UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PDFFILLER, INC., VADIM YASINOVSKY, and
BORIS SHAKHNOVICH,
Defendants.
Civil Action
No. 1:16-cv-11021-IT
PDFFILLER, INC.
Counterclaim/Third-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,
INC.
Counterclaim-Defendant,
and
REAL ESTATE BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.
and RE FORMSNET LLC d/b/a ZIPLOGIX,
LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.
DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIM/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF PDFFILLER,
INC.’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-
DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, INC.’S
CROSS-MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (ECF 283)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
II. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................2
A. PDFfiller Financial Documentation and Supplementation of Initial Disclosures ...............2
B. PDFfiller’s Investor Presentations And Documents..........................................................4
C. PDFfiller’s Takedown Notices And Responses ................................................................7
D. PDFfiller’s Database Schemas And Log Data ..................................................................8
E. CAR’s Request To Inspect And Test PDFfiller’s Platform ............................................. 12
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 14
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I. INTRODUCTION
CAR’s Cross-Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF 283) is an unfounded and unsuccessful
attempt by CAR to deflect attention from its improper discovery gamesmanship. As PDFfiller
explained in its Motion to Compel Discovery on an Expedited Basis (ECF 274), CAR, after
having obtained a months-long stay of antitrust discovery, is now engaged in delay tactics to run
out the clock on the abbreviated three-month fact discovery period for PDFfiller’s antitrust
counterclaim. CAR is also withholding crucial discovery that PDFfiller needs to defend against
CAR’s meritless copyright and DMCA anti-circumvention claims.
Instead of dealing with these issues head on, CAR has responded to PDFfiller’s Motion
with a Cross-Motion replete with concerns that are stale or moot. Indeed, most of what CAR
complains about in its Cross-Motion was already addressed and resolved at a lengthy, in-person
meeting involving outside counsel, PDFfiller’s CEO, and the parties’ technical experts that took
place on December 20, 2017 (“December Meeting”). (ECF 284 at 12 n.1.) At that meeting, and
in follow-up correspondence, PDFfiller answered every question posed by CAR. CAR’s current
demands are therefore moot.
What is more, CAR’s attempt to condition its willingness to turn over discovery plainly
relevant to its copyright and DMCA anti-circumvention claims on PDFfiller’s willingness to turn
over information that PDFfiller either does not have, has already turned over, or is plainly
irrelevant should be rejected.
The discovery requests highlighted in PDFfiller’s Motion have been outstanding for ten
months and CAR has failed to provide responsive information. The Court should deny CAR’s
Cross-Motion and order CAR to produce the discovery PDFfiller seeks in its Motion on an
expedited basis.
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II. ARGUMENT
A. PDFfiller Financial Documentation and Supplementation of Initial Disclosures
In its Cross-Motion, CAR demands that PDFfiller produce all of its federal and state tax
returns and all of its financial statements. CAR’s demand is plainly overbroad and
disproportional to the parties’ claims and defenses. See Watley v. Russell A. Farrow, Inc., 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96014, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2010) (denying motion to compel “all
financial records” as overly broad). For example, PDFfiller’s tax returns are irrelevant to CAR’s
intellectual property claims and to PDFfiller’s antitrust counterclaim. CAR has not articulated
any particularized basis for its supposed need for these tax returns.
In a similar vein, CAR’s request for “all financial statements” is unbounded in time and
scope would necessarily sweep in information that is irrelevant to this case. CAR has never
expressed any willingness to limit its request to financial information that could reasonably be
related to the parties’ claims. PDFfiller, on the other hand, is willing to meet and confer on the
scope of both parties’ request for financial information. The Court should reject CAR’s
harassing demand for unlimited tax and financial information and instead require the parties to
meet in good faith to agree on the production of sets of financial information from all parties
(including third-party defendants REBS and zipLogix) proportional to the claims and defenses in
this case.
Because CAR has failed to produce certain financial and market-share materials
responsive to PDFfiller’s requests for antitrust information, CAR’s demand that PDFfiller further
supplement its Initial Disclosures to identify with specificity its antitrust damages is illogical.
1
1
CAR claims that its initial disclosures are satisfactory because CAR has “disclosed a
computation of statutory damages.” (ECF 284 at 3.) However, CAR conveniently neglects to
mention that it also has requested an award of lost profits as an alternative to statutory damages.
