The People, Appellant,v.Ricky D. Gates, Respondent.BriefN.Y.April 24, 2018Estimated time: 10 minutes To be argued by: John A. Cirando, Esq. Syracuse, New York KA-16-02069 STATE OF NEW YORK) SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION - FOURTH DEPARTMENT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, against ) RICKY GATES, Defendant/Appellant. ') Indictment No. 15-274-14 THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS. Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 101 South Salina Street, Suite 1010 Syracuse, New York 13202 (315) 474-1285 j John A. Cirando, Esq. Bradley E. Keem, Esq. Elizabeth deV. Moeller, Esq. Of Counsel ■ S o / V- ..- - :f :/-'ÿ/ f :;•;ÿ/ £ ■ I ;; - : flip- ■ :- i n1 | | !s CSii:mu-itil S-: - .-v •\ \|||g 1 fi:-'.vi Sr;f ff r 121#■o js®ail. ■? —r ,,iiiiimI • \ nlife M ' ■; ' -mss■ :■■■: ; S mBfgr'.; sIlllSiP2 ::. ' " ' ' ; wfe ,P'rfltKm-'-. is ■v 2 ■g" ,\-V.H 5i gipm - Iftfif i f;y \ KilftBBSS r— m FSSS ;>C? ’ .vV"'v|'.'-',vS.' .• -'iV;-.' v.; §1- :V;:f $ F •ÿ' . :--s.s -'±*m \.J m TABLE OF CONTENTS "1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 POINT I 2 APPELLANT DID NOT PROPERLY WAIVE HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. » POINT II 5 THE POLICE LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH APPELLANT’S VEHICLE. POINT in 7 APPELLANT UNEQUIVOCALLY ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. POINT IV 9II APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS IMPROPERLY ENTERED. CONCLUSION 13 THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION SHOULD BE UNANIMOUSLY REVERSED. 1 I5 -I ::x © s i o INDEX TO APPENDIX APPENDIX A A-l APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 23, 2017 APPENDIX B. B-l APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT ORDER ENTERED MARCH 7, 2017 APPENDIX C C-l APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT ORDER ENTERED APRIL 10, 2017 APPENDIX D D-l APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT ORDER ENTERED MAY 8, 2017 ! : 1 ii 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 Cases 184 A.D.2d 1083, 1083 [4th Dept.] 70 N.Y.2d 891, 894 82 N.Y.2d 825 9People v. Ames, People v. Bennett, People v. Bonilla, People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 213. ' People v. Dunbar, 5 N.Y.3d 834, 835 People v. Harris, 4 A.D.3d 767, 767 [4th Dept.] People v. Jones, 114 A.D.3d 1239, 1242 [4th Dept.].... People v. Long, 27 A.D.3d 1053, 1054 [4th Dept.] : People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666 People v. Lubanski, 148 A,D.2d 947, 947 [4th Dept.]. People v. Nicodemus, 247 A.D.2d 883, 836 [4th Dept.] ) 3 2 6 6 10 & 11 4 9 9 4,7 1 7People v. Owens, 206 A.D.2d 303, 304 . People v. Speed, 13 A.D.3d 1083, 1084 [4th Dept.].... People v. Vaughan, 48 A.D.3d 1069, 1071 [4th Dept.] 9, 12 8 Statutes Criminal Procedure Law §470.15 [6] [a] 3,5,8 iii I ■■■IS IKA-16-02069 STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION - FOURTH DEPARTMENT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Respondent, against RICKY GATES, Defendant/Appellant. Indictment No. 15-274-14 THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This Brief is submitted in response to the People's Brief which was received, by counsel, by regular mail, on May 11, 2017. By Order, entered January 23, 2017, this Court extended the time for the People to file and serve its Respondent's Brief to on or before February 22, 2017, and the time for appellant to file and serve his Reply Brief to on or before March 9, 2017 (Order, entered January 23, 2017; Appendix A). By Order, entered March 7, 2017, this Court extended the time for the People to file and serve its Respondent's Brief to 1 on or before March 27, 2017, and the time for appellant to file and serve his Reply Brief to on or before April 11, 2017 (Order,m entered March 7, 2017; Appendix B). By Order, entered April 10, 2017, this Court extended the © time for the People to file and serve its Respondent's Brief to on or before April 17, 2017, and the time for appellant to file and serve his Reply Brief to on or before May 2, 2017 (Order, © entered April 10, 2017, Appendix C). By Order, entered May 8, 2017, this Court extended the time for the People to file and serve its Respondent's Brief to on or© before- May 11, 2017, and the time for appellant to file and serve his Reply Brief to on or before May 26, 2017 (Order, 1 entered May 8, 2017, Appendix D). POINT I APPELLANT DID NOT PROPERLY WAIVE HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. Initially, the People claim (see The People's Brief, p. 13) that appellant abandoned his Suppression Motion by entering into a plea of guilty without demanding that the trial court's "tentative" ruling be reduced to writing (People v, Bonilla, 82 N.Y.2d 825). As the People indicate (see The People's Brief, p. 13), the trial court stated, on the Record, that its suppression - determination was "tentative" (73). . Nevertheless, based on its 2 1 statements it was clear that the trial court would deny the suppression of appellant's statements (73). It was only with this understanding that appellant decided to enter his plea of guilty (73-74). As such, since the trial court's Bench Decision deprived appellant of a real and meaningful opportunity to decide whether to plead guilty, this Court should review the issue as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (73-74) (Criminal Procedure Law §470.15 [6] [a]). .'-I- 1 On the merits, the People claim (see The People's Brief, pp. 14-17) that appellant was not in custody when he spoke to Trooper Smithers (People's HH Witness No. 1) during the traffic stop, and properly waived his Miranda rights when speaking to Trooper Pelton (People's HH Witness No. 2). It is respectfully submitted, however, that the circumstances demonstrated that appellant's freedom of movement was retrained to ' a degree that was associated with a formal arrest (10-11) (People v. Bennett, 70 N.Y.2d 891, 894). Smithers indicated he was suspicious as to what was in the bags in appellant's vehicle (9, i 34). After answering Smithers's questions about their contents, appellant requested to "be on his way," and was denied that 1 ;request (10). Smithers then requested appellant to unzip the bags |so that he could see what was inside (11). Appellant declined, and indicated he wished to leave (11). Smithers also had appellant exit the vehicle, and conducted a pat search of him (11-12). ! 3 I Under such circumstances, especially the fact that Smithers explained that he interpreted appellant's request to "be on his way" to mean that appellant wanted the questioning to cease, and he be permitted to leave would lead any reasonable person, i 1 innocent of any crime, would have thought that they were in custody (10) (People v. Long, 27 A.D.3d 1053, 1054 [4th Dept.]). Therefore, appellant's statements made subsequent to > Smithers's denial of appellant's request to leave, which included the purported confession to having untaxed cigarettes in his vehicle, should have been suppressed (10, 15-16) (Long, supra at 1054). The trial court's failure to suppress such statements denied appellant a meaningful choice in pleading guilty, and as » such, should result in the reversal of the judgment of conviction, and the matter being remitted for further proceedings (10-16) (see People v. Nicodemus, 247 A.D.2d 883, 836 [4th Dept.]---vacating a> guilty plea and remitting the matter for further proceedings after reversing the trial court's improperly denied the suppression of ■ physical evidence and statements). 4 3 :;S 1 POINT II THE POLICE LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH APPELLANT'S VEHICLE. The People reiterate their claim (see The People's Brief, p. 18) that appellant abandoned this part of his Suppression Motion by entering into a plea of guilty without demanding that the trial court's "tentative" ruling be reduced to writing. While it is acknowledged that the trial court stated, on the that its suppression determination was "tentative," it wasRecord, clear that the trial court determined that there was probable cause to search appellant's vehicle (73). It was only with this understanding that appellant decided to enter his plea of guilty (73-74). As such, since the trial court's Bench Decision deprived appellant of a real and meaningful opportunity to decide whether to plead guilty, this Court should review the issue as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (73-74) (Criminal Procedure Law §470.15 [6] (a]). On the merits, the People claim (see The People's Brief, p. 20) that it was only after Trooper Smithers (People's HH Witness No. 1) received "multiple inconsistent answers about the bags that he could clearly see were untrue" did he ask appellant to open one of the bags (11). Smithers asked appellant to exit the vehicle, and received, according to the People (see The People's Brief, p. > 21) "further conflicting answers" from the passengers (13). While 5 # appellant denied the request, and asked to be on his way, the People assert (see The People's Brief, p. 21) that Smithers wasm justified in thinking that a crime was being committed (11). It is respectfully submitted, however, that Smithers did not > have a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot (10-16) (People v. Dunbar, 5 N.Y.3d 834, 835). Under People v. DeBour (40 N.Y.2d 210, 213), the police possessed an objective credible O However, thereason to approach appellant based on his speed. encounter never reached a level two Debour (supra at 213) inquiry, "a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."