Zoba International Corp.v.DVD Format/LOGO Licensing Corporation

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 10, 2011

No. 92051714 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2011)

WINTER
Mailed: March 10, 2011

Cancellation No. 92051714
Cancellation No. 92051790
Cancellation No. 92051821

Zoba International Corp.

v.

DVD Format / LOGO Licensing
Corporation

Before Seeherman, Bucher, and Cataldo,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

By the Board:

Background
Zoba International Corp. (“petitioner” or “Zoba”) seeks
to cancel three registrations1 owned by DVD Format / LOGO
Licensing Corporation (“respondent” or “DVD FLLC”) for the
following mark (hereafter, the “DVD LOGO”), which is

1 U.S. Reg. No. 2295726, the subject of Cancellation No.
92051714, issued November 30, 1999 for “optical disc players,
compact discs containing digital information for display of
filmed products”; U.S. Reg. No. 2381677, the subject of
Cancellation No. 92051790, issued August 29, 2000 for “compact
discs containing digital information for display of filmed
products”; and U.S. Reg. No. 2711602, the subject of Cancellation
No. 92051821, issued April 29, 2003 for “Blank optical discs for
use through recording as carriers for data, sound, images,
computer games, computer programs and map information; personal
computers; optical disc readers; computer game equipment
containing memory devices, namely, optical discs; CD players;
hand-held karaoke players; digital video cameras; and digital
still video cameras.” The term “DVD” is disclaimed in all three
registrations.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
THIS OPINION IS A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
2
identical in each of the registrations sought to be
cancelled in this consolidated proceeding:

As grounds for cancellation, petitioner asserts claims of
fraud and abandonment. In lieu of filing answers, respondent
filed motions to dismiss in each of the consolidated
proceedings.2
Respondent’s Motions based on Res Judicata
DVD FLLC requests that the Board dismiss Zoba’s fraud and
abandonment claims in each proceeding on the basis that said
claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata (or claim
preclusion). In support of its motion, DVD FLLC asserts,
inter alia, that the instant claims are virtually identical to
petitioner’s counterclaims that were previously dismissed with
prejudice by stipulation and order in a prior civil action
between the parties.3 In support of its motions, DVD FLLC

2 Although these proceedings were consolidated by the Board in
its February 9, 2010 order, petitioner filed a separate response
to each motion to dismiss. Respondent filed a single reply brief
in regard to its motions to dismiss.

3 DVD Format / LOGO Licensing Corp. v. U-Tech Media USA LLC and
Zoba International Corp., d/b/a CD Digital Card, Case No. 09-CV-
5461 brought in the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. The Stipulation and Order of Dismissal
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
3
submitted a copy of petitioner’s counterclaim in the prior
civil action, and a copy of the Stipulation and Order of
Dismissal. Respondent also argues that the asserted grounds
of fraud and abandonment fail to state a claim for which
relief may be granted.
Because the portions of respondent’s motions regarding
the issue of res judicata necessarily rely on matters outside
of petitioner’s three petitions, we previously informed the
parties that they will be treated as motions for summary
judgment4 (see July 16, 2010 order). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b). These portions of respondent’s motions now are fully
briefed. To the extent respondent’s motions seek, in the
alternative, relief under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, consideration was deferred in the same prior
order, pending completion of briefing. In this order, we
address the portion of DVD FLLC’s motions in which DVD FLLC
argues that Zoba’s claims are barred by claim preclusion, and
conclude that summary judgment dismissing Cancellation Nos.
92051714 and 92051790 is warranted. In a separate order, we
consider the question whether the petition in Cancellation No.

states, in relevant part, “that the Complaint and all of
Plaintiff’s claims, and the Answer and Counterclaims and all of
Defendant’s counterclaims in this action are dismissed with
prejudice.”

4 Although respondent has not stated that it has served its
initial disclosures on petitioner, our consideration of the
subject motion as one for summary judgment is appropriate at this
stage of the proceeding because it asserts claim preclusion. See
Trademark Rule 2.127(e)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(e)(1).
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
4
92051821 fails to state a claim upon which relief should be
granted.
• Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of
cases in which there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833
F.2d 1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1795-1796 (Fed. Cir. 1987), citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554
(1986). A factual dispute is genuine if, on the evidence of
record, a reasonable finder of fact could resolve the matter
in favor of the non-moving party. See Opryland USA Inc. v.
Great American Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471
(Fed. Cir. 1992); and Olde Tyme Foods Inc. v. Roundy’s Inc.,
961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Additionally,
“the record must be viewed in a light favorable to the party
opposing the motion, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in the non-movant’s favor.” Barmag Barmer
Maschinenfabrik AG, 731 F.2d 831, 836, 221 USPQ 561, 564 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
5
Under the doctrine of res judicata, the entry of a final
judgment “on the merits” of a claim in a proceeding serves to
preclude the relitigation of the same claim, cause of action,
or defense, in a subsequent proceeding that involves the same
parties or their privies, even when the prior judgment
resulted from default, consent of the parties, or dismissal
with prejudice. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.,
349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); Chromalloy American Corp. v. Kenneth
Gordon, Ltd., 736 F.2d 694, 222 USPQ 187, 189 (Fed. Cir.
1984); and Flowers Indus. Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 5
USPQ2d 1582 (TTAB 1987). The “claim extinguished includes all
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose,”
Vitaline Corp. v. General Mills Inc., 891 F.2d 273, 13 USPQ2d
1172, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and also includes those claims or
defenses that could have been raised in the prior action, as
long as they arise from the same series of transactional facts
as those in the original claims. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker
Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and Int’l
Nutrition Co. v. Horphaq Research Ltd., 220 F.3d 1325, 1328,
55 USPQ2d 1492, 1494 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
A subsequent claim will be barred by claim preclusion if:
“(1) there is identity of parties (or their privies); (2)
there has been an earlier final judgment on the merits of a
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
6
claim; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of
transactional facts as the first.” Jet Inc. v. Sewage
Aeration Systems, 223 F.3d 1360, 55 USPQ2d 1854, 1857 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Sept. 28, 2000),
citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5
(1979).
Before addressing whether there is any genuine dispute as
to relevant facts and if the doctrine of res judicata bars
Zoba’s claims, we find it necessary to comment on whether, as
respondent asserts, Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp.5 is
controlling with respect to whether petitioner’s claims are
barred by claim preclusion. We thus first briefly review that
decision.
In Nasalok, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reviewed the Board’s determination that Nasalok’s claim of
trademark invalidity as set forth in its petition to cancel
Nylok’s trademark registration was barred by res judicata. As
background, the salient facts were that in a civil action
between the same parties prior to the Board proceeding, the
defendant Nasalok had failed to appear. As a result, the
district court issued a default judgment against Nasalok and
an injunction ordering Nasalok to cease use of the involved
mark. On review of the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit

5 522 F.3d 1320, 86 USPQ2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
7
reiterated the three-part test for claim preclusion discussed
in Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems, supra, and discussed,
inter alia, when the rules of defendant preclusion apply. The
Court emphasized that “Section 18(2) of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments makes clear that a defense that could
have been interposed cannot later be used to attack the
judgment of the first action, [and] when a former defendant
attempts to undermine a previous judgment by asserting in a
subsequent action a claim or defense that was or could have
been asserted in the earlier case, the rules of defendant
preclusion will apply.” Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).
Notably, the Court stated that defendant preclusion would
apply in circumstances where “the defendant in the original
action attempts to collaterally attack the default judgment.”
Id. at 1376 (emphasis added).6 The Court concluded that
Nasalok’s claim constituted a collateral attack on the
district court’s judgment and affirmed the Board’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Nylok. Id. at 1377.
In its motions in Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and
92051790, DVD FLLC argues, in relevant part, that “Nasalok
Coating Corp. is binding and directly on point” (p. 5); and
contends that the circumstances in Nasalok are the same as

6 The Court also held that a defendant is precluded if the claim
or defense asserted in the second action was a compulsory
counterclaim that the defendant failed to assert in the first
action. Id. at 1372.

Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
8
those in the cases at bar. “Having bargained for, and
received, dismissal of the district court lawsuit with
prejudice, Petitioner is barred from seeking to overturn that
result” (p. 6). In Cancellation No. 92051821, DVD FLLC also
relies on Nasalok to argue that defendant preclusion bars
Zoba’s claims. Specifically, DVD FLLC asserts that Zoba’s
claims therein “could have [been] brought when it asserted
(and then relinquished) its cancellation claims in the
district court,” and also constitute an improper collateral
attack on the district court judgment (p. 8).
Respondent’s reliance on Nasalok in all three motions is
misplaced. In regard to Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and
92051790, Zoba asserted its counterclaims as a counterclaim-
plaintiff in the prior civil action. Thus, the traditional
doctrine of plaintiff claim preclusion is applicable to the
instant cancellations involving the counterclaims in the prior
civil action. See Nasalok, 86 USPQ2d at 1372 (“Typically,
claim preclusion is applied against a plaintiff who brings a
second action related to an earlier action”). See also J.
Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:82
(4th ed. 2010) (distinguishing between elements necessary for
claim preclusion to operate against a plaintiff versus a
defendant in the first action). In view thereof, with respect
to Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790, the analysis in
Jet Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems applies here. As to
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
9
Cancellation No. 92051821, the rules of defendant preclusion
discussed in Nasalok also do not apply. The registration that
petitioner now seeks to cancel in the ‘821 proceeding was not
the subject of the parties’ prior civil action; therefore,
Zoba had no obligation to assert a defense of trademark
invalidity regarding that registration in the civil action
(see infra). Thus, defendant preclusion, as analyzed and
applied in Nasalok, is inapposite to the present motions.
Turning back to respondent’s motions for summary
judgment, we conclude for the following reasons that there is
no genuine dispute as to any pertinent facts, and that the
doctrine of res judicata bars Zoba’s claims in Cancellation
Nos. 92051714 and 92051790 as a matter of law, but does not
bar Zoba’s claims in Cancellation No. 92051821.
As to the first factor, whether the parties are identical
or in privity, the parties do not dispute that the parties to
the civil action and to the subject consolidated proceeding
are identical.7 Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute
regarding any material fact involving the first factor of the
res judicata analysis.
Regarding the second factor, namely, whether there has
been an earlier final judgment on the merits of a claim,

7 We note the additional defendant in the civil action, namely,
U-Tech Media USA LLC; however, the pleadings and the “Stipulation
and Order of Dismissal” issued in that proceeding clearly name
petitioner as a defending party therein.

Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
10
courts have long held that judgments on consent give rise to
res judicata. See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Service
Corp., 349 U.S. at 327 (holding that a lawsuit, dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement, “bars a later
suit on the same cause of action”); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co.,
947 F.2d 469, 20 USPQ2d 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“there is
no dispute that … claim preclusion principles apply to a
consent judgment”).
Zoba does not explicitly dispute that the stipulated
order of dismissal in the civil action is a final judgment.
However, in response to respondent’s arguments applying
Nasalok to petitioner’s claims (discussed supra), Zoba
contends that its claims do not amount to a collateral attack
on the stipulated dismissal by the district court; that “here,
the judgment simply dismissed all claims”; that the stipulated
judgment was “simply a dismissal with prejudice”; and that “no
rights were granted to either Plaintiff or Defendant beyond a
release from those claims and counterclaims” (responses, pp.
6, 10-11). To the extent that Zoba’s assertions could be
construed as an argument that the consent order issued by the
district court is not a final judgment with respect to Zoba’s
counterclaims in the civil action, the contention is not well
founded. The “Stipulation and Order” issued in the civil
action between the parties clearly dismissed all parties’
claims, including Zoba’s counterclaims, with prejudice. In
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
11
view thereof, there is no genuine dispute that a final
judgment order was issued in the civil action between the
parties and, specifically, with respect to the counterclaims
asserted therein.
With respect to the third factor for claim preclusion,
namely, whether the claims in the later proceeding are based
on the same set of transactional facts as those asserted in a
prior action, we apply the analysis used by our primary
reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which is guided by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24
(1982). See Chromalloy American Corp. v. Kenneth Gordon,
Ltd., 736 F.2d 694, 222 USPQ 187, 189-190 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
and Young Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d
1305, 1314, 219 USPQ 1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cited in
Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems, 55 USPQ2d at 1856.
Specifically, we must consider whether Zoba’s counterclaims
comprise the same “core [or nucleus] of operative facts” or
are “based on the same, or nearly the same, factual
allegations” as those asserted in these proceedings. Id. at
1857.
Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790
• Zoba’s Fraud Claims
In the Fourth Counterclaim in the civil action entitled
“Cancellation of Trademark under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1119, 1058 and
1064(3),” Zoba asserted a counterclaim of fraud “on the basis
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
12
that [the DVD LOGO] registration[s], [i.e., U.S. Reg. Nos.
2295726 and 2318677] were obtained and/or renewed on the false
and fraudulent basis that DVD FLLC was using the DVD LOGO”
(¶112); that the specimens of use submitted by DVD FLLC to
renew its trademark registrations were not specimens
evidencing its own use of the DVD LOGO for its own goods, but
were specimens used by other entities (¶111); and that “DVD
FLLC does not actually use the DVD LOGO as a trademark for its
own goods” (¶112).
Similarly, Zoba asserts in the cancellation proceedings
claims of fraud in connection with DVD FLLC’s filing of its
declarations of continued use and renewal under Sections 8 & 9
and its “Affidavit[s] of Incontestability.” The factual
assertions underlying these fraud claims are, as set forth in
the petitions to cancel, in relevant part, as follows:
“By effecting the §§ 8/9 Filing” [¶20 in Cancellation No.
92051714] and “[b]y effecting the “§§8/15 Filing[s]” [¶18
in Cancellation No. 92051714; ¶17 in Cancellation No.
92051790], DVD FLLC fraudulently filed its declaration or
affidavit, and that said declaration or affidavit, in
which DVD FLLC stated that its DVD LOGO had been in
continuous use in commerce and was still in use in
commerce, was fraudulent because DVD FLLC “had never used
the subject Mark, since it had never manufactured any
products … in connection with the [DVD LOGO] mark,” and
because DVD FLLC submitted specimens of use of the DVD
LOGO for products that were manufactured by a shareholder
of DVD FLLC that is not a licensee of DVD FLLC (¶¶ 18, 20
in Cancellation No. 92051714; ¶17 in Cancellation No.
92051790).

Thus, Zoba’s counterclaims in the prior civil action and its
claims in Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790 assert that
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
13
DVD FLLC committed fraud in filing sworn statements for the
renewal of U.S. Reg. Nos. 2295726 and 2318677 by stating that
it was using the DVD LOGO in commerce and by submitting a
specimen of use manufactured and used by a non-licensed third
party. Additionally, in both the civil action and in the
cancellation proceedings, Zoba’s claims rely on the same
affidavits and specimens of use. Cf. Vitaline Corp. v.
General Mills, 13 USPQ2d at 1174 (the court noted that
“Vitaline’s theories of abandonment and fraud are not only
based upon the same transactional facts-use of the mark on
product containers in connection with certain wording, but
rely on the very same proof-the affidavit and specimens”).
Therefore, there is no genuine dispute that the fraud
counterclaim in the civil action and the respective fraud
claims in Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790 are based on
the same set of transactional facts out of which the fraud
claim arose, viz. that DVD FLLC assertedly has not used and/or
does not use the DVD LOGO for its own goods and that, in
maintaining its DVD LOGO registrations (i.e., Nos. 2295726 and
2318677), DVD FLLC submitted a specimen of use for goods which
were actually manufactured and used by another, unlicensed
entity.
In view of the foregoing, we find that all three claim
preclusion requirements have been met in connection with
Zoba’s fraud claim. Specifically, there is no genuine dispute
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
14
that the parties in the civil action and in Cancellation Nos.
92051714 and 92051790 are identical, that there was an earlier
final judgment on the merits of Zoba’s fraud claims, and that
the instant fraud claims are based on the same set of
transactional facts as the first action. Consequently, Zoba’s
fraud claims regarding U.S. Reg. Nos. 2295726 and 2318677 are
barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
• Zoba’s Abandonment Claims
We now consider whether Zoba’s abandonment claims in the
present proceeding and in the prior civil action are based on
the same set of transactional facts. The claim preclusion
doctrine also bars a plaintiff from a subsequent assertion of
the same transactional facts in the form of a different cause
of action or theory of relief. Vitaline Corp. v. General
Mills, 13 USPQ2d at 1174. See also Young Engineers, 219 USPQ
at 1151; and 4 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 23.36 (4th ed. 2010) (“A party is not entitled to a second
day in court simply by alleging a new ground of recovery for
the same wrong”), citing to Fink v. Golenbock, 680 A.2d 1243
(Conn. 1996) (“claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the
same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence
or legal theories might be advanced in support of it”).
In the civil action, Zoba alleged the following in its
Third and Fourth counterclaims, which incorporate by reference
paragraph 84:
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
15
84. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has entered
into licenses for its DVD format and its DVD LOGO
with over 400 licensees in the United States …”;
. . .

107. The primary significance of the DVD LOGO is as a
generic and/or descriptive and/or functional term …
and [it] is not a designation of source or origin
of the DVD LOGO with DVD FLLC.
108. The DVD LOGO has become so commonplace in use on
DVDs irrespective of manufacturer or source that
the DVD LOGO has lost its significance as a
trademark […].
109. […] the primary significance of the [DVD LOGO]
trademark in the minds of the consuming public is
not the producer but the product.
. . .

112. Upon information and belief, DVD FLLC does not
actually use the DVD LOGO as a trademark for its
own goods, and, accordingly, … its registration[s]
should be cancelled on the grounds that said
registration[s were] obtained and/or renewed on the
false and fraudulent basis that DVD FLLC was using
the DVD LOGO.

Similarly, the petitions for cancellation set forth four
claims alleging that DVD FLLC does not use the DVD LOGO as a
trademark as follows (emphasis added):
• DVD FLLC does not use the DVD LOGO, but purports to
“license” the subject mark to licensees (¶¶ 22-23, 25 in
92051714, ¶¶ 19-20, 22 in 92051790); and “any uses of the
mark are other than by its owner” (¶24 in 92051714, ¶21
in 92051790);

• DVD FLLC permits unlicensed use and uncontrolled
licensing (¶¶ 22-23 in 92051714, ¶¶ 19-20 in 92051790);

• DVD FLLC fails to police its mark by allowing unlicensed
and non-compliant use of the DVD LOGO (¶23 in 92051714,
¶20 in 92051790); and
• DVD FLLC misuses the DVD LOGO as a certification mark
since “any uses of the mark are other than by its owner
[or a related company],” the mark is intended to indicate
the quality of the licensee’s goods, and “is not intended
to” and does not indicate the source of the goods (¶¶ 24-
25 in Cancellation No. 92051714; ¶¶ 21-22 in Cancellation
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
16
No. 92051790).8

Although Zoba has identified these allegations in its
petitions for cancellation as “abandonment” claims, and did
not specifically allege in its counterclaims in the prior
litigation that DVD FLLC had abandoned its DVD LOGO, there is
no genuine dispute that Zoba’s abandonment claims in the
cancellation proceedings are based on the same set of
transactional facts which gave rise to Zoba’s counterclaims
asserted in the civil action, namely, that DVD FLLC does not
itself use the DVD LOGO in U.S. Reg. Nos. 2295726 and 2318677
as a trademark for its own goods; that the DVD LOGO is used by
third parties; and that the DVD LOGO no longer identifies a
single source for the goods with which the mark is used. See
Section 45(2) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.9 See
also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION at § 18:48

8 Zoba also alleges the following facts in support of its
abandonment claims, namely, that respondent does not exercise the
requisite control over the nature and the quality of the goods
sold by licensees of the mark (¶22 and ¶19 in the respective
pleadings); that respondent’s shareholders are permitted to use
the DVD LOGO without becoming licensees (¶22(a)and ¶19(a)); that
respondent does not exercise any routine testing and examination
of licensees to insure compliance with “DVD Format Books” (¶22(b)
and ¶19(b)); that respondent permits unlicensed use of the DVD
LOGO or use that is non-compliant with respondent’s DVD LOGO
specifications (¶¶ 22(c) & 23; ¶¶ 19(c) & 20); and that “any uses
of the mark are other than by its owner” and display of the mark
is intended to indicate that the goods[’] material, mode of
manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of such
licensees[’] goods comply with an established certification
standard (¶¶ 24-25; ¶¶ 21 & 22).

9 “A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ … [w]hen any course
of conduct of the owner, … causes the mark to become the generic
name for the goods or otherwise to lose its significance as a
mark.”
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
17
(distinguishing uncontrolled or “naked” licensing
characterized as “abandonment,” where loss of trademark rights
in a mark is caused by loss of significance as a mark or
indicator of single source, from abandonment resulting from
nonuse and intent to abandon). Inasmuch as the subject claims
are based on the same set of operative facts, the difference
in terminology used in the pleadings of the two proceedings
does not raise a genuine dispute as to whether the
counterclaim and the instant claims are based on the same set
of transactional facts. See Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration
Systems, 55 USPQ2d at 1856.
There is also no genuine dispute that the other factual
assertions within the abandonment claims in the cancellation
proceedings fail to constitute new or different transactions
that would prevent the application of claim preclusion to
Zoba’s abandonment claims. Specifically, there is no genuine
dispute that the several allegations related to respondent’s
licensing regime constitute a series of connected
transactions, that is, they are related to or exemplify Zoba’s
allegations that DVD FLLC itself, by commission or omission,
does not use or control the DVD LOGO as a trademark for its
own or properly licensed goods, and that the mark assertedly
no longer has the significance of a trademark. Further, even
though Zoba’s allegations in its civil complaint regarding DVD

Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
18
FLLC’s license agreements (see ¶84 answer and counterclaim)
relate largely to Zoba’s counterclaims asserting antitrust
violations, there is no genuine dispute that Zoba’s
allegations regarding DVD FLLC’s licensing regime, viz., those
asserting uncontrolled use, failure to police the use of the
DVD LOGO by respondent’s licensees, and misuse of the mark,
should have been and could have been alleged in the prior
proceeding. See Nasalok, 86 USPQ2d at 1371 (“claim preclusion
refers to ‘the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters
that never have been litigated, because of a determination
that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit’”
(emphasis added)). See also Vitaline Corp., 13 USPQ2d at 1174
(the court determined that claim preclusion barred Vitaline
from asserting abandonment in a separate and subsequent
proceeding inasmuch as “the abandonment theory clearly could
have been brought in the original proceeding because Vitaline
had access to the affidavit and related specimens … when it
filed its counterclaim …, [and] Vitaline could even have
plausibly argued there was a statutory presumption of
abandonment” (emphasis in original)); and Int’l Nutrition v.
Horphaq, 55 USPQ2d at 1494-95 (“the differences between the
two pleadings are not sufficient to differentiate the claims
for res judicata purposes, particularly since there was
nothing in the cancellation petition that could not have been
alleged in the opposition”).
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
19
Therefore, with respect to Zoba’s claims of abandonment
in Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790, there is no
genuine dispute regarding the third factor of the res judicata
analysis, namely, that Zoba’s abandonment claims in these two
proceedings are based on the same series of transactional
facts as those alleged in Zoba’s counterclaims in the prior
civil action between the parties.
In view of the foregoing, we find that all three claim
preclusion requirements have been met in connection with
Zoba’s abandonment claims set forth in these proceedings.
Specifically, there is no genuine dispute that the parties in
the civil action and in Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and
92051790 are identical, that there was an earlier final
judgment on the merits of Zoba’s non-use or abandonment
claims, and that the instant abandonment claims are based on
the same set of transactional facts as those in the earlier
action. Consequently, Zoba’s abandonment claims with respect
to U.S. Reg. Nos. 2295726 and 2318677 are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata.
Accordingly, DVD FLLC’s motions for summary judgment in
Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790 on the ground of res
judicata are granted; and Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and
92051790 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Cancellation No. 92051821
Zoba’s fraud claim in Cancellation No. 92051821, which
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
20
relates to U.S. Reg. No. 2711602, comprises the allegations
that DVD FLLC “fraudulently filed the Statement of Use setting
forth goods in connection with which the subject Mark was then
in use” by DVD FLLC’s predecessor in interest, and that the
affidavit therein was fraudulent because the specimens
submitted by DVD FLLC were examples of a product manufactured
by Panasonic, Inc., which, assertedly, was not a limited
partner, agent, or licensee of DVD FLLC’s predecessor in
interest (¶¶ 9 and 15). Likewise, Zoba made the same
abandonment claims that it made in connection with
Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790.
Unlike the other petitions for cancellation discussed
herein, however, U.S. Reg. No. 2711602 was not pleaded by DVD
FLLC in the prior civil action and Zoba’s counterclaims
therein did not seek to cancel that particular registration.
As a result, the validity of U.S. Reg. No. 2711602 was never
at issue in the prior civil action. Additionally, although
U.S. Reg. No. 2711602 is for the same DVD LOGO, the
identification in the registration is for different and
broader goods than are identified in the registrations
involved in the civil action. Specifically, the DVD LOGO
registrations pleaded in the civil action describe only
optical disc players and compact discs containing digital
information for display of filmed products; whereas, the goods
described in U.S. Reg. No. 2711602 include, inter alia,
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
21
optical disc readers and blank optical discs for use in
recording data, sound, images, computer games, computer
programs and map information, and a variety of other
electronic goods. In view of the differences between the
trademark registrations involved and the goods described in
respondent’s registrations, there is no dispute that the fraud
and non-use counterclaims in the prior civil action and the
fraud and abandonment claims in Cancellation No. 92051821 are
not based on the same set of transactional facts. See
Nasalok, 86 USPQ2d at 1374 (“preclusion as to validity applies
only “if the accused product in the second suit [is]
‘essentially the same’ [‘or [is] only colorably different’] as
the specific device that was before the court in the first
suit”) (internal citations omitted); Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v.
Berkshire Fashions Inc., 424 F.3d 1229, 76 USPQ2d 1310, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2005); and Realex Chemical Corp. v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc., 849 F.2d 299, 7 USPQ2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1988)
(“There is no res judicata or claim preclusion where, while
the legal theory is the same, the accused mark is a newly
designed label used on a different product. The cause of
action is different and there is no ‘splitting’ of a cause of
action.”).
Furthermore, because the civil action did not involve
U.S. Reg. No. 2711602, we cannot find that DVD FLLC is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Zoba’s
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
22
fraud and abandonment claims based on the doctrine of res
judicata. In the civil action, DVD FLLC pleaded ownership of
only the two registrations that are the subject of
Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790. Since DVD FLLC chose
not to plead ownership of U.S. Reg. No. 2711602 in support of
its trademark infringement action, the complaint in the civil
action did not provide Zoba with notice that it had a right or
need to assert a defense against U.S. Reg. No. 2711602.
Consequently, Zoba had no obligation to file a counterclaim to
cancel U.S. Reg. No. 2711602; and U.S. Reg. No. 2711602 was
not the subject of or affected by the parties’ consent decree.
Thus, contrary to respondent’s arguments, it was not Zoba that
split the claims with respect to the DVD LOGO registrations.
Rather, although factual similarities exist among the three
proceedings, it was DVD FLLC that effectively split its claims
by failing to plead all of its DVD LOGO registrations in the
prior civil action.
In view of the foregoing, both precedent and fairness
dictate our finding that Zoba’s fraud and abandonment claims
in Cancellation No. 92051821 are not barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion. See, e.g., Sharp v. Thinksharp Inc., 79
USPQ2d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“when a party did not have
an opportunity to litigate disputed issues, a decision to
permit such litigation is favored”); and Mayer/Berkshire
Corp., 76 USPQ2d at 1314 (“The public policy underlying the
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
23
principles of preclusion, whereby potentially meritorious
claims may be barred from judicial scrutiny, has led courts to
hold that the circumstances for preclusion ‘must be certain to
every intent,’” citing Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 606,
610 (1878)).
Accordingly, respondent’s motion for summary judgment
with respect to Cancellation No. 92051821 is denied insofar as
respondent has failed to establish that Zoba’s fraud and
abandonment claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).10
Further, because Cancellation Nos. 92051714 and 92051790
have been dismissed, Cancellation No. 92051821 is no longer
considered to be consolidated with those proceedings, and
shall hereafter proceed forward as a single proceeding. All
papers filed hereafter in connection with Cancellation No.
92051821 must be filed in that specific proceeding, and the
caption for such papers should reference only Cancellation No.
92051821.
A separate order will be issued in Cancellation No.
92051821 to address whether the petition filed in that case

10 The parties should note that evidence submitted in support of
or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is of record
only for consideration of that motion. Any such evidence to be
considered at final hearing must be properly introduced in
evidence during the appropriate trial period. See, e.g., Levi
Strauss & Co. v. R. Joseph Sportswear Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1464 (TTAB
1993).
Cancellation Nos. 92051714, 92051790 and 92051821
24
sets forth a fraud or abandonment claim upon which relief can
be granted, and to reset the trial schedule in that proceeding
as necessary.
Decision
Respondent’s motions for summary judgment with respect to
Cancellation Nos. 9205714 and 92051790 on the ground of res
judicata are granted; and Cancellation Nos. 9205714 and
92051790 are dismissed with prejudice.11
Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of
res judicata with respect to Cancellation No. 92051821 is
denied.12
☼☼☼

11 Because this is a final decision of the Board, it may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or to a
U.S. District Court with appropriate jurisdiction. See Trademark
Act Sections 21(a)(1) and 21(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1071(a)(1) and
1071(b)(1); Trademark Rule 2.145, 37 C.F.R. § 2.145; and TBMP §
901.01 (2d ed. rev. 2004).

12 The decision in Cancellation No. 92051821 is interlocutory in
nature; therefore, any appeal thereof can be raised only after
final disposition of this proceeding. See Copeland’s Enterprises
Inc. v. CNV Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1989).