Response Reply

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.September 21, 2016

JAMES McMANIS(40958) TYLER ATKINSON (257997) JAMES GIACCHETTI (307117) McMANISFAULKNER a Professional Corporation 50 West San Fernando Street, 10'" Floor San Jose, California 95113 Telephone: (408) 279-8700 Facsimile: (408) 279-3244 Email: jgiacchetti@mcmanislaw.corn Attorneys for Plaintiff, MICHAELHANNEKEN 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MICHAELHANNEKEN, Plaintiff, vs. LELANDSTANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY,WILLIAMJ. PERRY, DOES 1-50, Defendants. Case No.: 16CV300285 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS Date: April 16, 2019 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept. 3 Judge: The Hon Patricia M. Lucas I REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CY300285 Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 4/9/2019 3:45 PM Reviewed By: R. Burciaga Case #16CV300285 Envelope: 2738158 16CV300285 Santa Clara - Civil R. Burciaga TABLEOF CONTENTS REPLY ARGUMENT I. DEFENDANTS BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO ALL COST ITEMS. DEFENDANTS FAILTO PROVE EXPERT AND STAFF FEES .... DEFENDANTS'EQUEST FOR PROHIBITDED ITEMS SHOULD BE DENIED . 10 A. Defendants Cannot Recover Expert Fees Under Section 1033.5.. B. Defendants Cannot Recover Transcript Costs Under Section 1033.5.. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IV CONCLUSION. DEFENDANTS'LAIMEDDISCRETIONARY COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED. A. The Court Should Tax Defendants'laimed Expert Fees...... l. AllofMr. Gotthardt's Fees Should be Taxed.... 2. Mr. Hazel's Pre-Offer Fees Should be Taxed..... B. The Court Should Tax Defendants'laimed FTI Staff Fees C. The Court Should Tax Deposition Tape, Messenger Fee, And Trial Costs. l. Unused Deposition Videotapes.. 2. Trial Equipment. 3. Messenger Fees. 2 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 TABLEOF AUTHORITIES 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CASKS 1 0 I 7 .......... 1 0 ...8,9 .6,9 5,6 5, 10 5,6 ... I 0 10 ...8,9 .10 ....... 1 0 3 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300286 Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal. App.4th 1475. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter dc Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th Bach v. County ofButte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294. Baker-Hoey v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 592.. Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 210 ........... County ofKern v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1107 .. Ellenberger v. Karr (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 423 .. Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 310. Fish v. Guevara (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 142 Goodstein v. Bank ofSan Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App,4th 899 .. Huber, Hunt ck Nichols, Inc. v. Moore (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 278. Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258 ........................ Kahn v. The Dewey Grp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 227 Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761 Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618.. Millerv. Highland Ditch Co. (1891) 91 Cal. 103. Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111. Perko 's Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238..................... Regency Outdoor Advert. Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4th 507 ................ Ripley v. Pappadopoulos (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1616 ... Santantonio v. 8'estinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102......... Science Applications Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095 ... Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550. Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014 ........................„ 1 Stmmons v. sexier (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 1007. 2 Stiles v. Estate ofRyan (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1057. 3 Sviridov v. City ofSan Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514.. 4 Toste v. CalPortland Constr. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362 5 lt'agner Farms, Inc. v, Modesto Irr. Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765 ... 6 STATUTES 7 Code Civ. Proc. O'I 998. 9 Code Civ. Proc. f 998(c)(1) .. Civ. Code Proc. O'I 1033.5(a)(9). Code Civ. Proc. $ 1033.5(b) . Code Civ. Proc. $ 1033.5(b)(5).. 1 3 Code Civ. Proc. $ 1 033 .5(c)(2) . Gov. Code $ 68086. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 REPLY Stanford University and WilliamPerry ("defendants") filed a Memorandum of Costs on or about February 22, 2019. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hanneken ("Col. Hanneken") objected to the Memorandum of Costs by filing a Motion to Tax Costs ("Motion") on March 11, 2019. Col. Hanneken did not contest all of defendants'laimed costs. The majority of fees for Mr. Hazel, defendants'xpert, were not challenged. Nor were deposition costs for Col. Hanneken's 10 12 experts. Col. Hanneken challenged costs that are disallowed by statute, fees claimed for an expert that defendants withdrew and for non-expert staff, and costs that were not reasonable or necessary. In response, defendants filed Defendants'pposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Tax Costs ("Opposition" ) on April 3, 2019. The Court should tax costs defendants'osts. First, defendants fail to prove costs. Col. Hanneken's Motion put at-issue items claimed in defendants'emorandum of Costs. As a result, defendants bore the burden ofproof as to the 13 reasonableness and necessity of their claimed costs. Defendants failed to present evidence to 14 support fees for experts or staff. (See Plaintiffs Objections to Evidence, filed herewith.) 15 Defendants also failed to show that discretionary costs were reasonable and necessary. 16 17 18 19 Second, items sought by defendants are specifically not recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 ("section 1033.5"). Expert fees and transcript costs are prohibited under that section. Post-settlement offer expert costs are recoverable in the court's discretion under Code of CivilProcedure section 998 ("section 998") after rejection of an offer to settle. 20 21 Third, defendants seek discretionary costs for pre-settlement offer expert fees, the fees of an expert that defendants withdrew, and non-expert staff fees. Under section 998, courts allow 22 recovery of fees for disclosed experts expected to testify at trial. Under the facts of this case, the 23 24 25 26 27 28 law does not support an award of fees for non-expert staff persons. Further, defendants have failed to support the full request with competent evidence. Fourth, various discretionary items are recoverable under section 1033.5, provided that defendants prove that those items were reasonable and necessary to the case, Defendants failed to show that the cost for unused deposition tapes, messenger fees, or trial technology rentals, were necessary. Those items should be taxed. 4 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 ARGUMENT 2 I. DEFENDANTS BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO ALLCOST ITEMS. Defendants misconstrue the burden ofproof as to costs. Defendants contend that "[w]here the party seeking to tax costs fails to meet its burden ofpresenting evidence showing that a particular cost is unnecessary, excessive, or unrecoverable, the prima facie evidence of the cost memorandum is uncontroverted and the burden ofproof does not shift back to the party claiming costs." (Opposition 5:15-18; see also 7:11-21; 12:5-8.) A motion to tax costs rebuts a prima facie showing in a memorandum of costs. (Melnyk v.'obledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 10 624.) Where costs are objected to, they are put at issue, and the burden ofproof is upon the party claiming them. (Wagner Farms, 1nc. v. Modesto 1rr. Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, 773- 774.) Defendants "ought not to be permitted to rest on [their] oars and say ... that [their] verified 12 13 14 memorandum, unless controverted by proofs on the other side, must control the decision." (Millerv. Highland Ditch Co. (1891) 91 Cal. 103, 105-106.) Cases relied on by defendants supports this construction. For example, both Ladas and 15 16 Nelson hold that ifitems on a cost bill "are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden ofproof is on the party claiming them as costs." (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. 17, 18 19 20 (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774, 776 [declaration contained substantial evidence that costs were reasonably necessary]; see also Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131 [a motion to tax costs is a proper objection].) Contrary to defendants'osition, County ofKern v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1107 does not hold that a motion to tax is insufficient to challenge costs. 21 22 23 24 25 26 There, the court held that on the facts before it, the party seeking costs submitted a declaration sufficient to "indicate depositions were clearly within the realm ofnecessity ...." (County of Kern, 146 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1113-1114.) As in Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1265, another case cited by defendants, because Col. Hanneken "objected to [defendants'] verified memorandum of costs, the burden shifted to [defendants] to prove [their] costs." Col. Hanneken's Motion put at-issue items claimed in defendants'emorandum of 27 Costs. As set out below and in Plaintiffs Objections to Evidence, defendants have not met their 28 burden ofproof as to expert fees, or discretionary costs. 5 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 1 II. DEFENDANTS FAILTO PROVE EXPERT AND STAFF FEES. .2 A party that moves for expert witness fees under Code of CivilProcedure section 998 3 shoulderstheburdentoprovecosts. (Jones,supra,63 Cal.App.4thatp.1265.) Oncesection 4 998 expert witness fees claimed in a memorandum are challenged by way of a motion to tax, 5 "[d]ocumentation must be submitted" to sustain the claimant's burden ofproof. (Ibid. (citing 6 Bach v. County ofButte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 308 [motion to tax placed burden ofproof 7 on requesting party]).) A party may fail to meet its burden where the evidence of costs consists 8 of a conclusory declaration that contains hearsay. (Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 9 310, 315 (citing Miller, supra, 91 Cal. at p. 105).) 10 Defendants have not met their burden ofproof as to expert and staff fees requested 11 pursuant to section 998. The only evidence presented by defendants is contained in two (2) 12 declarations ofdefendants'ounsel, Andrew D. Lanphere, submitted on February 22, 2019, and 13 April 3, 2019, respectively. The documents, information, and statements in the declarations are 14 inadmissible hearsay. Mr. Lanphere lacks personal knowledge about topics addressed in the 15 declarations, and is not qualified to testify on those matters. Information contained in those 16 declarations is inadmissible, and should not be considered as evidence to support defendants'7 Memorandum of Costs. (See Plaintiffs Objections to Evidence, filed herewith.) 18 Mr. Lanphere cannot authenticate the documents and other information contained in 19 Exhibit G to his declarations. Mr. Lanphere does not have personal knowledge of the billing 20 practices or tasks performed by Mr. Gotthardt, Mr. Hazel, or the staff at FTI. Mr. Lanphere does 21 not have personal knowledge to testify as to the tasks claimed to have been performed by Mr. 22 Gotthardt, the staff at FTI, the utilityof those tasks, or the accuracy of their invoices. 23 Many of the statements contained in Mr. Lanphere's declarations are improper expert 24 opinion. Mr. Lanphere is not qualified to opine as to the reasonable hourly rates, tasks 25 performed, or the utilityofwork done by Mr. Gotthardt, Mr. Hazel, or the staff at FTI. Nor is 26 Mr. Lanphere qualified to testify as to the reasonableriess or necessity ofexpert and staff billing 27 practices. Much of the information contained in Mr. Lanphere's declarations is inadmissible. 28 They are insufficient to meet defendants'urden to prove costs. 6 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 1 III. DEFENDANTS'EQUEST FOR PROHIBITDKDITEMS SHOULD BK DENIED. 2 A. Defendants Cannot Recover Exnert Fees Under Section 1033.5. 3 Code of CivilProcedure section 1033.5 subdivision (b) contains a list of items that are 4 not allowable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc. $ 1033.5(b).) That section expressly disallows "[fjees 5 of experts not ordered by the court." (Code Civ. Proc. I'I 1033.5(b)(1); see also Kahn v. The 6 Dewey Grp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 227, 237.) In Baker-Hoey v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 7 111 Cal.App.4th 592, the court rejected a request to recover the costs of expert depositions. (Ld. 8 at p. 596.) The court explained: "the fees of an expert witness are not recoverable as costs under 9 Code of Civil Procedure section 1032." (/d. at p. 601.) As made clear by the Sixth District 10 Court of Appeal: "[p]revailingparties do not recover their expert witness fees as a matter of 11 right. When the opposing party has rejected a settlement offer and fails to obtain a more 12 favorable judgment, the trial court may, in its discretion, make an award of expert witness fees 13 [pursuant to Code of CivilProcedure section 998]." (Fish v. Guevara (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 14 142, 148.) Here, expert fees are only recoverable under section 998. As discussed below, such 15 an expert fees under section 998 is discretionary, and defendants'equest should be taxed. 16 B. Defendants Cannot Recover Transcrint Costs Under Section 1033.5. 17 Defendants conflate transcript and court reporter costs. Although court reporter fees are 18 recoverable under section 1033.5, transcripts are not. Defendants do not parse out transcript and 19 reporter costs in their Memorandum of Costs, or in their Opposition. (See Opposition 10:22- 20 11:7.) Instead, these separate costs are combined, and cannot be distinguished. As set out in 21 Col. Hanneken's moving papers, "Transcripts ofcourt proceedings not ordered by the court" are 22 "not allowable as costs," except when expressly authorized by law. (Code Civ. Proc. tj 23 1033.5(a)(9); Code Civ. Proc. tj 1033.5(b)(5).) Defendants are unable to distinguish between 24 costs incurred for transcripts (which the court did not order) or court reporter fees authorized 25 under Government Code section 68086. Defendants have not presented evidence to support their 26 claimed costs. The requested amount of $ 12,085 should not be awarded. 27 /// 28 /// 7 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 1 IV. DEFENDANTS'LAIMEDDISCRETIONARYCOSTS SHOULD BE TAXED. 2 A. The Court Should Tax Defendants'laimed Expert Fees. 3 Code of Civil Procedure section 998 authorizes a party to recover post-settlement offer 4 expert witness costs that were "actually incurred and reasonably necessary" to the preparation of 5 the case. (Code Civ. Proc. $ 998(c)(1); Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 6 1484.) Such costs are notmandatory. (Simmons v. Wexler(1979) 94Cal.App.3d1007,1015 7 [not error to deny expert fees].) The court has discretion to determine a reasonable amount and 8 what was reasonably necessary to the case. (Huber, Hunt Ck Nichols, Inc. v. Moore (1977) 67 9 Cal.App.3d 278, 315 [not error to deny expert fees]; see also Santantonio v. JPestinghouse 10 Broadcasting Co., Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 121-124 [court has discretion to determine if 11 claimed fees were "in fact" for expert services that were reasonably necessary to case].) 12 Defendants'ntent to "penalize" Col. Hanneken is improper. (See Opposition 6:15-18.) 13 Courts should ensure that section 998 is not used by affluent litigants as a scare tactic to silent 14 complainants. (See Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1561-1562.) 15 1. Allof Mr. Gotthardt's Fees Should be Taxed. 16 Defendants'equest for fees paid to Mr. Gotthardt should be denied. Defendants 17 cancelled Mr. Gotthardt's deposition months before trial. Mr. Gotthardt did not produce an 18 expert report. He was not included on defendants'itness list. The Declarations ofAndrew D. 19 Lanphere fail to establish evidence ofMr. Gotthardt's reasonable hourly rate, utilityin the case, 20 or value for trial. Unlike in Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., Inc. (2012) 204 21 Cal.App.4th 210, 222, there is no evidence that Mr. Gotthardt's services, even ifviewed to be 22 "consultant," were necessary. (See also Plaintiffs Objections to Evidence, filed herewith.) 23 2. Mr. Hazel's Pre-Offer Fees Should be Taxed. 24 The Court should tax Mr. Hazel's pre-offer fees. The operative version of section 998 25 allows a defendant to recover only post-settlement offer costs of the services of expert witnesses. 26 (Taste v. CalPortiand Constr. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362, 375; Sviridov v. City ofSan Diego 27 (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514, 520, fn.4.) The Court in Regency Outdoor Advert. Inc. v. City ofLos 28 Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4th 507, 532 considered a version of section 998 that no longer applies. 8 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300286 B. The Court Should Tax Defendants'laimed FTI Staff Fees. Defendants request expert fees for staff persons at FTI. For purposes of a section 998 award, experts are individuals that a party designates "before trial and intended to call either in defense-in-chief or in rebuttal to Plaintiffs claims or his expert witnesses." (Goodstein v Bank ofSan Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 910 [expert costs awardable because defendant designated its experts before trial and intended to call each of them; experts were potential witnesses at trial and not merely consultants] (quotations omitted).) In Ellenberger v. Karr (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 423, a party sought to recover expert witness fees as costs under Code of 10 Civil Procedure section 998.. (Id. at p. 428.) The court explained: "Section 68092.5 of the Government Code.... restricts fees allowable to a witness who testifies solely as to any expert opinion." (Ibid.) There, the court held that witnesses for whom costs were sought were not 12 expert witnesses, and therefore, their services were not subject to being charged as costs under 13 14 15 section 998. (Ibidq see also Stiles v. Estate ofRyan (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1067.) Authority relied on by defendants supports taxation of fees requested for staff persons at FTI. As held in Evers, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at pp. 317-318: "itwould be unreasonable to 16 conclude that the Legislature intended to include the cost of services of all 'experts'ho 17 18 19 might assist counsel in preparation for trial.... counsel conceded ... that [the witness] could not be considered even a 'potential'xpert witness. [Therefore] [t]he trial court improperly allowed this item as a recoverable cost under section 998." (Emphasis added).) 20 Santantonio and Bates engage in analysis that is in accord with Evers. In Bates, supra, 21 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 222, expert fees were awarded to a consultant whose qualification as an 22 23 expert were not disputed. Here, FTI staff are not experts, and were not disclosed as such. In Santantonio, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 124, staff fees were awarded, in part, where disclosed 24 experts testified at trial, and work done by the experts'taff assisted at trial. Here, defendants'5 26 experts did not testify at trial, and defendants unilaterally withdrew Mr. Gotthardt months before trial. Financial issues were not reached at trial. Under the facts of this case, the Court should not 27 28 award expert fees for staff. (See also Plaintiffs Objections to Evidence, filed herewith.) /// 9 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 C. The Court Should Tax Denosition Tane. Messenaer Fee. And Trial Costs. Costs not specifically enumerated as allowable in section 1033.5 subdivision (a) nor prohibited in subdivision (b) may be recoverable ifreasonably necessary to the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc. $ 1033.5(c)(2).) Costs that were not necessary, but merely convenient or beneficial, are not recoverable. (Perko 's Enterprises, Inc. v, RRIVS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) "Acourt has the obligation to ensure that only costs that are necessary and reasonable in amount are allowed ...." (Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering'Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1039 (citation omitted).) Defendants'osts for unused deposition tapes, messenger fees, and 10 trial equipment, though perhaps convenient, were unnecessary. These costs should be taxed. 1. Unused Denosition Videotanes. As stated in Col. Hanneken's moving papers, defendant never used a videotape at trial of 12 William Fellers, Kent Hillhouse, or Suzanne Heinemann, nor were they required to videotape 13 14 those depositions to obtain transcripts that could be used at trial. Those costs were not necessary to the case. Defendants cannot recover merely convenient discretionary costs. 15 2. Trial Eouinment. 16 Defendants chose to rent trial equipment, even after Col. Hanneken repeatedly offered to 17 share his trial equipment with defendants. The facts here are distinct from Am. Airlines, Inc. v. 18 19 20 Sheppard, Mullin, Richter d'c Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1057 and Ripley v. Pappadopoulos (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1616, 1623, as defendants cannot rationalize why they chose to pay a fee to use rental equipment, when Col. Hanneken offered to allow them to use his 21 22 equipment for free. Ifa party chooses to "expend monies in trial presentation ... when more conventional ifless impressive methods are available, the party must stand his own costs." 23 (Science Applications Internat. Corp. v, Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1105.) 24 3. Messenaer Fees. 25 26 27 28 Defendants have requested messenger fees for unnecessary motions and filings. Unlike in Ladas, defendants failed to submit a "declaration [thatj provides substantial evidence that these charges were reasonably necessary." (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 776.) Defendants are not allowed to recover costs for messenger services that were only convenient. 10 REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285 1 CONCLUSION Defendants have failed to present competent evidence to meet their burden ofproof as to expert fees and discretionary costs. Furthermore, defendants seek costs for items that are expressly unauthorized by statute, which the Court cannot award. Defendants may not recover transcript costs, or pre-settlement offer expert fees. Case law does not support an award of expert fees for an expert not intended to be called at trial, or for staff who are not experts, especially when the requesting party has entirely failed to explain what work was performed. Defendants fail to show that the cost for unused deposition tapes, messenger fees, or trial 10 technology rentals, were not merely convenient, but necessary to this case. For the reasons stated above, the Court should tax defendants'laimed costs in the 12 13 14 15 amount of $ 184,315.65, representing the total amount of: Expert fees - $ 1'58,858.30 (partial of amount requested by defendants); b. Court reporter fees - $ 12,085; Depositions costs - $ 5,724.80 (partial of amount requested by defendants); d. Technology equipment - $ 3,790; 16 17 18 Dated: April Messenger fees - $ 3,857.55. 9, 2019 McMANISFAULKNER 19 20 21 TYLER ATKINSON JAMES GIACCHETTI 22 23 Attorneys for Plaintiff, MICHAELHANNEKEN 24 25 26 27 28 II REPLY ISO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONTO TAXCOSTS; CASE NO. 16CV300285