* Specifically, appellant was cooperative in answering all questions posed by Smithers during the course of the traffic stop, including ! stepping out of his vehicle when requested to do so (10-16). While appellant did not consent to a search of his vehicle, it was his right to decline (11). i Moreover, Smithers beliefs that appellant's answers were inconsistent were not supported by the Record (7-10, 26-27). Appellant initially said there was clothing in the bags (8). Upon further inquiry he added that the clothes were inside boxes, accounting for the protruding edges sticking out from the bags (8). Appellant then said that there were presents for his family and children, including bicycles and toys (9, 26-27). Appellant's and did not "change," but insteadanswers were not inconsistent, 26-27). Additionally, even ifsimply provided more detail (7-10, 6,> #§ appellant and his passengers appeared nervous that was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that appellant was committing a crime (7-11) (People v. Owens, 206 A.D.2d 303, 304). It also should be noted, as discussed above (see POINT I, supra), appellant's "confession" regarding the cigarettes did not provide the People with reasonable suspicion to search appellant's vehicle because the statements were not voluntary (16-18). It is respectfully submitted that because the trial court failed to suppress the evidence seized from appellant's vehicle appellant was denied a meaningful choice in pleading guilty, and as such, should result in the reversal of the judgment of conviction, and the matter being remitted for further proceedings > (17-21) (see People v. Nicodemus, 247 A.D.2d 883, 836 [4th Dept.]-- 3-vacating a guilty plea and remitting the matter for further proceedings after reversing the trial court's improperly denied - the suppression of physical evidence and statements). POINT III APPELLANT UNEQUIVOCALLY ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. The People reiterate their claim (see The People's Brief, p. 23) that appellant abandoned this claim by entering into a plea of guilty without demanding that the trial court's "tentative" ruling be reduced to writing. Despite the trial court's "tentative" determination, this Court should review this issue, as a matter of 7 j 3 ■0 discretion in the interest of justice, because appellant's right to counsel was infringed by Trooper Pelton (People's HH Witness0 No. 2) (Criminal Procedure Law §470.15 [6] [a]). On the merits, the People claim (see The People's Brief, pp. > 23-25) that appellant did not unequivocally request an attorney Pelton's recollection of theprior to providing his statement. exchange was "I believe he said, do you think I need a lawyer?" (55). Pelton indicated that he interpreted appellant's statement as a question, and not as a demand (55). The Record, however, reflected that Pelton's recollection was) dubious (55, 60-61). Appellant was a former law enforcement officer, and was thus very familiar with his rights (54-55). That i appellant phrased his request for counsel in the manner testified to by Pelton is also belied by Pelton's notes from the interrogation which he admitted indicated the name of attorney Michael Young, without further explanation (60-61). The People recognize (see The People's Brief, pp. 24-25) that there is no © explanation for the attorney's name in Pelton's notes, but stress that the trial court's determination of the credibility of Pelton should be given great deference (People v. Vaughan, 48 A.D.3d 1069, 1071 [4th Dept.]). y It is respectfully submitted, that under such circumstances, the trial court credibility determination was erroneous, and its "tentative" determination regarding the facts deprived appellant 8 ■ of a meaningful choice in regard to pleading guilty (54-55, 60-61) (cf., Vaughn, supra at 1071). As such, the judgment of conviction should be reversed, and the matter remitted for further proceedings (People v. Lubanski, 148 A.D.2d 947, 947 [4th Dept.]). POINT IV APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA MAS IMPROPERLY ENTERED. The People claim (see The People's Brief, p. 26) that this issue is not preserved due to appellant's failure to move to withdraw his guilty plea (People v. Ames, 184 A.D.2d 1083, 1083 [4th Dept.]). The instant appeal, however, falls within the narrow exception to the preservation rule, described in People v. Lopez (71 N.Y.2d 662, 666), because it cast significant doubt as to appellant's guilt, and otherwise calls into question the voluntariness of his plea (76-79, 89-91) (see People v. Speed, 13 A.D.3d 1083, 1084 [4th Dept.]). On the merits, the People claim (see The People's Brief, pp. 26-28) that appellant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and ■ voluntary. The People assert (see The People's Brief, p. 26-27) that appellant: entered a "detailed admission" to the charge; did not indicate he had physical or mental health issues at the time : of the plea; was given a thorough explanation of the rights he forfeited by pleading guilty. 