Yulun Wang et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 21, 2021

2020006191 (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/345,161 12/29/2008 Yulun Wang P001CDCC2 7352
98471 7590 05/21/2021
Teladoc Health
C/O CPA Global Part of Clarivate
30200 Telegraph Road Suite 300
Bingham Farms, MI 48025
EXAMINER
AMIN, BHAVESH V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3666
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/21/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
clambrecht@teladochealth.com
docketing@cpaglobal.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte YULUN WANG, KEITH PHILLIP LABY,
CHARLES S. JORDAN, STEVEN EDWARD BUTNER, and
JONATHAN SOUTHARD
____________

Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, BRANDON J. WARNER, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.

GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the rejection
of claims 86, 87, 91–95, and 97–100. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies InTouch Technologies, Inc. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
2
THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to “robotics used in the medical field.”
Spec. 1:3–4. Claims 86 and 94 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim
86, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A robotic system, comprising:
a robot at a first location, the robot includes a camera, a
monitor, and a receiver that receives control commands via a
network, said robot can be controlled by a plurality of users
having a plurality of different user types; and,
a control station at a second location, remote from said
first location, the control station includes a transmitter for
transmitting said control commands via the network to said robot
responsive to input of a user, wherein said robot system provides,
via the control station, debug access to said robot to a first user
of said plurality of users based on the user type of said first user
and denies debug access to said robot to a second user of said
plurality of users based on the user type of said second user, and
wherein the robot system permits both the first type of user and
the second type of user to control said robot.
THE REJECTIONS2
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the
rejections:
NAME REFERENCE DATE
Kuno US 5,802,494 Sept. 1, 1998
Kasuga US 2002/0038168 A1 Mar. 28, 2002
Edwards US 6,650,748 B1 Nov. 18, 2003
Mitchell US 6,684,188 B1 Jan. 27, 2004
Ghodoussi US 6,951,535 B2 Oct. 4, 2005

2 “The rejections for claims 88–90 and 96 have been withdrawn and the
claims now stand as being objected to as being an allowable dependent
claim under a rejected independent claim.” Ans. 3.
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
3
The following rejections are before us for review:
I. Claims 86, 91–94, 99, and 100 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kuno, Mitchell, and
Kasuga.
II. Claims 87, 95, and 97 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Kuno, Mitchell, Kasuga,
and Ghodoussi.
III. Claim 98 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kuno, Mitchell, Kasuga, and Edwards.

OPINION
Rejection I
Appellants argue claims 86, 91–94, 99, and 100 as a group. Appeal
Br. 6–11. We select claim 86 as representative and claims 91–94, 99, and
100 stand or fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding independent claim 86, the Examiner finds that Kuno
discloses a patient monitoring system including a robot at a first location
(i.e., a sickroom) having a camera, a monitor, and a receiver that receives
control commands, and also a control station at a second location (i.e., a
monitor room) having a transmitter for transmitting the control commands to
the robot, as claimed. Final Act. 4–5 (citing, e.g., Kuno 3:33–39, 5:10–25,
Figs. 2b, 3–5). The Examiner further relies on Kuno for disclosing that a
doctor (second user) is a user that controls the robot via the control station.
Id. at 5 (citing Kuno 22:55–67).
The Examiner determines that Kuno fails to disclose that the robot can
be controlled by a plurality of users having a plurality of different user types,
as required by claim 86. Final Act. 5. The Examiner relies on Mitchell for
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
4
disclosing a computer implemented system that labels users based on their
job description (i.e., technician, nurse, doctor) and further, that Mitchell
describes that “[the] system restricts a beginner user from accessing all the
features of the system . . . by the use of a password system and a
classification of the users privileges based on their skills.” Id. (citing
Mitchell 39:45–65, 41:34–37); see also Ans. 6 (“Mitchell . . . discloses their
system having user levels/user privileges based on the title of the user for
example they may be labeled technician, nurse, or Doctor.”) (citing Mitchell
41:35–47). The Examiner reasons that
it would have been obvious . . . to modify Kuno by the teaching
of Mitchell . . . [by] applying the known technique of data access
based on users privileges to prevent unauthorized access to
sensitive medical files by someone who is not permitted to see
them as taught by Mitchell and applying it to Kuno whom is
silent to this feature and would be improved by using this feature
to control who as access to sensitive patient information based
on their privileges.
Id. at 6.
First, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reasoning for modifying
Kuno, in view of Mitchell, namely, to control who has access to sensitive
patient information, lacks a rational basis because Mitchell does not teach
preventing unauthorized access to sensitive medical files based on user type.
Appeal Br. 6–7; see also Reply Br. 4–5. In particular, Appellant submits
that “Mitchell neither teaches nor suggests varying the level of access (or
‘privileges’) of a particular user to ‘sensitive medical information’ based on
user level,” but rather, “[Mitchell’s] user either has a valid login and can
access sensitive medical information using the CaD or the user does not
have a valid login and cannot use the CaD at all.” Appeal Br. 7 (citing
Mitchell 36:9–13). Appellant further submits that “[t]he ‘privileges’ that
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
5
depend on user level discussed in Mitchell include ‘to skip over questions
that have a defaulted or inferred answer’ and ‘to skip ahead to enter the
diagnosis,’” in the context of generating a medical record. Id. (citing
Mitchell 39:47–64).
The Examiner clarifies in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection
does not rely on Mitchell for disclosing varying the level of access based on
user type to limit access to sensitive medical information, but rather, for
teaching, more generally, that “it is well known and understood in the art to
allow access/control of certain feature[s] of software based on the users
privileges.” Ans. 4. In other words, the Examiner relies on Mitchell for
teaching that a computer implemented system’s access to software features
(i.e., in Mitchell, certain interview questions presented by the execution
module) is controlled based on user type (i.e., “the title of the user, e.g.,
Doctor vs a nurse”). The Examiner also clarifies that the Examiner’s
reasoning is to modify Kuno’s patient monitoring system, which involves
doctors and nurses, in view of Mitchell’s general teaching to restrict access
to software functionality based on user type, for the purpose of protecting
Kuno’s patient’s sensitive medical information from being viewed by certain
user types. Id. at 7. To the extent the Examiner altered the Examiner’s
findings relative to Mitchell in the Examiner’s Answer, we note that
Appellant did not file a petition and, therefore, waived any argument that the
Examiner’s Answer includes new grounds of rejection. See 37 C.F.R.
§41.40; accord MPEP § 1207.03; cf. Reply Br. 4 (referring to the
Examiner’s Answer, “the Examiner attempts to recast the statement of the
rejection as ‘merely [using] the prior art of Mitchell to show that it is well
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
6
known and understood in the art to allow access/control of certain features
of software based on the user privileges’”).
In reply, Appellant argues that Mitchell does not disclose that
different user levels or types have access to “different parts of the software,”
as relied on by the Examiner, but rather, that “different user levels may have
differing privileges, e.g., the ability to overwrite data and/or skip fields when
filling out a form.” Reply Br. 7 (emphasis added) (citing Mitchell 39:47–
64); id. at 8 (“the privileges discussed in Mitchell concern the ability to
overwrite data or skip fields in a form, not access ‘different software
parts’”).
Mitchell discloses that
[t]hree classes of users are defined in the preferred embodiment.
These can be simply described as beginner(interview),
intermediate and expert or advanced. . . . In a medical setting
they might be labeled technician, nurse, and doctor. The user
level has implications in terms of various privileges granted in
the running of the [Computer-assisted Document or] CaD
program.
Mitchell 41:37–43 (emphasis added). Mitchell also discloses that “[a]
beginning user would be restricted from using the expert mode,” and that
“[t]his is accomplished by the user of a password system and a classification
of user privileges.” Mitchell 39:62–64 (emphasis added). Thus, Mitchell
teaches that, in the context of a preferred embodiment, the “beginner” class
of user corresponds to a “technician” user level, the “intermediate” class of
user corresponds to a “nurse” user level, and the “expert” class of user
corresponds to the “doctor” user level, and further, that these user levels
have implications relative to different privileges for running the CaD
software program, for example, for allowing or denying access to modes of
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
7
operation within the software program (i.e., an expert mode). As set forth
supra, the Examiner correctly finds that Mitchell’s user levels correspond to
the claimed plurality of different user types.
Appellant’s argument does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s
(modified) reliance on Mitchell for disclosing limiting access to software
functionality based on user type generally—without specific reference to
limiting access for the purpose of protecting sensitive medical information
within the software application. Additionally, a preponderance of the
evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that Mitchell discloses granting or
denying access to certain privileges of the CaD software program based on
user types (i.e., technician, nurse, doctor). Further, Appellant does not
adequately explain why “giv[ing] [an] expert or more experienced users
greater freedom when filling out forms than less experienced users” would
fail to disclose granting or denying access to Mitchell’s software
functionality. Reply Br. 9 (citing Mitchell 39:47–64). To the extent
Mitchell discloses allowing or denying access to software functionality
within a control program, and not to a control program within the software,
as apparently argued by Appellant supra, the Examiner relies on Kasuga for
disclosing an authoring tool for performing debugging of the robot-action-
control program, as discussed infra.3

3 Notably, claim 86 requires restricting or allowing “debug access to said
robot,” which implies that a user has some access to the claimed robotic
system sufficient to remove errors from the system’s hardware or software.
Appellant does not explain how Mitchell’s allowing or restricting access to
modes within a software program is not applicable to or instructive for
allowing or restricting access to an authoring tool for debugging a software
program, in view of the Examiner’s proposed modification to Kuno’s patient
monitoring system to include Kasuga’s authoring tool for the purpose of
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
8
Further, the Examiner’s rationale (i.e., to protect a patient’s sensitive
medical information) need not be expressly stated in Mitchell. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has rejected the rigid requirement that the rationale for the
proposed combination necessarily come from within the references. See
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (rejecting the rigid
requirement of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known
elements to show obviousness). Here, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
argument that the Examiner’s reasoning lacks rational underpinning.
Notably, by ensuring monitoring only when necessary and, preferably,
subject to patient permission, Kuno’s improved patient monitoring system
specifically suggests guarding against unnecessarily invading a patient’s
privacy. Id. 1:48–53.
Second, Appellant argues that
even if there is a rationale for combining the teachings of Kuno
and Mitchell, the “obvious” combination would seem to be the
robot system of Kuno modified such that the computer-assisted
documentation system of Mitchell is available to the physician to
document patient encounters from the monitoring station—not
different degrees of access to the features of the robot based on
user type, as the claims require.
Appeal Br. 8. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, however,
because the argument does not address the rejection as articulated by the
Examiner, but seems to imply a bodily incorporation of Mitchell’s CaD into
Kuno’s patient monitoring system. See also Ans. 8 (“[t]he prior art was not
relied upon for what [Appellant] argue[s]”). “The test for obviousness is not
whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated

debugging a robot’s software program. See, e.g., Final Act. 6; Ans. 8–10; cf.
Spec. 22 (“By way of example, a packet may include . . . a debug field.”).
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
9
into the structure of the primary reference . . . .” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981); In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The Examiner also determines that neither Kuno nor Mitchell
discloses providing debug access to the robot, as required by claim 86, and
the Examiner relies on Kasuga for disclosing, inter alia, a system “for
debugging/editing computer software.” Final Act. 6 (citing, e.g., Kasuga
¶ 96). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to a skilled
artisan to modify Kuno’s patient monitoring system, as modified by
Mitchell, to use the “well-known technique (e.g., debugging),” . . . “to
improve operation and prevent extended down time.” Final Act. 6–7.
Appellant argues that “while Kasuga may disclose a debugger that can
be used to debug action scripts for a toy robot, Kasuga does not restrict
access to the debugger,” as required by claim 86. Appeal Br. 8 (citing
Kasuga ¶¶ 14, 71, 121). In other words, Appellant submits that “Kasuga
does not disclose to grant or deny access to a debugger in any way, let alone
granting or denying debug access to a robot based on the user’s user type
from a remote station, as required by the claims.” Id; see also Reply Br. 9
(“this notion of controlling access to a debugger—which Kasuga does not
disclose—is central to the Examiner’s rationale for combining the
references”).
The Examiner clarifies in the Examiner’s Answer that, in Kasuga,
access to the authoring (and thus, debugging) system is restricted relative to
users by password controls. Ans. 11 (citing Kasuga ¶ 97). The Examiner
also clarifies that Kasuga is not relied upon for teaching access control based
on user type, but rather, Mitchell is relied on for “granting and denying of
access to [a] certain user based on their user profile.” Id. at 9. The
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
10
Examiner responds that Appellant’s argument does not address the
Examiner’s (modified) rejection. Ans. 9 (citing, e.g., In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking
references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references).
Appellant replies that “the role of the password in Kasuga is unclear,”
such that “Kasuga does not teach allowing or denying debug access to a
debugger in any way, much less allowing or denying debug access to a robot
based on user type, as required by the claims.” Reply Br. 9 (citing Appeal
Br. 9–10). Appellant also submits that Kasuga fails to remedy the
deficiency in the Examiner’s reliance on Mitchell, arguing that “it falls on
Kasuga to provide what is missing, i.e., granting or denying debug access to
a robot, from a remote station, based on user type.” Id. at 11 (emphasis
added).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, which does not
apprise us of error in the Examiner’s (modified) reliance on Kasuga, where
Kasuga discloses an authoring tool for a user to debug a software program,
and Mitchell is relied on for granting or denying access to software
functionality based on user type. We also find that the Examiner’s reliance
on Kasuga for disclosing controlling access to the authoring tool based on
passwords is unnecessary, in view of the Examiner’s reliance on Mitchell for
disclosing allowing or denying a user’s access to software functionality.
Again, to the extent the Examiner altered the Examiner’s findings relative to
Kasuga in the Examiner’s Answer, we note that Appellant did not file a
petition and, therefore, waived any argument that the Examiner’s Answer
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
11
includes new grounds of rejection. See 37 C.F.R. §41.40; accord MPEP
§ 1207.03.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 86, and
claims 91–94, 99, and 100 fall therewith.
Rejection II
Dependent claim 87
Claim 87 depends from independent claim 86 and recites, in relevant
part, “an arbitrator that controls access to said robot, said arbitrator has a
plurality of arbitration mechanisms, different mechanisms are invoked for
said plurality of different user types.” Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The
Specification discloses that “[t]he arbitration scheme may have one of four
mechanisms[:] notification, timeouts, queue and call back.” Spec. 21:4–5,
Tables 1, 2.
The Examiner finds that “Kuno, Mitchell, and Kasuga fail to disclose
the limitations of claim 87, and the Examiner relies on Ghodoussi for
disclosing the claimed arbitrator.” Final Act. 8 (citing Ghodoussi 9:30–42).
The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art to modify Kuno’s patient monitoring system, as
modified by Mitchell and Kasuga, to include an arbitrator, as disclosed in
Ghodoussi, “to prevent damage to the robot and system by access to the
system by unauthorized users.” Id.
Appellant argues that “[t]he cited portion of Ghodoussi discloses [an]
arbitrator but fails to teach or suggest that ‘said arbitrator has a plurality of
arbitration mechanisms, different mechanism are invoked for said plurality
of different user types’ as required by claim 87.” Appeal Br. 11.
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
12
The Examiner responds that Mitchell is relied on for disclosing
multiple users. Ans. 17. The Examiner also responds that Ghodoussi
discloses “how the arbitrator . . . is able to control access to the system based
on the priority level of the user,” and also that Ghodoussi’s system
“display[s] who has control of the system.” Id. (citing Ghodoussi 9:50–58,
10:16–25).
Appellant replies that “[t]he Examiner does not explain how
Ghodoussi discloses, teaches, or suggests how these different mechanisms
are invoked for different user types.” Reply Br. 12.
Ghodoussi discloses that “computer 140 may function as the
arbitrator, screening the data before transmission across the network 148”
and that “computer 140 may have a priority scheme that always awards
priority to one of the control units 50 or 52.” Ghodoussi 9:50–54.
Ghodoussi also discloses that “[t]he PRIORITY field defines the priority of
the input device,” wherein “[t]he priority data may be utilized to determine
which input device has control of the medical device.” Id. 9:6–8. As such,
Ghodoussi’s arbitrator controls access to the medical device (or robot)
wherein arbitration mechanisms (or priority data) are invoked for different
input devices (i.e., control units). Ghodoussi further discloses that “[t]he
arbitration function of the system allows the teacher to take control of robot
movement and instrument actuation at anytime during the procedure . . . [to]
allow[] the teacher to instruct the pupil on the procedure and/or the user of a
medical robotic system.” Id. at 10:16–25. Thus, a preponderance of
evidence supports the Examiner’s finding Ghodoussi’s arbitrator controls
access to a medical robotic system, at least with mechanisms (or priority
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
13
data) that arbitrates between control units and a user (i.e., surgeon
instructor).
Appellant’s argument also does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s combination, wherein Ghodoussi’s arbitrator is applied to
Kuno’s patient monitoring system, as modified by Mitchell and Kasuga,
wherein Ghodoussi’s arbitrator is further modified in its application to
control access to Kuno’s patient monitoring system as between different
users, as Mitchell discloses assigning privileges to a computer software
system based on user type.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 87.
Dependent claim 95
Claim 95 depends from independent claim 94 and recites, in relevant
part, “wherein providing debug access includes allowing the user to set
operational parameters.” Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Ghodoussi discloses “allow[ing] the doctor to
set the surgical robots parameters for the surgical procedure.” Final Act. 8
(citing Ghodoussi 4:15–24).
Appellant argues that “[t]hough the cited portion of Ghodoussi may
discuss ‘allow[ing] the surgeon to control various functions and parameters
of the system,’ Ghodoussi does not suggest doing so in the context of ‘debug
access’ that is allowed or denied to users of a remote station depending on
their user type, as required by the claims.” Appeal Br. 12; see also Reply
Br. 12.
The Examiner responds that Ghodoussi was not relied on for allowing
the user to set operational parameters within a debugging program, but
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
14
rather, that Kasuga discloses providing a debugging program relative to a
robot-action-control-program. Ans. 18; see, e.g., Kasuga4 ¶ 96).
Appellant’s argument also does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s combination, wherein Ghodoussi is relied on for disclosing a
user’s (i.e., surgeon’s) ability to set operational parameters, such that
applying Ghodoussi’s user’s abilities to Kuno’s patient monitoring system,
as modified by Mitchell to allow access based on user-type and Kasuga to
specify debug access, results in the subject matter recited in claim 95.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 95.
Dependent claim 97
Claim 97 depends from independent claim 94 and recites, in relevant
part, “wherein said plurality of user types includes a local operator5, a
caregiver, a doctor, a family member and a service personnel.” Appeal Br.
17 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Ghodoussi discloses “a doctor being one of
the operators which can use the system.” Final Act. 9 (citing Ghodoussi
10:16–34).
Appellant argues that although Ghodoussi discloses that a doctor may
be an operator, Ghodoussi fails to disclose that a local operator, a caregiver,
a family member, or a service personnel may be operators. Appeal Br. 12;
see also Reply Br. 12.

4 Notably, Kasuga appears itself to disclose that debug access, or the
authoring tool, allows a user to perform real-time processing (i.e., set
operational parameters) for debugging the robot-action-control program by
cooperatively operating the host computer 100 and the robot 1. Kasuga
¶ 96; see also id. ¶¶ 119, 213.
5 The Specification defines “local user” as “a person who is physically
present with the robot.” Spec. 19:7–8.
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
15
The Examiner responds that Kuno further discloses a “family and
friend mode” (citing Kuno 23:18–27) and that Mitchell discloses user types,
such as a “technician, Doctor and nurse” (citing Mitchell 41:35–47), such
that the combination of references disclose user types including a local
operator (i.e., any user operating the robot locally or physically with the
robot), a caregiver (i.e., nurse), a doctor, a family member, and a service
personnel (technician). Ans. 19.
Appellant replies that, with respect to Kuno’s family and friend mode,
Kuno merely discloses “a switch the patient may use to disconnect the
monitoring features of the robot when the patient has a visitor,” and that
“[t]his button or mode . . . is not a ‘user type,’” as claimed. Reply Br. 12.
Independent claim 94 requires that “said robot can be controlled by a
plurality of users having a plurality of different user types,” wherein claim
97 further requires that such user types include “a local operator, a caregiver,
a doctor, a family member and a service personnel.” Appeal Br. 16–17
(Claims App.). Appellant’s argument does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s finding that Kuno discloses that the patient (or a family or friend
visiting a patient) may control Kuno’s patient monitoring system by
disconnecting the monitoring feature via a button.
Appellant also replies that “the technician in Mitchell appears to be a
medical technician and not a service personnel,” as required by the claims.
Reply Br. 12.
Claim 97 recites “a service personnel,” without further specifying the
services provided by the personnel. The Specification discloses that “[t]he
service user may service the system such as by upgrading software, or
setting operational parameters.” Spec. 19:17–19. Mitchell discloses that
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
16
“technicians might record the vital signs.” Mitchell 7:63–64. Although
Appellant is correct that the claimed service personnel is for servicing the
computer, even though Mitchell’s technician is for servicing the patient,
claim 97 does not expressly exclude Mitchell’s technician from being a
service personnel. Notably, Kuno discloses that configuring the patient
monitoring system can be done by “a human operator,” such that Kuno’s
human operator constitutes a service personnel user type that controls (and
configures) the system, as required by the claims.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 97.
Rejection III
Claim 98, which depends from claim 97, which depends from
independent claim 94, recites, in relevant part, “wherein a request for robot
access from the service personnel user type invokes the callback mechanism
if a current user is the local operator, the caregiver, the doctor or the family
member user type.” Appeal Br. 17.
The Examiner relies on Edwards for disclosing “[a] system having the
feature of a call back and also queuing of calls.” Final Act. 9 (citing
Edwards, Fig. 4A). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious
to modify Kuno, as modified by Mitchell and Kasuga, by the teachings of
Edwards, “to ensure the patient could receive calls and also be able to talk
with other people whilst on a call with a doctor when sick.” Id.
Appellant argues that “[e]ven assuming Edwards discloses a call back
and also a queuing of calls, Edwards fails to teach or suggest invoking the
call back mechanism depending on the user type of the current user, as
required by the claims.” Appeal Br. 13.
Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
17
The Examiner responds that Edwards is relied on for teaching the call
back feature only. Ans. 20 (citing Edwards 14:19–55). We are not
persuaded of Examiner error, in that the Examiner’s rejection, as discussed
supra, relies on Kuno for disclosing a patient monitoring system, wherein
user types are allowed to control or access the patient monitoring system, as
taught in Mitchell, and as further modified by Kasuga to include debug
access and by Ghodoussi to include service personnel as a user. In view of
Edward’s teaching that the system may further be modified to include a
callback mechanism if Kuno’s patient monitoring system is being controlled
by another user, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s reasoning
that it would have been obvious that one user attempting to access Kuno’s
patient monitoring system is the service personnel while the user currently
accessing Kuno’s patient monitoring system is the local user (or patient),
such that the service personnel would be subject to Edward’s callback
mechanism.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 98.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
86, 91–94,
99, 100
103(a) Kuno, Mitchell, Kasuga 86, 91–94,
99, 100

87, 95, 97 103(a) Kuno, Mitchell, Kasuga,
Ghodoussi
87, 95, 97
98 103(a) Kuno, Mitchell, Kasuga,
Edwards
98
Overall
Outcome
86, 87, 91–
95, 97–100

Appeal 2020-006191
Application 12/345,161
18
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED