Zaffinov.Hughes

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 31, 2014

12870017 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2014)

BoxInterferences@uspto.gov Paper 104
Tel: 571-272-9797 Filed: 31 December 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

ALAN HUGHES
Junior Party
Application 12/763,451,

v.

PASCAL ZAFFINO
Senior Party
Patent 8,517,248.

Patent Interference No. 106,010 (McK)
Technology Center 1700

Before FRED E. McKELVEY, RICHARD E. SCHAFER, and
SALLY GARDNER LANE, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKELVEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

JUDGMENT
37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a)(2) & 41.202(e)
In view of DECISION ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE entered 1
concurrently with this JUDGMENT, it is— 2
ORDERED that judgment be entered against junior party Alan Hughes as to 3
Count 1 (Paper 1, page 4); 4
FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1-25 of Hughes involved application 5

2

12/763,451 are finally refused, 35 U.S.C. 135(a); 1
FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this JUDGMENT and the DECISION 2
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE be entered in the administrative records of 3
(1) Zaffino U.S. Patent No. 8,517,248 and (2) Hughes application 12/763,451; and 4
FURTHER ORDERED that a party seeking judicial review timely serve 5
notice on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 6
37 C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 104.2. We also direct the parties’ attention to Biogen Idec 7
MA, Inc., v. Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research, 2014 WL 2167677 8
(D.Mass. 2014). 9
10
NOTICE: "Any agreement or understanding between parties to an interference,
including any collateral agreements referred to therein, made in connection with or
in contemplation of the termination of the interference, shall be in writing and a
true copy thereof filed in the Patent and Trademark Office before the termination
of the interference as between the said parties to the agreement or understanding."
35 U.S.C. 135(c); see also Bd.R. 205 (settlement agreements).

3

cc: (electronic transmission):
Attorney for Hughes:
Harold H. Fox
John M. Caracappa
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLC
hfox@steptoe.com
jcaracap@steptoe.com

Attorney for Zaffino:
William S. Gottschalk
Timothy J. Murphy
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
wgottsschalk@cgolaw.com
tmurphy@cgolaw.com
BoxInterferences@uspto.gov Paper 103
Tel: 571-272-9797 Filed: 31 December 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

ALAN HUGHES
Junior Party
Application 12/763,451,

v.

PASCAL ZAFFINO
Senior Party
Patent 8,517,248.

Patent Interference No. 106,010 (McK)
Technology Center 1700

Before FRED E. McKELVEY, RICHARD E. SCHAFER, and
SALLY GARDNER LANE, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKELVEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
37 C.F.R. § 41.202(d)
I. Introduction 1
Junior party applicant Hughes presented claims to provoke an interference 2
with senior party patentee Zaffino. 3

2

When a junior party applicant seeks to provoke an interference with a senior 1
party patentee, the junior party applicant must comply with the provisions of 2
37 C.F.R. § 41.202(d) [some italic and indentation added]: 3
(d) Requirement to show priority under 35 U.S.C. 102(g). 4

(1) When an applicant has an earliest constructive 5
reduction to practice that is later than the apparent earliest 6
constructive reduction to practice for a patent or published 7
application claiming interfering subject matter, the applicant 8
must show why it would prevail on priority. 9

(2) If an applicant fails to show priority under paragraph 10
(d)(1) of this section, an administrative patent judge may 11
nevertheless declare an interference to place the applicant under 12
an order to show cause why judgment should not be entered 13
against the applicant on priority. New evidence in support of 14
priority will not be admitted except on a showing of good 15
cause. The Board may authorize the filing of motions to 16
redefine the interfering subject matter or to change the benefit 17
accorded to the parties. 18

(e) Sufficiency of showing. 19

(1) A showing of priority under this section is not 20
sufficient unless it would, if unrebutted, support a 21
determination of priority in favor of the party making 22
the showing. 23

(2) When testimony or production necessary to show 24
priority is not available without authorization under § 41.150(c) 25
or § 41.156(a), the showing shall include: 26

(i) Any necessary interrogatory, request for admission, 27
request for production, or deposition request, and 28

3

(ii) A detailed proffer of what the response to the 1
interrogatory or request would be expected to be and an 2
explanation of the relevance of the response to the question of 3
priority. 4

II. Facts 5
A. Parties 6
1. Junior party 7
The junior party is Alan Hughes. 8
The real party in interest is Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Paper 11. 9
The junior party is involved on the basis of application 12/763,451 (20 April 10
2010). 11
The junior party application has been published as U.S. Patent Application 12
Publication 2011/0256257 A1 (20 Oct. 2011). 13
2. Senior party 14
The senior party is Pascal Zaffino. 15
The real party in interest is Ariel Andre Waitzman. Paper 7.1 16
The senior party is involved on the basis of Zaffino U.S. Patent 17
8,517,248 B2 (27 Aug. 2013), based on application 12/870,017 (27 Aug. 2010). 18
The application maturing into the Zaffino patent was published as U.S. 19
Patent Application 2011/0083823 A1 (14 Apr. 2011). 20
Zaffino has been accorded the benefit of Provisional application 61/251,498 21
(14 Oct. 2009). 22

1 The chain of title is from Zaffino to Douglas J. Potier (Reel 029318, Frame
0882) and from Potier to Waitzman (Reel 029319, Frame 0173).

4

Hughes has not contested the benefit accorded to Zaffino. 1
III. Facts 2
A. Declaration of interference 3
1. An interference was declared on 8 September 2014. Paper 1. 4
2. Since Hughes is a junior party applicant and Zaffino is a senior party 5
patentee, Hughes was obligated to comply with the provisions of 37 C.F.R. 6
§ 41.202(d). 7
3. Hughes initially elected to satisfy its Rule 41.202(d) burden by attempting to 8
establish prima facie that Hughes had (1) conceived prior to the Zaffino 9
14 October 2009 filing date and (2) been reasonably diligent from a time 10
prior to when Zaffino entered the field (i.e., Zaffino’s accorded benefit date) 11
until a constructive reduction to practice based on the filing date of the 12
Hughes application. 13
4. Upon consideration of Hughes’ Rule 41.202(d) showing, it was determined 14
that the showing was inadequate and the Board issued an order to show 15
cause ordering Hughes to show cause why judgment should not be entered 16
against Hughes. Paper 3. 17
5. The order to show cause (1) assumed a conception, but (2) found that 18
Hughes had not established prima facie a case of diligence. 19
B. Response to order to show cause 20
6. Hughes had considerable difficulty presenting exhibits in the manner 21
required by the rules. 37 C.F.R. § 41.154(c). 22
7. Ultimately, Hughes was able to present properly labeled exhibits and those 23
exhibits are Exhibits 2001B through 2024B. 24
8. All other Hughes exhibits have been expunged. 25

5

9. In responding to the order to show cause, Hughes maintained that it had 1
made out a case of diligence. Papers 15, 38, 64, and 67. 2
10. Despite the fact that the Rule 41.202(d) showing did not purport to rely on 3
derivation, Hughes also maintains at this time that the Zaffino invention had 4
been derived from Hughes. 5
11. The Board authorized Hughes to present a case based on derivation. 6
Paper 39, pages 2-3. 7
12. Zaffino has filed a response. Paper 102. 8
C. Evidence considered 9
13. In an interference, all evidence is presented in the form of an exhibit. 10
37 C.F.R. § 41.154(a). 11
14. In this case, the only evidence to be considered is Exhibit 2001B through 12
2024B. 13
15. Hughes has filed an Exhibit List. Paper 68. 14
16. Given the nature of proceedings under Rule 41.202(d), the patent owner is 15
not authorized to file exhibits. 16
17. Zaffino was advised that it could not file evidence. Paper 27, page 3. 17
18. Accordingly, Zaffino Exhibits 1001 through 1005 have not been considered. 18
D. Hughes’ case based on conception and diligence 19
19. For the purpose of evaluating Hughes’ conception coupled with diligence 20
case, it has been assumed that Hughes conceived. 21
20. In considering a response to an order to show cause, the Board addresses 22
only the issues raised in the order to show cause—diligence in this case. 23

6

21. While Zaffino in its response questions whether Hughes has established 1
conception (Paper 102, page 1:6-7), Zaffino’s “no conception” argument 2
will not be considered. 3
22. As noted earlier, conception was not raised in the order to show cause and 4
therefore Hughes has not had a fair opportunity to address conception in 5
connection with its conception/diligence presentation. 6
23. With respect to diligence, Hughes must establish reasonable diligence from a 7
time prior2 to Zaffino’s entry into the field until a subsequent constructive 8
reduction to practice by Hughes. 9
24. On the record before us, Zaffino “entered the field” when it filed its 10
Provision Application (14 October 2009). 11
25. Hughes is entitled to a constructive reduction to practice as of the filing date 12
of its involved application (20 April 2010). 13
26. The relevant diligence period (often referred to as the “critical period”) is 14
from a time prior to 14 October 2009 until 20 April 2010. 15
16

2 There is precedent which states that a “time prior” is a “time just prior”.
However, the applicable pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) states “reasonable
diligence . . . from a time prior to conception by the other [Zaffino in this case].”
(Italics added). Hence, the Board looks for an event prior to Zaffino’s date and
evaluates diligence from that date forward. Anderson v. Hill, 66 USPQ2d 1113,
1125-26 (BPAI 2002).

7

27. Hughes’ case for diligence is summarized its diligence chart.3 Ex. 2010B. 1
28. As is apparent from the Hughes diligence chart, there several events prior to 2
14 October 2009 listed. 3
29. The relevant event is the event listed closest and prior to 14 October 2009. 4
30. According to Hughes, on 24 July 2009, Hughes attended a meeting with 5
members of a Die Mold Division and made a PowerPoint presentation. 6
Ex. 2010B, page 1. 7
31. The diligence chart sets out the following events prior to 14 October 2009: 8
Date Activity
24 July 2009 Hughes attended a meeting with members of the Die Mold
Division and Gave a PowerPoint presentation.
Alan Hughes worked with members of his team at Honda to
design and develop his concept of a mold insert with
conformal cooling lines.
16 February 2010 Hughes attended another meeting with members of the Die
Mold Division and gave a PowerPoint presentation.
Alan Hughes worked with members of his team at Honda to
design and develop his concept of a mold insert with
conformal cooling lines. Hughes worked with patent
attorney to draft patent application.
20 April 2010 Hughes files Application . . . 12/763,451
9

3 A diligence chart is helpful to the Board in evaluating diligence. Ginter v.
Benson, 74 UPSQ2d 1930, 1935-36 (BPAI 2004); Standing Order ¶ 208.6
(Paper 2). Hughes did not file a diligence chart with its Rule 41.202(d) showing,
but after declaration of the interference the Board required the filing of, and
Hughes filed, a diligence chart. Paper 39, page 2.

8

32. As is apparent, the diligence chart does not set out dates for activity between 1
(1) 24 July 2009 and 16 February 2010 and (2) 16 February 2010 and 2
20 April 2010. 3
33. In a declaration, Hughes states (Ex. 2001B, ¶ 13) [bold added]: 4
On July 24, 2009, I attended a meeting with members of the 5
Die Mold Division and gave a PowerPoint presentation. See 6
Ex. 2007 [now Ex. 2007B]. One slide from the presentation 7
was entitled “Technical Concern\Investigation Points.” In this 8
slide, I presented a drawing of a water (cooling) channel that 9
would be created by placing robotic “3D TIG welded layers” 10
into a “bridging area.” Id. 11

34. In the same declaration, Hughes further states (Ex. 2001B, ¶ 14) [bold 12
added]: 13
On or about February 16, 2010, I attended another meeting with 14
members of the Die Mold Division and gave a Power Point 15
presentation. See Ex. 2009 [now Ex. 2009B]. One slide from 16
the presentation . . . was entitled “Technical 17
Concern/Investigation Points.” By this time, Honda had built 18
and tested prototypes. In the large box about the drawing, there 19
is a sentence next to an asterisk, which sates “Refer to Testing 20
and Data entry sheet for specific detail.” Id. 21

35. Hughes does not explain what he means by “[b]y this time.” 22
36. There is no description of the dates on which “Honda had built and tested 23
prototoypes”, the nature of those prototypes, or how they relate to any 24
conception. 25
37. Sometime after 16 February 2010, Hughes states that he worked with a 26
patent attorney to draft a patent application. Ex. 2010B, page 2, last entry. 27

9

38. No details are provided as to dates on which Hughes worked with the patent 1
attorney or testimony by the patent attorney as to dates on which the patent 2
attorney worked on the application. 3
39. Based on the evidence, Hughes has not established that Hughes exercised 4
reasonable diligence from 24 July 2009 through 20 April 2010. 5
E. Hughes’ case based on derivation 6
40. The elements of derivation are (1) conception and (2) communication to the 7
opponent, both prior to the opponent’s date. 8
41. We elect to focus on the element of communication, assuming arguendo that 9
Hughes has established a prior conception. 10
42. According to Hughes (Ex. 2010B, ¶ 8) [bold added]: 11
Six days after my conception [said to have occurred] on 12
May 27, 2009, I wrote and sent an email to Jim Roe, of Jim Roe 13
& Associates, who at the time served as a business intermediary 14
between me on behalf of Honda and Pat Zaffino and his 15
company, Tool-Tec Welding, Inc. (“Tool-Tec”). See Ex. 2003 16
[now Ex. 2003B]. I explained to Mr. Roe that I was “currently 17
working on a project to manufacture mold inserts with cooling 18
lines conformal to the mold surface” and wanted to investigate 19
the use of a three-dimensional robotic welding machine “as an 20
option to achieve our objectives.” Id. I attached an Excel 21
spreadsheet to the email containing a CAD drawing and a 22
“rough profile” of the mold with conformal cooling lines for 23
quoting purposes. See Ex. 2004 [now Ex. 2004B]. The “rough 24
profile” in Exhibit 2004 illustrates my concept of creating 25
conformal cooling lines by covering groves in the mold with a 26
“3-D weld.” Id. 27

43. Further according to Hughes (Ex. 2010B, ¶ 9) [bold of exhibit numbers 28
added]: 29

10

That same day, on May 27, 2009, Mr. Roe sent an email [at 1
11:03 am] confirming that Mr. Zaffino would like to work on 2
the welding portion of my project. See Ex. 2005 [now 3
Ex. 2005B]. He stated: “Pat [Zaffino] would like to work on 4
your project on a time and material basis . . .. We assume 5
EGA [Honda] would build the mold including milling out the 6
water line grooves and Tool-Tec’s part is to complete the 7
welding portion . . . Do you have a general project timeline 8
you can share with us?” Id. (Emphasis added). Pat Zaffino 9
was copied on the email. 10

44. The Roe email also states (Ex. 2005B, first sentence): 11
I spoke with Pat [Zaffino] just now and I will meet with him 12
tomorrow morning to review and we would like to call you at 13
that time so Pat can explain how he would go about his part of 14
the project and understand how you would like to proceed. 15

45. On the basis of the evidence to be considered at this stage, we understand the 16
facts to be as follows. Jim Roe acted as an intermediary between Hughes 17
and Zaffino. Thus, a “communication” to Roe does not establish that Roe 18
passed the communication on to Zaffino. 19
46. Roe indicates that he intended to meet with Zaffino “tomorrow” but there is 20
no indication that the meeting actually took place. 21
47. Moreover, the fact that Roe spoke with Zaffino on 27 May 2009 does not 22
establish what was “communicated” by Roe to Zaffino when Roe spoke with 23
Zaffino. 24

11

IV. Analysis 1
A. Standard of proof 2
In a proceeding under Rule 41.202(d), the applicant is under a burden to 3
establish prima facie under a preponderance of the evidence standard that it would 4
prevail in the interference assuming the patent owner presents no evidence. 5
These standards are articulated in a Board precedential opinion in 6
Basmadjian v. Landry, 54 USPQ2d 1617 (BPAI 1997). 7
While Basmadjian was decided under former Rule 1.608(b) [37 C.F.R. 8
§ 1.608(b) (1995), the principles are still applicable under current Rule 41.202(d). 9
Section 41.202(d) sets forth the basis for a summary proceeding when an 10
applicant does not appear to be able to show it would prevail on priority. 11
Section 41.202(d)(1) restates Rule 608, but eliminates the 12
distinction between Rule 608(a) and Rule 608(b). Section 13
41.202(d)(2) restates Rule 617 by providing a basis for a 14
summary proceeding on priority when the applicant fails to 15
make a sufficient showing of priority. Under § 41.202(e), the 16
showing must by itself, if unrebutted, warrant a determination 17
of priority favorable to the applicant. 18

Notice of Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960, 49969 (Aug. 12, 2004). See also 19
Comment 171: 20
Another comment suggests waiting until the interference is 21
initiated to require the showing under § 41.202(d). Answer: A 22
practice of waiting would require the declaration of an 23
interference, with all of the costs associated with the declaration 24
of an interference, that the applicant might not want to contest. 25
Moreover, since an inadequate showing under § 41.202(d) is 26
the trigger for a summary disposition under § 41.202(d)(2), 27
delay in making the showing would drag out the pendency of 28
the interference. 29

12

69 Fed. Reg. at 49992. 1
The justification for summary proceedings is discussed in Kistler v. Weber, 2
412 F.2d 280, 283-285 (CCPA 1969). 3
B. Diligence 4
Whether a party has been diligent is a question of fact. In re Jolley, 308 5
F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Martus & Becker v. Heise, 39 F.2d 715, 717 6
(CCPA 1930). 7
A party attempting to prove diligence must account for the entire critical 8
period, in this case from 24 July 2009 until 20 April 2010. Gould v. Schawlow, 9
363 F.2d 908, 918-19 (CCPA 1966) ("The party chargeable with diligence must 10
account for the entire period during which diligence is required."); Griffith v. 11
Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same—involving interference 12
summary proceeding) 13
There are numerous gaps in Hughes’ diligence case. 14
Assuming arguendo that the events which took place on 24 July 2009 and 15
16 February 2010 are relevant to diligence, there remains the periods between 16
(1) 24 July 2009 and 16 February 2010 and (2) 16 February 2010 and 20 April 17
2010. 18
Hughes has not convincingly explained what events took place in the two 19
time periods. 20
It is not enough to say events took place without providing a convincing 21
story as to the nature of the events and when they took place. 22
Accordingly, we are unable to find that there was relevant continuous 23
activity during the two period involved. Burns v. Curtis, 172 F.2d 588, 591 24
(CCPA 1949). 25

13

The Hughes presentation is reminiscent of unsuccessful story told Gould in 1
Gould v. Schawlow, supra: “[m]erely stating that there were no weeks or months 2
that he ‘did not work on the laser’ is not enough, absent supporting facts showing 3
specifically what that ‘work’ consisted of and when it was performed.” 363 F.2d 4
at 918. 5
Nor does Hughes’ citation of Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (Fed. 6
Cir. 2002), help its case. 7
The current record is devoid of the necessary relevant events and the time 8
when those events occurred so as to bring this case within the 17-day commercial 9
development case put on by Scott. 10
Hughes’ work with a patent attorney likewise is of no avail. D’Amico v. 11
Koike, 347 F.2d 867, 869 (CCPA 1965) (unexplained one-month period during 12
critical period found to be lack of diligence); Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024 13
1028 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (diligence not proved in the face of a lack of records and 14
dates on which attorney activity occurred). 15
Hughes has failed to establish the requisite diligence and therefore has not 16
established a prima facie case of diligence. 17
C. Derivation 18
As noted earlier, the elements of derivation are (1) conception and 19
(2) communication. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 20
The initial Hughes Rule 41.202(d) showing was not based on establishing a 21
prima facie case of derivation. 22
Initially it was determined that it would not be appropriate to permit Hughes 23
to raise derivation in the summary proceeding. 24

14

However, upon consideration of Hughes’ argument, it was determined that it 1
would be appropriate to permit Hughes to raise derivation as an issue. Paper 39, 2
pages 2-3. 3
Hughes has presented a case based on derivation, but we find that Hughes 4
has failed to establish a communication from Hughes to Zaffino of the conception 5
said to have taken place on or about 29 May 2009. 6
Hughes has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 7
that the communication took place. 8
Hughes attempts to do so by virtue of (1) a communication by Hughes to 9
Roe and (2) thereafter a further communication by Roe to Zaffino. 10
A communication does not have to be from inventor to inventor. 11
Rather, a communication can include an indirect communication, such as a 12
communication from inventor Hughes to non-inventor Roe followed by a 13
communicaton from non-inventor Roe to inventor Zaffino. 14
Assuming arguendo that Hughes communicated to Roe, a penetrating 15
analysis of the communication evidence does not reveal precisely what Roe 16
communicated to Zaffino. 17
We find convincing the following brief argument made by Zaffino (citations 18
to the record omitted): 19
First, Hughes argues that one July 22, 2009, Mr. Hughes 20
delivered a CD with CAD data for creating conformal cooling 21
lines to Mr. Zaffino. Even if true, there is no evidence in the 22
record regarding what was contained on the SD. The only 23
explanation of the subject matter of the CD is a reference to the 24
drawing attached to a May 27, 2009 email between Mr. Hughes 25
and Mr. Roe—not Mr. Zaffino. The only other explanation is 26

15

Mr. Hughes emails and his own testimony, which is 1
uncorroborated. 2
3
Paper 102, page 13:4-11. 4
Roe acted as an intermediary. Thus, a communication to Roe is not per se a 5
communication to Zaffino. 6
Nothing in the Roe email to Hughes, copied to Zaffino, reasonably reveals 7
what Roe communicated to Zaffino. 8
The burden of establishing the nature of the Roe to Zaffino communication 9
was up to Hughes. 10
We recognize that Hughes may not have been able to obtain declaration 11
testimony at this stage of the proceeding. 12
Our rules authorize a party to proffer evidence of potential testimony of an 13
unavailable witness—in this case Roe. 37 C.F.R. §41.202(e)(2)(ii). 14
Hughes did not avail itself of the proffer possibility and all we are left with 15
is the Roe to Hughes email. Ex. 2005B. 16
But, that email is not credible proof of any communication of a Hughes 17
conception to Zaffino. 18
On the record created by Hughes, we find that the evidence insufficient to 19
establish communication of a conception from Hughes to Zaffino. 20
Hughes has failed to establish a prima facie case of derivation. 21
D. Additional evidence 22
1. Hughes evidence 23
Generally in a Rule 41.202(d) proceeding, an applicant is not entitled 24
to submit additional evidence absent a showing of good cause. 37 C.F.R. 25
§ 41.202(d)(2); Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 26

16

Hughes made no attempt to show good cause for any additional evidence 1
relied upon in support of its conception/diligence case. 2
However, given the authorization to raise derivation, and because the 3
original showing and the subsequent evidence combined fails to show a case of 4
diligence, we have elected to considered all the Hughes evidence. 5
We nevertheless find that Hughes has not established a prima facie case of 6
diligence or communication. 7
2. Zaffino evidence 8
Zaffino submitted Exhibits 1001 through 1005. 9
Since a patent owner is not allowed to submit evidence in a summary 10
proceeding, we have not considered Exhibits 1001 through 1005, or Zaffino 11
arguments based thereon. 12
V. Decision 13
Hughes has failed to overcome the order to show cause. 14
Hughes has failed to establish a prima facie case of priority or derivation vis-15
à-vis Zaffino. 16
A judgment is entered in a separate paper. 17

17

cc: (electronic transmission):
Attorney for Huges:
Harold H. Fox
John M. Caracappa
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLC
hfox@steptoe.com
jcaracap@steptoe.com

Attorney for Zaffino:
William S. Gottschalk
Timothy J. Murphy
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
wgottsschalk@cgolaw.com
tmurphy@cgolaw.com