9 It is respectfully summited, however, that appellant did not make a "detailed admission" concerning the charges, and instead,1 merely responded "[y]es sir" to questions posed by the trial court (78-79). Moreover, appellant did not provide narrative responses » in regard to the trial court's inquiries regarding the rights he forfeited, and his voluntariness, and again, only replied to the trial court with monosyllabic responses (76-79). s 27) thatThe People claim (see The People's Brief, p. theappellant's assertion that he was allowed to possess cigarettes due to his Native American status, and that he could* not pay taxes on such a product if he was tax exempt did not render his guilty plea ambiguous (80) (People v. Harris, 4 A.D.3d 767, 767 [4th Dept.]). Contrary to the People's claim (see The People's Brief, pp. 27-28), even though appellant's statements occurred after the it was only meretrial court's factual explanation of the crime, (79-80.moments after appellant's terse confirmatory responses Specifically, after the trial court advised appellant to become : better acquainted with the law regarding the transportation of cigarettes, appellant responded: 10 1 I tried to do that, sir. Everybody that I asked- -I even asked Officer Smithers and I asked Officer Pelton also and they still can't give me the answer that I need, either. But because I'm Native American, I carry my tribe card, I have a New York State tax exempt card. Where do I pay it being tax exempt? Not being smart, I was wondering if you could direct me if I could go to get this information (80). s The trial court did not answer appellant's inquiry (80). statement was a clear assertion that he did notAppellant's believe he was a person eligible to be charged with such an offense, and thus the trial court should have made further inquiry regarding the propriety of the plea (80) (Lopez, supra at 666). ■ IMoreover, the People rely (see The People's Brief, p. 27) on People v. Jones (114 A.D.3d 1239, 1242 [4th Dept.]) as standing for the proposition that "even where the defendant plead [sic] guilty by way of an Alford plea and where the record contains strong -evidence of guilt that the very narrow Lopez exception does not 5 apply." The People's reliance on Jones (supra at 1242) is misplaced. : 4 The Court merely indicated that the allocution in Jones (supra at : 1242) did not fall under the Lopez exception. Then this Court indicated, "in any event, we conclude that the record establishes 1 that defendant's Alford plea was 'the product of a voluntary and rational choice,' and that the record 'contains strong evidence of i (Jones, supra at 1242). Contrary to the People'sactual guilt / n 11 ) claim (see The People's Brief, pp. 27-28), the Court's decision in Jones (supra at 1242) merely denied the Lopez exception was present in that specific case, and stated that the Alford plea was appropriate. It did not make any sweeping proclamations in regard r to Record evidence and the Lopez exception (Jones, supra at 1242). As such, when viewing the totality of this unique guilty plea, it is respectfully submitted that it was not knowingly, * intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and as a result, should be vacated (76-80) (Speed, supra at 1084). > C) ) ■ 5 12 I > t i I 1 1CONCLUSION THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION SHOULD BE UNANIMOUSLY REVERSED. yt;! ; Respectfully submitted, ft.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS. / Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 101 South Salina Street, Suite 1010 Syracuse', New York 13202 (315) 474-1285 1 1 John A. Cirando, Esq. Bradley E. Keem, Esq. Elizabeth deV. Moeller, Esq. Of Counsel1 Date: May 24, 2017 3> ... : ' i 13 > ■> APPENDIX A I I . SUPREME COURT OF TOE STATE OF NEW YORK appellate ®tbt£uin, Jfourtfi 3Ftibtdal department PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND CARNI, JJ. KA 16-02069 a THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, V ■a RICKY GATES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Indictment No: 0464/15 . Respondent having moved for an extension of the time to file and serve a brief on the appeal taken from a judgment of Jefferson County Court, rendered August 6, 2015, Now, upon reading and filing the affidavit of George R. Shaffer, III, Esq. sworn to December 16, 2016, the notice of motion with proof of service thereof, and due deliberation having been had thereon, It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted, and the time to file and serve a respondent's brief is extended to February 22, 2017, and It is further ORDERED that the time to file and serve a reply brief be and the same hereby is extended to March 9, 2017. €' s ) Entered: January 23, 2017 FRANCES E. CAFARELL, Clerk /H iJ © m ' APPELLATE DIVISION Fourth Judicial Department Clerk's Office, Rochester, N.Y. , Cl I, FRANCESE. CAFARELL, Clerk of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, do hereby certify that this is a true copy of the original order, now on file in this office. © f IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at the City of Rochester, New York, this JAN 23 2017 & mwk o2- 2 o Clerk / © t: avcxx J •• •: A*-*- v*%; 9*%V •‘i W' "-w- 'v-xviv V .x'!\ •.cc .-I. -I -A- vs. r‘- ■> "5 APPENDIX B> A SUPREME COURT OF TEE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Btbtgton, Jfourtfj Jubtctal ®apartment r> PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND CARNI, JJ. mtmKA 16-02069 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, V RICKY GATES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Indictment No: 0464/15 Respondent having moved for an extension of the time to file and serve a brief on the appeal taken from a judgment of Jefferson County Court, rendered August 6, 2015, Now, upon reading and filing the affidavit of George R. Shaffer, III, Esq. sworn to February 15, 2017, the notice of motion with proof of service thereof, and due deliberation having been had thereon, It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted, and the time to file and serve a respondent's brief is extended to March 27, 2017, and It is further ORDERED that the time to file and serve a reply brief be and the same hereby is extended to April 11, 2017. ; i | Entered: March 7, 2017 FRANCES E. CAFARELL, Clerk ( > Supreme Court APPELLATE DIVISION Fourth Judicial Department Clerk's Office, Rochester, N.Y. } I, FRANCESE. CAFARELL, Clerk of theAppellateDivision of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, do hereby certify that this is a true copy of the original order, now on file in this office. v IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at the City of Rochester, New York, this MAR 0,? 2017l§H mm 3, Clerk > ■ :.••/.V":?W > •.<*;ÿ ......; v v • v*ÿ - 'f ' '• -r*-'f-- j'-’ •< ----- T-.r-.vv- :/;-f'-T-'-T' -v- 'Tv :’V’Z'=:ÿ r "i WV;-v :/;>• % .* : ••••: :•• : % : -• : :. % *» i APPENDIX C ! I . 3 I ; 1 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK appellate ®tbt£ton, jfourtfj Jutrktal department y PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., DEJOSEPH, CURRAN, TROUTMAN, AND SCUPPER, JJ. KA 16-02069 l cssf®THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, V f RICKY GATES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Indictment No: 0464/15 O Respondent having moved for an extension of the time to file and serve a brief on the appeal taken from a judgment of Jefferson County Court, rendered August 6, 2015, Now, upon reading and filing the affidavit of George R. Shaffer, III, Esq. sworn to March 24, 2017, .the notice of motion with proof of service thereof, and due deliberation having been had thereon, It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted, and the time to file and serve a respondent's brief is extended to April 17, 2017, and It is further ORDERED that the time to file and serve a reply brief be and the same hereby is extended to May 2, 2017. . I Oj Entered: April 10, 2017 FRANCES E. CAFARELL, Clerk I » * Supreme Court APPELLATE DIVISION Fourth Judicial Department Clerk's Office, Rochester, N.Y. } I, FRANCES E. CAFARELL, ClerkoftheAppellateDivisionof theSupreme Court in the Fourth JudicialDepartment, do hereby certify that this is a true copy of the original order, now on file in this office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at the City , of Rochester, New York, this mm m APR I0 foi7aa_ Z mmWrnm Clerk —' \ O If . ; 'ÿ% l ■ 1 8 4 i ■m% W-? ■i $ u >a a i! 3 I | } ! - 3 X*.J % 5 ilI 3 :> :: ■■■;: ■; O 1 i •: ■■■■ ■v : ■■■■■ I ■) : *. i'. £ : o i ,t • \ 0 : a XI0N3ddV < ' i tjt % SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK appellate ®tbfeum, jfmirtfj J'uMdat department 1PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., DEJOSEPH, CURRAN, TROUTMAN, AND SCUPPER, JJ. KA 16-02069 ®HD) ! THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, V * RICKY GATES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Indictment No: 0465/15 ) Respondent having moved for an extension of the time to file and serve a brief on the appeal taken from a judgment of Jefferson County Court, rendered August 6, 2015, Now, upon reading and filing the affidavit of George R. Shaffer, III, Esq. sworn to April 13, 2017, the notice of motion with proof of service thereof, the affidavit of John A. Cirando, Esq. sworn to May 5, 2017, and due deliberation having been had thereon, It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted to the extent that the time to file and serve a respondent's brief is extended to May 11, 2017, and It is further ORDERED that the time to file and serve a reply brief be and the same hereby is extended to May 26, 2017, and It is further ORDERED that the People shall not be permitted oral argument. ) O 3 ! I OJ ! !Entered: May 8, 2017 FRANCES E. CAFARELL, Clerk Supreme Ccmrt APPELLATE DIVISION Fourth Judicial Department Clerk's Office, Rochester, N.Y. }m I, FRANCES E. CAFARELL, Clerk of theAppellate Division of theSupreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, do hereby certify that this is a true copy of the original order, now on file in this office. “> O IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at the City of Rochester, New York, this MAY @8 2017 P 11 mm ao B &I Clerk 1.» O 0ÿ f ri-'\ %* w V.j w