Ziv Wolkowicki et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 25, 2020

14341562 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/341,562 07/25/2014 Ziv WOLKOWICKI 122202-5048 (P23433US1) 1095
142248 7590 03/25/2020
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Apple)
600 Anton Boulevard
Suite 1800
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
EXAMINER
CAIRNS, THOMAS R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2468
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/25/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
OCIPDocketing@morganlewis.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ZIV WOLKOWICKI,
DANIEL B. POLLACK, and JUSTIN WOOD
____________

Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.

AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18–20, 22–28, and 30.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest
as Apple Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention “relates generally to
wireless communication between a portable electronic device and a server,
and more particularly to power optimization modes for data delivery
between [a] portable electronic device and [a] server.” Spec. ¶ 1.2 The
Specification explains that the “device can dynamically change between
communication modes based on an application or quality of service, battery
life, an amount of noise associated with the communications link, a
frequency of messages, and a type of message received in a given time
period.” Id. ¶ 4, Abstract. As an example, the “device can determine if the
number of pull messages is greater than the number of push messages,” and
the “device can select a push mode where a pull message can accompany a
push message.” Id. Abstract. As another example, the “device can
determine that the number of push messages is greater than the number of
pull messages,” and the “device can select a low-power associated sleep
mode.” Id.
Exemplary Claims
Independent claims 1 and 13 exemplify the claims at issue and read
as follows:

2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the
Specification, filed July 25, 2014; “Final Act.” for the Final Office
Action, mailed June 22, 2017; “Appeal Br.” for the Appeal Brief,
filed January 16, 2018; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed
April 19, 2018; and “Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed June 19, 2018.
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

3
1. A device comprising:
a transceiver configured to communicate through
a communications link to a wireless access point; and
a processor configured to:
dynamically switch between at least a first mode of
communication and a second mode of communication for
communicating push messages and pull messages over
the communications link, wherein each of the first and
second modes of communication includes a first period
and a second period;
receive data during the first period of the first
mode of communication and switch to a first inactive
state having a first base power level during the second
period of the first mode of communication, the push
messages being receivable at the first base power level
in the first inactive state; and
retrieve data corresponding to a data request
originating at the device during the first period of the
second mode of communication and switch to a second
inactive state having a second base power level, lower
than the first base power level, during the second period
of the second mode of communication, the push
messages being unreceivable at the second base power
level of the second inactive state.
13. A method comprising:
dynamically switching between a first mode of
communication that is initiated by a server device and a second
mode of communication that is initiated by a client device
based at least in part on a number of push messages and a
number of pull messages expected to be communicated to the
client device during a given time period, each of the first and
second modes of communication including a first period and a
second period;
when the number of pull messages expected to be
communicated to the client device during the given time period
exceeds or equals the number of push messages expected to be
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

4
communicated to the client device during the given time period,
receiving data during the first period of the first mode of
communication and switching to an inactive state during the
second period of the first mode of communication; and
when the number of push messages expected to be
communicated to the client device during the given time period
exceeds the number of pull messages expected to be
communicated to the client device during the given time period,
retrieving data during the first period of the second mode of
communication and switching to the inactive state during the
second period of the second mode of communication.
Appeal Br. 25, 27 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner
relies on the following prior art:

3 Jacobs claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No.
61/976,922, filed on April 8, 2014. Jacobs ¶ 1, code (60). Appellant does
not argue that Jacobs fails to qualify as prior art.
Brakmo et al. (“Brakmo”) US 6,816,977 B2 Nov. 9, 2004
Nakajima et al.
(“Nakajima”)
US 7,174,161 B2 Feb. 6, 2007
Jansson et al. (“Jansson”) US 2007/0264948 A1 Nov. 15, 2007
Nakao et al. (“Nakao”) US 8,225,323 B2 July 17, 2012
He et al. (“He”) US 8,547,941 B2 Oct. 1, 2013
Liu US 2014/0153457 A1 June 5, 2014
Black et al. (“Black”) US 8,904,206 B2 Dec. 2, 2014
(filed Jan. 26, 2010)
Jacobs et al. (“Jacobs”) US 2015/0286391 A1 Oct. 8, 2015
(filed Mar. 11, 2015)3
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

5
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 18–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) as having an
improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the
base claim. Final Act. 12.
Claims 1, 4, 6, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Jansson and Nakao. Final Act. 14–19.
Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jansson, Nakao, and Nakajima. Final Act. 19–20.
Claims 7, 8, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Jansson, Nakao, and Liu. Final Act. 20–24.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jansson, Nakao, and Brakmo. Final Act. 24–25.
Claims 13, 16, 18–20, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Jansson and Liu. Final Act. 26–36.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jansson, Liu, and Nakajima. Final Act. 36–37.
Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jansson, Liu, and Brakmo. Final Act. 37–38.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jansson, Liu, and Jacobs. Final Act. 38–39.
Claims 26–28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Jansson, Nakao, and Liu. Final Act. 39–48.
Claim 30 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jansson, Nakao, Liu, and Black. Final Act. 49–50.
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

6
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments
that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we disagree with
the Examiner’s determinations regarding unpatentability under § 103. But
we (1) agree with the Examiner that claim 18 fails to further limit the subject
matter of the base claim and (2) disagree that claims 19 and 20 fail to do so.
We add the following to address and emphasize specific findings and
arguments.
The § 112(d) Rejection of Claims 18–20
Claims 18–20 depend directly or indirectly from claim 13 and read as
follows:
18. The method of claim 13, further comprising:
determining the number of push messages and the
number of pull messages expected to be communicated to the
client device during the given time period.
19. The method of claim 18, further comprising:
switching to the first mode of communication when the
number of pull messages expected to be communicated to the
client device during the given time period is greater than or
equal to the number of push messages expected to be
communicated to the client device during the given time period.
20. The method of claim 19, further comprising:
switching to the second mode of communication when
the number of push messages expected to be communicated to
the client device during the given time period is greater than the
number of pull messages expected to be communicated to the
client device during the given time period.
Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.).
Section 112(d) provides that “a claim in dependent form shall contain
a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

7
limitation of the subject matter claimed.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(d). The
Examiner concludes that claim 18 “requires determining the number
of push/pull messages to be received within a given time limit, but this
limitation is . . . found in claim 13.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner explains
that “[t]he limitations of claim 13 cannot be met without determining the
number of push messages and the number of pull messages, because the
numbers must be compared to each other in order to receive messages in a
first mode or retrieve messages in the second mode.” Ans. 3. The Examiner
reasons that “without such determination the limitations of dynamically
switching between modes to receive or retrieve messages cannot be reached”
and that claim 18 “merely recites a feature inherent to claim 13.” Id. at 4.
In addition, the Examiner concludes that claims 19 and 20 are “fully
incorporated” into claim 13. Final Act. 12. The Examiner explains that the
limitation “‘dynamically switching between a first mode and a second mode’
of claim 13 requires switching to the first mode (as required by claim 19)
and switching to the second mode (as required by claim 20).” Ans. 6–7.
For claim 18, Appellant contends that claim 13 differs from claim 18
because claim 13 does not include the term “determining” or “any variation
thereof.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant also contends that claim 13 “does not
recite how the ‘number of push messages’ and ‘the number of pull
messages’ become known.” Id. According to Appellant, claim 18 requires
“determining” by “the actor of the method.” Reply Br. 7.
For claims 19 and 20, Appellant asserts that claim 13 “does not
specifically recite ‘switching to the first mode,’ or ‘switching to the second
mode,’ as is recited in dependent claims 19 and 20, respectively.” Appeal
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

8
Br. 11. Appellant also asserts that claim 13 does not require switching
according to the “when” conditions in claims 19 and 20. Reply Br. 8.
For claim 18, we agree with the Examiner that it fails to further limit
claim 13’s subject matter because claim 18 recites a feature necessarily
required by claim 13. Specifically, to “dynamically switch[] between a first
mode of communication . . . and a second mode of communication . . . based
at least in part on a number of push messages and a number of pull messages
expected to be communicated to the client device during a given time
period” according to claim 13 requires determining the number of push
messages and the number of pull messages expected to be communicated.
Claim 18 requires the same determination. Hence, we sustain the § 112(d)
rejection of claim 18.
For claims 19 and 20, we disagree with the Examiner that they fail
to further limit the subject matter of the base claim. The Specification
discloses more than two modes of communication, including the following
modes: (1) a push mode, (2) a low-power-associated-sleep mode, (3) an
associated-polling mode, and (4) a poll-and-reconnect mode. See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 82–87, 90–94, Figs. 2B, 2D, 4A, 5A, 6A–6C. Claim 13 requires
switching between two modes of communication, i.e., “switching between a
first mode of communication . . . and a second mode of communication.” In
contrast to claim 13, claim 19 requires “switching to the first mode of
communication” when a first condition exists. Similar to claim 19, claim 20
requires “switching to the second mode of communication” when a second
condition exists.
Because the Specification discloses more than two modes of
communication, “switching to the first mode of communication” according
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

9
to claim 19 may occur from a mode other than the second mode. Similarly,
“switching to the second mode of communication” according to claim 20
may occur from a mode other than the first mode. Thus, the “switching to”
requirements in claims 19 and 20 differ from the “switching between”
requirement in claim 13. Hence, we do not sustain the § 112(d) rejection of
claims 19 and 20.
The § 103 Rejection of Claims 1, 4, 6, and 11
INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1
As noted above, the § 103 rejection of claim 1 rests on Jansson and
Nakao. See Final Act. 14–17. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 because Jansson and Nakao fail to teach or suggest the
following limitations in claim 1:
receive data during the first period of the first mode of
communication and switch to a first inactive state having a first
base power level during the second period of the first mode of
communication; and
retrieve data corresponding to a data request originating at the
device during the first period of the second mode of
communication and switch to a second inactive state having a
second base power level, lower than the first base power level,
during the second period of the second mode of
communication.
See Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 3–5.
Specifically, Appellant asserts that Jansson discloses sending fewer
and fewer or even no emails to a device depending on decreases in the
device’s battery level instead of switching the device to any lower-power
mode, i.e., “a first inactive state” and “a second inactive state” according to
claim 1. Appeal Br. 13 (citing Jansson ¶ 31). Appellant also asserts that
Nakao does not cure Jansson’s deficiency. Id.
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

10
In response, the Examiner explains that Jansson discloses a device
with “multiple battery trigger levels for reducing the granularity of receiving
batches of pushed emails or email notifications.” Ans. 8. As an example,
when the device reaches a first battery-level threshold, “push an email
notification when two emails are received at” a server. Id. As another
example, when the device reaches a second battery-level threshold, “push an
email notification when five emails are received at” the server. Id. As yet
another example, when the device reaches a third battery-level threshold, do
not “push any further emails or email notifications to” the device. Id.
Based on the record before us, we agree with Appellant that the
Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited portions of Jansson
teach or suggest switching to “a first inactive state” and “a second inactive
state” according to claim 1. That Jansson’s server “reduc[es] the granularity
of receiving batches of pushed emails or email notifications” by a device
does not mean that the device switches to the claimed inactive states. The
Examiner does not rely on Nakao for teaching or suggesting switching to
“a first inactive state” and “a second inactive state” according to claim 1.
See Final Act. 14–17; Ans. 7–10. Hence, we do not sustain the § 103
rejection of claim 1.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 4, 6, AND 11
Claims 4, 6, and 11 depend directly from claim 1. For the reasons
discussed for claim 1, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of claims 4, 6,
and 11.
The § 103 Rejections of Claims 2, 7, 8, 10, and 25
Claims 2, 7, 8, 10, and 25 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1.
On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

11
secondary references—Nakajima, Liu, and Brakmo—overcome the
deficiency in Jansson and Nakao discussed above for claim 1. Hence, we
do not sustain the § 103 rejections of claims 2, 7, 8, 10, and 25.
The § 103 Rejection of Claims 13, 16, 18–20, and 23
INDEPENDENT CLAIM 13
As noted above, the § 103 rejection of claim 13 rests on Jansson and
Liu. See Final Act. 26–31. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 13 because Jansson and Liu fail to teach or suggest the
following limitation in claim 13: “dynamically switching between a first
mode of communication . . . and a second mode of communication . . . based
at least in part on a number of push messages and a number of pull messages
expected to be communicated to the client device during a given time
period.” See Appeal Br. 15–18; Reply Br. 5–7.
In particular, Appellant contends that Jansson’s device (1) “has no
a priori knowledge or expectation of how many messages might be received
during a given period of time” and (2) operates differently based on the
battery state. Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis omitted). Appellant asserts that
a “battery state undeniably differs from ‘a number of push messages and
a number of pull messages expected to be communicated to the client
device,’ as recited in independent claim 13.” Id. In addition, Appellant
contends that “Liu does not disclose or suggest any information regarding
determining a number of push or pull messages.” Reply Br. 7. According to
Appellant, Liu determines energy consumption for different channels using
test data that does not correlate “to any particular number of messages”
because “the size of each message may vary, e.g. a message with an
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

12
attachment may be significantly larger than a message without an
attachment.” Id.
In response, the Examiner explains that Jansson discloses push and
pull messages and a device “receiving a notification for 5 mails (expected
number of messages) that it will receive at once (a given time period) upon
fetching them.” Ans. 15. The Examiner also explains that Liu discloses
“selecting channels based on energy efficiency for a push/pull session . . .
calculated from a number of equations.” Id. at 16. The Examiner reasons
that “[i]t is evident that the device disclosed in Liu is capable of using the
equations provided to determine” that “the amount of data for pull messages
(i.e., the number of pull messages) is greater than or equal to the amount of
data for push messages (i.e., the number of push messages).” Id.
Based on the record before us, we agree with Appellant that the
Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited portions of Jansson
and Liu teach or suggest switching between different modes of
communication “based at least in part on a number of push messages and a
number of pull messages expected to be communicated to the client device
during a given time period” according to claim 13. Jansson discloses
different device operations based on the device’s battery level. See, e.g.,
Jansson ¶¶ 25–26, 31–36, Fig. 3. Liu discloses determining energy
consumption for push channels and pull channels to select a channel that
“consume[s] the least amount of energy.” See, e.g., Liu ¶¶ 56, 64, 86–94,
Fig. 6. To determine energy consumption, Liu uses test data corresponding
to “a unit data packet size.” Id. ¶ 89. Liu “calculate[s] energy consumed by
retrieving or receiving the test data.” Id. ¶ 92, Fig. 6. In addition, Liu
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

13
discloses equations for calculating energy consumption. Id. ¶¶ 53, 58, 61,
63–64.
The Examiner has not explained how any of Liu’s equations for
calculating energy consumption allows an ordinarily skilled artisan to
calculate “a number of push messages and a number of pull messages
expected to be communicated to the client device during a given time
period” as required by claim 13. See Ans. 12–16. Nor has the Examiner
explained how Liu’s test data corresponding to “a unit data packet size”
relates to a number of messages. See id. Hence, we do not sustain the § 103
rejection of claim 13.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 16, 18–20, AND 23
Claims 16, 18–20, and 23 depend directly or indirectly from claim 13.
For the reasons discussed for claim 13, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection
of claims 16, 18–20, and 23.
The § 103 Rejections of Claims 14, 22, and 24
Claims 14, 22, and 24 depend directly from claim 13. On this record,
the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited secondary
references—Nakajima, Brakmo, and Jacobs—overcome the deficiency in
Jansson and Liu discussed above for claim 13. Hence, we do not sustain the
§ 103 rejections of claims 14, 22, and 24.
The § 103 Rejection of Claims 26–28
INDEPENDENT CLAIM 26
As noted above, the § 103 rejection of claim 13 rests on Jansson,
Nakao, and Liu. See Final Act. 39–44. Appellant argues that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 26 because Jansson, Nakao, and Liu fail to teach or
suggest the following limitations in claim 26: “determine a number of push
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

14
messages for the device and a number of pull messages for the device within
a given time period” and “dynamically switch . . . between at least a first
mode of communication and a second mode of communication based at least
on the number of push messages and pull messages for the device within the
given time period.” See Appeal Br. 19–20; Reply Br. 7.
Specifically, Appellant cites the following statement in the Final
Office Action: “Jansson-Nakao do not explicitly disclose wherein the
dynamic switching is based at least on the number of push messages and pull
messages for the device within the given time period.” Final Act. 43
(emphasis omitted); see Appeal Br. 19. Appellant then contends that “Liu
discloses that the telecommunications device uses test data to test which
‘push/pull communication channel consume[s] the least amount of energy,’
and that channel is selected, i.e. irrespective of how many messages might
be transmitted over the channel.” Appeal Br. 19 (citing Liu ¶ 94.).
Appellant also contends that “Liu does not disclose or suggest that the
energy for each channel is determined based on ‘a number of push messages
for the device and a number of pull messages for the device within a given
time period,’ as recited in independent claim 26.” Id. at 20. Appellant adds
that “a number of push messages vs. a number of pull messages has no
bearing on the selection of the push/pull channel in Liu, nor does Liu
contemplate such numbers.” Id.
In response, the Examiner explains that (1) Jansson discloses
“dynamically switching between modes,” (2) Nakao discloses distinct “base
power levels,” and (3) Liu discloses “selecting channels based on energy
efficiency for a push/pull session . . . calculated from a number of
equations.” Ans. 17–18. As with claim 13, the Examiner reasons that “[i]t
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

15
is evident that the device disclosed in Liu is capable of using the equations
provided to determine” that “the amount of data for pull messages (i.e., the
number of pull messages) is greater than or equal to the amount of data for
push messages (i.e., the number of push messages).” Id. at 18.
Based on the record before us, we agree with Appellant that the
Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited portions of Jansson,
Nakao, and Liu teach or suggest switching between different modes of
communication “based at least on the number of push messages and pull
messages for the device within the given time period” according to claim 26.
As with claim 13, the Examiner has not explained how any of Liu’s
equations for calculating energy consumption allows an ordinarily skilled
artisan to calculate “the number of push messages and pull messages for the
device within the given time period” as required by claim 26. See
Ans. 17–18. Nor has the Examiner explained how Liu’s test data
corresponding to “a unit data packet size” relates to a number of messages.
See id. Hence, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of claim 26.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 27 AND 28
Claims 27 and 28 depend directly from claim 26. For the reasons
discussed for claim 26, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of claims 27
and 28.
The § 103 Rejection of Claim 30
Claim 30 depends indirectly from claim 26. On this record, the
Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited secondary reference—
Black—overcomes the deficiency in Jansson, Nakao, and Liu discussed
above for claim 26. Hence, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of
claim 30.
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

16
Because the preceding determinations resolve the appeal for the § 103
rejections, we need not address Appellants’ other arguments regarding
Examiner error. See, e.g., Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an administrative agency may render a
decision based on “a single dispositive issue”).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(d).
We reverse the rejection of claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(d).
We reverse the rejections of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16,
18–20, 22–28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
18–20 112(d) Improper Dependent Form 18 19, 20
1, 4, 6, 11 103 Jansson, Nakao 1, 4, 6, 11
2 103 Jansson, Nakao, Nakajima 2
7, 8, 25 103 Jansson, Nakao, Liu 7, 8, 25
10 103 Jansson, Nakao, Brakmo 10
13, 16,
18–20, 23 103 Jansson, Liu
13, 16,
18–20, 23
14 103 Jansson, Liu, Nakajima 14
22 103 Jansson, Liu, Brakmo 22
Appeal 2018-006981
Application 14/341,562

17
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
24 103 Jansson, Liu, Jacobs 24
26–28 103 Jansson, Nakao, Liu 26–28
30 103 Jansson, Nakao, Liu, Black 30
Overall
Outcome 18
1, 2, 4, 6–8,
10, 11, 13,
14, 16, 19,
20, 22–28,
30
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED IN PART