Yorkaire, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 1989

297 N.L.R.B. 401 (N.L.R.B. 1989)

YORKAIRE, INC 401
Yorkaire, Inc. and Sheet Metal Workers Local
Union No. 19. Cases 4-CA-16100, 4-CA-
16199, and 4-CA-16225
November 30, 1989
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On July 21, 1987, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A Ricci issued the attached decision con-
cluding that the Respondent had violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by changing the contrac-
tual terms and conditions of employment of its
sheet metal workers without giving the proper
notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service and the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation
as required under Section 8(d)(3) of the Act,' and
by withdrawing recognition from the Union there-
after
The Respondent excepted, arguing, inter aim,
that it was free to repudiate the collective-bargain-
ing agreement upon its expiration, in accordance
with the principles established in John Deklewa &
Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), enfd sub nom Iron
Workers Local 3 v NLRB 843 F 2d 770 (3d Cir
1988)
On December 17, 1987, the Board issued a
Notice to Show Cause why the Board should not
dismiss the complaint pursuant to the principles es-
tablished in Deklewa The General Counsel, the
Charging Party, and the Building and Construction
Trades Department, AFL-CIO, together with the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations, filed responses
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the papers filed by the parties
and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions 2 and to adopt the recom-
mended Order
We find that the Respondent's Deklewa excep-
tion was untimely raised The Board issued
Deklewa, February 20, 1987 The hearing in the in-
' The judge concluded, inter aim, that the Respondent violated Sec
8(d) of the Act We note that Sec 8(d) defines the obligation to bargain
collectively It is not itself an unfair labor practice section of the Act See
Accurate Die Casting Co, 292 NLRB 284 fn 5 (1989) In addition the
judge failed to conform his formal Conclusions of Law to his statement
in the decision that the Respondent's changing terms and conditions of
employment of its employees without serving proper notice in advance to
the requisite mediation services violated Sec 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
We correct this oversight
2 Member Cracraft concurs in her colleagues' adoption of the judge's
finding that by changing its sheet metal workers terms and conditions of
employment in August 1986 without giving proper notice to FMCS and
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation, the Respondent violated Sec
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act However, she does not pass on whether she
would find a violation of the Act had the Union, as nommoating party,
given timely 8(d) notice not only to FMCS but also to the appropriate
state agency
stant case was held March 24 and 25, 1987, and the
judge's decision issued July 21, 1987 The Respond-
ent did not during the hearing or in its brief to the
judge assert that its relationship with the Union
was governed by Section 8(f) of the Act In
August 1987, at the exceptions stage of the pro-
ceeding, the Respondent contended that the judge
failed to consider the application of Deklewa to the
case
We find that the Respondent has not timely
raised its defense that its relationship with the
Union was presumptively governed by Section 8(f)
See, e g, Armour Con-Agra, 291 NLRB 962 fn 1
(1988), Ellis Tacke Go, 229 NLRB 1296 fn 2
(1977) A contention raised for the first time in ex-
ceptions to the Board is ordinarily untimely raised
and, thus, deemed waived 3
Here, despite the fact that the case was entirely
litigated and bnefed to the judge after Deklewa
issued, the Respondent failed to raise the Deklewa
issue until it filed exceptions with the Board The
Respondent denied the Union's Section 9(a) status
in answering the complaint based on employee res-
ignations from the Union and nonmember replace-
ments, and it litigated the case without questioning
the status of the Union at times prior to the Re-
spondent's withdrawal of recognition on September
24, 1986 Thereby the Respondent implicitly con-
ceded that the Union enjoyed 9(a) status at least
until September 24, 1986
Consequently, we find that the General Counsel
carried the burden of establishing the Union's ma-
jority status The Respondent did not rebut the
General Counsel's case and cannot now be allowed
to so do on 8(f) grounds that have been untimely
raised We therefore conclude that the relationship
between the Respondent and the Union is gov-
erned by Section 9(a) of the Act
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-
1 By changing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of its sheet metal workers in August 1986
without giving the proper notice in advance to the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation, the Re-
spondent has violated and is violating Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
2 By withdrawing recognition from the Union
in September 1986, the Respondent has violated
and is violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
3 Ron E Savoia Construction Ca, 289 NLRB 200 (1988), is inapposite
because the case was already pending on exceptions to the Board when
the decision in Deklewa issued Member Cracraft, who dissented in
Savo's, finds it unnecessary to distinguish that case
297 NLRB No 58
402 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 The above-described unfair labor practices
affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Yorkaire,
Inc , York, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order
4 In so doing, we note that the Respondent's liability for loss of earn
ings from fringe benefits does not include industry advancement funds
As Industry advancement funds are permissive, nonmandatory subjects of
bargaining, It is not an unfair labor practice for an employer unilaterally
to discontinue its contributions to such funds American Thoro-Clean, 283
NLRB 1107, 1109 (1987) This matter may be resolved at the compliance
stage of this proceeding
Barbara C Joseph, Esq , for the General Counsel
Thomas R Davis, Esg and Harry R Harmon, Esq
(Harmon & Sears), of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, for the
Respondent
Ira Silverstein, Esq (Spear, Wdderman, Sigmond, Borish,
Endy & Silverstein), of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
the Charging Party
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A Ricci, Administrative Law Judge A hear-
ing was held in this proceeding at York, Pennsylvania,
on 24 and 25 March 1987, on complaint of the General
Counsel against Yorkaire Mechanical Contractors, a/k/a
Yorkaire, Inc (the Respondent or the Company) The
complaint issued on 29 December 1986, based on charges
filed on 29 September and 7 and 20 November 1986, by
Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No 19 (the Charging
Party or the Union) The issue presented is whether the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilat-
erally changing conditions of employment Briefs were
filed by all parties
On the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following 1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Yorkaire, Inc , a Pennsylvania corporation, is engaged
in the installation of sheet metal fabrication During the
12-month period before issuance of the complaint in the
course of its business it received gross revenues in excess
of $500,000 and during the same period of time it pur-
chased and received materials and supplies valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from locations outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania I find that the Re-
spondent is an employer within the meaning of the Act
I Separate motions by the General Counsel and the Respondent to cor-
rect inadvertent errors in the record transcript, unopposed, are granted
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No 19 is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Yorkaire Mechanical Contractors uses two categories
of employees—sheet metal workers and pipefitters At
the time of the events that gave rise to this proceeding It
had on its payroll about six or seven sheet metal work-
ers For some years these had been represented by Local
19, the Union here, under successive collective-bargain-
ing agreements The last contract in effect covered the
period 2 June 1984 to 31 May 1986 It was a multiem-
ployer association contract, of which the Respondent
was an integral part
In January 1986 the Respondent withdrew from the
Association and advised the Union that it wished to bar-
gain directly and independently of the Association The
Union agreed The parties met in negotiation three times,
on 3 June, 25 June, and 13 August There was no agree-
ment and that same day, 13 August, the Respondent ad-
vised the Union that it intended to put in effect all condi-
tions of employment which it had failed to convince the
Union to accept On 23 August it did that The changes
were extreme Apart from small variances on matters of
minor consequence, the principal change made—the one
that had been the main bone of contention between the
parties—was a reduction in pay, from the $21 65 per
hour which the employees had been receiving under the
terms of the old contract, to $14 per hour
The Respondent never gave notice to the Federal Me-
diation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) or to the Penn-
sylvania State Mediation Agency of its intent to change
the conditions of employment, until long after it had so
drastically altered the terms under which the employees
worked
The complaint now alleges that the Respondent violat-
ed the statute on two separate grounds (1) Despite its
desire and intent to modify the existing contract, it did so
without first giving the statutory requisite 30-day notice
to the FMCS and Pennsylvania State Mediation Agency
(2) It failed to bargain in good faith with the Union, and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it uni-
laterally changed all the conditions of employment and
bypassed the established majority representative of its
employees
As the facts set out below will show the Respondent
clearly violated Section 8(d) of the Act when it imple-
mented what it called its last offer to the Union, or in
the language of the statute, when "it modified the terms
of the contract then still in effect" If only because it ad-
mittedly took this unilateral action without first giving
the requisite 30 days' notice to the FMCS and the Penn-
sylvania State Mediation Agency, It committed an unfair
labor practice that day It may be that it also violated
Section 8(a)(5) because an honest impasse had in fact not
been reached in the bargaining that had taken place In
my considered judgment this second theory of complaint
is also supported by the evidence But no useful purpose
will be served by detailing in this decision all the record
YORKAIRE, INC 403
facts related to that aspect of the case Even if the
second theory were found to be correct, the remedy
would still be the same
Section 8(d) provides, in pertinent part, that
where there is in effect a collective bargaining con-
tract covering employees in an industry affecting
commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that no party to such contract shall ter-
minate or modify such contract, unless the party de-
siring such termination or modification-
\
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service within 30 days after such notice of the
existence of such a dispute and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency
established to mediate and conciliate disputes within
the state or territory where the dispute occurred,
provided no agreement has been reached by that
time, and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without re-
sorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and condi-
tions of the existing contract for a penod of 60 days
after such notice is given or until the expiration date
of such contract, whichever occurs later"
When, in August 1986, the Respondent changed unilat-
erally all the conditions of employment, there was still
"in effect" a collective-bargaining contract between the
parties The contract which took effect in 1984 read as
follows
Section 1 This agreement shall become effective on
the first day of June, 1984 and remain in full force
and effect until the last day of May, 1986, and shall
continue in force from year to year thereafter unless
written notice of reopening is given not less than 90
days pnor to the expiration date In the event such
a notice of requested reopening is served, this
agreement shall continue in force and effect until
conferences relating thereto have been terminated
by either party
Clearly there was a contract "in effect" when the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by modifying it with-
out first giving notice to the FMCS and the Pennsylva-
nia State Mediation Agency On the face of things the
Respondent committed the unfair labor practice alleged
Its defense is that it was the Union which first desired to
change the conditions of employment, that it was the
Union which first gave notice of such intention, and that,
therefore, because the Union was the "initiating party"
to the idea of changes, it was its duty to comply with the
requirements of Section 8(d) and not the Respondent's
As set out above the last contract between the Re-
spondent and the Union was a multiemployer agreement,
between the Sheet Metal Contractors' Association of
Central Pennsylvania and Local Union No 19 It was
due to expire on 31 May 1986, with explicit provision
that in the event either party requested reopening of the
contract the agreement was to "continue in force and
effect" until the subsequent bargaining ended On 27 Jan-
uary 1986 the Respondent wrote to the employer asso-
ciation resigning from that organization and withdrawing
all authorization to bargain on its behalf, "effective im-
mediately " By letter dated the same day it also wrote to
the Union, informing it that it had withdrawn from the
association and stating its intention to bargain individual-
ly with the Union It is the contention of the Respondent
in this proceeding that because neither of the two letters
used the word "modify," it of necessity follows that the
Respondent did not thereby reveal an "intent" to change
the terms of the old contract The facts of record com-
pletely belie the assertion
By chance, on the very same day-27 January 1986—
the Union also wrote to the Employer Association, ad-
vising it that it sought "to terminate and/or modify" the
about-to-expire contract The Respondent now contends
that this Union letter of 27 January must be viewed as a
notice to it—the individual Respondent Company—of
the Union's intent to change the terms and conditions
under which these employees—working for the Re-
spondent—were to work under a new contract This po-
sition rests entirely upon the fact that the Union, in wnt-
mg to the Association, used the word "modify," whereas
the Respondent's letter to the Union spoke only of "con-
cerning contractual negotiations"
When the Union wrote to the Association on 27 Janu-
ary the Respondent was no longer a member of the mul-
tiemployer group It had withdrawn the same day What
the Union's letter referred to, when it spoke of "our
present collective-bargaining agreement which expires on
May 31, 1986," was the Association contract Its stated
intent as to the future therefore meant what terms and
conditions of employment were to follow that contract,
and not any other The Respondent no longer being a
member of the Association it follows that the Union's
letter had nothing to do with the Respondent Company
It was not until 24 February, a month after the Respond-
ent's initiating letter, that the Union wrote to the Re-
spondent about modifying whatever new agreement
might be made separately with it
Moreover, the Union could not know—as early as Jan-
uary 1986—what its demands upon this employer could
be the day the two should meet in negotiations Its posi-
tion always has been, to start all negotiations first with
the Association, a contract that really covers hundreds
and hundreds of members of the Union Only after those
negotiations are completed does the Union meet with
small, separate employers who desire separate contracts