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(See ECF 284 at 2-3, 11.) PDFfiller needs antitrust discovery first from CAR, and then it will be
able to supplement further its Initial Disclosures.
CAR cites no legal authority for the proposition that it can engage in self-help and
withhold antitrust discovery because of purported deficiencies with PDFfiller’s Initial
Disclosures. In fact, any purported deficiencies with PDFfiller’s Initial Disclosures have no
bearing on CAR’s obligation to cooperate in discovery. See Parrish v. Premier Directional
Drilling, L.P., No. SA-16-CA-00417-DAE, 2017 WL 5139260, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 8, 2017)
(“A party’s recourse when discovery is not produced is to file a motion to compel; a party cannot
withhold discovery for any reason as doing so subverts the discovery process and undermines the
Court's authority.”).
Indeed, this Court has ruled in similar disputes that a party is not required to provide
detailed damages calculations when such calculations depend upon information in the possession
of another party. For example, in AVX Corp. v. Cabot Corp., 252 F.R.D. 70 (D. Mass. 2007), the
Court held that AVX’s supplementation of damages calculations was not untimely when made
two years after the initial request for that calculation because Cabot “had not provided all of the
information necessary to perform the calculations.” Id. at 76. When that information was finally
provided, AVX supplemented its damages calculation within several weeks. Here too, when
CAR (finally) produces the antitrust discovery PDFfiller sought months ago, PDFfiller will
further supplement its Initial Disclosures to provide additional specificity regarding the amount
of damages it is owed because of CAR’s antitrust violations.
If the Court finds supplementation of PDFfiller’s disclosures which include a claim for lost
profits necessary at this stage of the litigation, then CAR should be required to supplement its
disclosures as well. (See ECF 270 at ¶¶ 109 and 123.)
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B. PDFfiller’s Investor Presentations And Documents
CAR seeks PDFfiller’s investor presentations but fails to provide any reasoned
explanation as to why these presentations are even tangentially relevant to either party’s claims
or defenses.
CAR speculates that these documents will provide information on the “functionality of
[PDFfiller’s] platform” (ECF 284 at 14), but offers nothing to support this statement. To the
extent that PDFfiller investor presentations even contain any technical information, that
information is cumulative and redundant of technical information PDFfiller has already produced
to CAR. PDFfiller already produced documents regarding the technical underpinnings of its
platform and then provided CAR the specific technical information it requested at the December
Meeting and spent hours of time diligently answering each of CAR’s questions regarding the
PDFfiller platform. PDFfiller’s investor presentations do not include any additional technical
information that CAR does not already have.
CAR’s claim that the investor presentations may include “risk factors for [PDFfiller’s]
business” fares no better. (Id.) PDFfiller investor presentations do not include “risk factors” that
have any bearing on the issues in dispute in this litigation.
Finally, CAR’s suggestion that PDFfiller investor presentations will reveal what
PDFfiller considers “to be the relevant product market and its competitors in that market” also
misses the mark. (Id.) PDFfiller investor presentations do not contain legal definitions of
markets relevant to CAR’s anti-competitive behavior; those markets have instead been defined in
detail in PDFfiller’s counterclaim. As set forth in PDFfiller’s Motion and herein, the parties who
have information relevant to the California electronically fillable real estate forms (“EFRE”) and
paperless transaction management software (“PTM”) markets, and to CAR’s exploitation of
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those markets through the tying of its EFRE to its zipForm software are CAR, REBS and
zipLogix—not PDFffiller.
Interestingly, even as CAR presses for irrelevant PDFfiller investor presentations, CAR
contends in its Cross-Motion that it will withhold, as a bargaining tool, discovery relevant to (i)
CAR strategy presentations, (ii) notifications generated by Google Alerts concerning CAR forms
posted on the Internet, and (iii) CAR Google Analytics regarding the volume of users of its
zipForm software. See ECF 284 at 10 (CAR indicating that it will produce information
concerning the volume of zipForm use, costs, and revenues associated with CAR forms, and the
interrelationship between CAR, REBS and zipLogix, only if PDFfiller agrees to produce
irrelevant “strategy and investor presentations”). The Court should not countenance CAR’s
refusal to produce responsive materials as leverage to obtain documents from PDFfiller that are
not relevant to any party’s claims or defenses.
Moreover, unlike CAR, PDFfiller has already produced Google Analytics information,
including documents that reveal the number of URL requests made on a per-month basis for
PDFfiller landing pages associated with CAR forms, and information regarding its Google
AdWords accounts. CAR should likewise provide PDFfiller with CAR Google Analytics
information so that PDFfiller can determine the number of users, forms, and other usage data
related to CAR EFRE and zipForm, information that will be relevant to, among other things,
CAR’s market share of the relevant California EFRE and PTM Software markets. (See ECF 284
at 9.)
CAR’s attempt to withhold information concerning its strategy presentations is especially
egregious because the information PDFfiller seeks and that CAR is withholding goes to the heart
of PDFfiller’s antitrust counterclaim. Based upon the outdated CAR strategy presentation
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PDFfiller located online dated September 2012, CAR likely has in its possession recent, updated
presentations
2
that contain (i) information on membership dues, (ii) records of REBS’ dividend
payments to CAR, (iii) information on initial costs and ongoing operating costs of zipForm, and
(iv) zipLogix/zipForm financial metrics—all of which are highly relevant to PDFfiller’s antitrust
counterclaim.
First, because CAR bundles access to zipForm and the associated cost into its
membership fees, information in CAR presentations will go directly to the price at which
zipForm has been offered over an extended period of time. Additionally, REBS’ dividend
payments will provide information regarding CAR’s incentive to monopolize the PTM Software
market. Similarly, information on CAR/REBS/zipLogix operating costs is related to the
determination of barriers to entry of expansion in the PTM Software market. Lastly,
zipLogix/zipForm financial metrics are clearly relevant to the calculation of PDFfiller’s lost
profits.
Because the presentations withheld by CAR also include business strategy plans, it is also
likely that these presentations include discussions of CAR’s strategy with respect to
monopolizing the market for PTM Software in California by tying zipForm to its EFRE
products. PDFfiller is entitled to receive CAR’s strategy presentations as they are directly
responsive to its antitrust claims.
Given the relevance of the CAR strategy presentations and the CAR Google Analytics
information and the abbreviated time allotted by the Court for antitrust discovery, the Court
should order CAR to comply on an expedited basis with its antitrust discovery obligations.
2 Mr. Singer noted in his deposition that these presentations are given at least once a year. (See
Singer Depo. Tr. at 203:3-10) (Michaels Decl., Ex. C)) (ECF 276-3).
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C. PDFfiller’s Takedown Notices And Responses
CAR seeks all Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) takedown notices ever sent
to PDFfiller and each of PDFfiller’s responses to any such notice. CAR’s unlimited and
sweeping request is not proportional to the claims and defenses in the case. The DMCA
takedown notice that is clearly relevant to this matter is the letter CAR itself sent to PDFfiller.
CAR obviously is in possession of that notice, and it also is in receipt of PDFfiller’s response
thereto. CAR has not articulated why it needs every DMCA notice sent to PDFfiller by unrelated
third-parties concerning alleged copyright issues unrelated to the intellectual property which is
the subject of this case. Takedown notices unrelated to the copyrights pled in this case are not
pertinent to CAR’s claims of copyright infringement with respect to CAR’s forms.
Moreover, CAR’s broad, sweeping request for all DMCA notices PDFfiller has received,
just like its incredibly broad requests for all PDFfiller tax returns and financial information and
all PDFfiller investor presentations, stands in sharp contrast to the arbitrary and unfair
boundaries CAR attempts to draw around the documents it will produce in response to
PDFfiller’s discovery requests. Thus, for example, CAR suggests that it should be permitted to
limit its production of information concerning the copyrightability of its forms to correspondence
with the U.S. Copyright Office relating to the 64 forms referenced in the Complaint. Of course,
information regarding the copyrightability of the CAR forms as a whole is relevant to
determining whether the 64 forms at issue are the proper subject of copyright protection. If the
content of CAR real estate forms is dictated by federal and state statutes or regulations and there
are only a limited number of ways to convey that content, then the forms will lack the requisite
originality needed to be copyrightable. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (2017) (When
“the common idea is only capable of expression in [a] more or less stereotyped form . . . [no]
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actionable similarity” exists.). CAR should be required to produce the information it has
concerning the copyrightability of its forms – an issue that goes squarely to CAR’s copyright
claims and PDFfiller’s defenses to those claims.
