YU, Han et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 26, 2019

14656009 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/656,009 03/12/2015 Han YU Q218435 9523
23373 7590 12/26/2019
SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
2000 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
SUITE 900
WASHINGTON, DC 20006
EXAMINER
SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PPROCESSING@SUGHRUE.COM
USPTO@sughrue.com
sughrue@sughrue.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte HAN YU, CHUNYAN MIAO, and ZHIQI SHEN
__________

Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,0091
Technology Center 3600
__________

Before DONALD E. ADAMS, ERIC B. GRIMES, and
RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judges.

TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims to a
computer system for allocating human intelligence tasks to a worker in a
crowdsourcing system, which have been rejected as directed to patent
ineligible subject matter, obvious, and/or failing to comply with the written
description requirement. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as NANYANG
TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY. (Br. 2.)
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Specification indicates that “[c]rowdsourcing systems are
a unique type of collaborative computing systems where human beings act
as workers to perform human intelligence tasks (HITs) in exchange of
monetary or other forms of payoffs.” (Spec. 1.) According to Appellant’s
Specification,
a crowdsourcing system is faced with two major challenges:
1) To reduce the time taken to complete HITs, HIT
allocation to a large number of workers should be automated;
and
2) To ensure the quality of the HIT results, requesters
should be able to provide feedback on the quality of the results
they receive and use the feedback to reward trustworthy
workers and punish untrustworthy ones.
(Id.) Appellant’s Specification contends that these “two challenges
represent conflicting system objectives” that the invention addresses
simultaneously. (Id. at 2.)
Claims 1, 3–5, and 7–9 are on appeal. Claim 1 is representative and
reads as follows:
1. A computer system for allocating each of one or more human
intelligence tasks to a corresponding one of a plurality of
workers in a crowdsourcing system, the computer system
comprising:
a computer processor;
at least one electronic interface;
a data storage device, the data storage device storing:
(a) for each of the plurality of workers, a respective
profile describing
(i) at least one worker trustworthiness score
indicative of the quality of work performed by the
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

3
worker, wherein the trustworthiness score is calculated
based at least on feedbacks from requesters, and
(ii) a current workload value indicative of the
current level of workload of the worker;
(b) program instructions operative by the computer
processor, to cause the computer processor automatically:
(i) to receive, from the at least one electronic
interface, data describing the one or more human
intelligence tasks which are to be performed;
(ii) to receive, from the at least one electronic
interface, data for updating the profiles; and
(iii) to transmit, using the interface, for each task a
message to a selected worker indicating that the worker is
to perform the task;
a worker fitness evaluation module, the worker fitness
evaluation module being configured to form for each of the
workers a respective fitness function, the fitness function
increases with an increasing value of the at least one said
worker trustworthiness score, and decreases with an increasing
value of the current workload value; and
a task allocation module, the task allocation module
being configured to select for each task the selected worker to
perform the task based on the respective profile of each worker,
wherein the selection takes into account both the quality
of work performed by the workers and the current level of
workload of the workers, and wherein the worker having the
highest value of the fitness function is selected.
(Br. 22–23.)

Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

4
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Douglas US 2005/0060217 A1 Mar. 17, 2005
Yankelevich US 2013/0197954 A1 Aug. 1, 2013
Patel US 2007/0067200 A1 Mar. 22, 2007
Candelario US 2012/0221476 A1 Aug. 30, 2012
Noda US 2005/025086 A1 June 9, 2005
Wang US 2013/0086054 A1 Apr. 4, 2013

The following grounds of rejection by the Examiner are before us on
review:
Claims 1, 3–5, and 7–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 3–5, and 7–92 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 1, 5, and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Douglas, Yankelevich, and Patel.
Claims 4 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Douglas,
Yankelevich, Patel, and Candelario.
Claims 3 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Douglas,
Yankelevich, Patel, Noda, and Wang.

