Plaintiffs Memorandum In Reply To Defendants Opposition

Reply

Cal. Super. - 5th Dist.February 24, 2016

SN 0 Ah Ww W nN ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ROSNER, BARRY & BABBITT, LLP Hallen D. Rosner, SBN 109740 Gregory T. Babbitt, SBN 214299 10085 Carroll Canyon Road, Suite 100 San Diego, California 92131 Telephone: (858) 348-1005 Facsimile: (858) 348-1150 hal@rbblawgroup.com greg@rbblawgroup.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs E-FILED 1/3/2018 11:15 AM FRESNO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT By: R. Faccinto, Deputy SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF FRESNO - B.F. SISK COURTHOUSE ROBERT KEENE, an individual, PAMELA L. ALSUP, an individual, Plaintiffs, Vv. LITHIA JEF, INC., a California corporation, dba Lithia Hyundai of Fresno; SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., an Illinois Corporation; and DOES 1- 75, inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO. 16CECG00590 PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS Date: January 10, 2018 Time: 3:30 p.m. Judge: Alan Simpson Dept.: 503 Complaint Filed: February 24, 2016 Trial Date: None PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS SN ar A W ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1. Introduction The story of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs request, and this case for that matter, is “you reap what you sow.” Defendants cannot complain about Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs because they are the ones which caused them. Defendants refused to cooperate with basic discovery requirements, such as appearing for depositions, or producing documents it said it would produce in discovery. Never in Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s 19 years of practicing law has he had defendants and their attorneys flat out refuse to participate in basic discovery. Declaration of Gregory T. Babbitt in Support of Reply (“Babbitt Reply Decl.”), 1 3. The California Supreme Court said it best KK in Serrano v. Unruh, when it wrote a defendant “’cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.” Serrano v. Unruh, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 638, quoting Copeland v. Marshall, (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 904. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion accuses Plaintiffs’ Counsel of overstating their hours, duplicative billing, billing excessive hours, and over litigating this case. The question for the Court is which party, or attorney for that matter, is more credible? The answer is Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not fail to meditate the case. Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not refuse to show up for depositions. Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not refuse to produce documents it said it would produce in discovery. Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not get sanctioned. Rather, Plaintiffs’ Counsel did the things the Court ordered. He tried to re-schedule a mediation for which Defendants failed to show up. He tried to get Defendants to comply with the discovery act, which is supposed to be self-executing, and only resorted to filing motions to compel when it became apparent Defendants would not comply without court intervention. He made reasonable settlement offers, including a 10% reduction off Plaintiff's Counsel’s bill before filing this Motion, which Defendants refused. What is worse is that Defendants and their counsel never apologized to the Court or Plaintiffs for wasting both of theirs time fo get them to do basic things the Court’s local PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES S N U 1 A W ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 rules and the Discovery Act require. Defendants’ proposed reductions to Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs request are unreasonable and without merit. Moreover, granting Plaintiffs’ fees and costs request in full will cause Defendants to think twice in the future before engaging the litigation tactics it engaged in this case. Thus, Plaintiffs request the Court grant their request for $86,927.98 in attorneys’ fees and costs, which consists of a lodestar of $51,844.50, a multiplier in the amount of $25,922.25, $3,811.50 for preparing this Reply, and $5,349.73 in costs. 2, Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiffs’ Requested Hours are without Merit Incredibly, Defense Counsel Brian Leach claims Plaintiffs should get $21,790.00 in attorneys’ fees, which is a nearly 60% reduction of their lodestar. This is not a reasonable objection, this is vindictive. This demonstrates that Defense Counsel's judgment is clouded, and they are completely biased. “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 (2008). While Defendants have pointed to entries they believe are excessive, they have not provided sufficient argument or citation to evidence to support their claims. Moreover, they have detailed how they came up with the finale amount they believe Plaintiff should receive. Defendant’s proposed amount is contrary to the purpose for the awarding attorneys’ fees as discussed in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 150: The legislative policy to allow prevailing plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees [in actions under the CLRA] is clear. Section 1780 provides remedies for consumers who have been victims of unfair or deceptive business practices. [Citations.] The provision for recovery of attorney’s fees allows consumers to pursue remedies in cases as here, where the compensatory damages are relatively modest. To limit the fee award to an amount less than -2= PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES S N 01 A W ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 that reasonably incurred in prosecuting such a case, would impede the legislative purpose underlying section 1780.” (emphasis added). “[A]bsent circumstances rendering an award unjust, the fee should ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent.” Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal.3d 621, 624 (1982). “[R]easonableness must be determined by reference to the circumstances existing at the time the expense is incurred.” Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demeter, (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 465, 475. Each billing entry in Plaintiffs’ Counsel's bill is evaluated by whether at the time, given the circumstances of the case, the work was reasonable. Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a declaration he believed the time spent was reasonable - this was 113.20 hours. Defendants claim this is too much. But, Defendants’ Opposition does not consider the “circumstances existing at the time the expense is incurred,” meaning how Defendants’ obstinacy contributed to the amount of the attorneys’ fees incurred. This shows Defense Counsel is biased and cannot be reasonable. a. Defendants’ reference to Plaintiffs’ statement of damages is irrelevant Defendants attack Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees request based on the amounts requested in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Damages. However, the amount requested in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Damages is irrelevant. Defendants appear to arguing Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee recovery should be reduced, because it is substantially less than the amounts in the Statement of Damages. However, the amount of the recovery is irrelevant for purposes of the lodestar. Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 164 (2006) (“because this matter involves an individual plaintiff suing under consumer protection statutes involving mandatory fee-shifting provisions, the legislative policies are in favor of Graciano’s recovery of all attorney fees reasonably expended, without limiting the fees to a proportion of her actual recovery”). The only time in which the amount in the Statement of Damages may possibly be relevant is for determining whether Plaintiffs were prevailing party, by arguing Plaintiffs did not prevail, because they did not obtain their litigation objective. Graciano, at 150-151. But, Defendants did not argue -3- PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES SN O0 1 ~~ Ww W nN ~N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Bg 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiffs were not prevailing party. Defendants have brought up the Statement of Damages to distract from Plaintiffs’ outstanding recovery. The Statement of Damages was filed only in case Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment. It was overstated out of the abundance of caution, because Plaintiffs cannot obtain more than the amounts listed in the Statement of Damages if any defendant is defaulted. Evidence that it is a red herring is from Defendants’ concession that the settlement Plaintiffs obtained was the “equivalent of rescission of the sales transaction.” Defendants’ Opposition, at 3:12-13. Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 of the Complaint support this as well as they show the price of the vehicle in question over the course of three contacts to be $21,000 to $16,000. The prayer for relief in the Complaint includes a request for rescission, which is what Plaintiffs obtained. b. Defendants’ attacks on Plaintiffs’ hourly rates are misplaced Defendants argues Plaintiffs’ Counsel's hourly rates should be reduced, because they are not in line with what they claim are the hourly rates in Fresno, and Plaintiffs did not show it was impractical for Plaintiffs to hire local counsel to allow them to get out of town hourly rates. Defendants cite several federal district cases, which it claims awarded hourly rates lower than Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s. However, Defendants have neither attached these cases nor set forth a declaration demonstrating their knowledge of these cases. It is unknown whether Defense Counsel was involved in these cases. In addition, it does not appear that these cases are consumer cases. This is significantly, because Defendants failed to address at all Exhibit 7 to Gregory T. Babbitt’s Declaration. By failing to do so, Defendants conceded the validity of the Report. Exhibit 7 is the Consumer Law 2015-2016 Attorney Fee Survey Report. Pages 181 and 182 of the Report address Fresno area. The Report demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s hourly rates are consistent with other attorneys practicing consumer law in Fresno. Mr. Babbitt’s hourly rate is $495.00. The Hourly Rate Average in Fresno for attorneys practicing 16-20 years is $500.00 per hour. Even though Mr. Babbitt has been