Zhengping Zhang

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 13, 2019

14616745 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/616,745 02/08/2015 Zhengping Zhang 5485
69715 7590 11/13/2019
ZHENGPING ZHANG
401 N. Armistead St
Unit T4
Alexandria, VA 22312
EXAMINER
KENNEDY, JOSHUA T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/13/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Dr.Zhang@Dietors.com
ZPZHANG@HOTMAIL.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ZHENGPING ZHANG
____________

Appeal 2018-002470
Application 14/616,745
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, PHILLIP A. BENNETT, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Zhengping
Zhang. Appeal Br. 2.
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The present invention relates generally to a web-based, collection law-
compliant, debt collection system and method. See Abstr.
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the
appealed claims:
1. A method for aiding debt collection, comprising
the steps of:
receiving data of a debt that comprise the name of
a debtor and the contact information of a creditor or collector,
storing said data in a database,
creating or updating a webpage that contains said
name but no information about said debt and contains a
hyperlink for communication with said creditor or collector,
and
posting said webpage to make it searchable by said
name on the Internet.

Appellant appeals the following rejections:
R1. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act.
2–4.;
R2. Claims 1–8, 11–14, 18, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) as being anticipated by Kassir (US 2013/0159164 A1, June 20,
2013). Final Act. 4–9.; and
R3. Claims 9, 10, 15–17, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kassir. Final Act. 9–11.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

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ANALYSIS
Rejection under § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with the framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”). For example, concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and
thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity,
such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski,
561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
69 (1972)).
Recently, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application
of 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).
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Under the Revised Guidance “Step 2A,” the office first looks to whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)). 84 Fed. Reg. at
51–52, 55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then
(pursuant to the Revised Guidance “Step 2B”) look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Step 2A, Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
With respect to independent method claims 1 and 12, and similarly,
system claim 18, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to “a
method of facilitating a transaction between a debtor and a collector” (Final
Act. 3), which we conclude are certain methods of organizing human
activity, i.e., managing interactions between people, which is a type of
abstract idea. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed
Cir. 2014) (holding that claim “describe[ing] only the abstract idea of
showing an advertisement before delivering free content” is patent
ineligible); In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed Cir. 2009) (holding
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methods “directed to organizing business or legal relationships in the
structuring of a sales force (or marketing company)” to be ineligible).
The Specification discloses:
It would be helpful to connect creditors and the people
searching the names of individuals through the Internet for
information or curiosity. Among them are debtors themselves,
their relatives, neighbors, friends, attorneys, or employers, and
authorized entities who conduct their background checks. The
concern for their online reputation would motivate debtors to
search online; and the communication initiated or authorized by
debtors would always be in compliance with the FDCPA.
Moreover, without any disclosure about debts, the acquisition
of debtors’ location information from third parties is allowed by
the law. Furthermore it would be mutually beneficial that the
authorized entities, such as prospective landlords, share and
exchange relevant information with creditors. In the prior art,
however, no system provides such useful connections.

Therefore, it is desirable to build a FDCPA-compliant, web-
based system that enables creditors to store the information
about debtors and debts, enables the debt information to be
fully accessible and searchable except the debtors’ identities,
enables debt purchasers, service providers, or debtors to contact
creditors, enables the names of the debtors to be publicly
searchable without indications of their debts, enables creditors
to exchange information about debtors with authorized entities,
and enables debtors to dispute or negotiate with creditors. Such
a system would establish cost-efficient, effective
communication, information exchange, and business between
creditors and interested third parties and encourage debtors to
solve their debt problems with creditors.

Spec. 1–2. In other words, Appellant describes an invention that aims to
provide useful connections between people, especially between debtors,
creditors, and people connected to the debtors, i.e., “opens up a wider
communication channel that enables more parties than just a debtor to
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communicate with a creditor or collector.” Appeal Br. 4 (citing Spec. 2, ¶ 4,
ll. 2–5).
For example, claim 1 recites at least the following limitations: (1)
“receiving data of a debt that comprise the name of a debtor and the contact
information of a creditor,” (2) “storing said data,” (3) “creating or updating a
webpage . . . contains a hyperlink for communication,” and (4) “posting said
webpage.” Claim 1. These limitations, under their broadest reasonable
interpretation, at least recite business practices and interactions between
people, i.e., connecting creditors with individuals including debtors and
others interested in the named debtors.
Appellant challenges the Examiner’s determinations on the ground
that “[t]he OA missed or ignored” elements and “overgeneralized what [is]
recited in the claim.” Appeal Br. 3. However, whichever way the concept is
described by the Examiner, we do not see that Appellant has adequately
shown that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. Just because the claim
includes more words than the phrase the Examiner uses as an articulation of
the abstract idea to which he/she found the claim to recite, is an insufficient
reason to persuasively argue that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea.
Further, the identified abstract idea need not encompass every claim
limitation. Otherwise, there would be no need for step two of the Alice
inquiry. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
Therefore, for at least the aforementioned reasons, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, which we conclude is certain
methods of organizing human activity.
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Step 2A—Prong 2 (integration into Practical Application) 2
Under the Revised Guidance, we now must determine if additional
elements in the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
We discern no additional element (or combination of elements)
recited in Appellant’s representative claim 1 that integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55 (“Prong 2”). For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements
(e.g., “a webpage,” “ database,” “web server,” “a processor,” and “a
memory”) do not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other
technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a
generic computer); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to
a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant contends that, like DDR, the “process is not known in prior
art and is organically tied to or integrated with the Internet and with its web
techniques.” Appeal Br. 4. We disagree with Appellant.
In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2014), the subject claim was held patent-eligible because it

2 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
revised guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within
the Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office
revised guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27–32.

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encompassed “an inventive concept” for resolving a “particular Internet-
centric problem.” In contrast, we find Appellant’s method (claim 1) does
not provide a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Because we find all claims on appeal merely use a
generic computer or processor as a tool which is used in the way a computer
normally functions, we conclude claims 1–20 fail to impart any discernible
improvement upon the computer or processor, nor do Appellant’s claims
solve “a challenge particular to the Internet” as considered by the court in
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256-57. Instead, the claims use the Internet as a tool to
reach debtors and/or creditors. Thus, we conclude none of Appellant’s
claims are like the claim held patent-eligible by the court in DDR, in which
the claimed invention was directed to the “challenge of retaining control
over the attention of the customer in the context of the Internet,” such that:
Instead of the computer network operating in its normal,
expected manner by sending the website visitor to the third-
party website that appears to be connected with the clicked
advertisement, the claimed system generates and directs the
visitor to the above-described hybrid web page that presents
product information from the third-party and visual “look and
feel” elements from the host website.
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258-59. Thus, we find unavailing Appellant’s arguments
that the claims are “[s]imilar to the DDR example” (Appeal. Br. 5), given
that no convincing “inventive concept” for resolving a “particular Internet-
centric problem” is identified by Appellant.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that “[t]he focus of the claims in
the instant application is not on such an improvement in computers as tools,
but on an independently abstract idea that uses computers as tools.” Ans. 4.
We also agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s Specification merely
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states that the improvements achieved concern “opening lines of
communications to exchange information” in a cost efficient way. See Ans.
4 (citing Appellant’s Specification 2:9–16.).
For instance, Appellant’s Specification states:
Therefore, it is desirable to build a FDCPA-compliant, web-
based system that enables creditors to store the information
about debtors and debts, enables the debt information to be
fully accessible and searchable except the debtors’ identities,
enables debt purchasers, service providers, or debtors to contact
creditors, enables the names of the debtors to be publicly
searchable without indications of their debts, enables creditors
to exchange information about debtors with authorized entities,
and enables debtors to dispute or negotiate with creditors. Such
a system would establish cost-efficient, effective
communication, information exchange, and business between
creditors and interested third parties and encourage debtors to
solve their debt problems with creditors.
Spec. 2:9–16. In other words, Appellant’s invention relates to a cost-
efficient way to exchange information.
For at least the reasons noted supra, we determine that claim 1
(1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into
a practical application. Thus, representative claim 1 is directed to the
aforementioned abstract idea.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, we now look to
whether claim 1 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything
“significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible
application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. As recognized by the Revised
Guidance, an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 can be evaluated based
on whether an additional element or combination of elements:
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(1) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations
that are not well-understood, routine, conventional
activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive
concept may be present; or
(2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which
is indicative that an inventive concept may not be
present.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Appellant contends “the idea of posting debtors’ names without their
debts’ information recited in the claim is not common, understood, or known
for debt collection.” Appeal Br. 3–4; see also id. at 5.
In response, the Examiner determines that “[a]lthough the claims
recite specific steps, such as those involving the creation of a webpage, the
steps do not require anything apart from routine, conventional, well-known
computer functions, such as receiving, storing, processing, and transmitting
data.” Ans. 5; see also Ans. 7–8 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In other words, the
Examiner determines that the claims merely amount to the application of the
abstract idea using a generic computer in its ordinary sense to carry out the
abstract idea itself. Such an analysis is a factual determination. See
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Whether
something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan
at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”).
We find the Examiner’s noting the generic nature of the component
parts recited in the claims provides sufficient evidence of a generic computer
system used to implement the abstraction. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v.
Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Significantly, the
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claims do not provide details as to any non-conventional software for
enhancing the financing process.”). See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining
that “[o]ur law demands more” than claim language that “provides only a
result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer
accomplishes it”).
We find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s
claim 1 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly
more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application.
More importantly, Appellant has not adequately explained how claim 1 is
performed such that it is not a routine and conventional function of a generic
computer.
Furthermore, we highlight that a finding of novelty or non-
obviousness does not require the conclusion that the claimed subject matter
is patent-eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is
termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation
of novelty or nonobviousness, but, rather, is a search for “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or
even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n.
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. See also Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
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determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
Because Appellant’s independent claim 1 is directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept, does not include additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and does not add
a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, and conventional,” we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of the claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory
subject matter in light of Alice, its’ progeny, and the Revised Guidance.