2 We note that the Examiner’s rejection indicates that claims 1–3, 5, and 7–9
are subject to the written description rejection. (Final Action 7; Ans. 3.)
However, we agree with Appellant that only claims 1, 3–5, and 7–9 are
pending. The Examiner’s identification of the claims for this rejection
appears to be an inadvertent error, as he addresses independent claims 1, 5,
and 9, and notes that the dependent claims thereon “inherit the deficiency”
described with respect to claims 1, 5, and 9. Thus, we determine that the
Examiner intended to identify claims 1, 3–5, and 7–9.
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

5
DISCUSSION
Patent Ineligible Subject Matter
The Examiner finds that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
allocating tasks to workers where the limitations are concerned with data
input, manipulation and reporting for selecting workers to perform tasks.
(Final Action 5–6.) The Examiner explains that the limitations directed to
this data collecting, manipulation, and reporting include
“a respective profile describing [worker qualities and
workloads];” and program instructions “to receive . . . data
describing [] one or more human intelligence tasks,” “to receive
. . . data for updating the profiles,” “to transmit . . . a message,”
“to form for each of the workers a respective fitness function,”
and “to select for each task the selected worker.”
(Id. at 6.) The Examiner further explains that the claims “require no more
than a generic computer (a processor, electronic interface, and data storage
device in claim 1) to perform generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry.” (Id.) The Examiner also notes that “the claims do not recite an
improvement to another technology or technical field, nor do they recite an
improvement to the functioning of the computer itself.” (Id.) Consequently,
the Examiner concludes that the claims recite ineligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. §101. (Id.)
Applying the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance
(“Guidance”), 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019), we agree with the
Examiner’s assessment.
The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for
“distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

6
concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014). “First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to” a
patent-ineligible concept. Id. If so, “we consider the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2012)).
STEP 2A, Prong One:
Under the Guidance, in determining what concept a claim is “directed
to” in step one of the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, we first look to
whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, such as managing
relationships or interaction between people or business relations, i.e.,
methods of organizing human activity, mental processes, and/or
mathematical concepts. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54 (Step 2A, Prong
One).
Appellant describes the invention recited in claim 1 as a “specific
process for allocating tasks to workers taking into account both the quality
of work performed by the workers and the current level of workload of the
workers, wherein the worker having the highest value of the fitness function
is selected.” (Appeal Br. 12.) This is consistent with the description of the
object of the invention set forth in the Specification explaining the two
challenges in the prior art crowdsourcing systems and noting that the “object
of the invention” is to provide “an apparatus to address both of [those]
challenges simultaneously. (See Spec. 1–2.) Claim 1 recites a computer
system for allocating a human intelligence task to a worker in a
crowdsourcing system where the system includes (1) a storage device that
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

7
includes program instructions to cause the computer processor to
automatically receive both data about the task to be performed and data for
updating profiles of workers that are indicative of the quality of work
performed by a worker and current workload level, (2) a worker fitness
evaluation module that “form[s] . . . a fitness function” for a worker that
relates to worker trustworthiness and current workload, and (3) a task
allocation module that selects a worker to perform a task based on the profile
of a worker that takes into account quality of work performed by a worker
and current level of workload and the highest value of the fitness function,
and the storage device includes program instructions to cause the computer
processor to automatically transmit a message to the selected worker to
indicate selection for performing the task.
This system that allocates tasks to workers is thus drawn to managing
relationships between a customer and service provider or a business
relationship, i.e., a system for organizing human activity, which is an
abstract idea.
We find further that the task allocation module performs a function
that is a mental process. (See Ans. 4.) That is, selection of a worker with
the highest fitness function to perform a task based on a profile of the pool
of workers is a process that can be performed in a person’s mind, or by a
human using a pen and paper. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, n. 14
(citing e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer
implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose
them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”));
see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

8
73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] method that can be performed by human thought
alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”); see
also In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental
processes–or processes of human thinking–standing alone are not patentable
even if they have practical application.”). That the system requires
“dynamic updating of data and the use of the dynamically updated data in
the allocation of tasks” (Br. 13), is insufficient to establish that the mental
process cannot practically be performed in the mind. Versata Dev. Grp. v.
SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have
examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.”); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, n.14.
Additionally, we find the function to be performed by the worker
fitness evaluation module includes mathematical concepts. Indeed,
Appellant concedes as much in noting that “the claimed subject matter
provides an algorithmic decision support system . . . [in which] data from
multiple sources [is] processed in real-time and at a large scale in order to
allocate tasks.” (Br. 12.) In particular, claim 1 recites that the worker
fitness evaluation module is “configured to form for each of the workers a
respective fitness function” and that the fitness function “increases with an
increasing value of the at least one said worker trustworthiness score, and
decreases with an increasing value of the current workload value.” As the
Specification explains “[t]he worker fitness evaluation module . . . calculates
the fitness score of each individual worker.” (Spec. 6.) The Specification
provides an example of a specific formula for calculating the fitness score.
(Id. at 6–7.) While the claim does not recite a specific mathematical
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

9
formula, it nevertheless recites that the “function” involves a specific
mathematical relationship, i.e., a direct relationship between the fitness
function and value of worker trustworthiness score (fitness function
increases with an increase in the value of worker trustworthiness) as well as
an inverse relationship with value of the current workload (fitness function
decreases with an increase in the value of current workload). As such, even
though a specific formula is not recited for the worker fitness evaluation
module, the module nevertheless must effect a function that is grounded in
mathematical concepts.
Even if one were to disagree that the worker fitness evaluation module
recites mathematical concepts and/or that, but for the fact that the task
allocation module function appears to be carried out by a computer, the
function can be performed in the human mind, Appellant does not dispute
that the claims are drawn to a judicial exception. Rather, Appellant contends
that because the claim recites a specific process for the allocation it “does
not pre-empt or tie up all processes of allocating tasks to workers” and is
thus “directed to a limited practical application” of the judicial exception.
(Br. 12.) We address the issue of practical application under STEP 2A,
Prong Two of the Guidance, below. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
STEP 2A, Prong Two:
In the Prong Two analysis, we examine whether there are additional
elements beyond the judicial exception that integrates it into a practical
application. That is we look to the claim to see if it “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or
use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception.” Id. at 54.
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

10
Regarding Appellant’s “preemption” argument, we note that “[w]hile
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or
may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make
them any less abstract.”).
Claim 1 itself requires a generic “processor,” “electronic interface,”
and “data storage device” that perform normal computer functionality, i.e.,
receive information, store information, and process information to be used as
tools to perform the abstract idea. One of the “examples in which a judicial
exception has not been integrated into a practical application” is when “[a]n
additional element . . . merely includes instructions to implement an abstract
idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an
abstract idea.” Id. at 55. Moreover, that the program instructions of the data
storage device cause the computer processor to automatically receive data
about the tasks to be performed and receive data for updating profiles
constitutes insignificant pre-solution activity. See MPEP § 2106.05(g):
An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data
for use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining
information about credit card transactions, which is recited as
part of a claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the
gathered information by a series of steps in order to detect
whether the transactions were fraudulent.
Similarly, that the program instructions of the data storage device cause the
computer processor to automatically transmit a message to a selected worker
indicating that the worker is to perform the task is reasonably characterized
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

11
as being directed to insignificant post-solution activity. See e.g., Apple, Inc.
v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241-42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that
printing or downloading generated menus constituted insignificant extra-
solution activity).
To the extent the worker fitness evaluation module and task allocation
module might be considered additional elements beyond the recited method
of organizing human activity, we do not find that they are elements that
integrate the judicial exception. The worker fitness evaluation module and
task allocation module are recited with some more specificity than the
aforenoted generic computer components. However, the specificity is
directed to judicial exceptions, mathematical concepts and mental processes,
as discussed above. “It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s
use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the
inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that
ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Moreover, the data manipulation performed by the worker fitness
evaluation module does not improve the functioning of the computer, nor
does it result in an improved technological result, contrary to Appellant’s
argument (Br. 15). Cf. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the claimed rules allow
computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial
expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced
by human animators). Although the determination of the fitness function
based on trustworthiness data and current workload may provide for the
automatic selection by the task allocation module of a more trustworthy
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

12
worker than in prior crowdsourcing systems, that is an improvement to the
business process of task allocation in the crowdsourcing environment, not an
improved technological result.
Appellant argues that “the claimed features provide an algorithmic
decision support system that allows multiple sources of data to be taken into
account in real-time” providing for “dynamic management of data relating to
tasks.” (Br. 14–15.) However, as the Federal Circuit has explained, “[a]
process that start[s] with data, add[s] an algorithm, and end[s] with a new
form of data [is] directed to an abstract idea.” RecogniCorp, LLC v.
Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Federal Circuit
has further held that “mere automation of manual processes using generic
computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer
technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044,
1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Appellant’s additional elements recited in claim 1, considered
individually and as an ordered combination, do not (1) improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any
particular machine (except for generic computer parts), (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
STEP 2B
Step 2B requires that we look to whether the claim “adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that [is] not ‘well-understood,
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

13
routine, conventional’ in the field.” Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP §
2106.05(d)).
The Examiner explains that the claims “require no more than a
generic computer (a processor, electronic interface, and data storage device
in claim 1) to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry.” (Final
Action 6.) Appellant does not respond directly, arguing only that the claim
“provides ‘significantly more’ than merely allocating tasks to workers”
because dynamic management of data and allocation of tasks based on the
dynamically changing data is a technological solution to a technological
problem. (Br. 14–15.) However as discussed above, this solution is a
business solution not a technological solution. Moreover, the Examiner cites
prior art that teaches or suggests the claimed activities that are required to be
performed by the various components of the system (Final Action 9–12),
including that the processor of Douglas updates the schedule, and implicitly
the profile information of the worker task schedule (Ans. 5). Appellant did
not respond to the Examiner’s Answer. We find that the Examiner has
established the limitations of claim 1, considered alone and as an ordered
combination, do not add anything beyond the judicial exception that is not
well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that claim 1 is directed to no
more than judicial exceptions to Section 101 and does not recite the
“significantly more” requisite to transform the nature of the claim into a
patent-eligible application. We consequently affirm the Examiner’s
rejection upon this ground.
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

14
Appellant argues that “[i]ndependent claims 5 and 9, and their
dependent claims satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101 for similar reasons” as claim 1.
(Br. 13.) Thus, these claims have not been argued separately and therefore
fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
II
Lack of Written Description
The Examiner finds that while claim 1 recites a worker fitness
evaluation module that is “configured to form for each of the workers a
respective fitness function,” there is “no algorithm or workflow for forming
a fitness function . . . provided in the specification or claims.” (Final Action
7.) The Examiner notes that a specific formula is given at pages 6–7 of the
Specification but that no steps are provided for forming the fitness function.
(Final Action 7–8.) The Examiner further explains that the Specification
“does note that the score should be proportional to current workload (see top
of p. 7).” (Ans. 6.) However, the Examiner concludes that identifying
proportionality as one factor in the fitness function “does not provide
sufficient detail regarding the forming of the function, as claimed.” (Ans.
6.) Moreover, explains the Examiner, “trustworthiness” which is an element
of the fitness function “does not have a disclosed algorithm” and the
“proportionality to trustworthiness score does not appear to be disclosed in
the [S]pecification.” (Id.) The Examiner states:
Merely describing factors on which a function is based does not
adequately describe the function. Moreover, the factors
themselves are not adequately described. In essence, the claims
describe a result without adequate disclosure of how to achieve
the result.
(Id.)
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

15
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that claim 1 lacks written
description for the reasons expressed by the Examiner and noted above.
When claims are drawn to a genus using functional language to define a
desired result, “the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has
made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by
showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim
to the functionally-defined genus.” AbbVie Deutschland GmbH& Co., KG
v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).
As the Examiner explained in the rejection, the claim “broadly
recite[s] a genus of steps performed by a module that include forming a
fitness function[, but] no steps are provided in the [S]pecification or claims
for forming a fitness function.” (Final Action 7.) Indeed, Appellant’s
Specification does not even refer to a “fitness function.” While Appellant’s
Specification provides a formula that can be used to calculate “the current
fitness score,” it does not discuss using that score in forming a fitness
function. As the Examiner explained in the Answer, to which Appellant
does not respond, Appellant’s Specification teaches that the fitness “score
should be proportional to current workload (see top of p. 7),” as well as
requiring proportionality to a trustworthiness score, but “[m]erely describing
factors on which a function is based does not adequately describe” the
fitness function itself capable of determining a fitness score. (Ans. 6.)
In light of the foregoing, we do not find Appellant’s argument that
because (1) a specific formula for calculating a fitness score is provided in
the Specification, (2) the Specification explains that the fitness score is
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

16
based on the worker’s current workload and target workload, and (3) the
Specification describes how a target workload may be calculated, the fitness
function is adequately described (Br. 20), persuasive. “[A]analogizing the
genus to a plot of land, if the disclosed species only abide in a corner of the
genus, one has not described the genus sufficiently to show that the inventor
invented, or had possession of, the genus. He only described a portion of it.”
AbbVie, 759 F.3d at 1299–1300. Appellant has provided a single equation
for a fitness score and does not adequately demonstrate that a generic fitness
function has been made. “In essence, the claim[] describe[s] a result without
adequate disclosure of how to achieve the result.” (Ans. 6.) Thus, we affirm
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as failing to comply with the written
description requirement.
Appellant does not argue the claims rejected under § 112, first
paragraph separately and therefore claims 3–5, 7, and 9 fall with claim 1.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
III
Obviousness
The Examiner finds that “Douglas discloses a customer service
support system for assigning issues to workers.” (Final Action 10.) The
Examiner explains that Douglas’ system includes a computer processor, an
electronic interface, and a data storage device. (Id. at 9.) The Examiner
further finds that the data storage device stores (1) worker information, such
as competency information, which information is verified by employee
managers and (2) workload level. (Id. at 9–10.) The Examiner finds, too,
that the storage device includes program instruction to cause the processor to
receive data concerning tasks to be performed. (Id. at 10.) The Examiner
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

