Young Hinkle Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 16, 1979

244 N.L.R.B. 264 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Young Hinkle Corporation and Terri E. Drake. Case
I -CA-7686
August 16, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PENEI..O, MURPHY, AND TRUESDAII
On May 8, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Mar-
vin Roth issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' and
conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be-
low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Young
Hinkle Corporation, Lexington, North Carolina, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc.. 91 NLRB 544
(1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
violated Sec. 8(aX3) and (I) of the Act by denying employment to Terri E.
Drake because of her union activities, we find it unnecessary to adopt or pass
upon his finding that Respondent's personnel manager. Emma McKee. "pre-
sented the Company's hiring policy" when McKee told Drake that since she
had engaged in union activities she need not fill out an employment applica-
tion because she would not be hired by Respondent for quite some time.
Respondent argues that the record is devoid of evidence that this was the
"Company's hiring policy." However, whether McKee was echoing a com-
pany policy it is clear that. as she was speaking as Respondent's agent,
McKee's statement establishes Respondent's unlawful motivation for deny-
ing Drake employment.
'In par. (c) of his recommended Order the Administrative Law Judge
uses the broad cease-and-desist language. "in any other manner." However.
we have considered this case in light of the standards set forth in Hickmortt
Foods. Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979), and have concluded that a broad reme-
dial order is inappropriate inasmuch as it has not been shown that Respon-
dent has a proclivity to violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or
widespread misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for employees'
fundamental statutory rights. Accordingly. we shall modify the recommend-
ed Order so as to use the narrow injunctive language "in any like or related
manner.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph I(c):
"(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
Norict(I To EPI.OYtES
PoSTEiI BY ORDER 01O I 1I
NAII()NAI. LABOR R.AIIONS B()ARI)
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had an opportuni-
ty to present their evidence, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has found that we violated the National
Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this
notice and to carry out its provisions.
Wi Will . NOT discourage membership in
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union
No. 391, or any other labor organization, by dis-
criminatorily refusing to hire job applicants, or
in any other manner discriminating against em-
ployees with regard to their hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
WI WVll.l NOI tell job applicants that they will
not be hired by us or other area employers be-
cause of their union activity.
Wi wII.I. NO in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of their rights to organize, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, including Lo-
cal 391. to bargain collectively through represen-
tatives of their own choosing, to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any and all such activities.
WE WI.I. offer a job to Terri Drake, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights, and Wli
WILL make her whole for losses she suffered by
reason of the discrimination against her.
All of our employees and job applicants are free to
become or remain members of Chauffeurs, Teamsters
and Helpers Local No. 391 or any other labor organi-
zation.
YOUNG HINKLE CORPORATI()N
DECISION
SIAI EMENI O)F T111 CASI
MARVIN Rorl, Administrative Law Judge: This case was
heard in Winston-Salem. North C(arolina on March 2.
244 NLRB No. 45
264
YOUNG HINKLE CORPORATION
1979. The charge was filed on June 12. 1978, by Terri E.
Drake, an individual. The complaint, which issued on Sep-
tember 19, 1978, and was amended at the hearing, alleges
that Young Hinkle Corporation (herein the Company or
Respondent). violated Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended. The gravemen of
the complaint is that the Company allegedly told Drake. a
job applicant, that she would not be hired by the Company
or other area employers because of her union activity and
refused to hire Drake because of her activity on behalf of
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391.
affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
(herein the Union). The Company's answer denies the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices. All parties
were afforded full opportunity to participate, to present rel-
evant evidence, to argue orally, and to file briefs. The Gen-
eral Counsel and Respondent each filed a brief.
Upon the entire record in this case, from my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having considered the
arguments of counsel and the briefs submitted by the Gen-
eral Counsel and Respondent, I make the following:
and sanding furniture until November 15. 1973, when she
was discharged a second time, again. according to the Com-
pany's records, for insubordination.
In 1974 Drake went to work for PPG Industries of Lex-
ington (herein PPG). In early 1978 she became active in the
Union's campaign to organize PPG. On March 13. 1978,
PPG fired Drake. The Union filed unfair labor practice
charges alleging that PPG discriminatorily discharged
Drake and other union adherents and engaged in other acts
and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
The Regional Director issued a complaint, and hearing in
the PPG case commenced on March 2 (the same day that
the present case was heard) before another administrative
law judge. The Union's organizational campaign and the
subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings attracted con-
siderable attention in the Lexington area. (Lexington is a
relatively small community, having a population of 17,205,
according to the 1970 census.) Company Personnel Man-
ager Charles Kinley, the Company's only witness in this
case, testified that he learned about the Union's organiza-
tional campaign in the spring of 1978. i.e., after the Union
filed its charges, through newspapers and by word of
mouth.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Company, a North Carolina corporation, operates a
plant in Lexington, North Carolina, where it is engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of home furnishings. In
the operation of its business the Company annually ships
goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its Lexington plant
directly to points located outside the State of North Caro-
lina. I find and the Company admits that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOI.VED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Drake's Previous Employment With the
Company and Her Union Activriry at PPG Industries of
Lexington
Terri Drake began her working career when she was
hired at the Company's Lexington plant on May 28. 1972.
She worked in the chair department clamping chair legs
together until June 14, 1972, when she was discharged.
Drake testified that her foreman told her that she was fired
because she failed to disclose that she was pregnant when
she applied for work. The Company's personnel records in-
dicate that she was discharged "because of her willful fail-
ure to carry out her assigned duties to the best of her abil-
ity." Her personnel file contained a notation recommending
that she not be reemployed. Nevertheless, on March 9.
1973, Drake reapplied for a job with the Company. and she
was promptly hired. She worked in the rubroom wooling
B. The Company's Alleged Refusal To Hire Drake
After her discharge from PPG Drake applied for unem-
ployment compensation. She testified that she was told by
North Carolina Employment Security Commission
(NCESC) to seek other employment, and that she did.
Drake testified that in early May 1978 she applied for a job
at the Company's Lexington plant because it was her first
place of employment, and she thought that the Company
might hire her. She testified that she signed the register in
the personnel office, whereupon a lady came out and asked
if she could help Drake. According to Drake, she (Drake)
asked if they were taking applications, and the lady an-
swered that they were and asked Drake if she would like to
fill one out. Drake said that she would, adding, "I was fired
for Union activity." Drake testified that she said the same
thing at other places where she applied for employment.
According to Drake, the lady laughed and said: "Oh well,
in that case there won't be no need of filling out an applica-
tion because you won't get hired around here for quite
some time." Drake testified that she thanked the lady and
left. According to Drake, the lady never asked her her
name, whether she was previously employed by the Com-
pany. whether she had signed the register, of if she had an
application on file.
The Company introduced into evidence its personnel of-
fice register for Monday, May 8, 1978, which indicates that
Drake was the eighth person to sign the register that day,
on a list of 36 persons (3 of whom scratched out their signa-
tures). The Company's personnel office is staffed by two
persons, Personnel Manager Charles Kinley and his sub-
ordinate, Assistant Personnel Manager Emma McKee.
Kinely has been with the Company for 16 years and has
held his present position since late 1972. McKee has been
assistant personnel manager since September 1977. Kinley
is responsible for interviewing and hiring job applicants and
also gives formal personal notice to terminated employees
265
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL ABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the time of separation. McKee has authority to interview
and hire applicants in Kinley's absence. However, her nor-
mal duties. as will be discussed, are to obtain such docu-
ments (application forms and/or prior employment rec-
ords) as are necessary to enable Kinley to interview the
applicant. McKee also does typing and prepares timecards
for payroll. It was stipulated at this hearing that McKee.
although not a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(1 1) of' the Act, was at all times material an agent of the
Company acting on its behalf. In her testimony Terri Drake
indicated that she believed that McKee was the person who
spoke to her.
