YWCA

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 10, 2006

01-CA-042618 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 10, 2006)

JD-13-06
Springfield, MA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES

YOUNG WOMEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS,

and Case 1–CA–42618

INTERNATIONAL UNION , UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL WORKERS OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 2322, AFL–CIO.

Gene Switzer, Esquire
of Boston, Massachusetts, for the General Counsel

Jay Presser, Esquire
of Springfield, Massachusetts , for the Respondent

Shelley B. Kroll, Esquire
of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Charging Party

DECISION

Statement of the Case

David I. Goldman, Administrative Law Judge. This case was submitted by the parties for
decision based on a stipulated record. By order dated December 7, 2005, I granted the parties’
Joint Motion and Stipulation of Facts, accepted the stipulated facts proposed by the parties and
agreed to waive the hearing in this case. Briefs were filed by all parties on January 11, 2006.

The charge in this case was filed by the United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural
Workers of America, Local 2322 (Union or Charging Party) June 9, 2005.1 The complaint
issued September 30, and alleges that the Young Women’s Christian Association of Western
Massachusetts (YWCA or Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act (Act). The YWCA filed a timely answer, denying that it had violated the Act.

On the entire record, and after considering the briefs filed by counsel for the General
Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Party, I make the following findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations.

1All dates are in 2005 unless otherwise indicated.
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I. Jurisdiction

The YWCA is a corporation operating a social services agency at its facility in
Springfield, Massachusetts. It annually derives gross revenues in excess of $250,000. It
purchases and receives at its Springfield facility goods valued in excess of $5,000 directly from
points outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The parties stipulate and I find that at all
material times Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The parties also stipulate and I also find that at all material
times Charging Party has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.

II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

The General Counsel alleges that the YWCA violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by
withdrawing recognition from the Union and by failing and refusing to execute a collective-
bargaining agreement previously reached with the Union. The YWCA essentially admits the
conduct, but defends on the grounds—the fact of which is conceded by the General Counsel—
that the Union lost majority support within the bargaining unit, through no fault of the YWCA,
after the parties reached an oral agreement on all substantive terms to be included in the written
collective-bargaining agreement. The YWCA contends that this loss of majority support after
reaching oral agreement with the Union privileges—indeed, requires—its refusal to execute the
collective-bargaining agreement and, similarly, privileges and requires its withdrawal of
recognition from the Union.

III. Factual Findings2
By letter dated September 8, 2003, the Union advised the YWCA that it represented a
majority of the YWCA’s direct service provider employees. The Union proposed to prove its
majority status in an “appropriate forum” and expressed a preference for verification by an
“impartial third party.” In addition to requesting recognition from the YWCA directly, on
September 9, 2003, the Union filed a representation petition with the Board.
By letter dated September 11, 2003, the YWCA responded to the Union’s September 8
letter and declined to recognize the Union as its employees’ bargaining representative. In its
letter, the YWCA referenced the Union’s representation petition and expressed the intent to
permit Board processes to determine the employees’ desires regarding union representation.
After a Board election conducted on October 17, 2003, the Union was certified on
October 27, 2003 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for a bargaining unit of
the YWCA’s employees at facilities in Hampden and Hampshire counties. The certified
bargaining unit consisted of:
All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by Respondent at its
facilities located in Hampden and Hampshire counties including direct service
advocates, service coordinators/case managers, hotline counselors, community
educators, father's and youth outreach workers, program cook, housing
advocates, construction managers, construction trainer, coordinator of

2The following factual findings are derived from the parties’ Stipulation of Facts.
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operations, and youth development, education coordinator, teacher,
counselor/case manager, rape crisis counselor, program coordinator, site
coordinators, staff associates, safeplan advocates, mentor coordinators,
counselor/volunteer coordinator, and youth development program coordinator,
but excluding all office clerical employees, managerial employees, professional
employees, confidential employees, casual employees, all relief staff, building
maintenance, custodians, guards, site/program directors, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
In early 2004, the YWCA and the Union commenced negotiations for a collective-
bargaining agreement. During negotiations the Union was represented by International
Representatives Henry Fijalkowski and Joseph Calvo, and Servicing Representative Tim Scott,
in addition to several bargaining unit employees. The YWCA’s chief spokesperson at
negotiations was Attorney Ralph Abbott. Also present at the negotiations on behalf of the
YWCA were Human Resource Coordinator Kimberly L. Chatel and Chief Financial Officer Suzy
M. Cieboter. Between February and December 2004, the parties generally met to negotiate on
a weekly basis. During this period the parties reached tentative agreement on numerous
issues.3
The parties’ ground rules for bargaining provided that as they reached agreement on a
particular contractual provision, each party initialed a tentative agreement on that provision. On
April 5, 2005, the YWCA presented the Union with what it termed “a final offer” for a collective-
bargaining agreement. In addition to the provisions already tentatively agreed to, the “final
offer” included provisions for wages, group health and dental insurance, short-term and long
term disability insurance, retirement plans, hours of work and overtime, personal days, and
holidays. As part of its final offer, the YWCA proposed that the length of the contract would be
two years. With respect to holidays, the YWCA's final contract offer included a provision to
permit the Union, at its sole discretion, to designate a floating holiday.
Pursuant to the parties' negotiating ground rules, any agreement between the parties
was subject to ratification by the Union's membership. Union Representatives Scott and Calvo
advised the YWCA that the Union would present the YWCA’s final contract offer to the Union
membership for a ratification vote. Calvo and Scott explained that if the membership rejected
the YWCA’s final contract offer, the membership could also vote to authorize a strike. The
Union scheduled the ratification vote for April 8, but then postponed it until April 20.

3These issues included the following: recognition clause with a unit description; preamble;
duration and renewal; scope of agreement; no-strikes no-lockouts; union security and dues
deduction; definitions of regular full-time, regular part-time, other part-time and temporary
employees and relief staff; management rights; probationary period; vacations; flextime
scheduling; leave without pay; bereavement; grievance arbitration procedure; discipline and
discharge; labor-management committee; resignation; reduction-in-force or work hours;
evaluations; personnel files; union business; separability; seniority; job descriptions; health and
safety; job posting; bulletin boards; non-discrimination; worker's compensation; jury duty;
military leave; professional liability insurance; direct deposit; and transportation reimbursement.
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On April 7, YWCA Executive Director Mary Reardon Johnson sent a letter to bargaining
unit employees encouraging them to attend the Union’s meeting and ratify the proposed
collective-bargaining agreement. The letter discussed the final offer and warned that “a strike or
even the threat of a strike would not be good for you, your families or our clients who rely so
much on us.” The letter added that “[i]t is our intention to continue offering our services to our
clients regardless of the outcome of any strike vote.”
Between April 8 and April 20, the Union held several informational meetings for its
membership in preparation for the April 20 ratification vote.
On April 19, YWCA Executive Director Johnson sent a second letter to bargaining unit
employees encouraging them to attend the meeting and ratify the proposed contract. The letter
also set out what Ms. Johnson described as “the cold, hard facts about what a strike could
mean to you,” which, as described in the letter, included the cessation of employer contributions
to medical insurance, the possibility of permanent replacement, and the unavailability of
unemployment compensation benefits to strikers.
On April 20, the Union held a ratification vote on the YWCA’s contract offer. The
membership voted to accept the offer. On or about April 20, after the vote, Union
Representative Scott telephoned YWCA Attorney Abbott and told him that the membership had
ratified and accepted the YWCA’s offer for a collective-bargaining agreement. In this
conversation, Attorney Abbott offered to reduce to writing the final and complete agreed-upon
contract for signature by the parties.
With the exception of the Union still having to designate a floating holiday, on or about
April 20, the parties had orally reached an agreement on all of the terms and conditions of
employment to be included in the collective-bargaining agreement.
On April 25 Union Representative Scott issued a letter to the employees in the
bargaining unit to congratulate them on having ratified the contract. The letter stated, in part:
The union contract covers various aspects of your wages, benefits, hours of work
and working conditions. As soon as we proof read the final version and sign off
on it, copies will be made available for all YWCA members.
In the mean[time] the contract as agreed upon is in effect and if you have any
questions about it or if you have any concerns about anything pertaining to your
job, especially in regards to any disciplinary actions taken against you, please
contact us. See the enclosed form to learn more about your rights.
An important next step for your union at the YWCA is to elect union stewards.
Stewards will be YWCA employees who will serve as your primary union
leadership who will represent all YWCA union employees in the workplace. Your
new contract states, “The Employer shall recognize one steward from each
worksite, elected by the Union.” The election process and timeline is detailed in
the enclosed flyer.
After union stewards are elected, union bulleting [sic] boards will be put up at
each worksite. The contract states, “The YWCA will provide a bulleting [sic]
board at each worksite for the Union to post notices of Union meetings, election
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of officers or notices of Union recreational, educational or social activities. Each
bulletin board will be placed in an area accessible to employees.” Bulletin boards
play an important role in educating and keeping union members informed about
their union. Regular union membership meetings for all YWCA union members
to attend will also be scheduled once we have stewards in place.
On May 2, at Attorney Abbott's request, Union Representative Scott advised Abbott, by
telephone, of the floating holiday that the Union had chosen. By May 2, when the Union
advised the YWCA of the floating holiday, the YWCA and the Union had orally reached a
complete agreement on all of the terms and conditions of employment to be included in a
collective-bargaining agreement.
As of this time, May 2, the YWCA had no objective evidence that the Union did not
represent a majority of the bargaining unit employees.
Attorney Abbott reduced the agreed-upon contract to writing in anticipation of its
execution and on May 6 forwarded it to the YWCA's Chatel and Cieboter for review.
By letter dated May 12, Union Representative Scott notified the YWCA that, in
accordance with the contractual provision of the new contract that allows the Union to have five
stewards, three employees had been selected and the Union was making an effort to fill the two
remaining slots. Also on this date, Scott left a telephone message for Chatel asking about the
status of the draft contract and requesting that she advise management to start applying the
terms of the contract. Scott followed up this telephone message with an e-mail to Chatel. On
May 13, Chatel sent an e-mail to Scott responding to his May 12 inquiries. She stated:
Hi Tim:
Suzy and I have had a chance to review the contract and we e-mailed
some questions to Ralph. He may need to make some changes but Ralph will
forward to you when it is complete. I apologize for the delay, but things have
been extremely hectic.
Regarding the concern you raised about directors telling staff that the
contract is not in effect: Since the contract is not complete and neither
management nor staff have received a copy, there appears to be some confusion
around this issue. We plan to clarify things as soon as possible when the draft of
the contract is complete. We plan to distribute a copy of the contract as well as
discuss with supervisors. In the meantime, if there are any issues or questions,
we will direct supervisors to contact Suzy or myself with questions.
Thanks,
Kim
As of May 19, there were 64 employees in the bargaining unit. On May 13, the YWCA
received 34 signed and dated cards from bargaining unit employees. Each signed and dated
card stated that the “undersigned employees of the YWCA of Western Massachusetts no
longer wants representation from Local 2322 of the united automobile; aerospace and
agricultural implement workers of America.” The card added, “I no longer want to be
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represented by the UAW Local 2322 and I would like action to be taken to get them out of
our agency, so we can get our voices back! [Emphasis in original.]”
The 34 cards were signed on the following dates:
April 14 ………..……………. 6 cards signed
April 16 ………………..……. 3 cards signed
April 18………………...……. 4 cards signed
April 19…………….…..……. 6 cards signed
April 20 ………………….…. 6 cards signed
April 21 …………………..…. 2 cards signed
April 23 ………………….…. 2 cards signed
April 25 ………………….…. 1 card signed
May 8 …………………….…. 2 cards signed
May 9 …………………….…. 1 card signed
May 12 ……………….….…. 1 card signed

The YWCA did not receive the cards until May 13. But based on this stipulated
evidence, the 32nd card, in a bargaining unit of 64 employees, was signed May 8. Accordingly,
as of May 8, 50 percent of the bargaining unit had indicated through signed cards provided to
Respondent May 13 that they “no longer wanted to be represented by [the Union].” May 8 was
18 days after April 20, the date that the Union accepted the YWCA’s final contract offer and on
which (with the exception of designating the floating holiday) the parties had orally reached an
agreement on all of the terms and conditions of employment to be included in the collective-
bargaining agreement. It was six days after May 2, the date on which the Union advised the
YWCA of the floating holiday it had selected, at which time “Respondent and the Union had
orally reached a complete agreement on all of the terms and conditions of employment of the
Unit to be included in a collective bargaining agreement.”
By letter dated May 19, the YWCA informed the Union that it would not execute the
agreed-upon collective-bargaining agreement and that it was withdrawing recognition of the
Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees. In this letter, the
YWCA stated that it had objective evidence that the Union had lost majority status among the
unit employees, in the form of the cards signed by 34 of the 64 unit employees stating that they
did not wish to be represented by the Union. The sole and exclusive basis for the YWCA’s
withdrawal of recognition and its refusal to execute the agreed-upon contract, was the May 13
receipt of the cards referred to above. Had the YWCA not received those cards the collective-
bargaining agreement would have been reduced to writing and executed by the parties.4

4Stipulated Fact No. 32 states: “At all times since at least May 2, 2005, Respondent has
failed and refused to execute a written contract encompassing all of the terms and conditions of
employment of the Unit that the parties had final agreement on . . . .” This stipulation is in error,
presumably inadvertently agreed to by both parties, and I cannot accept it. It is at odds with
other stipulated evidence that shows that at least until May 13 when the YWCA received the
employee cards repudiating the Union the YWCA attorney was laboring to reduce the
agreement to writing in preparation for execution. The first indication that the YWCA gave to the
Union that it would not execute the agreement was on May 19.
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Analysis and Conclusions
A. Introduction
The question here is whether an employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition from its
employees’ union and refuse to execute a written version of a labor agreement, when, after
reaching agreement with the union, the employer is confronted with undisputed evidence that—
again, after reaching agreement—a majority of the union-represented employees have indicated
they no longer want to be represented by the union.
The answer to this question implicates the Act’s overriding policy of industrial peace, the
twin goals of the Act of employee free choice and stability of labor relations, and the manner in
which the Board has accommodated these goals. And the question requires consideration of
the difference between the right to utilize the Board’s election procedures and the right of an
employer, acting on behalf of its employees, to unilaterally reject its bargaining obligation and
withdraw recognition from the certified employee representative.
But while the question presented by this case implicates fundamental objectives of the
Act, the answer, I believe, is clear. Under longstanding Board law and policy, it is settled that
once parties enter into an agreement—as the parties manifestly did here—a contract is formed
and the employer cannot, without committing an unfair labor practice, refuse to execute the
agreement and unilaterally withdraw recognition based on a union’s loss of majority support that
did not occur until after the formation of the contract. And this is true notwithstanding the
equally longstanding Board policy in representation cases that permits use of the Board’s
election processes to raise questions of representation until such time as the parties commit
their agreement to a signed and written document.
Accordingly, as discussed herein, I find that since May 19, by withdrawing recognition
from the Union and failing and refusing to execute the agreement it reached with the Union, the
YWCA violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.5
1. The conclusive presumption of majority support
during the term of a labor agreement
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he object of the National Labor Relations Act
is industrial peace and stability, fostered by collective bargaining agreements providing for the
orderly resolution of labor disputes between workers and employers.” Auciello Iron Works, Inc.
v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785 (1996). “To such ends, the Board has adopted various
presumptions about the existence of majority support for a union within a bargaining unit, the
precondition for service as its exclusive representative.” Id. at 785–786. As the Board has
explained:

5Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Sec.
8(d) of the Act defines to “bargain collectively” to include “the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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Absent specific statutory direction, the Board has been guided by the
Act’s clear mandate to give effect to employees’ free choice of bargaining
representatives. The Board has also recognized that, for employees’ choices to
be meaningful, collective bargaining relationships must be given a chance to
bear fruit and so must not be subject to constant challenges. Therefore from the
earliest days of the Act, the Board has sought to foster industrial peace and
stability in collective bargaining relationships, as well as employee free choice, by
presuming that an incumbent union retains its majority status.6
The presumption of majority support is usually rebuttable, but in some periods of a
collective-bargaining relationship it is conclusive. One such period is during the life of a
collective-bargaining agreement that is not longer than three years duration. Thus, it is a “long-
established principle that a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support during
the term of a collective-bargaining agreement, up to 3 years.” Trailmobile Trailer, LLC, 343
NLRB No. 17, slip op. 3–4 (2004); Levitz, supra at fn. 17 (“a union’s majority status may not be
questioned during the life of a collective bargaining agreement up to 3 years”); Auciello Iron
Works, 517 U.S. at 791 (rejecting an exception “to the conclusive presumption [of majority
support] arising at the moment a collective-bargaining contract offer has been accepted”).
2. The agreement
It has been black letter law, for over 60 years, that "[w]hen an oral agreement is
reached as to the terms of a collective-bargaining contract, each party is obligated, at the
request of the other, to execute that contract when reduced to writing.” Liberty Pavilion Nursing
Home, 259 NLRB 1249 (1982). At least since the Supreme Court’s decision in H.J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941), “it is well established that an employer's failure to reduce to writing
an agreement reached with a union constitutes an unlawful refusal to bargain.” Ethan
Enterprises Inc., 342 NLRB No. 15, slip op. at 5 (2004), enfd. 178 LRRM (BNA) (9th Cir. 2005).
However, it is also the case that an oral agreement on the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract is binding and enforceable prior to being written and executed.7 Indeed,

6Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 720 (2001).

7Terrace Gardens Plaza, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 F.3d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“An unexecuted
CBA is valid and binding upon the parties”); Automobile Mechanics Local No. 701, 280 NLRB
1312 (1986); North Broths. Ford, Inc., 220 NLRB 1021 fn. 8 (1975) (“The existence of an
agreement is not dependent upon its written incorporation in final form”); Utility Tree Service,
215 NLRB 806, 807 (1974) (“we find that on March 9 [upon notification to the employer that its
contract offer had been accepted] a final and binding collective-bargaining contract was
consummated between the Respondent and the [union], and that the Respondent had been
duly notified”), motion to reopen the record denied, 218 NLRB 784 (1975), enfd. 539 F.2d 718
(9th Cir. 1976); East Texas Steel Castings Co., 191 NLRB 113 (1971) (contract came into
being upon union telegram notifying employer of acceptance of company proposal), enfd. 457
F.2d 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 852 (1972); F.W. Means & Co., 157 NLRB 1434
(1966) (in dicta: “we disagree with the Trial Examiner's view that an oral agreement is not
binding on the parties until reduced to writing”), enf. denied on other grounds, 377 F.2d 683 (7th
Cir. 1967); Teamsters Local 294 (Conway’s Express), 87 NLRB 972 (1949) (rejecting General
Counsel’s claim that oral agreements are not binding on the parties).
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absent a request by either party, there is no requirement that a labor agreement ever be
reduced to writing.8

The Board holds that a contract is formed (and thereafter must be reduced to writing and
executed upon the demand of either party) when the parties have reached mutual agreement on
all material and substantive terms and conditions of employment to be incorporated in the
bargaining agreement. Transit Service Corp., 312 NLRB 477, 481 (1993).

In this case the parties stipulate that “[b]y May 2, 2005, when the Union advised
Respondent of the floating holiday it had selected, Respondent and the Union had orally
reached a complete agreement on all of the terms and conditions of employment of the Unit to
be included in a collective bargaining agreement.” (Stipulated Fact No. 21). Indeed, the parties
refer to the “collective bargaining agreement that the parties had reached full agreement on by
May 2, 2005.” (Stipulated Fact No. 30). Thus, the parties agree that no later than May 2, the
parties had reached “oral agreement on all the substantive terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.” (Joint Statement of Issue Presented).9

8NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co., 641 F.2d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 1981) (“It is well
settled that a union and employer's adoption of a labor contract is not dependent on the
reduction to writing of their intention to be bound”) [footnote omitted]; NLRB v. Scientific
Nutrition Corp., 180 F.2d 447, 449 (9th Cir. 1950) ("The (National Labor Relations) Act, it is to
be remembered, does not require contracts between employer and the union to be in any
particular form, or that they be reduced to writing”); Ben Pekin Corp., 181 NLRB 1025 (1970)
(“Respondent recognized the Union and had an oral collective-bargaining agreement with the
Union covering Respondent's flat janitors. While said contract was not reduced to writing, it
nevertheless was valid between the parties”), enfd. 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971); Pacific Iron &
Metal Co., 175 NLRB 604, 606 (1969) (“the Act does not require that a collective-bargaining
agreement be reduced to writing unless either party demands it”), citing Rabouin v. NLRB, 159
F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952) (“There is nothing in the Act which compels the conclusion that
collective-bargaining contracts must be formally attested by the parties; rather Sec. 8(d)––
specifically provides for a written agreement 'if requested by either party'––a clear evidence that
writing is not required as a matter of law").

9I note that, similar to the point drawn by the Board in its discussion of the “oral” agreement
in Teamsters Local 294 (Conway’s Express), 87 NLRB 972, 976 fn. 9 (1949): “[o]f course, the
contract in this case was ‘oral,’ more exactly ‘parole,’ only in a highly technical sense. Save for
the missing signature, it was a complete written document, duly publicized to all interested
parties at the time of its adoption, and proved by unimpeachable documentary evidence.” In the
instant case, the Union’s acceptance of the final offer was oral, but for the very most part the
agreement was in writing, in the form of tentative agreements on specific provisions (Exh. 7)
and a document describing the YWCA’s final economic offer. (Exh. 8). Most significantly––as
will be discussed below––the parties accept that the agreement was not sufficiently written and
signed to have constituted a “contract bar” to an election petition had one been filed. So while
the agreement reached by the parties was “oral” only in a technical sense, throughout this
decision I refer to the agreement reached by the parties for a new collective-bargaining
agreement as an “oral” agreement, to be distinguished from the formal collective-bargaining
agreement that was being reduced to writing and prepared for execution until the issue of the
Union’s loss of majority support derailed that process.
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However, the record strongly supports a finding, as asserted by the General Counsel,
that the contract was formed twelve days earlier upon the Union’s acceptance of the YWCA’s
contract offer on April 20.10 That is the date on which the membership ratified Respondent’s
contract offer, and the date on which that acceptance was conveyed by the Union to
Respondent. That is the date on which the YWCA’s Attorney Abbott “offered to reduce to
writing the final and complete agreed-upon contract for signature.” (Stipulated Fact No. 18).
There were no further bargaining sessions scheduled or required. Employees were told that
they would be voting on the “last and final offer” and the YWCA urged employees to “accept
Respondent’s final contract offer and ratify the entire contract, or risk facing the uncertainties of
a strike.” (Stipulated Fact No. 14; Exhs. 9. 10). Clearly, the message to employees was that
this was the final step to a complete and binding agreement.
As of April 20, the only matter left for determination was the date of the floating holiday.
The YWCA's final offer, accepted by the Union, provided that “the Union, at its sole discretion”
designate the date of the holiday, “assuming that the final offer was accepted.” (Stipulated Fact
No. 12). That there would be an extra holiday was agreed to, and, indeed, touted to employees
by the YWCA as one of the “economic improvements in the YWCA’s final offer” (Exh. 9) and a
reason to vote to accept the contract offer. The agreement to delegate to one party the
discretion to choose the holiday was an agreed to term of the final offer, and when the offer was
accepted the contract was formed on that basis. It does not reflect a failure of the parties to
mutually agree on a substantive term and conditions of employment. To the contrary, the
mutual agreement was that the date was to be unilaterally chosen by the Union, “assuming that
the final offer was accepted.” (Stipulated Fact No. 12). The parties’ intentions were clear.
Similarly, on April 20 the Union was still to designate the individuals who were to serve as
stewards. These were not missing terms, but mutually agreed to provisions to be carried out
upon contract formation. Accordingly, I find that the parties entered into a binding agreement on
April 20, 2005.
I would add that the April 20 date is also consistent with the evidence that the parties
intended the contract to be effective as of the ratification. The Union’s correspondence to
employees on April 25 represents that while the Union waits for a final version to be proof read
and “sign[ed] off on” that “the contract as agreed upon is in effect.” (Exh. 11). On May 12, the
Union “notified Respondent that, in accordance with the contractual provision that allows the
Union to have five stewards, three employees had been selected and the Union was still making
an effort to fill the two remaining slots.” (Stipulated Fact No. 24). Also on May 12, Union
Representative Scott “left a telephone message for Respondent’s Human Resource Coordinator
Chatel asking about the status of the draft contract and requesting that she advise management
to start applying the terms of the contract. . . . Scott followed-up this telephone message with
an e-mail to . . . Chatel.” (Stipulated Fact No. 25). Chatel’s response (Exh. 13) did not deny
that the contract was in effect, but indicated that “since the contract is not complete and neither
management nor staff have received a copy, there appears to be some confusion around this
issue.” By “not complete,” Chatel could only mean that the document was not in final written
form, as the parties have stipulated that ten days earlier they had “orally reached a complete
agreement on all of the terms and conditions of employment of the Unit to be included in a
collective bargaining agreement.” (Stipulated Fact No. 21). Thus, the “confusion” must have
been from the lack of staff and management having copies—a not surprising difficulty while the

10Respondent does not explicitly propose a date on which a binding agreement was
reached. The stipulations state that “full agreement” was reached “no later than May 2.”
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parties wait for a written version of the contract.11 In the face the Union’s assertions to
employees and the YWCA that the contract was in effect, the YWCA’s failure to deny the
Union’s position, express a contrary assertion, or even surprise at the Union’s position, only
adds to the evidence that the contract came into being on April 20.12
3. Application of the conclusive presumption of
majority support to agreements yet to be executed
Having found that the parties entered into a binding agreement on April 20 brings us to
the central legal dispute in this case: the applicability of the conclusive presumption of majority
support to agreements that are yet to be executed when a union loses majority support.
Notwithstanding the depth of the division between the parties, they agree on much. For
example, no party claims that the employee cards submitted to the YWCA are inadequate to
demonstrate an actual loss of majority support by the Union. As of May 8, 50 percent of the
bargaining unit had signed such a card and the YWCA became aware of the cards on May 13.
There is no allegation that any misconduct by the YWCA is responsible for the employees’ loss
of support for the Union. The parties do not dispute that an agreement was reached prior to the
Union’s loss of majority support. In terms of legal issues, the parties agree that once an
agreement between an employer and union is executed the conclusive presumption of majority
support precludes an employer from withdrawing recognition based on a loss of majority support
that occurs after execution. The parties agree that prior to an agreement between a union and
employer, the presumption of majority support is rebuttable and that an employer may withdraw
recognition from the union based on a showing that the union has lost majority support within
the unit.
The dispute is this: the YWCA contends that the conclusive presumption of majority
support that exists during the term of a labor agreement is not in effect until an oral agreement
is executed. Up to that point, according to the YWCA, the presumption of majority support is

11See Appalachian Shale Products, 121 NLRB 1160, 1163 (1955) (“real stability in industrial
relations can only be achieved where the contract undertakes to chart with adequate precision
the course of the bargaining relationship, and the parties can look to the actual terms and
conditions of their contract for guidance in their day-to-day problems”).

12Throughout its brief, Respondent accepts that an oral agreement was reached between
the parties, at least by May 2. It does, however, repeatedly refer to the agreement as a
“tentative agreement.” The General Counsel’s brief anticipates, and takes issue with this
characterization. It is a noteworthy characterization. In collective-bargaining parlance, a
“tentative agreement” refers to an agreement that (1) has been accepted by the parties subject
to ratification or other approval mechanism or (2) is an agreement on a particular issue that is
subject to becoming binding if and when the parties reach agreement on all other issues.
Neither describes the “complete agreement on all of the terms and conditions of employment of
the Unit to be included in a collective bargaining agreement” (save for the holiday designation)
that existed after ratification of the YWCA's final offer. Prior to its ratification, the agreement
could appropriately be called “tentative.” And during the some 15 months of bargaining that
preceded the agreement the parties entered into numerous “tentative agreements” (Exh. 7) on
many specific issues. However, there was nothing “tentative” about the agreement reached on
April 20.
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rebuttable, just as it is rebuttable before formation of the oral agreement, based on an
employer’s showing that the union has lost majority support in the bargaining unit. Indeed,
according to the YWCA, an employer presented with evidence of the union’s loss of majority
support not only may, but must withdraw recognition and refuse to execute the oral agreement.
The General Counsel and the Union, for their part, contend that the conclusive presumption of
majority support attaches with the formation of the contract, without regard to the written status
of the document.
Specifically, the YWCA contends that the demonstrated lack of majority support for
union representation that it became aware of on May 13, relieved it of the obligation—indeed,
precluded it—from executing or adhering to the agreement previously reached with the Union,
or from continuing to recognize the Union as the employees’ collective-bargaining
representative.
The YWCA would place this case within the ambit of Section 8(a)(2) cases that forbid
“negotiating, executing and implementing” (YWCA Br. at 11) a contract with a “minority union.”
See International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (holding that
recognizing and reaching agreement with minority union is unlawful). But the cases the YWCA
relies upon are inapposite, as they involve employers executing agreements where the union
had lost majority support prior to contract formation, during (or even before) negotiations for a
new contract.13
Cases that involve a union’s loss of majority support prior to contract formation moot
issues regarding the competence of the union to contract as a majority union that are simply not
at issue here. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1992) (“As
for the Board's rule that a union's unconditional acceptance of an offer for a collective-
bargaining contract is valid and binds the company unless circumstances have changed since
the company's offer was made or renewed, we do not think the rule should apply to a case such
as this where between the original offer and its renewal the union lost the support of the
workers. . . . Here the union had lost majority support long before it accepted the company's
offer”), denying enforcement of Chicago Tribune, 303 NLRB 682 (1991); see also, Four Flags
Motors, 1997 WL 852914 (N.L.R.B.G.C.) (a case cited by Respondent in which the General
Counsel’s Division of Advice recommended dismissal of a Section 8(a)(5) charge because,
assuming the union lost majority support prior to accepting the bargaining offer, the employer
was privileged to withdraw recognition).
Even cases involving only employer “doubt” of a union’s majority support—where the
doubt is based on events known to the employer before the union accepts the bargaining

13The YWCA points particularly to cases that cite the “execution” of an agreement with a
minority union as violative of the Act. See, e.g., Dura Art Stone, 346 NLRB No. 14 (2005); Point
Blank Body Armor, Inc., 312 NLRB 1097 (1993); Presbyterian Community Hospital, 230 NLRB
599 (1977); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 187 NLRB 15 (1971), enfd. 454 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1972); and
Hart Motor Express, 164 NLRB 382 (1967); Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 NLRB 910
(1964). In each of these cases the contract was negotiated and agreed to while the union
represented a minority of the unit, so the execution was unlawful. These cases simply do not
treat with the issue at hand: whether an employer may (or must, to avoid an 8(a)(2) violation)
refuse to execute a contract already agreed to with a union that became a minority union after
agreeing to the contract.
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agreement––brush up against the 8(a)(2) issue in a way that is not presented by the instant
case. Thus, in Auciello, where the Board concluded that an employer cannot refuse to execute
an agreed-upon bargaining contract based on good-faith doubt that arose before the union
accepted the offer, it was careful to distinguish its holding from those cases where an actual
loss of majority support occurred prior to contract acceptance. See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works,
Inc., 317 NLRB 364, 370–371 (1995), enfd. 60 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1995), affd. 517 U.S. 781
(1996).
Here, these concerns are not present. There is no evidence that the Union was anything
but a majority union when it accepted the YWCA’s offer. Respondent entered into a binding
agreement with the Union before the Union lost majority support. Section 8(a)(2) is not
offended.
The stipulated evidence is clear: there was no loss of majority support until after
formation of the contract. Contrary to the position of the YWCA—which contends without
authority that it is not the formation of the contract but its execution that is the relevant moment
when the incumbent union’s presumption of majority support becomes conclusive—I think the
law is clear that once a contract is formed, an employer may not rely on a union’s subsequent
loss of support to justify withdrawal of recognition, or refusal to execute the contract.
It is not just that the Supreme Court has recognized (in passing to be sure) that typically
a “conclusive presumption [of a union’s majority support] aris[es] at the moment a collective
bargaining contract offer has been accepted.” Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. at 791
(1996). But a series of on-point Board cases confirm it. Flying Dutchman Park, Inc., 329 NLRB
414, 417 (1999) (“When an employer asserts a good-faith doubt about an incumbent union’s
continued majority status based on events—including the filing of a decertification petition—
occurring after final agreement on the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
an employer may not lawfully refuse to bargain. This is true regardless of the status of any
written instrument incorporating such agreement”) [footnote omitted]; Auciello Iron Works, 317
NLRB at 368 (“We affirm the rule set forth in North Bros. Ford, that a union’s acceptance of an
employer’s outstanding contract offer precludes the employer from raising a good-faith doubt of
the union’s majority status based on events occurring after acceptance. Thus, the employer’s
good-faith doubt based on subsequent events is not available to defend a refusal to execute a
valid agreement or a withdrawal of recognition”) [emphasis in original]; Belcon, Inc., 257 NLRB
1341 (1981) (“Having found there was a valid agreement in existence between the parties on
November 29, I do not deem it necessary to treat the Respondent's claim that it had a
[subsequent] good-faith doubt based on objective considerations regarding the Union's majority
status”); North Bros. Ford, Inc., 220 NLRB 1021 (1975) (“Final agreement was reached no later
than October 14, 1974, well before the decertification petition was filed. Once final agreement
on the substantive terms was reached, and regardless of the status of any written instrument
incorporating that agreement, the Respondent was not free to refuse to bargain even if then has
lawful grounds for believing that Local 376 had subsequently lost its majority status”) [footnote
omitted]; Utility Tree Service, 215 NLRB 806 (1974) (employer violated the Act by refusing to
sign and execute agreement where union accepted final offer after ratification and 2 days later
employer received cards from a majority of employees indicating they did not want union
representation: “we find that on March 9 the parties had consummated a valid contract to which
the Respondent was bound, and the Respondent was made aware of that fact on the same day.
Thus, subsequent actions by IBEW members or issues raised by the Respondent regarding its
good-faith doubt as to whether the IBEW thereafter represented a majority of employees in the
appropriate unit are irrelevant”), motion to reopen record denied, 218 NLRB 784 (1975) (later
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actions or issues “irrelevant and immaterial since on March 9, when the agreement was
consummated, Respondent had no basis for questioning the Union's majority”), enfd. 539 F.2d
718 (9th Cir. 1976); East Texas Steel Castings Co., 191 NLRB 113 fn. 4 (1971) (“Respondent's
alleged doubt of the Union's majority is immaterial since at the time agreement was
consummated, the Respondent, by its own assertion, had no basis for questioning the Union's
majority”).
The YWCA contends that the present case is beyond the reach of this seemingly
dispositive case law because the above-cited cases reference the irrelevance of post-
agreement “doubt” of majority support and not, as can be shown here, of an actual loss of
majority support by the union.
I think that argument misses the point of these cases. This is not a significant distinction
for purposes of understanding whether an employer can withdraw recognition based on a
union’s loss of majority support that occurs after a contract has been formed.14
Of course, the YWCA points to the Board’s statement in Auciello that “there is a
significant distinction between a case involving a claim of actual loss of majority support and
one involving a claim of good-faith doubt.” The Board in Auciello emphasized that it limited its
holding to instances involving an employer’s “good-faith” doubt of the union’s majority status.
Auciello Iron Works, 317 NLRB at 365 fn. 14. However, to apply this observation to the instant
case is truly to apply it out of context. As referenced, supra, Auciello involved a situation where
the good-faith doubt of the union’s majority support was based on events that occurred prior to
the union’s acceptance of the contract, albeit the employer did not assert its pre-contract doubt
until after the union accepted the contract offer. The Board in Auciello held (in a decision
enforced by the First Circuit and affirmed by the Supreme Court), that where an employer has a
good-faith doubt of the union’s majority support before the union accepts an outstanding

14The distinction is rooted in the standards the Board has required of employers to rebut the
presumption of majority support accorded to incumbent unions, and, therefore, to justify an
employer’s withdrawal of recognition. Until its decision in Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717
(2001), the Board had long held that an employer could rebut the presumption of majority
support, and lawfully withdraw recognition, by showing either that a union had actually lost the
support of a majority of the bargaining unit employees, or that based on objective
considerations, it had a “good-faith doubt” of the union’s continued majority status. In Levitz, the
Board held that, henceforth, an employer could not unilaterally withdraw recognition based on a
good-faith doubt of the union’s majority support, but could take that unilateral action “only where
the union has actually lost the support of the majority of the bargaining unit employees.” Levitz,
supra at 717. Of course, both before and after Levitz, meeting these standards rebutted the
presumption of majority support only during times when the presumption was rebuttable; these
standards did not justify withdrawal of recognition during times—such as “while a collective
bargaining agreement is in effect”—when the presumption was not subject to challenge. Levitz,
supra at 730 fn. 70 ( “[a]n employer may not lawfully withdraw recognition while a collective
bargaining agreement is in effect, because an incumbent union enjoys a conclusive
presumption of majority status during the life of the contract (up to 3 years)”).
In Levitz, the Board altered the means available to an employer to rebut a presumption of
majority support for a union during times that the presumption is rebuttable. It did not purport to
alter the circumstances in which that presumption was conclusive and not subject to rebuttal.
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contract offer, but fails to assert that good-faith doubt until just after acceptance of the contract
offer, the employer is precluded from withdrawing recognition during the term of the contract.
The Board in Auciello was clear that it was not deciding whether a showing that the
union suffered an actual loss of majority support prior to entering into the contract—even if
unasserted until after the contract was formed—similarly precluded the employer from refusing
to bargain with the union. As discussed, supra, the latter scenario raises the specter of 8(a)(2)
concerns that the contract was the product of an agreement between an employer and a
minority union not competent to enter into the contract, having actually lost majority support
prior to the formation of the contract.
That the distinction is a significant one in the context of precontract issues of majority
support (the case in Auciello) does not offer the slightest support for a claim that the distinction
is relevant for questions regarding a union’s loss of majority support (whether the loss is a
certainty or an uncertainty) that occurs only after contract formation, which is the situation
presented by the instant case. Here, where no evidence shows a loss of majority support for
the Union at the time the Union accepted the contract, none of the issues regarding the
competence of a minority union to accept a contract are mooted. After a union and an employer
enter into a binding contract, whether an employer subsequently develops a good-faith doubt of,
or can show an actual loss of, a union’s majority support is an irrelevancy, as a “conclusive
presumption [of a union’s majority support] arises at the moment a collective bargaining contract
offer has been accepted.” Auciello, supra 517 U.S. at 791. That this means, as the YWCA
stresses, that an employer will be executing a contract with a union that has (since entering into
the contract) become a minority union, is of no more consequence than the fact, accepted by
the YWCA, that where majority support erodes days (or the day) after signing of a contract the
employer must nonetheless deal with the union until the expiration of the labor agreement.
Whether or not the union actually has lost (or will lose) majority support since the contract came
into being matters not, because, “[a]s the Supreme Court in Fall River noted, the Board bases
its presumptions of majority status not on absolute certainty that the union’s majority status will
not erode following certification [or acceptance of a contract], but rather on carefully considered
policy choices intended to further the Act’s objectives.” Auciello, 317 NLRB at 367 (referencing
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987)).
Notably, although the YWCA is correct that the Board cases rejecting employer efforts
to withdraw recognition after acceptance of a contract talk in terms of “doubt” regarding loss of
majority support, the case that is most similar to the instant case—indeed its facts are
essentially indistinguishable—involves a showing of an actual loss of majority support. In Utility
Services, supra, the IBEW membership ratified the employer’s offer on March 9 and on that
date the union so advised the employer. According to the facts stipulated to by the parties, on
March 11 and 12 the employer received signed statements from a majority of its bargaining unit
employees stating that they no longer wished to be represented by the IBEW. On March 14, the
employer advised the IBEW that it would not sign the ratified agreement. The union filed
charges and the Board found “[c]ontrary to the contentions of the Respondent” that
on March 9 the parties had consummated a valid contract to which the
Respondent was bound, and the Respondent was made aware of that fact on the
same day. Thus, subsequent actions by IBEW members or issues raised by the
Respondent regarding its good-faith doubt as to whether the IBEW thereafter
represented a majority of employees in the appropriate unit are irrelevant.
Accordingly we find that on March 9 a final and binding collective-bargaining
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agreement was consummated between the Respondent and the IBEW, and that
the Respondent had been duly notified. At that point the Respondent had a legal
obligation to sign and execute the contract. The respondent’s alleged doubt of
the IBEW’s majority on March 12 was immaterial since on March 9 it had no
basis for questioning the IBEW’s majority. The refusal of the Respondent to
execute the contract, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.15
The YWCA would ascribe the outcome in this case to an employer that defended on the
wrong theory by neglecting to point out that the union had actually lost majority support. But
there is not the slightest basis for the suggestion that in this or any of the other cases that had
the employer framed its withdrawal of recognition as being based on the union’s actual loss of
majority support, and not on doubt as to union’s majority support, it would have made a
difference to the analysis or outcome. As in the instant case, the employer in Utility Services
was holding statements from a majority of bargaining unit employees declaring that they no
longer wanted union representation. But under the circumstances this evidence was
irrelevant—not because of the level of certainty on the employers’ part—but because the unions
and employer “had consummated a valid contract to which the Respondent was bound” and
[t]hus, subsequent actions by [union] members or issue raised by the Respondent” regarding
the union’s majority support “are irrelevant.” Whether based on “doubt” of or actual loss of
majority support, a unilateral withdrawal after formation of a valid contract violates the Act.16

4. The relationship of the Board’s
Appalachian Shale rule to this case
The YWCA's position draws heavily on its view of the proper relationship between an
employer’s ability to unilaterally withdraw recognition from an incumbent union and the Board’s
rules governing when a contract bars an election seeking to oust an incumbent union. The
discussion is incomplete without consideration of this aspect of Respondent’s argument.

15215 NLRB at 807.

16One can surmise that the reason so many cases speak of “good-faith doubt” and not
“actual loss” of majority support, is that because from 1951 when the Board issued Celanese
Corp. of America, 95 NLRB 664, to the issuance of Levitz, supra, in 2001, in circumstances
where the presumption of support was rebuttable both the “good-faith doubt” and “actual loss”
standards provided a basis for the same employer action: unilateral withdrawal of recognition
(see fn. 14, supra). Given that both standards entitled the employer to take the same action
employers did not need to assert the more demanding “actual loss” of majority standard as a
“good-faith doubt” was adequate to justify unilateral withdrawal of recognition. There is nothing
in Levitz to suggest that the Board’s jettisoning of one option for unilateral action prior to
reaching a valid contract (the “good-faith doubt” option) transformed the remaining option (a
showing that the union has actually lost majority support) into one that may be utilized after
reaching a valid oral contract.

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The Board’s contract bar doctrine is an administrative device adopted by the Board that
provides generally that an extant labor agreement bars the processing of an election petition.17
However, a longstanding exception to the Board’s contract bar doctrine provides that a labor
agreement between an employer and union that is yet to be reduced to writing and signed does
not bar the filing of an election petition seeking to displace an incumbent union. The bar is
imposed and the filing and processing of an election petition precluded only by a written and
signed contract. Appalachian Shale Products., Co. 121 NLRB 1160 (1958).18
The YWCA’s contention starts from the observation—undisputed by any party to this
litigation––that the parties’ agreement was not sufficient under Appalachian Shale to bar an
election petition. Thus, even after the Union’s oral acceptance of the YWCA’s offer, employees
or a rival union could have filed and the Board would have processed a petition seeking to oust

17In Direct Press Modern Litho, Inc., 328 NLRB 860, 860–861 (1999), the Board described
its contract bar doctrine in the following terms:
Thus, in general, the [contract bar] doctrine's dual rationale is to permit the employer,
the employees' chosen collective-bargaining representative, and the employees a
reasonable, uninterrupted period of collective-bargaining stability, while also
permitting the employees, at reasonable times, to change their bargaining
representative, if that is their desire. It is worth noting that the contract-bar doctrine is
not compelled by the Act or by judicial decision there under. It is an administrative
device early adopted by the Board in the exercise of its discretion as a means of
maintaining stability of collective bargaining relationships. The Board has discretion
to apply a contract bar or waive its application consistent with the facts of a given
case, guided overall by our interest in stability and fairness in collective-bargaining
agreements [citations omitted].

18Appalachian Shale Products is often cited as the lead case for this proposition, although
this exception to the Board’s contract bar doctrine dates back to the 1940s. While oral contracts
have always been binding on the parties to them (see fn. 7, supra), the Board has long
“decline[d] to treat oral agreements as a sufficient basis for denying or postponing the statutory
right of employees to change or discharge their bargaining representatives.” Teamsters Local
294 (Conway’s Express), 87 NLRB 972 (1949), enfd. 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952); Eicor, Inc.,
46 NLRB 1035, 1937 (1943) (“a collective-bargaining agreement which has not been reduced to
writing and signed does not constitute a bar to a determination of representatives”). This
included contracts that were not yet signed before the filing of an election petition although for a
time the Board’s rule was that contracts signed after the filing of an election petition constituted
a bar where the agreement and acceptance were in written form, the parties considered the
agreement concluded and put into immediate effect certain important provisions, and the
agreement was signed within a reasonable time after agreement had been reached. Oswego
Falls, Corp., 110 NLRB 621 (1954). This wrinkle was eliminated when the Board overruled
Oswego Falls in Appalachian Shale Products and accepted the bright line rule that “a contract to
constitute a bar must be signed by all the parties before a petition is filed and that unless a
contract signed by all the parties precedes a petition, it will not bar a petition even though the
parties consider it properly concluded and put into effect some or all of its provisions.” 121
NLRB at 1162. The holding of Appalachian Shale has prevailed since 1958. Thus, parties that
conclude an agreement that is still to be written and signed run the risk that a decertification or
rival representation petition will be filed and processed.

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the incumbent union.19 Respondent argues that to treat employer withdrawals of recognition
and election petitions differently is without justification. In other words, if one method (election
petitions) of expressing employee lack of support for an incumbent union is available, all others
(specifically, employer withdrawal of recognition based on a loss of employee support for the
union) must be as well. According to the YWCA, “[p]olicy, precedent and logic compel the
conclusion” that “just as the loss of majority support after verbal acceptance of contract
provisions does not preclude a decertification petition, the fact that the loss of support comes
after contract acceptance does not preclude a majority of employees from asking its employer to
withdraw recognition based on an actual loss of support.” (R. Br. at 17, 19) (original emphasis).
I do not agree. While the Board’s doctrine of an irrebuttable presumption of majority
support during the contract term is based on the Board’s contract bar doctrine––which unlike the
presumption of majority support principle was developed in the representation context––it is not
the same doctrine. Certainly, both doctrines are motivated by the same policy, often overlap
and result in the same outcome, and at times are both aptly described as “contract bar” rules,
but they are, in fact, not identical doctrines and do not need to be—and are not—identically
applied. The significant overlap has, at times, led the Board and some courts to describe the
doctrines interchangeably, but there are differences.20

19It is clear that pursuant to the Appalachian Shale rule, employees and rival unions may file
an election petition notwithstanding an employer and incumbent union’s oral contract. Whether
an employer party to an oral contract may file an election petition (an RM petition) is not
presented by this litigation and I do not reach that issue. I note that the General Counsel’s
published position is that such a petition is barred. NLRB Outline of Law and Procedure in
Representation Cases, Chapter 7-220, RM Petitions/Incumbent Unions (July 2005) (available
on the Agency’s website at www.nlrb.gov) (“Once an incumbent union has accepted a contract
offer, the employer cannot challenge its majority status by filing an RM petition even though a
RD or rival RC petition could be filed assuming acceptance would not otherwise be precluded
by the Board’s contract bar standards“). Notably, the Board has refused to interpret its contract
bar rules to allow contracting parties “to avoid their contractual obligations and commitments
through the device of a petition to the Board for an election.” Montgomery Ward & Co., 137
NLRB 346, 348–349 (1962) (holding that 5-year agreement barred employer's RM petition, even
though agreement’s term exceeded 3-year maximum permitted by the Board's contract bar
doctrine and therefore employees and outside unions were not barred from filing a petition).

20In Auciello, supra at 367 fn. 26, the Board emphasized the analytical distinction:
The First Circuit in remanding the present cases stated that the Board’s decisions regarding
the availability of the good-faith doubt defense after the parties have reached a binding
agreement are based on the contract bar rule. Under that rule, a contract meeting certain
requirements is valid and will bar an election. See generally Hexton Furniture Co., 111
NLRB 342 (1955). Although the Board has on occasion framed its discussion of a union’s
continuing majority support during the term of a contract in terms of the contract bar rules
(see, e.g., Westwood Import Co., 251 NLRB 1213, 1213–1214 (1980), enfd. 681 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1982)), we emphasize that the precise rule of law applicable here is the irrebuttable
presumption that a union retains majority status during the contract term. We note,
however, that the same policy underlies both the presumptions of majority status and the
contract bar rules: achieving a reasonable balance between industrial stability and employee
freedom of choice.
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For instance, a well-settled exception to the contract bar doctrine is the “open period” in
the 60-90 days prior to contract expiration during which election petitions can be filed and
processed notwithstanding the extant contract. Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 NLRB
1000 (1962). However, it is equally well-settled that there is no similar open period for an
employer seeking to withdraw recognition from a union that has lost majority support during the
term of the contract. The employer violates Section 8(a)(5) if it withdraws recognition prior to
contract expiration no matter the extent or certainty of the loss of support for the Union. Burger
Pits, Inc., 273 NLRB 1001, 1002 (1984) (“while the contract was in effect the Respondent was
not privileged to withdraw recognition from the Union or unilaterally to implement contractual
changes”), enfd. 785 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, while the contract bar doctrine permits the
filing of election petitions 60-90 days before contract expiration, during this period the employer
is “barred” from withdrawing recognition by the conclusive presumption of majority support.
But the most pertinent example is that at issue here: not only is it clear that an
employer’s ability to engage in unilateral withdrawal of recognition has long been “barred” by
“the conclusive presumption [of a union’s majority support] arising at the moment a collective
bargaining contract offer has been accepted” (Auciello, 517 U.S. at 791 and cases cited at 13-
14, supra), but some of the very cases demonstrating this proposition also involve the filing of
an election petition because the new agreement had not been reduced to writing and signed.
For example, in North Bros., supra, the Board’s holding that questioning of the
presumption of majority was precluded “[o]nce final agreement on the substantive terms was
reached, and regardless of the status of any written instrument incorporating that agreement,”
included express rejection of the employer’s contention “that the filing of the decertification
petition [after the parties reached oral agreement] . . . barred it from executing any contract or
bargaining with Local 376 while the petition was outstanding.” 220 NLRB at 1022 [footnote
omitted]. Even more pointedly, in Flying Dutchman Park, 329 NLRB at 417, the Board held that
[w]hen an employer asserts a good-faith doubt about an incumbent union’s
continued majority status based on events—including the filing of a
decertification petition—occurring after final agreement on the substantive terms
of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer may not lawfully refuse to
bargain. This is true regardless of the status of any written instrument
incorporating such agreement.
Thus, the ability to file an election petition at the same time that an oral agreement bars
unilateral employer withdrawal of recognition has not gone unnoticed by the Board. The case
law demonstrates that from the moment an employer and a union reach agreement on terms
and conditions of employment the employer is barred from rebutting the presumption of majority
support, notwithstanding that an election petition may still be filed until the agreement is reduced
to writing and signed. Indeed, even the actual filing of an election petition has no impact on the
employer’s inability to withdraw recognition based on doubts of a union’s majority support
developing after the union has accepted a contract offer. Precedent does not support the
YWCA’s position.
Moreover, the interaction of these different “contract bar” rules is consonant with Board
policy. As the Board explained in Auciello, “with respect to employers [ ] permissible methods
of self-help to select and reject bargaining agents—in this case assertion of a good-faith doubt
and attempted withdrawal of recognition—must be carefully circumscribed to prevent stable
labor relations from being undermined by total employer control.” 317 NLRB at 374 [Board’s
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emphasis]. While “[t]he Board and the courts have consistently said that Board elections are
the preferred method of testing employees’ support for unions” (Levitz Furniture Co., supra, 333
NLRB at 727), unilateral employer severance of a bargaining obligation is disfavored. Indeed, in
Levitz, the Board took the step of requiring a lower evidentiary burden for an employer to file an
RM petition than for an employer to withdraw recognition of a union, precisely because “we think
that processing RM petitions on a lower showing of good-faith uncertainty will provide a more
attractive alternative to unilateral action” (333 NLRB at 727) and will “reduc[e] the temptation to
act unilaterally.” Id. at 725.
Thus, Board policy disfavors employer unilateral withdrawal of recognition even
compared to employer election petitions. Compared to employee election petitions, Board
policy is equally, if not more, willing to circumscribe unilateral employer action. “It is well to bear
in mind, after all, that it is the employees’ Section 7 right to choose their bargaining
representatives that is at issue here. Strictly speaking, employers’ only statutory interest is in
ensuring that they do not violate Section 8(a)(2) by recognizing minority unions.” Levitz, 333
NLRB at 728 [Board’s emphasis]. In the instant case, as discussed supra, there is no possibility
that the YWCA violated 8(a)(2) by entering into agreement with the Union, which by all evidence
maintained majority support at the time of contract formation. Thus, the only statutory interest
implicated by YWCA’s right to unilaterally withdraw recognition after forming an oral contract is
the employees’ right of free choice. It is well-settled that “[e]mployers’ invocation of employee
free choice as a rationale for withdrawing recognition has, with good reason met with
skepticism.” Levitz, 333 NLRB at 724 fn. 45.21 Or as the Seventh Circuit has put it: “the
company is not its workers’ good uncle.” Chicago Tribune, supra, 965 F.2d at 249. Less
colorfully, the Supreme Court in Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) explained the policy
rationale for this skepticism:
The underlying purpose of this statute is industrial peace. To allow employers to
rely on employees’ rights in refusing to bargain with the formally designated
union is not conducive to that end, it is inimical to it. Congress has devised a
formal mode for selection and rejection of bargaining agents and has fixed the
spacing of elections, with a view of furthering industrial stability and with due
regard to administrative prudence.
The Court’s admonition in Brooks is all the more compelling here. In Brooks, the loss of
majority support occurred one week after a representation election. By statute, employees
would have to wait 51 more weeks in order to utilize the Board’s election procedures and act on
their desire to decertify the union. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (“No election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held"). By contrast, here, there was no bar to an immediate election
had the employees sought one at the time that the YWCA withdrew recognition. Thus, in this
case the YWCA’s effort to vindicate employee rights was not only, as stated in Brooks, “inimical”

21In Levitz, 333 NLRB at 724 fn. 45, the Board went on to cite the Supreme Court:
As the Supreme Court observed in Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, “The Board is
accordingly entitled to suspicion when faced with an employer’s benevolence as its
workers’ champion against their certified union, which is subject to a decertification
petition from the workers if they want to file one. There is nothing unreasonable in giving
a short leash to the employer as vindicator of its employees’ organizational freedom”
[citations omitted].
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to the Act’s underlying purpose of industrial peace, but also unnecessary for immediate
vindication of the Act’s goal of allowing the exercise of employee free choice.
Rules that preclude an employer from unilaterally severing the bargaining relationship
after entering into an oral agreement, while still permitting employees to act through a Board
election to exercise free choice, are obviously consistent with the Board’s disfavoring of
employer withdrawal of recognition, ostensibly exercised on behalf of employees.
Notably, the Board’s policy disfavoring unilateral withdrawal of recognition also accounts
for the fact that under Board precedent there is (in most circumstances) no opportunity for an
employer to rebut the union’s presumption of majority support at a time that election petitions
are subject to the contract bar. The Board has reasoned that
“for the period during which the contract was a bar and no question concerning
representation might validly be raised, the Respondent was under an obligation
to recognize and bargain with the Union.” Otherwise, we should have the
anomalous result of an employer being permitted unilaterally to redetermine his
employees' bargaining representative at a time when the Board would refuse to
make such redetermination because the time is inappropriate for such action.
Accordingly, by withdrawing recognition from the Union during the middle of the
contract term, the Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union.
Hexton Furniture Co.,111 NLRB 342, 344 (1955) (quoting, Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB
1102, 1103 (1950), enfd. 195 F.2d. 250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S. 863 (1952)).
This obviously accords with the Board’s stated disfavor for the more disruptive unilateral
action of employer withdrawal of recognition. It also explains why some cases Respondent
cites rely upon the fact that a decertification petition would be barred by a contract as proof that
an employer cannot unilaterally withdraw recognition. Thus, in NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc.,
671 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1982), cited by Respondent, the Court explained that

since an employer may not petition for decertification during this contract-bar
period, it follows that he may not repudiate the contract or withdraw recognition
from and refuse to bargain with the Union during the term of the collective
bargaining agreement. A contrary rule would permit an employer to do on its
own what would have been forbidden had it petitioned the Board, i.e. question
the majority status of the Union. Thus, during the period a valid collective
bargaining agreement is in effect, the Union, absent unusual circumstances not
present here, enjoys a conclusive presumption of majority status. [citations
omitted].
See also, Pioneer Inn Associates v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 838-839 (9th Cir. 1978) (“although the
Company does not seek a decertification election, it seeks the same result by professing a
doubt of majority status and refusing to adhere to the contract terms. The Board correctly
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contends that while the [contract bar] rule applies, the employer must adhere to the terms of the
contract”). 22
Thus, the significant overlap between the doctrines is not without reason, but does not
advance Respondent’s case here. For reasons rooted in Board policy—i.e., denying employers
the opportunity to unilaterally oust an incumbent union at a time that an election petition is
barred—the existence of an election petition contract bar demonstrates (absent unusual
circumstances), a priori, that a unilateral employer withdrawal of recognition is also prohibited.
However, it does not follow, as Respondent asserts, that that whenever an election petition may
be filed an employer is also free to unilaterally withdraw recognition.
The contract bar doctrine and irrebuttable presumption of majority support do overlap,
and both often operate as contract bars, but they are not identically applied. An exception to the
contract bar doctrine permitting election petitions at a time that the irrebuttable presumption of
majority support bars unilateral withdrawal of recognition is consistent with Board policy 23
Finally, the Board’s rationale for not applying a contract bar to oral agreements does not
apply to unilateral employer withdrawal of recognition after entering into an oral agreement.
In 1949, in Teamsters Local 294 (Conway’s Express), 87 NLRB 972, 975 (1949), the
Board rejected the General Counsel’s contention that oral agreements were not binding on the

22Similarly, in Plymouth Court, 341 NLRB 363 (2004), a case which Respondent cites, the
administrative law judge not only found that “[a] valid contract came into existence as soon as
the tentative contract was executed by the parties and ratified by the Union on December 27,
2002,” but also found that this agreement was formalized and signed sufficient to meet the
Appalachian Shale contract bar requirements prior to the employer’s unilateral withdrawal of
recognition in March 2003. The latter finding effectively rules out the employer’s withdrawal but
does not prove that, had the Appalachian Shale requirements not been met, that the employer
could have withdrawn recognition.
Although I do not believe that the judge’s analysis in Plymouth Court helps Respondent’s
case, I note that, in any event, the judge’s analysis on these points was not the subject of
exceptions. 341 NLRB 363 at fn. 1. It is well settled that the Board's adoption of a portion of a
judge's decision to which no exceptions are filed is not precedent for any other case. ESI, Inc.,
296 NLRB 1319 fn. 3 (1989); Anniston Yarn Mills, 103 NLRB 1495 (1953).
23It is not only the Appalachian Shale doctrine that can be relied upon to remove an
incumbent union (or test its support) during a period that there is a conclusive presumption of
majority support. In certain circumstances other Board doctrines can trump the conclusive
presumption of majority support and allow the employer to withdraw recognition even during the
term of a contract. See Nott Co., 345 NLRB No. 23 (2005) (applying accretion analysis to
permit midterm withdrawal of recognition where purchase of business resulted in addition of
large group of unrepresented employees into unit). This goes to show that given the range of
Board doctrines in play at any given time, the conclusive presumption of majority support is not
a guarantee in every circumstance that an incumbent union cannot be challenged during the
term of the agreement. By the same token, the fact that election petitions can be filed and
processed during the term of an (unsigned and/or unwritten) agreement does not show that the
irrebuttable presumption of majority support doctrine is not otherwise in effect.
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parties, calling it “beside the point that, in representation cases, we decline to treat oral
agreements as a sufficient basis for denying or postponing the statutory right of employees to
change or discharge their bargaining representatives.” The Board explained:

The principal basis of the Board’s rule that an unwritten or unsigned agreement
may not operate to bar a petition under Section 9(c) of the Act is that such
agreement do not adequately stabilize industrial relations, and therefore do not
satisfy the statutory policy which underlies the contract-bar rule itself.
In addition, the rule [ ] operates as a safeguard against false proof in a
situation where the two parties to the alleged contract are likely to have a strong
mutual interest in defeating the petition, and hence be tempted to offer collusive
evidence of the existence of an oral agreement between themselves. In the
present case, however, there is no such danger of collusive evidence as to the
existence of the agreement, for the interests of the contracting parties are
opposed.
These two rationales for the not applying the contract bar doctrine are not applicable in
the context of an employer that has recently agreed on terms and conditions with a union and
then seeks to withdraw recognition. The stabilization of industrial relations provided by written
and signed agreements is encouraged by a rule that leaves oral agreements at risk to a
decertification or rival union’s election petition. This encourages parties to write and sign their
oral agreements so as to activate a contract bar and thereby protect their agreement from an
election petition. But protecting the right of one of the parties to the agreement—i.e., the
employer’s right to withdraw from an agreement it has just made does not encourage, and in
cases will discourage, the transition from oral to written agreements. There is no allegation or
evidence that the YWCA delayed the process of writing and signing the agreement but a rule
that permits an employer to unilaterally withdraw from an agreement until it is signed obviously
can encourage such delay. That is the opposite of the Board’s intent in adopting the oral
contract exception to the contract bar rule.
The second rationale set forth in Teamsters Local 294, for not applying the contract bar
doctrine to oral agreements is particularly inapplicable to employers who are parties to an oral
agreement. The evidentiary clarity provided by written and signed contract enables employees
and rival unions to know without doubt when a contract bar is, in fact, in place. To bar election
petitions based on an oral contract—the details and even existence of which may only be known
to the employer and union entering into it—would provide great incentive for “collusive
evidence” on the part an employer and union that wished to maintain the contract against a non-
supportive majority of employees or rival unions. However, as the Board also pointed out in
Teamsters, this risk is not an issue when the interests of the contracting parties are opposed.
That is the case when the contracting employer seeks to void the agreement and withdraw
recognition from the incumbent/contracting union.
In sum, there is precedent, as well as policy and logic behind a doctrine that precludes
an employer from withdrawing recognition from a union that loses majority support after entering
into an agreement with the employer. That employees retain the ability to reject the union until
that agreement is signed and written has been a part of Board procedure for many years. That
an employer that has just reached an agreement with a union is more limited—than employees–
–in its ability to vindicate employee rights represents an appropriate balancing of the goals of
employee free choice and bargaining stability.
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V. Conclusions of Law

1. Respondent Young Woman’s Christian Association of Western Massachusetts is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

2. Charging Party International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural
Workers of America, Local 2322, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. Charging Party, at all times since October 27, 2003, has been the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative, based on Section 9(a) of the Act, of an
appropriate unit for such purposes as defined by Section 9(b) of the Act, of
Respondent’s employees, composed of:

All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by
Respondent at its facilities located in Hampden and Hampshire
counties including direct service advocates, service
coordinators/case managers, hotline counselors, community
educators, father's and youth outreach workers, program cook,
housing advocates, construction managers, construction trainer,
coordinator of operations, and youth development, education
coordinator, teacher, counselor/case manager, rape crisis
counselor, program coordinator, site coordinators, staff
associates, safeplan advocates, mentor coordinators,
counselor/volunteer coordinator, and youth development program
coordinator, but excluding all office clerical employees, managerial
employees, professional employees, confidential employees,
casual employees, all relief staff, building maintenance,
custodians, guards, site/program directors, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.

4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing and refusing since
May 19, 2005, to reduce to writing and sign the collective-bargaining agreement
reached with the Union and ratified by the employees on April 20, 2005.

5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by withdrawing recognition
from the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
bargaining unit described above in paragraph 3, on May 19, 2005, and failing and
refusing to recognize the Union at all times thereafter:

6. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

VI. Remedy

Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it
must be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent YWCA must forthwith reduce to writing and sign
the agreement reached with the Union and ratified by employees on April 20, giving effect to its
terms retroactive to April 20, 2005.
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Respondent YWCA shall recognize, and upon request of the Union, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employees.

Respondent YWCA shall make whole its employees for losses, if any, which they may
have suffered as a result of Respondent's failure to sign and honor the collective-bargaining
agreement in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444
F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971). This includes making whole their employees by making all unpaid
fringe benefit fund contribution payments (if any) to the extent provided for by the collective
bargaining agreement and by reimbursing employees for any expenses ensuing from the
Respondents’ failure to make such contribution payments, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing &
Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). Respondent
shall reimburse the Union, with interest, for lost dues that would have been remitted to the
Union but for Respondent’s failure and refusal to honor the collective-bargaining agreement
reached with the Union, such sums calculated in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection
Service, supra. Interest on all sums shall be computed as prescribed in accordance with New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).

Respondent shall post an appropriate informational notice, as described in Appendix A,
attached. This notice shall be posted in Respondent’s facility or wherever notices to employees
are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or defacing its contents. When
the notice is issued to Respondent, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 1 what action it will
take with respect to this decision.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended24

ORDER

The Respondent, YWCA of Western Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from:

a. failing and refusing to reduce to writing and sign the collective-bargaining
agreement reached with the Union and ratified by employees on April 20, 2005;
and

b. failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the following bargaining unit of its employees:

All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by
Respondent at its facilities located in Hampden and Hampshire

24If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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counties including direct service advocates, service
coordinators/case managers, hotline counselors, community
educators, father's and youth outreach workers, program cook,
housing advocates, construction managers, construction trainer,
coordinator of operations, and youth development, education
coordinator, teacher, counselor/case manager, rape crisis
counselor, program coordinator, site coordinators, staff
associates, safeplan advocates, mentor coordinators,
counselor/volunteer coordinator, and youth development program
coordinator, but excluding all office clerical employees, managerial
employees, professional employees, confidential employees,
casual employees, all relief staff, building maintenance,
custodians, guards, site/program directors, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.

c. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Act:

a. Reduce to writing and sign the collective-bargaining agreement reached with the
Union and ratified by the employees on April 20, 2005, giving effect to its terms
retroactive to April 20, 2005.

b. Recognize and, upon the Union’s request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employees described
above.

c. Make all affected employees whole, with interest, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this Decision and Order, for any loss of earnings or benefits
resulting from the failure to sign and honor the collective-bargaining agreement
reached with the Union and ratified by the employees on April 20, 2005.

d. Reimburse the Union, with interest, for any dues it was required to withhold and
transmit under the collective-bargaining agreement, in a manner described in the
remedy section of this Decision and Order.

e. Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available to the Board or its agents
for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. Bryant & Stratton Business
Institute, 327 NLRB 1135 (1994).

f. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Hampden and
Hampshire counties, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, copies of the attached
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notice marked Appendix.”25 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 1, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.

g. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director of Region
1 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply with the provisions of
this Order.

Dated, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2006

____________________
David I. Goldman
Administrative Law Judge

25If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to reduce to writing and sign the collective-bargaining agreement
reached with the Union and ratified by you on April 20, 2005.

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative
for the following bargaining unit of its employees:

All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by Respondent at its
facilities located in Hampden and Hampshire counties including direct service
advocates, service coordinators/case managers, hotline counselors, community
educators, father's and youth outreach workers, program cook, housing
advocates, construction managers, construction trainer, coordinator of
operations, and youth development, education coordinator, teacher,
counselor/case manager, rape crisis counselor, program coordinator, site
coordinators, staff associates, safeplan advocates, mentor coordinators,
counselor/volunteer coordinator, and youth development program coordinator,
but excluding all office clerical employees, managerial employees, professional
employees, confidential employees, casual employees, all relief staff, building
maintenance, custodians, guards, site/program directors, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL reduce to writing and sign the collective-bargaining agreement reached with the Union
and ratified by you on April 20, 2005, giving effect to its terms retroactive to April 20, 2005.

WE WILL, upon the Union’s request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employees described above.

WE WILL, make all affected employees whole, with interest for any loss of earnings or benefits
resulting from our failure to sign and honor the collective-bargaining agreement reached with the
Union and ratified by you on April 20, 2005.

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WE WILL, reimburse the Union, with interest, for any dues we were required to withhold and
transmit under the collective-bargaining agreement.

YOUNG WOMEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS
(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
10 Causeway Street, Boston Federal Building, 6th Floor, Room 601
Boston, Massachusetts 02222–1072
Hours of Operation: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
617-565-6700.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 617-565-6701.

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