Anticipated and/or Obvious over Kassir
Appellant contends that “[c]laim 1 is not anticipated because its
element of ‘creating or updating a webpage that contains said name but no
information about said debt’ is not found in Kassir . . . . In fact, Kassir was
based on one key concept ‘anonymous debtor match’ (ADM), i.e. no names
of debtors involved in its data collection and storage.” Appeal Br. 7.
Appellant further contends that “the OA erred in construing . . . ‘the last four
digits of the debtor’s Social Security Number’ as the debtor’s name.” Id.
(citations omitted).
Here, the Examiner “considers the last four digits of the debtor’s
Social Security Number to comprise a name -- a user defined identity (i.e.,
user name) by which a person is designated. There is nothing in the claims
to preclude such a reading of the claim limitation.” Ans. 9. We disagree
with the Examiner.
Although the Social Security Number is used to identify an individual,
we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret such a number as
being distinguishable from one’s “name.” Claim 1 specifically recites “the
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name of a debtor” (see claim 1), as opposed to any identifying information
of the debtor. As such, we find that the Examiner overreached in equating
one’s “name” with one’s Social Security Number.
Thus, we disagree with the Examiner’s finding that Kassir discloses
“creating or updating a webpage that contains said name,” as recited in each
of the independent claims, given that Kassir merely uses “anonymous search
parameters . . . such as the last four digits of the debtor’s Social Security
Number.” See Kassir ¶ 36. Since we agree with at least one of the
arguments advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of
Appellant’s other arguments. Accordingly, we will not sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation and/or obviousness rejections of claims 1–20 over
Kassir.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–8, 11–14, 18,
19
102 Kassir 1–8, 11–
14, 18, 19
9, 10, 15–17,
20
103 Kassir 9, 10, 15–
17, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

Because at least one rejection encompassing all claims on appeal is
affirmed, the decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED