first harassment restraining order did not erase the facts on which the order was based, and did not preclude the court from considering the existence of those facts in evaluating the need for a new order. Nor was the court restricted as to the nature of the evidence from which it could draw an inference of a likelihood that the harassment would resume; the court could consider any evidence showing a likelihood of future harassment, including evidence of conduct that might not itself constitute harassment. ($ 527.6, subcl. (i) [in determining whether restraining order is needed, court 18 48 'shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry'].) Behavior that may not alone constitute an intentionally harassing course of conduct logically still might show an intention to resume or continue an already-established course of harassing conduct." (R. D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 189-190 (R.D. ).) Although R.D. concerns application of section 527.6, which governs requests for civil harassment restraining orders, rather than section 527.8, the principles at issue are the same. As was true in R.D., in the instant matter, Covia had to show that S.V. would suffer harm due to the reasonable probability that unlawful violence or credible threats of unlawful violence would occur in the future. (Scripps, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.) Under both section 527 .6, subdivision (i), and 527.8, subdivision (j), the trial court must receive "any testimony that is relevant...." Thus, the court had to consider whether Mdnerney's "recent conduct, viewed in the context of [his] record of harassment, was sufficient to indicate that [he) was likely to harass [S.V.] in the future. [Citation.] (R.D., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.) There is substantial evidence to support a finding that Mclnerney engaged in unlawful violence or credible threats of violence, as defined under the relevant statutes, after the issuance of the first restraining order. Viewed in the context of the events preceding the request for the first restraining order, the evidence was sufficient to indicate that Mclnerney was likely to stalk or harass S.V. in the future. S.V, recounted the allegations leading to the issuance of the first restraining order in her declaration in support of the second order, stating Mclnerney followed her, made suggestive comments to her, took pictures of her without her permission and over her objection, refused to leave her desk when asked to do so, waited for her in the parking lot at the start of her shift, and stared at her through the windows of Town Park Towers. Although Mclnerney did not violate the first restraining order while it was in effect, in July 2015, almost a year-and-a-half after the court issued the first order, Mcinerney signaled his continuing 1 9 49 infatuation with S.V. in his opening brief in the appeal of that order, stating, "The fact of her magnetism is self-evident and respondent [Mcinerney] couldn't break free of her even if he wanted which he doesn't for obvious reasons." (Italics added.) Mclnerney waited less than a week after the first order expired to go to Town Park Towers and ask about S.V., being "very persistent" in doing so. He went back to Town Park Towers approximately three weeks later and again asked about S.V., indicating he wanted to see her. Mclnerney made clear his belief he could enter the premises any time he wanted, as the restraining order had expired, suggesting that K. Y. would have to call the police to compel him to leave. On the same day Mclnerney spoke to K.Y., he visited a residence affiliated with S.V., leaving a his phone number with a young resident of the home for S.V. to call him. The court received evidence of these three incidents that occurred after the expiration of the first restraining order from appropriate sources. K. Y. was an eyewitness, as he spoke to Mclnerney in Town Park Towers' parking lot. J.M., also an eyewitness, provided a declaration, which the court was authorized to consider. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 557.) While S.V.'s declaration and testimony relating to the three incidents occurring after the expiration of the first restraining order include hearsay statements, the trial court is allowed to consider hearsay evidence in evaluating a request for a workplace violence restraining order. (§ 527.8, subd. (j); Kaiser, supra, 20 I Cal.App.4th at p. 557.) This evidence shows Mclnerney engaged in a course of conduct, including entering S.V.'s workplace and corresponding with her through a "young resident" at her former mailing address, that would place a reasonable person in fear for her safety. ($ 527.8, subd. (b).) The three incidents occurring after the expiration of the first restraining order, taken in context of Mclnerney's previous stalking and harassing of S.Y., constituted unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence, which reasonably placed S.V. in fear of her safety, as she attested in her supporting declaration, and which served no legitimate 20 50 purpose. Moreover, the evidence showed a reasonable probability that unlawful violence or credible threats of unlawful violence would occur in the future. The evidence presented was sufficient for the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that an injunction should issue under section 527.8. ($ 527.8, subd. (j).) 7. The Restraining Order Does Not Violate Mcinerney's First Amendment Rights Mcinerney suggests the terms of the second restraining order prevent him from accessing the county law library; the order requires him to stay at least 300 yards away from S.V., her workplace (with specific addresses listed), home and vehicle. McJnerney cites the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta v. California" for the proposition that he needs access to the library as a self-represented litigant "in order to legitimize the right to petition the government under the First Amendment to redress grievances." Mcinerney does not cite to any portion of the record confirming the restraining order limits his access to the county law library. Nor does he cite additional legal authority aside from the Supreme Court case. In Faretta v. California (1975)422 U.S. 806, 834-835, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. The case at bar is not a criminal matter. Farella did not involve the issuance of a restraining order. Mclnerney has not explained how the ruling in Farella, when applied to the facts of the matter before us, reveals an error in the trial court's issuance of the restraining order. As we already noted, [i]t is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Benach v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.) Mcinerney has not shown reason to reverse the trial court's order on the basis that its scope allegedly includes the county law library. 21 51 8. There Is No Evidence The Trial Judge Committed an 'Obvious" or "Dlib Ar: · of.J • eliberate Miscarriage 0j 'ustice Mcinerney generally argues that the trial judge committed an obvious or "deliberate miscarriage of justice," without citation to factual or legal authority. As discussed above, there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's issuance of the restraining order under section 527.8. Mclnerney has not cited to any portion of the record showing bias or other impropriety on the trial judge's part. [A]dverse or erroneous rulings, especially those that are subject to review, do not establish a charge of judicial bias." (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112; Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795-796.) III. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. 22 52 Greenwood, P.J. WE CONCUR: Grover, J. Danner, J. Covia Communities v. Mcinerney No. H044941 53 r ood, PJ.” CUR: rover, ‘ anner, o' mmuniti . cl m o. O 9 1