McKee. who was presented as an adverse witness for
General Counsel, testified that although she was at work on
May 8, 1978, she never saw Drake before this hearing and
had no recollection of Drake coming to the personnel office
or of any such conversation as that described by Drake.
Personnel Manager Kinley testified that he was also in his
office on May 8, 1978, that he did not interview Drake, but
that McKee placed Drake's personnel file (covering her for-
mer employment) on his desk. The significance of this testi-
mony by Kinley will be discussed, infra. Kinley further tes-
tified that whether an applicant is hired depends on the
applicant's work record and ability and the jobs available
but, that to his knowledge, he has never hired an applicant
with knowledge of the applicant's union activity. The Com-
pany's plant is unorganized, as are most plants in the Lex-
ington area. Company counsel stipulated that the Company
is opposed to unionization. Among those who signed the
register on May 8, one applicant was hired the same day.
The applicant was placed on a job in the repair department,
which job did not require any skill. The Company also
hired about five other individuals who signed the register
but who had actually applied during the previous week and
were not reporting for work.
Kinley and McKee testified, in sum, that McKee fol-
lowed a standard procedure in dealing with job applicants.
When an applicant came in McKee would see the person
through a one-way mirror in the personnel office. McKee
would come out and ask if the person signed the register
and if he or she had filed an application within the previous
6 months. If so McKee would pull the previous application
and place it on Kinley's desk; if not McKee would ask if
the applicant was a previous company employee. If so
McKee would pull out the applicant's personnel file and
place it on Kinley's desk, and the file would be used in
I do not agree with the Company's argument that the General Counsel.
by calling McKee as a witness, thereby vouched for her credibility. As
McKee was admittedly an agent of the Company with respect to the matters
at issue, she qualified as a witness identified with the Company within the
scope of Rule 61 I(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and I so ruled
at the hearing. Even if she did not so qualify the only pertinent restriction
placed on counsel for the General Counsel would be that, generally, leading
questions could not be asked on her direct examination. As the representa-
tive of a government agency, the General Counsel has an obligation to pre-
sent such evidence as he deems material to resolution of the unfair labor
practice case. whether favorable or unfavorable. Therefore, the General
Counsel cannot be expected to vouch for the credibility of every witness
presented in the prosecution of an unfair labor practice case. Moreover, the
administrative law judge, who must make his own determination of the
credibility of the witnesses, is not bound by the express or implied represen-
tations of the parties in this regard,
place of a written application. Otherwise the applicant
would be instructed to fill out an application. The Com-
pany contends that in light of this procedure, which is in-
consistent with that described by Terri Drake, it is unlikely
that a conversation would have taken place as testified to
by Drake. I do not agree because the evidence indicates
that the Company did not uniformly follow the procedure
described by Kinley and McKee. When Drake applied for
reemployment with the Company in 1973, having worked
for the Company within the previous year, she filled out a
new application for employment which the Company re-
tained in its personnel file. (The application was introduced
in evidence in this case.) Charles Kinley was personnel
manager throughout 1973, but he did not testify that the
application procedure was changed during his tenure. Kin-
ley also testified that there were times when a former em-
ployee would be asked to fill out an application, e.g., when
the former employment dated back many years. In sum, I
find that McKee did not uniformly follow the practice de-
scribed by her, and therefore that Drake cannot be discred-
ited on this ground. I also do not find it incredible that
Drake would volunteer that she was discharged for union
activity. An employee may, for whatever motive, when fac-
ing a situation involving potential employer discrimination
voluntarily declare his or her union activity and thereby
deprive the employer of a defense of lack of knowledge of
such activity. Ohio Valley Graphic Arts, Inc., 234 NLRB
493, fn. 4 (1978). Drake knew that she was seeking employ-
ment in a largely unorganized area where there was outspo-
ken employer opposition to unionization and, that upon
listing her prior employment an employer would soon
learn, if it did not know already, that she had allegedly been
discharged for union activity. Therefore Drake may have
decided to draw out the Employer at the beginning in order
to determine whether she was employable, regardless of
whether she experienced apparent discrimination at other
locations before or after applying for employment with the
Company.
In sum, I find that Drake's testimony concerning her
abortive application is not inherently incredible. However,
as the General Counsel has the burden of proof in this case,
it remains to be determined whether, in light of the evi-
dence adduced in this case, it is more likely than not that
Drake's testimony is true. I find that the evidence supports
Drake's testimony. In particular, I find that Drake's testi-
mony is inferentially corroborated by Charles Kinley's un-
explained admission that he did not interview Drake on
May 8. but that McKee placed Drake's former personnel
jacket on his desk. This means, as the Company itself con-
cedes in its brief, that Drake must have presented herself to
McKee as a job applicant, that McKee learned or knew her
name and status as a former employee, that Kinley antici-
pated interviewing Drake, but that for some reason Drake
did not remain to be interviewed. It does not follow that
Kinley and McKee could have known who Drake was only
if Drake had identified herself to McKee. Drake's name
was on the register. Drake was hired and terminated in
1973 when Kinley was personnel manager. As indicated,
Kinley admitted that he learned about the Union's organi-
zation campaign at PPG in the spring of 1978 through the
266
YOUNG HINKLE CORPORATION
newspapers and by word of mouth. It is probable that as an
employer in the community and as a former Employer of
Drake that Kinley would have heard or seen her name
mentioned in connection with the campaign and remem-
bered it.2 In his testimony Kinley (unlike McKee). did not
deny knowing Drake, and it is quite possible that Kinley
saw and recognized her through the one-way mirror in the
personnel office.
The next question posed by the evidence is why Drake
left without being interviewed. If Drake was not seeking
employment in good faith but simply walked out after try-
ing to entrap the Employer into making an incriminating
statement or got cold feet and hurriedly left then it is prob-
able that McKee would have remembered such an unusual
event and would have recalled it when Drake filed her un-
fair labor practice charge. Therefore, I do not credit
McKee's testimony that she could not remember Drake
coming to the personnel office. The only remaining expla-
nation is that offered by Drake: namely, that she left be-
cause she was told, in essence, that it would be futile for her
to pursue her application. The evidence does not indicate
that this had anything to do with her prior employment
history or qualifications or available job openings. The
Company was hiring even unskilled help, and Drake had
previously been rehired by the Company after being dis-
charged for alleged insubordination. Indeed, Kinley had
not yet examined her prior employment record. The only
explanation presented is, as testified to by Drake. that she
was told, in sum, that she would not be hired because of her
alleged union activity. I credit Drake. As McKee was and is
admittedly an agent of the Company acting on its behalf, I
find that McKee presented the Company's hiring policy
when she told Drake that because of her alleged union ac-
tivity, "there won't be no need of filling out an application,
because you won't get hired around her for quite some
time." I find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Company
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling Drake that she
would not be hired by the Company or other area employ-
ers because of her union activity. See Universal Fuel, Inc.,
204 NLRB 26 (1973)., enfd. per curiam. 498 F.2d 1400 (5th
Cir. 1974). In sum, the Company told Drake that she was
blacklisted. As the evidence indicates that the Company
was hiring at the time that Drake applied for a job, and that
there was at least one job opening for which Drake was
qualified, I find that the Company further violated Section
8(aX1) and (3) of the Act by refusing to accept her applica-
tion and refusing to hire her because of her union activity.
See Phelps Dodge Corporation v. N.L.R.B.. 313 U.S. 177.
187 (1941): Universal Fuel, Inc., supra.
CONCUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2 Evidence of general discussion of a matter or the likelihood of such
discussion within all or part of community or local circle may raise an infer-
ence of knowledge of that matier by a member of that community or circle.
See II. Wigmore. Evidence (3d ed.. 1940) §§245. 261. pp. 43. 83 84. cited
with approval in State v. Costa. I I NJ. 239. 94 Atl 2d 303 (1953. Brennan.
Jr.. J).
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discriminatorily failing and refusing to hire Terri
E. [)rake, thereby discouraging membership in the Union,
the Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair la-
bor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act the Company has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THt REMEDY
Having found that the Company has committed viola-
tions of Section 8(aH I) and (3) of the Act, I shall recom-
mend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Having found that the Company discriminatorily refused
to hire Terri Drake, I am recommending that the Company
be ordered to offer her employment. Phelps Dodge Corpora-
tion v. N.L.R.B., supra at 192-193; see also Savo' Faucet
Co.. Inc.. d/h/a Savoy Brass Manufacturing Comnpanv, 241
NLRB 51 (1979). It cannot be said with any degree of cer-
titude that absent the discrimination against her the Com-
pany would have hired Drake on May 8, 1978. Conversely,
it cannot be said that the Company probably would not
have hired Drake in any event. The Company does not
have a policy against rehiring employees who are termi-
nated for insubordination, as evidenced by the fact that
Drake was hired in 1973 even though the Company's rec-
ords indicated that she was an unsatisfactory employee who
was discharged because of her willful failure to carry out
her assigned duties to the best of her abilities. Lawrence
Fleming. who signed the register later than Drake on May
8, 1978. was promptly hired for a job which had no special
qualifications. Where. as here, a respondent employer or
union has engaged in misconduct which might have pre-
vented an employee from obtaining or regaining a job but
the evidence is inconclusive on this point, the Board will
normally resolve the doubt against the wrongdoer rather
than against the wronged employee. Associated Truck
Lines, Inc.., 239 NLRB 917 (1978). Therefore, it is appropri-
ate to direct the Company to offer employment to Drake,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privi-
leges.
I am further recommending that the Company be or-
dered to make Drake whole for any loss of earnings that she
may have suffered by paying her sum of money equal to
that which she normally' would have earned as wages from
the date of the discrimination until the date of the Compa-
ny's offer of employment. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,
surpa at 197: Savov Faucet Co.. Inc.. supra. The backpay for
the said employee shall be computed in accordance with
the formula in F. W'. UWoolworth Com(paun, 90 NLRB 289
267
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(1950), with interest computed in the manner and amount
prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977). 3 It will also be recommended that the Company be
required to preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, payroll and other records necessary to
facilitate the computation of backpay due. General Coun-
sel's request for interest at 9 percent is, as General Counsel
frankly concedes in its supplemental brief, a request that
the Board reconsider its decision in Florida Steel regarding
the interest rate. So long as Florida Steel remains Board
policy, I am obligated to follow that policy. It is possible
that as a result of the pending unfair labor practice litiga-
tion in the PPG case, PPG might be ordered to make resti-
tution to Drake. However, this possibility does not deprive
Drake of her right to a full remedy in the present case. Any
rights as between PPG and the Company may be resolved
in compliance proceedings. See N.L.R.B. v. Louisville C('hair
Company, Inc., 385 F.2d 922, 926 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied 390 U.S. 1013 (1968), enforcing 161 NLRB 358 (1966).
As the present case involves serious 8(a)(3) discriminatory
conduct, I shall recommend that the Company be ordered
to cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Savoy Faucet Co.,
Inc., supra.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent, Young Hinkle Corporation, Lexington,
North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Chauffeurs, Teamsters
and Helpers Local Union No. 391, or any other labor or-
ganization, by discriminatorily refusing to hire job appli-
ISee, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, 717-721
(1962).
4 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
cants or in any other manner discriminating against em-
ployees with regard to their hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Telling job applicants that they will not be hired by
Respondent or other area employers because of their union
activity.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to orga-
nize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, including
the above-named labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is found
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer immediate and full employment to Terri Drake,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights or privi-
leges, and make her whole for losses she suffered by reason
of the discrimination against her, as set forth in the section
of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due.
(c) Post at its Lexington, North Carolina, plant copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion II, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to job applicants and to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
268