CAR’s broad-brush and unlimited demands for irrelevant information should be rejected.
The Court should instead require CAR to produce information that clearly bears on key claims
and defenses in this litigation.
D. PDFfiller’s Database Schemas And Log Data
CAR suggests that it needs schema for all PDFfiller databases regardless of whether the
databases contain information relevant to this litigation. CAR seeks this information even though
(a) PDFfiller explained to CAR at the technical meet-and-confer at the December Meeting that
the database that could potentially include relevant information is PDFfiller’s landing page
database; (b) PDFfiller already produced thousands of records from that database; and (c) after
the December Meeting, PDFfiller, in response to CAR’s request, provided the schema for its
landing page database.
CAR, true to form, was unsatisfied with the vast troves of information PDFfiller
voluntarily provided and now seeks irrelevant database schema. Tellingly, CAR had no answer
when PDFfiller asked CAR what additional PDFfiller database information CAR needed.
CAR’s inability to articulate what it needs, or why the information it seeks is relevant, is
consistent with its pattern and practice of demanding ever-more documents while refusing to
provide PDFfiller with keywords to search for the information CAR seeks or explanations as to
why the information CAR wants is relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. In fact, at the
parties’ December Meeting, CAR was unable to explain why it had refused to provide keywords.
CAR also acknowledged that PDFfiller had been forthcoming given the limited direction in
CAR’s discovery requests. To that end, PDFfiller has outlined in several previous Court filings,
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including its Motion for Protective Order and Reply in support thereof (ECF 202 & 229), the
incredible amount of time and money it has spent to ensure that CAR received any possible
information that could be relevant to the claims and defenses in this case.
The simple point is that CAR’s overly broad request for all PDFfiller database
schemas—regardless of the relevance of those databases to the claims at issue—is objectionable.
Considering that PDFfiller maintains a technically complex system of multiple databases which
have nothing to do with this case CAR’s demand is not only meritless, but also harassing. What
is more, CAR’s proffered justification for its demand is its truly absurd claim that PDFfiller’s
CEO “confirmed” that PDFfiller conducted inadequate searches for documents, “withheld”
responsive data, and “admitted” that PDFfiller is still withholding additional responsive
information. (See ECF 284 at 16.) CAR quite clearly cannot justify a demand for unspecified
and irrelevant database schema with false contentions about non-existent statements from
PDFfiller’s CEO.
CAR’s new request for “user log data” should also be rejected. First, it is not even clear
what CAR means by “similar log data for all landing page URLs associated with the C.A.R.
forms.” (See ECF 284 at 17.) Second, this request is not tethered to any specific Request for
Production previously made by CAR. Whatever this new overly broad, disproportionate, and
irrelevant request seeks, it is the first time CAR has made it. Third, to the extent CAR is seeking
copies of user log data in native form, it is seeking information that does not exist. As PDFfiller
explained to CAR on multiple occasions, including at the December Meeting, PDFfiller does not
maintain user identifiable data. Instead, PDFfiller maintains information about IP addresses that
are used to access its website for security purposes. It is precisely because this information is de-
identified and not associated with specific users that PDFfiller itself sought discovery from CAR
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regarding whether particular IP addresses that had been used for several years to access the
PDFfiller website were associated with CAR. Although CAR confirmed that this was the case, it
has refused to produce information relevant to its pre-Complaint access of the PDFfiller website.
This information is clearly responsive to PDFfiller Request for Production No. 40 and is the
subject of PDFfiller’s pending Motion to Compel.
Additional information relevant to CAR’s access to the PDFfiller website includes the
PowerPoint presentation
3
created by CAR’s Chief Technology Officer, Mr. Joshua Sharfman.
Mr. Sharfman has admitted that the presentation concerns the factual investigation of PDFfiller’s
platform and technology he undertook of his own accord. This presentation will show that CAR
has known for years how PDFfiller’s system worked, withheld filing a lawsuit notwithstanding
that knowledge, and is now making demands for irrelevant information although it already has
all the information it needs, merely to exert pressure on PDFfiller and run-up costs. For this
reason alone, CAR’s continued refusal to produce the Sharfman PowerPoint presentation is
without merit.
CAR has waived any claimed work-product protection following the extensive testimony
by Mr. Sharfman at his deposition about the experiments discussed in the PowerPoint
presentation. See Sharfman Depo. Tr. at 8:14-26:3; 27:25-28:22 (Michaels Decl., Ex. D (ECF
276-4); see also Whitman by Whitman v. United States, 108 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.N.H. 1985) (“It is
well accepted that an evidentiary privilege may be waived by the actions or inactions of the party
claiming the protections[; a] privilege may be waived by allowing a deponent to . . . testify[ ] in
an examination before trial as to matters covered by the attorney-client privilege or . . . orally
3
This presentation is also relevant to PDFfiller’s Request for Production No. 39: All documents
concerning the date that You first learned of the alleged copyright infringement complained of in
the Complaint. (Michaels Decl., Ex. A (ECF 276-1)).
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disclosing matters to that party at a pretrial conference.”). Courts in this Circuit have held that
testimony at a deposition can waive a defendant’s qualified privilege. Id. (holding that
defendant’s testimony at his deposition describing individuals present at a peer review hearing
and an experts’ opinion on the procedure used during an operation waived privilege as to the
peer review records because “[t]he information obtained from [the] deposition indicates that the
peer review record may contain [relevant] information.”). Here, just as in Whitman, Mr.
Sharfman testified in great detail regarding the experiments he conducted with respect to the
PDFfiller website, and his PowerPoint presentation summarized his findings from those
experiments. See Sharfman Depo. Tr. at 62:24 to 63:5 (Michaels Decl., Ex. D (ECF 276-4). Mr.
Sharfman’s extensive testimony regarding the material in the PowerPoint presentation operated
effectively as a waiver of any privilege CAR contends it could claim with respect to the
presentation.
The Court should also find that CAR waived any claim of work-product privilege with
respect to Mr. Sharfman’s presentation because PDFfiller “has [a] substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of [this] case and . . . is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981) (acknowledging that the work product
doctrine may be overcome with respect to materials that do not constitute “mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation”).
PDFfiller has a substantial need for the presentation because, among other things, CAR
has refused to produce documents related to its DMCA anti-circumvention claim. Although
CAR alleges that PDFfiller “bypassed” technological protection measures associated with CAR
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forms, it simply refuses to produce any information about those measures. Because Mr.
Sharfman’s presentation summarizes his experiments regarding PDFfiller’s alleged “bypassing”
of CAR’s technological protection measures, it necessarily contains information regarding
PDFfiller’s alleged circumvention of these protection measures. And until CAR provides
documents related to these technological protection measures, PDFfiller has no other means to
obtain this information. Ultimately, “a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications
or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then
shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.” In re Grand
Jury, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).
E. CAR’s Request To Inspect And Test PDFfiller’s Platform
CAR’s request to inspect and test PDFfiller’s platform is CAR’s third attempt to get the
Court’s blessing to engage in the most intrusive form of discovery possible. Just as it did twice
before, the Court should reject CAR’s request to inspect PDFfiller’s platform.
CAR’s demand for an inspection was misguided and inappropriate the first two times it
was first raised. CAR’s demand for an inspection was nothing other than an attempt to drive-up
PDFfiller’s costs and get a backdoor, judicially-sanctioned peek into PDFfiller’s platform, a
software platform competitive with the zipForm software package that is majority-owned by
CAR.
Now, after a fulsome opportunity to cross-examine PDFfiller’s CEO and its technical
expert about every aspect of PDFfiller’s platform at the December Meeting, CAR’s request can
only be described as intentionally harassing. By CAR’s own admission, the December Meeting
left CAR with no further questions about how the PDFfiller system worked. Further, after the
December Meeting, PDFfiller gave CAR essentially everything it asked for in a follow-up email.
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CAR has never articulated why its needs or is entitled to inspect PDFfiller’s systems and
servers for discovery purposes. PDFfiller has already answered questions about its systems and
servers during Mr. Shakhnovich’s deposition and at the December Meeting. CAR’s demand for
an inspection should be rejected for that reason alone.
What is more, CAR’s assertion that giving it access to PDFfiller’s systems and servers
“would not cause any business disruption” is farcical. As explained in PDFfiller’s Motion for
Protective Order and Reply in support thereof (ECF 202 & 229), PDFfiller’s production system
has hundreds of servers and handles hundreds of thousands of unique visitors per day. PDFfiller
has extensive security measures that prevent access to the system. It would be extremely
difficult if not impossible to “show” CAR the entirety of PDFfiller’s platform, “i.e., the
collection of web servers, databases, data/file storage, and other technical resources used to run
PDFfiller’s websites” (see ECF 284 at 17).
Finally, CAR’s demand for technological information from PDFfiller is richly ironic.
PDFfiller has produced tens of thousands of pages of documents about its platform. What is
more, the basic technology, functionality, and features associated with the platform are public-
facing and available through the PDFfiller website. CAR, by its own admission, has taken ample
advantage of PDFfiller’s website and has subscribed to, and conducted experiments, with all
features available through the website. PDFfiller has also provided CAR with deposition
testimony, demonstrations, and question-and-answer sessions with its executives and experts
regarding its technology. Yet, at this point, it is CAR—not PDFfiller—who is refusing to
explain how its own technology works.
Indeed, despite the fact that CAR has asserted a claim for a violation of the DMCA, it
refuses to disclose and describe the technological protection measures (if any) that CAR
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purportedly uses to protect its EFRE forms. CAR uses circular reasoning to assert that “[w]e’re
not alleging that they somehow broke the password, we’re alleging that they . . . bypassed
[CAR’s] documents which are password protected.” (ECF 284 at 5.) According to 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(3)(A), however, “to ‘circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure’ means
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright
owner.” Because bypassing and breaking (i.e., impairing or deactivating) both constitute
circumvention under the statute, CAR must explain the nature of the “passwords” at issue,
including how they work and the related technology. PDFfiller is entitled to know this
information.
PDFfiller has already made available the relevant technical information about its platform
through document productions, interrogatory responses, deposition testimony, demonstrations
and extensive and intrusive question-and-answer sessions of its CEO and technical expert. CAR,
on the other hand, has refused to produce even the most basic information about the
technological safeguard that it alleges PDFfiller “bypassed.” The Court should deny CAR’s
Cross-Motion and instead order CAR to produce on an expedited basis the technical information
it has withheld from discovery.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, PDFfiller respectfully requests that CAR’s Cross-Motion be
denied, that PDFfiller’s Motion be granted, and that the Court direct CAR to produce documents
related to (i) the security and protection measures implemented to prevent unauthorized access of
the CAR forms (responsive to PDFfiller Request for Production Nos. 51, 53, 54), (ii) CAR’s
access of the PDFfiller website (responsive to PDFfiller Request for Production Nos. 39, 40),
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(iii) CAR’s copyright enforcement efforts (responsive to PDFfiller Request for Production No.
42), (iv) CAR strategy PowerPoint Presentations (responsive to PDFfiller Request for Production
Nos. 1-2, 11-14, 52, 55, 63-66, 80), (v) CAR’s use of Google Alerts and Analytics (responsive to
PDFfiller Request for Production Nos. 56-59, 61-62,74), (vi) the copyrightability of the CAR
forms (responsive to PDFfiller Request for Production No. 37) and (vii) produce documents and
provide interrogatory responses relevant to PDFfiller’s antitrust counterclaim (responsive to
PDFfiller Request for Production Nos. 50-52, 54-72, 75-78 and Interrogatory Nos. 4-5).
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Dated: April 20, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael G. Strapp
Michael G. Strapp
BBO # 653884
DLA Piper LLP (US)
33 Arch Street, 26th Floor
Boston, MA 02110-1447
Telephone: 617.406.6031
Facsimile: 617.406.6100
michael.strapp@dlapiper.com
Paolo Morante (admitted pro hac vice)
paolo.morante@dlapiper.com
Adam I. Steene (admitted pro hac vice)
adam.steene@dlapiper.com
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
1251 Avenue of the Americas, 27th Floor
New York, NY 10020-1104
Telephone: 212.335.4500
John Nading (admitted pro hac vice)
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
500 8th Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: (202) 799-4157
Facsimile: (202) 799-5157
john.nading@dlapiper.com
Megan Michaels (admitted pro hac vice)
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
555 Mission Street, Suite 2400
San Francisco, CA 94105-2933
Telephone: (415) 836-2516
Facsimile: (415) 415-7320
megan.michaels@dlapiper.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
Case 1:16-cv-11021-IT Document 289 Filed 04/20/18 Page 18 of 19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent
electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
and paper copies will be sent to those indicated as non-registered participants on April 20, 2018
/s/ Michael G. Strapp
Michael G. Strapp
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