The Respondent's total of about six or seven sheet metal
workers could hardly have been of moment to the Union
at that time
As to the argument that because the Respondent's
letter to the Union of 27 January speaks only of prospec-
tive negotiations while the Union's letter of 24 February
speaks of modification, the complaint against the Re-
spondent must be dismissed, I view it all as but a play on
words It ignores the substantive meaning of the statuto-
ry requirement 2
2 See Mar Len Cabinets, 243 NLRB 523 (1979) A letter requesting
contract negotiations towards a new agreement is the equivalent of an
Intent to "terminate" the old agreement, and therefore makes the sender
the initiating party
404 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The very purpose of Section 8(d) is to alert the media-
tion services—Federal and state—to the possibility of an
industrial strike when the parties to the collective-bar-
gaining process are in serious dispute If the FMSC and
the state agency can step into the picture, peace may
take the place of financial hurt both to the employees
and the employer Was this a case where such a danger
should have been anticipated? Restated Was It the inten-
tion of the Respondent, when it withdrew from the asso-
ciation and told the Union it wished to bargain separate-
ly, to change, or "modify" the terms and conditions
under which its sheet metal workers were to work? If
there is one thing this record proves beyond doubt, it is
a "yes" to that question
Again and again at the hearing the Respondent's prin-
cipal witness admitted the Company could not remain in
business at all if it had to pay the ordinary union wages
The reason why it withdrew from the Association was
exactly in order to demand, and insist upon, a lower
wage scale it knew the Union would never concede to
the industry as a whole Actually, it is enough to look at
its initial wage cut demand—about 33 percent—to appre-
ciate the Respondent's position from first to last For 2
years, under the old contract, labor for sheet metal
workers have been costing it $21 65 per hour—$16 in
direct payment to the employee and $5 65 indirect pay-
ment for fringe benefits At its first meeting with the
Union's representatives the Respondent said the total
amount had to be reduced to $13 50 per hour During
the two meetings which followed it never deviated from
that fixed demand Although the Company agents re-
ferred to that one single payment as a "total package,"
they never really explained in what manner the fringe
benefits were to be covered They spoke of $1 out of the
total package as being intended to replace all the $5 65
for fringe benefits in the past, but never explained exact-
ly how they were suggesting all that be arranged All
this proves is that the Respondent had, from first to last,
but one idea in mind—to cut the wages by 33 percent It
was not until the last minute of the third and last meeting
between the parties on 13 August that it raised its offer
to $14 total package per hour
As already explained above no useful purpose would
be served by restating here all the details of evidence,
which, according to the General Counsel, are sufficient
to prove that the few meetings between the parties did
not justify the unilateral action taken by the Respondent
on 23 August If she is right, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act entirely apart from having
failed in its duty, under Section 8(d), to serve notice on
the FMCS and the Pennsylvania state agency
On 24 September the Respondent formerly withdrew
recognition from the Union In either event, the remedy
would be the same I therefore shall ignore that collater-
al allegation in the complaint Were I to consider it on
its merits, I would find the violation as alleged if only
because the Respondent's initial request for bargaining
was for a meeting after 31 May, the first meeting of the
parties actually took place on 3 June, on 3 June the par-
ties exchanged detailed proposals, the Company came up
with 12 changes in the contract and the Union with 7 or
8, and all were mutually explained, when the parties met
again on 25 June there was very little talk because the
union president was busy with larger negotiations with
companies having many more unionized employees than
the Respondent's six or seven sheetmetal workers, at the
last meeting of 13 August again the proposals and coun-
terproposals were discussed, and the Union came up
with a number of concessions to the Respondent in re-
sponse to its insistence that economic conditions required
them, in the face of all this the Respondent never varied
from each of its demands, it never explained how, and to
what extent it intended to utilize the $1 per hour that
was to go towards all the fringe benefits, when it
claimed impasse and put its proposals in effect, one of
them at least—the health insurance program—was not
the one it had offered to the Union at the meeting
On 13 August, the day of its last meeting with the
union agents, the Respondent announced it would put in
effect its $14 total package in replacement of the existing
conditions of employment of the old contract still in
effect It told its employees of its intent the next day, and
on 25 August it did exactly that
I find that the Respondent was the initiating party to
the intended modification of the old contract And I find
that because it had never served notice upon either the
FMCS or the Pennsylvania state agency of its intent to
terminate and change the old contract before initiating
those changes, the Respondent violated Section 8(d) of
the Act Weather Craft Co of Topeka, 276 NLRB 452
(1985) In September the Respondent formally withdrew
recognition from the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit
Because it was currently violating the statute in a very
substantial sense, I find that such denial of recognition to
the established bargaining agent was a further violation
of Section 8(a)(5)
As the Respondent had so drastically lowered the
wage scale in violation of the statute, some of the sheet
metal workers refused to work—and went on strike I
find that that strike was an unfair labor practice strike
In the light of the unfair labor practices here found,
the Respondent must be ordered to resume bargaining
with the Union in good faith, to make whole its sheet
metal workers for any deductions in pay and fringe bene-
fits due them under the old contract which were denied
them starting on 25 August 1986, and to post the appro-
priate notices At the hearing there was talk of the Re-
spondent and the Union having resumed their bargaining
a few days earlier, in an attempt to remedy all the dis-
putes and claims that resulted from the events of 1986 I
do not know the facts about what happened there or
since If the parties have reached an amicable adjustment
of their differences, good I will leave all that to be in-
vestigated in the compliance stage of this proceeding
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
ON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations
of the Respondent described in section I, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to
YORKAIRE, INC 405
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce
- THE REMEDY
The Respondent must be ordered to cease and desist
from again committing the unfair labor practices found
herein It must be ordered to make whole its sheet metal
workers for any reductions in pay, and loss of fringe
benefits, they suffered in consequence of the Respond-
ent's unlawful action in implementing its 1986 offer to
their union The Respondent must also post the usual ap-
propriate notices
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 By changing the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of its sheet metal workers in 1986 without serving
the proper notice in advance to the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service and the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Mediation the Respondent has violated, and is violating
Section 8(d) of the Act
2 By withdrawing recognition from the Union in Sep-
tember 1986 the Respondent has violated, and is violat-
ing Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
3 By the foregoing conduct the Respondent has vio-
lated, and is violating, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
4 The above-described unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed3
ORDER
The Respondent, Yorkaire, Inc , York, Pennsylvania,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
I Cease and desist from
(a) Changing the terms and conditions of employment
of its sheet metal workers represented by Sheet Metal
Workers Local Union No 19, without first serving the
appropriate notices upon the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service and the Pennsylvania Bureau of Me-
diation
(b) Withdrawing recognition from the Sheet Metal
Workers Local Union No 19 as the bargaining repre-
sentative of its sheet metal workers
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No 19, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid and protection as guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such ac-
tivities
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
2 Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Make whole its sheet metal workers for any loss of
earnings, either in the form of direct pay or fnnge bene-
fits, they may have suffered in consequence of the Re-
spondent's unlawful action in reducing those benefits in
August 1986, with interest thereon to be computed in the
manner prescribed in F W Woolworth Go, 90 NLRB
289 (1950), and New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987)
(b) On request, bargain with Sheet Metal Workers
Local Union No 19 as the exclusive representative of its
sheet metal workers
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order
(d) Post at its place of business in York, Pennsylvania,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix "
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Re-
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply
If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board"
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice
WE WILL NOT alter the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of our sheet metal workers represented by the
Union without first serving the appropriate notices upon
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Sheet Metal
Workers Local Union No 19, as the exclusive represent-
ative of our sheet metal workers
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act
406 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL make whole our sheet metal workers for any
loss of pay or fringe benefits they may have suffered by
reason of our having altered their terms and conditions
of employment illegally in August 1986
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with Sheet
Metal Workers Local Union No 19, as the exclusive rep-
resentative of our sheet metal workers
YORKAIRE, INC