Yogendra Desai, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 6, 2003
01a22073 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6, 2003)

01a22073

03-06-2003

Yogendra Desai, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Yogendra Desai v. United States Postal Service

01A22073

3/6/03

.

Yogendra Desai,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A22073

Agency No. 1J-603-0076-00

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. ,

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's

final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Distribution Clerk at the agency's South Suburban Processing &

Distribution Center facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on March 21, 2000, alleging that

he was discriminated against on the bases of race (Asian), sex (male),

disability (cervical arthritis/radiculopathy), and age (D.O.B. 6/29/39)

when, on December 15, 1999, his pay was reduced from the PS-6 pay level

to the PS-5 pay level.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

initially requested a hearing, but later withdrew his request and opted

for an immediate agency final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of discrimination on any bases because he failed to

establish that any similarly situated individuals not in his protected

classes were treated more favorably. Furthermore, the agency found that

it articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action,

which complainant failed to establish was a pretext for discrimination.

As for his claim of disability discrimination, the agency found

complainant failed to introduce any evidence that he suffers from an

impairment.

Complainant did not submit contentions on appeal, and the agency asks

that we affirm its final decision.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

After a review of the record, the Commission concurs with the agency's

determination that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination on any bases. Indeed, complainant averred that he

believed other individuals outside of his protected classes would have

been treated the same as he was under similar circumstances.

The Commission further finds that complainant failed to present

evidence that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons

for its actions were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this

conclusion, we note that the Personnel Manager averred that a review of

records revealed that on February 28, 1991, complainant had been given a

limited duty position as an accommodation following an on-the-job injury.

Complainant was afforded a �special pay status� that permitted him a saved

grade level 6 pay level for his limited duty position. Soon thereafter,

complainant bid on several other positions at pay level 5, and was the

successful bidder on those positions. However, the agency erred in not

updating a code in his records which would have removed him from the

�special pay status� that he had been in while encumbering the limited

duty position. The error was noticed in 1998, and corrected.

Soon thereafter, complainant approached the personnel office and informed

them about the pay change. The Personnel Manager informed complainant

of the error and stated that he had been mistakenly over paid for

several years. The Personnel Manager averred that to retroactively

correct the mistake would have forced complainant to pay back the agency

a substantial amount of money through no fault of his own. Instead,

the Personnel Manager informed complainant that the matter would be

corrected as of 1997, the date of his last bid, so that he would not

have to repay the agency.

In sum, the Manager of Personnel averred that complainant's pay level

changed not because of complainant's membership in a protected class,

but because he chose to bid out of a limited duty position that would

have enabled him to retain a saved grade. The agency's mistake was made

apparent years later when it learned complainant's records had not been

updated to reflect that by biding out of his limited duty position,

he was no longer entitled to the benefits of that position, including

saved grade.

Complainant presented no evidence that would contradict this information,

nor did he provide any evidence that would establish a discriminatory

motive on the agency's part. We note that we have assumed complainant

is an individual with a disability for the purpose of this decision.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

3/6/03

Date