practicing for nearly 20 years, his hourly rates is lower than the average hourly rate. Ms. Escalante’s hourly rate is $310.00. The hourly rate for an Ih PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES SN a A W ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 attorney practicing 6-10 years is $400 per hour while the average for an attorney practicing 3-5 years is $300 per hour. Ms. Escalante has been practicing six years, thus he hourly rate is in line with the Report. Even if Plaintiffs’ hourly rates were not consistent with other consumer attorneys’ hourly rates, Plaintiffs did demonstrate it was impractical for her to hire local counsel. Plaintiff Pamela Alsup’s declaration states that she tried to hire Kemnitzer, Barron & Krieg who has a Fresno Office run by William Krieg. When mentioning Ms. Alsup’s declaration, Defendants curiously failed to mention that Ms. Alsup’s declaration said Mr. Krieg’s Office told Ms. Alsup to contact Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s firm, Rosner, Barry & Babbitt. This is significant, because Mr. Krieg is a well-respected consumer attorney who has been practicing in the Fresno area since the 1970s. If there was another consumer attorney who would have taken and could handle Plaintiffs’ case, Mr. Krieg would have known and would have referred Plaintiffs to that attorney. But, he did not. Instead, he referred Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s firm. Defendants claim there were other attorneys who could have taken Plaintiffs’ case, but does not mention who those attorneys are. Their opinion without support carries no weight. Further, Defense Counsel is not local counsel either, so Mr. Krieg’s opinion on the attorneys available to take and handle Plaintiffs’ type of case should be believed more than Defense Counsel’s. “A plaintiff's threshold showing of impracticability, however, is not onerous,” Center For Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 618 (2010), and Plaintiffs have met that threshold. In addition, Defendants’ reference to the hourly rates or time when awarding sanctions when granting Motions to Compel are not a true barometer of hourly rates. Courts tend to reduce the amounts requested when granting discovery sanctions, unless the actions are egregious, because they do not want the attorney to have to report the amounts to the state bar. Babbitt Reply Decl., 74. [1] [1] -5- PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES a OG EN w nN ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 e. Plaintiffs’ Counsel is entitled to be paid for ex parte application which was denied without prejudice to re-file Without citing any authority, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Counsel should not be compensated for the first ex parte to advance the hearing date, because the Court denied the ex parte. The ex parte was denied on a technicality, without prejudice to re-file, which Plaintiffs did. Plaintiffs should be compensated for the work on this ex parte for several reasons. First, the Court granted the ex parte when it was re-filed, and ultimately granted the motion to compel with depositions, which Plaintiffs were seeking to advance. Second, the work which was done on the original ex parte was used in the second ex parte. Defendants opposed both ex parte applications. Defendants’ opposition to the first ex parte tipped their hand as to its arguments against the ex parte application. Thus, the unsuccessful ex parte application helped to contribute to the successful second application, which helped contribute to the ultimate settlement of the case. Babbitt Reply Decl., 1 5. In Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.1991), the Ninth Circuit allowed attorney fees in an unsuccessful opposition to a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, because the plaintiff's judgment was reinstated after remand: “If a plaintiff ultimately wins on a particular claim, she is entitled to all attorney’s fees reasonably expended in pursuing that claim-even though she may have suffered some adverse rulings.” d. The billing entries related to retaining Plaintiffs are not excessive Defendants claim the billing entries related to retaining Plaintiffs are excessive, because they are dubious or paralegal tasks. These arguments are misplaced. The billing entries are not excessive. In fact, they are less than the actual time expended. The first billing entry in this case is only .10 hours for “intake.” It takes more than .10 hours to interview potential, determine if his case has merit, and retain the case. Babbitt Reply Decl., 7 6. Ms. Escalante billed only .50 hours related to retaining the case. Moreover, the entry “looking for potential client retainer” is not looking for form retainer. It is looking for the retainer to see if it was retained, so the Complaint could be filed. This is not a PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES SN A w No ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 paralegal or administrative task. In addition, there was a concern about statute of limitations issue retained to the Automobile Sales Finance Act claim. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Counsel wanted to make sure the Complaint was filed within one year from the first contract, which was dated February 17, 2015. Babbitt Reply Decl., 1 7. Further, potential clients like consultations with actual attorneys not paralegals and like to know their case is receiving the attention it deserves, which is why founding Partner Hallen Rosner sends the letter to clients telling their lawsuit was filed. This lets them know their case is getting the attention it deserves. Babbitt Reply Decl., 1 8. e. Defendants’ objections to billing entries are inconsistent On one hand, Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ Counsel billing multiple tasks at .10 hours that it claims can be combined into one task, but on the other, it claims other billing entries should be disallowed because they were blocked billed. Defendants cannot have it both ways. Defendants point out only one time in which Plaintiffs’ Counsel made three separate billing entries for to review three different times it believed Plaintiffs’ Counsel should have billed them together. Because this is only one instance in which this occurred, it should be assumed that the entries were reasonable. In addition, Defendants have not pointed to any authority which requires Plaintiffs’ Counsel to lump three separate unrelated tasks together. Defendants do not claim that the things were not done. Contrary to Defendants’ claims, there is no per se prohibition against block billing. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 165 Cal.app.4th 1315, 1325 (2008) (at least 20 entries of trial-level work described as “further handling” was vague and supported a finding of block billing). Block billing is the act of listing all the task performed on a day on a case in one billing entry. If the entries give sufficient detail to determine whether the entries are accurate, then they are okay. Without citation to any authorities, Defendants claim Plaintiffs’ billing entries are too vague and do not adequately describe what occurred. However, Plaintiffs’ billing entries do provide sufficient detail to evaluate the tasks and do not simply say “further handling” as objected to in Christian Research Institute. 7 PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES S S a rn A W nN ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The entries which Defendants claim are block billed are not actually block billed. They describe tasks which related to the same specific topic, not all tasks which occurred on the same date. For instance, on August 31, 2016, Plaintiffs’ Counsel lists the tasks necessary related to Plaintiffs’ meet and confer letter - review Defendants discovery requests and the documents produced, and draft a meet and confer letter. On July 19, 2017, entered all the tasks performed related to a letter to Defense Counsel regarding Santander’s discovery responses, which included drafting a letter to opposing counsel regarding the need for Santander to produce the documents it said it would produce and drafting a propose protective order. 5 Defendants’ objections to inter-office conferences is without merit Defendants contends the entries regarding inter-office conferences, which are only noted by one person means those conferences did not occur. This is not true. This simply means the other party did not bill for the conference, because the conference was more significant to the party which billed for it than the party which did not bill for it. If both participants to the conference had billed for the conference, Defendants would object to this. Defendants have no evidence that these conferences did not actually occur, because the entries came from Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s billing system. Thus, the entries are appropriate. g. Contacts with client have sufficient detail Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Counsel should not be paid for conferences with client, described as “call from client” or “texted client.” Again, Defendants have no evidence that these conferences did not occur. Based on Plaintiffs’ billing records, the conferences did occur. Plaintiffs are not required to provide in detail what was discussed with the clients. Thus, Plaintiffs should be paid for them. h. The billing entries related to settlement discussions are not duplicative Defendants claim the settlement discussions between December 19, 2016, and January 3, 2017, are duplicative based on the email chain it produced. The email chain does not proof Defendants’ claim. The email chain and billing entries show multiple PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES SN O n A W ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2) 23 24 25 26 27 28 independent tasks. On December 19, Plaintiffs’ Counsel reviewed an email from opposing counsel, obtained and review the fee bill for the case, and reviewed the clients documents to discuss settlement with the client. This task was billed at .30, which is reasonable based on the circumstances. Next, on December 22, Plaintiffs’ Counsel had a lengthy conversation with the client about settlement to get authority, that is why this task is billed at .60. After that conversation, Plaintiffs’ Counsel than drafted an email to Defense Counsel with the settlement offer. This email dated December 22 is long and the .30 billed to draft it is reasonable. On December 28, Plaintiffs’ Counsel both reviewed and responded to Defense Counsel's counter offer. Billing .20 to do this is reasonable. On January 3, the email chain show multiple tasks done. Plaintiffs’ Counsel called and email Defense Counsel regarding settlement and Plaintiff Pamela Alsup’s deposition, and contacted Plaintiff to confirm the deposition. There were two phone calls and three emails back and forth and these tasks were billed in two different billing entries for .30 total. These entries are reasonable. 3. Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiffs’ Costs are Without Merit Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 dictates which costs are recoverable: (1) those costs listed in Section 1033.5(a) are allowed, (2) those costs identified in Section 1033.5(b) are not recoverable, and (3) costs neither permitted nor prohibited may be allowed or denied in the Court’s discretion. Defendants claim Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees for Advanced Attorney Service, Golden State Overnight Delivery, Federal Express, and One Legal, because these costs are not allowed under Section 1033.5(a). But, this is the wrong standard for two reasons. First, the Advance Attorney Service and One Legal fees are permitted because they are for electronic filing, which is permitted by Section 1033.5(a)(14). In addition, some of these fees include the actual filing fees for motions, which were advanced by the attorney service and are permitted by Section 1033.5(a)(1). Second, the other fees are permitted if they are reasonably necessary to the litigation. Attorney service fees for filing documents are the reality of the modern-day practice of law. Gone are the days when attorneys only practiced PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES a a h~ WwW ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Bi 29 23 24 25 26 27 28 in one city and/or were located next to the courthouse where they practiced. Attorneys practice law throughout the state and country. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s firm practices throughout the state, but has one office in San Diego. To file documents in the counties where cases are filed, Plaintiffs’ Counsel must pay an attorney service to file documents. Thus, these fees are “reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation.” Many cases have held such fees are recoverable, including the Ladas case relied on by Defendants. Ladas v. v. California State Auto. Assn., 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774 (1993). See also, Sanford v. Rasnick, 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1133 (2016) (recognizing attorney service fees were permitted in Ladas). Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ CourtCall fees are without merit as well, because the CourtCall fees were reasonably necessary to the litigation. By appearing by CourtCall, Plaintiffs’ Counsel saved in attorneys’ fees it would have cost Plaintiffs’ Counsel to appear in person for the appearances which were made by CourtCall. Despite Defendants’ objections, Plaintiffs’ costs associated with the deposition are recoverable. See Code of Civ. Pro. § 1033.5(a)(3)(C). Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to the meals and airfare. Airfare rates are always changing so what the airfare to fly on Alaska Airlines was on December 18 and 20, 2017, cannot be compare to what it was in January 2017. Defendant fails to cite any authority to claim that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the fees for the ex parte application which was denied. Section 1033.5(a) does not make a distinction. The only question is whether a party is prevailing party, which Defendants did not contest. 4. Conclusion Plaintiffs’ Counsel billed 7.7 hours reviewing Defendants’ Opposition to this Motion, and researching and drafting this Reply for $3,811.50. Babbitt Reply Decl., 1 9. This increases Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees lodestar to $55,656.00. Thus, the total amount in attorneys’ fees Plaintiffs are seeking with the 1.25 multiplier is $81,578.25. In addition, the total costs are $5,349.73. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ ask the Court to grant PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES S S a bh Ww W No ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in the amount of $86,927.98. DATED: January 3, 2018 ROSNER, BARRY & BABBITT, LLP By: GRE T. BABBITT Attorneys for Plaintiffs -11- PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE Keene et al. v. Lithia Jef, Inc., et al. San Diego County Case No. 16CECG00590 I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is: 10085 Carroll Canyon Road, Suite 100, San Diego, California 92131. On the date shown below, I served the following document(s) described as: PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORADUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS on the interested parties in this action at addressed as follows: Brian Leach, Esq. LEACH & MCGREEVY, LLP 2833 Laguna Street San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 775-4455 x.310 / F: (415) 775-7435 Imlawsfl@aol.com Attorneys for Defendant LITHIA JEF, INC. dba LITHIA HYUNDAI OF FRESNO and SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC. [X] BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the above addressed. I caused such envelope or package to be deposited in a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier. [X] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on January 3, 2018, at San Diego, California. Nadine’Hicks 1 PROOF OF SERVICE