17
further finds that Douglas teaches task allocation where selection takes into
account resource information, workload information, issue identification and
competency into account to determine a match. (Id. at 11.)
The Examiner recognizes that Douglas does not explicitly disclose the
storage device has program instructions to send out messages regarding a
task to be performed by a worker. (Id. at 10.) The Examiner finds,
however, that Yankelevich, which discloses matching tasks to workers based
on profiles, discloses sending out notification messages to workers regarding
available tasks. (Id.)
The Examiner also recognizes that Douglas’s system does not include
a worker fitness evaluation module or selection of a worker based on having
a highest value of fitness. (Id.) However, notes the Examiner, Patel
discloses a task assignment for employees that includes a qualification score
and a workload score as well as distance and that selection of a worker can
be based on a weighted workload and weighted qualification score. (Id. at
10–11.)
The Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art “to send a notification message as taught by
Yankelevich in the system executing the method of Douglas with the
motivation to inform workers of available tasks.” (Id.at 10.) The Examiner
further finds that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art to include a qualification score and workload score as taught by Patel in
the system of Douglas and to assign issues to workers based on the highest
scores. (Id. at 10 and 12.) The Examiner explains that having the selection
process include consideration of the qualification, workload, and distance
scores and selecting the highest weighted score would have been “merely a
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

18
combination of old elements” with each element performing the same
function as it did separately and that “one of ordinary skill in the art would
have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.” (Id.
at 12.)
We agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding the teaching of the
references and conclusion of obviousness. Appellant argues that Douglas
does not describe receiving data for updating worker profiles because the
task scheduling processor of Douglas automatically updates a task schedule
and the task schedule of Douglas “appears to be intended for use by the
worker themselves and not used for further processing.” (Br. 17–18.)
Moreover, Appellant argues that “the updating and editing of data appears to
be carried out manually and not ‘automatically’ as recited in claim 1.” (Id.
at 18.) We do not find these arguments persuasive. As the Examiner
explains in the Answer, to which Appellant does not respond, Douglas’s
processor updates the schedule, which implicitly updates the profiles that
include worker schedule information. (See Douglas ¶¶ 37–38.) The task
schedule that gets updated provides a worker’s current workload value. As
to whether the task schedule is intended to be used for further processing or
not, we note that claim 1 does not require any further processing of current
workload value. Appellant’s argument is thus not persuasive because it does
not relate to the requirements of claim 1.
Regarding the automatic nature of the processing, as the Examiner
explains, Douglas teaches automatic processing in addition to manual
processing. (Douglas ¶ 38 (“The task scheduling processor 108
automatically updates a task schedule”), ¶ 44 (“The data input device 114
provides input data 132 to the display generator 116 in response to receiving
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

19
input information either manually from a user or automatically from an
electronic device.”).)
Thus, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as being obvious
over Douglas, Yankelevich, and Patel.
Appellant does not argue claims 5 and 9 separately and thus, they fall
with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Moreover, Appellant’s argument as to claims 3, 4, 7, and 8 is that the
additional references fail to cure the deficiencies noted above with respect to
claim 1. (Br. 19.) However, as just discussed, we do not agree with
Appellant that the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1, 5, and 9 is
deficient. Thus, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims
4 and 8, as well as of claims 3 and 7.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–5, 7–9 101 1, 3–5, 7–9
1, 3–5, 7–9 112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
1, 3–5, 7–9
1, 5, 9 103 Douglas, Patel,
Yankelevich
1, 5, 9
4, 8 103 Douglas, Patel,
Yankelevich,
Candelario
4, 8
3, 7 103 Douglas, Patel,
Yankelevich,
Noda, Wang
3, 7
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–5, 7–9
Appeal 2019-001969
Application 14/656,009

20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED