Zenith Plastics Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 7, 1971

190 N.L.R.B. 735 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

ZENITH PLASTICS COMPANY
Zenith Plastics Company and Textile Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 8-CA-6071
June 7, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On February 23, 1971, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engag-
ing in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. He also found that Respondent did
not engage in a certain other unfair labor practice and
recommended that that allegation of the complaint be
dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent,
Zenith Plastics Company, Cleveland, Ohio, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alleged violation
not herein found be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.
' The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the
record, the exceptions, and the brief adequately present the issues and
positions of the parties.
' The Respondent excepts to certain credibility resolutions made by the
Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial
Examiner's resolutions as to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Such a conclu-
sion is not warranted here. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544,
enfd 188 F 2d 362 (CA 3)
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
735
ARTHUR LEFF, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed on
October 13, 1970, and an amended charge filed on November
16, 1970, by Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director of
Region 8, issued a complaint, dated November 23, 1970,
against Zenith Plastics Company, herein called the Respond-
ent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) (3) and (4)
and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. The Respondent filed an answer denying the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices. A hearing was
held on January 25, 1971, at Cleveland, Ohio. At the close
of the hearing the parties argued the issues orally on the
record. Thereafter the General Counsel and the Respondent
filed briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, an Ohio corporation, with its principal
office and place of business at Cleveland, Ohio, is engaged in
the manufacture of plastic components. Annually, the Re-
spondent receives goods at its Cleveland, Ohio, plant valued
in excess of $50,000 transported directly from States of the
United States other than the State of Ohio. Respondent ad-
mits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. It is so found.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues as Framed by the Pleadings
Except for a single item of alleged independent 8(a)(1)
conduct,' which is at most of minor import, this case is con-
cerned solely with the Respondent's alleged discriminatory
suspension and subsequent discharge of employee Maria
Djokic. The complaint avers in substance that the Respond-
ent, on October 12, 1970, suspended Djokic because of her
union activities, and, on or about October 15, 1970, dis-
charged her both for that reason and because she had in the
meantime filed an unfair labor practice charge. The Respond-
ent in its answer admits that on October 12, 1970, it sus-
pended Djokic ("laid [her] off for a period of approximately
one week"). But it affirmatively asserts that it did so only to
give it "an opportunity to investigate and evaluate complaints
made against Djokic by various employees" that she had
"threatened employees with the loss of their jobs unless they
voted for the Union" in a Board election that had been con-
ducted 3 days earlier. As for the alleged discriminatory dis-
charge, the Respondent in its answer denies that it ever dis-
charged Djokic. It affirmatively alleges that Djokic, instead,
"elected to terminate her own employment" on October 13,
1970, when the Union, in her behalf, filed its original unfair
labor practice charge accusing the Respondent, falsely ac-
' To the effect that the Respondent, on October 2, 1970, forced an em-
ployee (Maria Djokic) to post union literature on her machine
190 NLRB No. 138
736 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cording to the answer, of having terminated Djokic's employ-
ment because of her union activities.2
B. The Relevant Facts
Maria Djokic, prior to her suspension on October 12, 1970,
had worked for the Respondent as a machine operator on its
second shift for a period of some 6 years. Her competency as
an employee is not questioned in this proceeding. Possibly
because of her somewhat greater familiarity with the English
language, Djokic was considered a leader among the female
employees on the second shift, all or most of whom, unlike
the employees on the first shift, were immigrants of Croation
origin.
During August and September of 1970, the Union con-
ducted an organizational campaign among the Respondent's
employees. The campaign culminated in a consent election,
held on October 9, 1970, which was lost by the Union Djokic
played a prominent role in that campaign. She provided the
use of her home for union meetings, read and explained union
literature to her fellow employees, solicited employee signa-
tures to union designation cards, and aided employees in
filling out such cards. Djokic was present at the meeting at
the Board's Regional Office at which the agreement was
reached for a consent election. At the election she served as
the Union's observer.
During the course of the campaign, Djokic was involved in
the only incident alleged in the complaint to constitute an
independent violation of Section 8(a)(1). It may be well first
to dispose of that allegation before considering and evaluating
the evidence bearing more directly on the alleged 8(a)(3) and
(4) allegations which lie at the core of this case. The incident
in question occurred on October 2, a week before the election.
The union organizer had distributed that day to employees a
union leaflet containing caricature drawings of Fred N.
Acker, the Respondent's president, depicting him as con-
cerned over the outcome of the election and also as one whose
promises could not be relied on. Acker brought a copy of the
leaflet to Djokic's place of work, posted it on her machine,
and directed her to keep it there. When Djokic protested that
she was not responsible for the leaflet, Acker, according to
Djokic's uncontradicted testimony, called her "the biggest
liar in this world." The leaflet remained posted on Djokic's
machine for the balance of that shift; it was gone the follow-
ing day The evidence concerning this incident is cloudy and
it is difficult to tell what motivated Acker to post the leaflet.
Certainly, his purpose could not have been to promote the
Union's cause; his overall testimony leaves little doubt that
he was opposed to the organization of the Respondent's em-
ployees by the Union One may infer that his action was
prompted by a desire to show his disdain for the Union and
its propaganda and at the same time to deride and possibly
embarass Djokic before her peers. But even so, although
Acker's posting of the notice on Djokic's machine and his
accompanying remarks may fairly be viewed as evidencing
his hostility toward Djokic, I do not think this is sufficient to
support a finding of unlawful coercion. I shall accordingly
recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dis-
missed.
We come then to the facts bearing more immediately on the
alleged 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) violations. As noted above, the
election, at which Djokic served as the Union's observer, was
' The amended charge, filed on November 16, 1970, alleges, as does the
complaint, that the Respondent's original action as to Djokic was a suspen-
sion rather than a discharge As to this, the Respondent's answer alleges that
Dlokic's "attempt to reverse her own act by filing an amended petition [sic]
is of no avail She cannot quit the Company on October 13 and then on
November 16 decide she made the wrong decision "
held on Friday, October 9, 1970 Djokic did not work that
day, since the election ran into the second shift. Her next
workday was Monday, October 12. On her arrival at the plant
that day, she found her timecard missing from its rack. Upon
inquiry of her foreman, she was told that Acker had left
instructions for her to report to his office.
Acker informed Djokic, when she presented herself at his
office, that he was laying her off for a week because he wanted
to conduct an investigation to determine whether she had
"violated the law" during the preelection period. He told her
he understood that there had been complaints by various
employees that she had threatened them with loss of their
jobs if they did not vote for the Union. He added that he did
not himself know whether or not there was any validity to
these complaints because he had not yet talked to any of the
people who had reportedly made them, but that he believed
an investigation to be in order. The meeting that day lasted
approximately half an hour, and the conversation expanded
beyond the suspension notice. In the course of their meeting
Acker told Djokic that he knew she had been the leading
agitator for the Union and had pushed employees to support
the Union. He stated that employees in the plant had thereto-
fore been "like one family," and charged Djokic with respon-
sibility for creating disharmony in that relationship. Acker
also accused Djokic of having lied to him in the past about
the extent of her involvement with the Union and at least
implied, if he did not actually state, that she had broken an
earlier promise she had made not to get mixed up again with
the Union. The last had reference to an unsuccessful organi-
zational campaign at the Respondent's plant that the Union
had conducted some 2 years before. At that time, Djokic,
fearing possible reprisal, had voluntarily gone to Acker's
office and had represented to him that her role in that cam-
paign was simply a passive one, although Acker-at least so
he told Djokic-knew very well that she had also been a
leader at that time and had held meetings at her home.'
On October 13, 1970, the day following Acker's layoff
announcement to Djokic, the Union filed the original charge
in this proceeding, alleging in substance that the Respondent
had unlawfully terminated Djokic's employment because of
her union activities. The charge was served on the Respond-
ent on October 15, 1970.
Thereafter, Djokic had one further contact with Acker.
The Respondent's employees have Blue Cross hospitalization
coverage under a noncontributory plan; i.e., one in which the
premiums are paid out of the employees' wages. About a
week after her layoff, Djokic, concerned about a premium
payment which was then due, sent a message to her foreman
inquiring about her "hospitalization." The foreman sent
word back that she could come into the plant the next day
to pay her premium. When she came in she saw Acker. She
' The findings in this paragraph are based on a synthesis of the testimony
of Djokic and of Acker, to the extent credited There are some variations
in the respective accounts of Djokic and Acker as to what was said at
Acker's office that day Save in one respect, however, they do not appear
to be substantial, relating mainly to shadings in emphasis, the sequence in
which particular statements were made, and what comments by one party
to the meeting prompted comments by the other The substantial disagree-
ment centered about whether Acker told Djokic that employees had ac-
cused her of having threatened them with loss of their jobs if they did not
vote for the Union Djokic flatly denied that he did According to her
account, Acker merely referred to her having "violated the law," without
being more specific in this regard, and did not go into detail when she
questioned him about it Although Djokic appeared while testifying to be
sincere and strong in her conviction that no more was said on this point, it
seems to me highly improbable that Acker would have referred to an investi-
gation without also describing the nature of the complaints leading to it
Consequently, I accept his version on this conflict
ZENITH PLASTICS COMPANY
protested to Acker that her layoff had now been extended to
its second week although he had told her he was laying her
off for just 1 week, and she asked him how she could be
expected to pay her hospitalization when she was not working
and had no money. In response, Acker told her that it was
not true he had laid her off for just 1 week; that he had laid
her off for the period required to conduct an investigation;
and that-in Djokic's words while testifying-"now you be
in trouble while you make charges against me by Labor
Board "'
Shortly after that meeting , Djokic sent the Respondent
money to cover her Blue Cross premium for the month of
October and also did so when her premium for the following
month fell due. The Respondent accepted Djokic's payments
on these occasions. However, when Djokic tendered payment
of her December premium, the Respondent's payroll clerk
refused to accept it, stating that she had been directed by
Acker not to accept any further payments from Djokic.
Acker explained while testifying that the Respondent's group
policy with Blue Cross did not allow coverage for employees
who were off the Respondent's payroll for more than 60 days.
Djokic has never been recalled to work by the Respondent.
Nor, so far as appears, was she ever directly advised by the
Respondent that her layoff status had been converted to
something else.
The reason given by the Respondent at the hearing for its
suspension of Djokic is substantially the same as that stated
to her by Acker on October 12. As appears from Acker's
testimony , the decision to suspend Djokic was his alone.
When he notified Djokic that he was suspending her to con-
duct an investigation of employee complaints lodged against
her, his only knowledge of the complaints was derived from
the payroll clerk who had reported to him that two em-
ployees, Edna Wiley and Martha Hamilton, had voiced such
complaints.' Up to that time, Acker, by his own account, had
not himself spoken to either of these complaining employees,
had made no effort to check out the veracity of their com-
plaints, and did not know whether or not the complaints
could be substantiated As to why he considered it necessary
to suspend Djokic while conducting his investigation, Acker
could only say that after 6 or 7 weeks of "turmoil" in the
plant during the organizational period "there was a very, very
stong feeling against her by some women;" that he "thought
it would embarass [Djokic] if she knew she was being investi-
gated," and that he thought "this was the more polite, dig-
nified way to do the [investigatory] job."
Acker testified that after suspending Djokic he conducted
an investigation by interviewing some 5 or 6 employees, start-
ing with Edna Wiley who "was the one who had actually
come to the office and said [Djokic] was threatening her with
the loss of her job." Only Wiley and Martha Hamilton, he
testified further, gave him any information which might be
considered of probative value; the accounts given by the
' Although Acker would have expressed himself in more polished lan-
guage, I credit Djokic's testimony as to the substance of what Acker said
Acker's testimony on this point was equivocal Asked whether he had
mentioned anything to Djokic on this occasion about the charge filed with
the Board , he replied
I don't really think so I don't think it was discussed She may have
mentioned it. I don't know , but you might-something may have been
said about that , either because it was initiated by me or because maybe
she initiated it I don't remember
Elsewhere in his testimony , Acker identified Wiley alone as the em-
ployee who had actually come to the office to make the complaint Hamil-
ton's testimony that she had complained about the matter prior to the
election is inconsistent not only with Acker's testimony, but also with a
prehearing affidavit she had given the Board agent who investigated the
case
737
others, he discovered, were based solely on hearsay and ru-
mor. Acker's testimony reflects that his interrogation of Wi-
ley and Hamilton occurred before he received the charge.
To support Acker's account of what he had learned from
Wiley and Hamilton, the Respondent called these employees
as witnesses.
Wiley, an employee strongly opposed to the Union, tes-
tified that about a week before the election Djokic told her,
"If you don' t sign a contract for the Union you will be fired."
Djokic's remark, she added, did not disturb her because she
knew better.
Hamilton testified that in a conversation with Djokic dur-
ing the week preceding the election , after she had explained
to Djokic that she was unwilling to sign a union card because
her boyfriend had advised her not to get involved, Djokic told
her, "Well, I feel sorry for the girls that don't sign, especially
you older women that can't get a job somewhere else when
the Union gets in." Hamilton, as appears from her testimony,
reacted to Djokic's remark by inquiring of Acker, "If the
Union gets in, do we have to-you know, the ones that don't
sign , do we have to join the Union?" to which Acker re-
sponded, "Yes in a period of time."
Djokic denied that she ever told Wiley that she would get
her fired if she did not vote for the Union or that she ever
threatened Wiley in any other way, and I credit Djokic's
testimony in this respect.' Djokic, however, did not deny the
specific statement Hamilton attributed to her , taking issue
only with Hamilton's account of the setting in which it took
place . According to Djokic, Hamilton 's declination to sign a
union card because of her boyfriend's objection occurred in
August, a considerable time before the election, and she did
not then make the statement attributed to her. Djokic agreed,
however, that she did have a further conversation with
Hamilton a week before the election, in which, in her words,
I told [Hamilton], "The last Union meeting somebody
question representative from the Union and ask him,
"What happen to women when they don't sign Union
contract?' and answer was, after 30 days they must look
for another job." So I told Martha, I say, "You know,
I feel sorry for women in my age when they don't sign
Union contract, they cannot find so easy job, another
job."
Q. What did she say to you then?
A. She say, "Yes, I understand this."
Q. Did you tell her she would be fired if she didn't vote
for the Union?
A. No, I don't tell to nobody to be fired. How can I fire
somebody when I am employee over there, too?'
The Respondent makes no contention that it decided to
discharge Djokic because of the facts uncovered by the inves-
tigation; on the contrary, as noted above, it affirmatively
' Wiley did not impress me favorably as a witness As to surrounding
circumstances , her testimony was wanting in convincing detail, and her
demeanor was not such as to invite credence Moreover, her further tes-
timony that she reported this incident to Acker before the election is con-
trary to testimony given by Acker
' As is apparent from her testimony , Djokic has difficulty in expressing
herself in the English language , and it is quite possible that what the union
representative actually said at the union meeting, and the thought Dlokic
meant to convey to Hamilton , was that the Union could , if victonous in the
election, obtain a contract with a union-security clause requiring member-
ship after 30 days as a condition of employment Hamilton's inquiry of
Acker, reported above, which followed Djokic's remarks to her seems to
suggest that Hamilton gained such an impression On the other hand, if
Djokic , because of faulty recollection or faulty articulation , gave a garbled
account on the witness stand , she may well have given the same garbled
account to Hamilton Djokic's remarks must therefore be taken at face value
as stated in the record
738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
asserts that it never discharged her at all, but that she volun-
tarily quit her employment. The Respondent rests its claim
that Djokic quit not on any statement made by her to the
Respondent-Acker admitted that Djokic never told the Re-
spondent that she wanted to quit-but solely and entirely on
the original charge filed by the Union in this proceeding.
Concerning the charge, Acker testified:
. the charge itself was meaningless to me. The part of
the charge that irritated me was not that she brought a
complaint, that a charge was brought, but that she al-
leged, first of all, that I had terminated her employment.
This would have been the impression that I got, and I
knew that I hadn't. But the charge that she made which
I deeply resented, that I had done this because of her
union activity, because it just wasn't true.
Acker further testified that when he got the charge he felt,
"Well if this is the way they want it, let them have it that
way," and that he decided then that Djokic had quit "because
it said she had been terminated, and I know I hadn't ter-
minated her, somebody must have terminated her, and she is
the only other person."
Asked whether, but for the charge, Acker would have kept
Djokic in the Respondent's employ, Acker testified that he
did not know whether he would or would not; that he had not
made up his mind-"it would depend upon so many different
things that I really don't know."
C. Analysis and Conclusions
As shown above, the Respondent, relying on the fact that
the Union's original charge erroneously referred to its Octo-
ber 12 action as a termination rather than as a 1-week layoff
or a suspension, defends against the complaint's allegations
of unlawful discharge solely on the ground that Djokic's
termination was self-elected and not imposed on her by the
Respondent. The Respondent's reasoning which it would
have the Board adopt-the Respondent "hadn't terminated
her, somebody must have terminated her, and she is the only
other person"-I find adroit but not persuasive. It is undis-
puted that Djokic never told the Respondent that she in-
tended or desired to terminate her own employment, and, on
the facts of this case, I find it difficult to believe that the
Respondent really thought she had quit. The Respondent was
aware, of course, that she had not quit on October 12 for this
was a matter within its own knowledge. Nor could it have
reasonably inferred a quit from the charge which the Union
filed the next day. If anything, the charge was more consistent
with a desire on Djokic's part to remain in the Respondent's
employ than to leave it. Moreover, Djokic clearly manifested
her desire to continue with the Respondent when at her meet-
ing with Acker, which shortly followed the Respondent's
receipt of the charge, she protested the extension of her layoff
into a second week and voiced her interest in protecting her
continuing status as a covered employee under the Respond-
ent's Blue Cross Group Policy. Accordingly, I reject the
Respondent's defence that Djokic "elected to terminate her
own employment" as implausible and unfounded. I find that
the decision to terminate Djokic's employment was Respond-
ent's alone, and, as such, constituted a discharge, even though
the Respondent may have chosen to style it a quit.
In light of the finding just made, I think it clearly follows
that the Respondent's decision to regard Djokic as a quit,
which effected the termination of her employment, must be
found violative, at the very least, of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
Acker's testimony, related above, virtually concedes that the
Respondent was led to that decision by its resentment of the
charge's allegations that it had terminated Djokic because of
her union activities.' Moreover, if Acker's explanation is ac-
cepted that his resentment was directed not to the filing of the
charge as such, but to the contents of the charge which he
viewed as false, this cannot exculpate the Respondent from
liability under Section 8(a)(4). The statutory protection ac-
corded by that section is not forfeited, and certainly not in the
absence of malice , simply because a statement made in a
charge or testimony proves to be false or inaccurate. In this
case there is no evidence that Djokic deliberately falsified the
allegations of the charge which was prepared by the Union,
let alone that this was done with malicious intent.
I further find on all the evidence that the Respondent's
decision to terminate Djokic, although triggered by the filing
of the charge, was also influenced in significant part by the
Respondent's hostility to Djokic because of her leadership
role in the recently concluded union campaign. Because of
the absence of direct evidence of a causal relationship, the
case for an 8(a)(3) and (1) finding may perhaps not be as
readily apparent as the one for an 8(a)(4) finding. But, I
believe the contributing presence of unlawful 8(a)(3) motiva-
tion in the discharge decision is reasonably to be inferred
from the following when considered together: (1) Acker's
manifest hostility to Djokic for union-related reasons as evi-
denced by the poster incident and, more sharply, by his com-
ments to Djokic at the October 12 meeting , in the course of
which he went beyond the stated reason for the suspension
to characterize her as a union agitator, to accuse her of dis-
rupting plant harmony, and to charge her in effect with hav-
ing broken an earlier promise to him not to get mixed up with
the Union; (2) Acker's precipitate suspension of Djokic im-
mediately following the election, without any prior effort to
determine whether there was even probable merit to the com-
plaints he stated had been made against her; (3) Acker's
inability to explain on a plausible basis why Djokic's suspen-
sion was required in order to conduct a full and fair investiga-
tion; and (4) the implausible ground on which the Respond-
ent now defends Djokic's termination; i.e., that it was a quit
and not a discharge. These circumstances collectively, in my
opinion, also justify an inference that Djokic's initial layoff
was similarly motivated in part by the Respondent's resent-
ment of her union activities.
In reaching the conclusion that Djokic's termination was
unlawfully motivated, I have taken into account the credited
evidence in this record establishing that Djokic on one occa-
sion in the course of her preelection union activities made
statements (to employee Hamilton) of a kind which the Board
has ruled to be outside the area of protected activity.9 The
question here, however, is not whether the Respondent might
have discharged Djokic because of what she said to Hamilton,
but whether it did. As shown above, the Respondent's de-
fense to the complaint's allegations of unlawful discharge is
that it did not discharge her at all, but that she voluntarily
elected to quit by filing a charge stating she had been ter-
minated. That defense has been rejected, and it has been
found that the decision to terminate Djokic's employment,
though substantially related to the filing of the charge, was
the Respondent's decision, not Djokic's, and amounted to a
discharge for an unlawful reason. It is not to be presumed that
the Respondent, had it not chosen to view the charge's allega-
tions as an election by Djokic to quit, would have considered
Djokic's unprotected statements to Hamilton a substantial
basis for discharge and would have discharged her anyway
Support for this conclusion is also to be found in Acker's comment to
Djokic, made shortly after the Respondent's receipt of the charge, that
Djokic was now in "trouble" because of the filing of the charge
' See Continental Woven Label Co, 160 NLRB 1430, and cases there
cited
ZENITH PLASTICS COMPANY
for that sole reason ; indeed Acker stated at the hearing that
he did not know whether, but for the charge, the Respondent
would or would not have kept Djokic in its employ . In short,
I do not think it is for the Trial Examiner or the Board to
speculate on a possibly valid reason for discharge which the
Respondent itself has not advanced as the basis for its action,
and then to assess that hypothetical reason in the light of the
record evidence to determine whether, if advanced, it might
have stood up as a legitimate rather than a pretextual ground
for the action taken.
For the reasons set out above , I conclude and find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
suspending Djokic on October 12, 1970, and that it violated
the same section of the Act, as well as Section 8 (a)(4), by
terminating her employment on or about October 15, 1970.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By suspending Maria Djokic on October 12, 1970, be-
cause of her union activities , and by discharging her on or
about October 15, 1970, both for that reason and because the
Union had filed in her behalf unfair labor practice charges
under the Act, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondnet did not , as alleged in the complaint,
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by forcing Maria Djokic to
post union literature on her machine and instructing her not
to remove it.
THE REMEDY
The recommended Order will contain the conventional
provisions in cases involving findings of interference, re-
straint , coercion , and unlawful discharge , in violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. These will require Re-
spondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices
found , to offer reinstatement with backpay to the employee
discriminated against , and to post a notice to that effect. In
accordance with usual requirements , reinstatement shall be
to the discriminatee 's former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion , without prejudice to her seniority and other rights or
privileges . The discnminatee shall be made whole for any loss
of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tion against her by payment to her of a sum of money equal
to that which she normally would have earned from the date
of the initial discrimination against her (October 12, 1970) to
the date of the offer of reinstatement , less net earnings, if any,
during such period , to be computed in the manner prescribed
in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 , and Isis Plumb-
ing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
It will also be recommended, in view of the nature of the
unfair labor practices in which the Respondent has engaged,
(see N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536) that
it cease and desist from infringing in any manner on the rights
guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and
the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
I hereby issue the following recommended:10
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 . 46 of the
Rules and Rugulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
739
ORDER
The Respondent, Zenith Plastic Company, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership and activities in Textile
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, by dis-
criminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment
of Respondent 's employees , or by discriminating in any other
manner in regard to any term or condition of their employ-
ment , in order to discourage membership or activities therein.
(b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony
under the Act.
(c) In any other manner interfering with , restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action , which is deemed
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Maria Djokic immediate and full reinstatement to
her former or substantially equivalent position , without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make her whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered as
a result of her suspension and subsequent discharge in the
manner set forth in "The Remedy " section herein.
(b) Notify the above-named employee if presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces."
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards , person-
nel records and reports , and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
recommended Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Cleveland , Ohio, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after
being duly signed by the Respondent 's representative , shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
" This provision is being included in the Order in conformity with the
Board's standard practice , even though it appears from the record that
Djokic is a woman 59 years of age . It is however being omitted from the
notice for reasons stated in B. V.D. Company, 157 NLRB 978, 982
" In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing , within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evi-
dence, it has been decided that we, Zenith Plastics Company,
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, and we have
been ordered to post this notice.
The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as em-
ployees, certain rights, including the right to self-organi-
zation; to form, join, or help unions; and to bargain
collectively through a representative of your own choos-
ing. Accordingly, we give you these assurances:
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with any of
your rights listed above.
WE WILL NOT fire or take any reprisal action against
any of you because you join, support, or engage in organ-
izational activities on behalf of Textile Workers Union
of America, ALF-CIO-CLC, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT fire or take any reprisal action against
you for filing charges with the Board or giving testimony
under the Act.
WE WILL offer to reinstate Maria Djokic to her job,
with full seniority and all other rights and privileges,
since the Board found she was discharged because she
supported the organizational campaign of the above-
named Union and also because the Union filed an unfair
labor practice charge in her behalf.
WE WILL also make up all pay Maria Djokic lost with
6 percent interest.
All of you are free to become, remain, or refrain from
becoming or remaining members of Textile Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
ZENITH PLASTICS
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1695
Federal Office Building, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland,
Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-522-3715.