Yarvis, Mark D. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 27, 2019

14105676 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/105,676 12/13/2013 Mark D. Yarvis P60463 4384
88032 7590 12/27/2019
Jordan IP Law, LLC
12501 Prosperity Drive, Suite 401
Silver Spring, MD 20904
EXAMINER
HUARACHA, WILLY W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2195
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/27/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
admin@jordaniplaw.com
info@jordaniplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK D. YARVIS, CHRISTOPHER J. LORD,
ADAM ELMAN, ASHWIN PATTI, ANANTHA DEEPTHI UPPALA,
ADEDAMOLA OMOTOSHO, TEA LIUKKONEN-OLMIALA,
SWETA K. PATEL, and MILIND S. PANDIT
Appeal 2019-001463
Application 14/105,676
Technology Center 2100
Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s rejection. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Intel
Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to “a contextually-aware platform that
manages itself over the course of the day,” and that “may predict the user’s
plans and goals, learn preferred platform settings and continuously prepare
and manage resources to achieve the users’ needs.” Spec. ¶ 31. Claims 2–5,
8–11, 14–17, 20–24 are canceled; claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 25–33
are pending, of which claims 1, 7, 13, and 19 are independent. Appeal
Br. 26–33. Claim 19 is reproduced below for reference (emphasis added):
19. An apparatus to manage platform resources, comprising:
a processor;
a logic architecture implemented at least partly in one or
more of configurable logic or fixed functionality logic hardware,
to determine a user’s planned activities over a future timeframe
and manage the platform resources to meet one or more needs
associated with the user's planned activities,
wherein the logic architecture includes:
a user plan module to generate an activity plan for
the user wherein the user plan module is to predict one or more
of a meeting, a trip, a presentation, a media consumption session
or an application usage to generate the activity plan wherein the
activity plan is to be generated based on two or more of location
information, calendar information, historical information or
message information associated with the user;
a resource plan module to generate a resource plan
based on the activity plan and a current resource state of the
platform wherein the resource plan module is to determine one
or more resource needs of the platform and an availability of one
or more of the platform resources to generate the resource plan;
and
a remediation module to resolve one or more
conflicts between the activity plan and the resource plan wherein
a conflict is an inability of the one or more of the platform
resources to meet a resource need of the activity plan and
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wherein the remediation module is to determine
whether involvement of the user is required to resolve the one or
more conflicts,
when the involvement is not required, determine
whether user approval is required for one or more platform
changes to resolve the one or more conflicts, and
automatically implement the one or more platform
changes when the involvement is not required and the user
approval is not required.

References and Rejections
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Begole
Kelly
US 7,882,056 B2
US 9,710,252 B2
Feb. 1, 2011
July 18, 2017
Agrawal US 2010/0063756 A1 Mar. 11, 2010

Claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 25–33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being patent ineligible. Final Act. 2.
Claims 1, 6, 19, 25–27, 32, and 33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) as being indefinite. Final Act. 7.
Claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 25–33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Agrawal, Begole, and Kelly. Final Act. 8.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make
are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree
with Appellant that the Examiner erred and adopt as our own the findings
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and reasons set forth by the Examiner. We add the following primarily for
emphasis.
We discuss each of the statutory grounds of rejection in turn, below.

Patent Eligibility
The Examiner determines the claims are patent ineligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101, because “the claimed invention is directed to a judicial
exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea)
without significantly more.” Final Act. 2; see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (describing the two-step framework “for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.”).
After the docketing of this Appeal, the USPTO published revised
guidance on the application of § 101 (“Guidance”). See, e.g., USPTO 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Memorandum”); USPTO October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Update”), noticed at 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct.
18, 2019).
Under Step 2A of the Guidance, the Office looks to whether the claim
recites:
(1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–
(c), (e)–(h)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, does the Office then look, under Step
2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not well-understood, routine, conventional in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
We add the following primarily for emphasis and clarification with
respect to the Guidance.

A. Step 2A, Prong One
The Examiner determines the claims set forth “the abstract idea of
managing [a] battery (resource) of a mobile computing platform based on a
user activity plans and goals.” Final Act. 2. Appellant contends that, in
contrast to the Examiner’s determination, claim 192 “recites specific rules to
generate the activity plan and the resource plan, identify a conflict between
the activity plan and the resource plan, and automatically resolve the
conflict.” Appeal Br. 12. Regardless of the overall characterization of the

2 Appellant states claim 19 is representative for purposes of the eligibility
discussion. See Appeal Br. 11. We note independent claim 19 does not
recite certain limitations, such as a battery, that are present in independent
claim 1. Although we do not reach such un-argued differences in our
analysis, we note Office Practice is that “[c]laims should preferably be
arranged in order of scope so that the first claim presented is the least
restrictive.” MPEP § 608.01(m).
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claim, we determine claim 19 recites a judicial exception pursuant to Step
2A, Prong One of the Guidance. See Memorandum 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Particularly, claim 19 recites “a logic architecture implemented at
least partly in one or more of configurable logic or fixed functionality logic
hardware, to determine a user’s planned activities over a future timeframe
and manage the platform resources to meet one or more needs associated
with the user’s planned activities.” This “logic architecture” is configured to
perform steps of determining and managing, and the limitation recites
analyzing and outputting data in a manner that can be reasonably
characterized as “[m]ental processes” that entail steps of “observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion.” Memorandum 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also
Update page 7; Spec. 2 (“Conventionally, users of computing platforms may
manually manage the resources of the platform.”); Appeal Br. 14 (“manually
planning ahead may be a solution . . . [although] challenging”); Elec. Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The focus
of the asserted claims . . . is on collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.”); see also
ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(“[T]he invention of the patent is nothing more than the abstract idea of
communication over a network for interacting with a device, applied to the
context of electric vehicle charging stations.”).
Claim 19 further recites the logic architecture comprises various
modules: a “user plan module,” used “to generate an activity plan for the
user” by “predict[ing] one or more of a meeting, a trip, a presentation, a
media consumption session or an application usage to generate the activity
plan . . . based on two or more of location information, calendar information,
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historical information or message information associated with the user”; a “a
resource plan module,” used “to generate a resource plan based on the
activity plan and a current resource state of the platform . . . [and] to
determine one or more resource needs of the platform and an availability of
one or more of the platform resources to generate the resource plan”; and a
“remediation module” used “to resolve one or more conflicts between the
activity plan and the resource plan wherein a conflict is an inability of the
one or more of the platform resources to meet a resource need of the activity
plan.” Similar to the logic architecture recitation, these module limitations
are configured to perform steps of “observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” and thus can be reasonably characterized as “[m]ental processes.”
Memorandum 84 Fed. Reg. 52, 53; Update 8 (“Examples of claims that
recite mental processes” include “a claim to collecting and comparing
known information (claim 1), which are steps that can be practically
performed in the human mind, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC,” 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011).).
The recited “remediation module” is further used to “determine
whether involvement of the user is required to resolve the one or more
conflicts,” “determine whether user approval is required for one or more
platform changes to resolve the one or more conflict,” and “implement the
one or more platform changes” based on the determinations. These
limitations are steps of determining and applying the determinations, and
recite analyzing and outputting data in a manner that can be reasonably
characterized as “[m]ental processes” such as “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion.” Memorandum 84 Fed. Reg. 52; cf. In re Brown, 645 F.
App’x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (non-precedential) (claim limitations
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“encompass the mere idea of applying different known hair styles to balance
one’s head. Identifying head shape and applying hair designs accordingly is
an abstract idea capable, as the Board notes, of being performed entirely in
one’s mind”).
Accordingly, we conclude the claims recite a judicial exception under
Prong One of the Guidance. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. 54.

B. Step 2A, Prong Two
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error, because “claim
19 may enhance computer usage” for “individuals having busy schedules”
and as “computing platforms increase in complexity.” Appeal Br. 14.
Particularly, Appellant contends that “claim 19 recites specific rules rooted
in computer technology to solve a problem specifically arising in computer
technology. In particular, claim 19 solves a problem of resource
management and usage to meet a user’s activity plan.” Id. at 15.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The features
Appellant relies on to show patent eligibility, such as the “specific rules to
identify and resolve one or more conflicts,” are not recited in the claim.
Appeal Br. 12; see Ans. 11 (the limitations of claim 19 “do not . . ., in any
manner, set forth any particular or specific way to implement a solution to
the problem or to achieve a desired outcome.”). Unclaimed rules do not
render an invention patent eligible. See Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco
Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[N]either the
specifics of any novel computer modelling nor experimental modal analysis
are disclosed in the patent, much less included in the claims themselves, and
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these unclaimed features cannot function to remove claims 1 and 22 from
the realm of ineligible subject matter.”).
Instead of specific rules, claim 19 broadly recites various modules to
determine and “resolve conflicts.” See Ans. 12. Thus, the claim recites a
result (resolving platform conflicts) without specifying a way of achieving
the result. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Eligible “claims . . . transform[ed] a claim from one claiming
only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it.”); see ChargePoint, 920
F.3d at 769 (“[T]he specification cannot be used to import details from the
specification if those details are not claimed,” and “claims that claim nothing
more than the broad law or abstract idea underlying the claims, [are]
preempting all use of that law or idea.”). Given the breadth of the claim, we
disagree with Appellant that the limitations of claim 19 “do not pre-empt the
management of resources.” Appeal Br. 17.3
Other than the recited judicial exception, the claim includes hardware
(“a processor” and optionally a “logic hardware”). The claim further recites
the step of “automatically implement[ing] the one or more platform changes
when the involvement is not required and the user approval is not required.”
These limitations do not improve the underlying technology, or other
technical systems. See Final Act. 4. The claim will, at most, improve the
user experience. See Spec. ¶ 25 (“an entirely automatic conflict resolution
that may significantly enhance the user experience with regard to resource

3 In any event, although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In the instant case, the issue of preemption has been
resolved by the § 101 analysis performed by the Office. See Ans. 16.
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management on a platform.”); ¶ 77 (“[U]sers may spend more time and
effort on tasks and activities of importance to them via the techniques
described herein.”); cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084,
1090 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This invention makes the trader faster and more
efficient, not the computer. This is not a technical solution to a technical
problem.”).
As admitted by Appellant, the claim merely uses the ordinary
capabilities of a computer to automate what previously has been done
manually by a user. See Appeal Br. 14; Spec. ¶¶ 2, 22, 77. This is not
enough to integrate the underlying abstract idea into a practical application
under the Guidance, as “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more
quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 771 (“[T]he fact that the electricity flow is
modified based on demand response principles does nothing to make this
claim directed to something other than the abstract idea.”). Thus, the recited
“additional element[s] merely recite[] the words ‘apply it’ (or an equivalent)
with the judicial exception, or merely includes instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform
an abstract idea.” Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Accordingly, we determine the additional elements of claim 19—
individually and as an ordered combination—do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. 54.
As the “claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception
into a practical application” (id. at 51), “the claim is directed to the . . .
judicial exception” (id. at 54).
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C. Step 2B
As discussed above, we find none of the additional elements,
individually or as an ordered combination, integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application, under Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance;
these elements do not add significantly more to the exception under Step 2B
of the Guidance. See Update page 21, n.82 (“[M]any of the considerations
evaluated in revised Step 2A overlap with Step 2B and thus, are not
reevaluated in Step 2B”); see also Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Further, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in determining that
claim 19 is “recited at a high level of generality, [and] provide[s]
conventional computer functions that do not add meaningful limits to
practicing the abstract idea.” Final Act. 3. The features Appellant refers to
as unconventional (see Appeal Br. 16) recite the identified judicial exception
discussed above; these limitations are not “additional elements individually
and in combination” that may “provide an inventive concept” amounting to
“significantly more than the exception itself.” Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55–56; see also Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. 55, n.24. Based on the
record before us, we agree with the Examiner that the additional elements,
individually and as an ordered combination, are “[g]eneric computer
components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and convention activities.” Final Act. 4; Spec. ¶¶ 2, 22,
26–29, 78, 79; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 226; OIP Techs, 788 F.3d at 1363;
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2017). Thus, we find independent claim 19’s claim elements, individually
and as an ordered combination, do not provide significantly more than the
recited judicial exception.
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We agree with the Examiner that claim 19 is patent ineligible.
Appellant does not present additional substantive arguments for the
remaining claims. See Appeal Br. 10–18. Accordingly, we do not find the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, and
25–33 is in error.

Indefiniteness
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 6, 26, 27, 19, 25, and 32–33 as
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) because they include functional
limitations invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but do not disclose sufficient
corresponding structure in the Specification for performing the recited
functions. See Final Act. 5–7. Particularly, the Examiner finds that it “is
uncertain and not clearly understood as to what structural elements are
intended to perform the claimed functions” of independent claim 19:
“claim[] 19 . . . recites generic placeholders language ‘a user plan module’,
‘a resource plan module’, ‘a remediation module’ followed by function
language such as ‘to generate an activity plan’, ‘to generate a resource plan’
and ‘to resolve one or more conflicts,’” and these limitations “do not have a
corresponding structural definition in the specification in accordance with 35
U.S.C. § 112(f).” Final Act. 7.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Appellant
contends the claims do not recite means-plus-function limitations invoking
35 U.S.C. § 112(f), because claim 19, “when read in light of the
specification connoted sufficient, definite structure to one of skill in the art,”
and “the features interpreted by the Office under § 112(f) are part of a logic
architecture, as distinctly claimed by claim 19.” Appeal Br. 19. Appellant
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challenges the Examiner’s finding of indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) for similar reasons. See Appeal Br. 20.
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. We
address each of the 112 issues in turn, below.

A. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
We agree with the Examiner that claim 19 “use[s] the non-structural
term ‘module’ . . . coupled with functional language without recited
sufficient structure to achieve the [claimed] function.” Ans. 19. The
modules of claim 19 are generic placeholders, equivalent to the term
“means.” Final Act. 16; see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d
1339, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he word ‘module’ does not provide any
indication of structure because it sets forth the same black box recitation of
structure for providing the same specified function as if the term ‘means’
had been used”). Although each of the module recitations include a prefix
(“user plan module,” “resource plan module,” “remediation module”), such
prefixes merely indicate the function of the respective module without
connoting additional structure. See Ans. 19, 20.
Appellant does not challenge the above analysis of the module terms;
rather Appellant relies on the Specification’s disclosure of logic. See Appeal
Br. 19, 20. Appellant’s citation to the logic architecture of the Specification,
however, does not provide a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary
skill in the art that the module terms denote structure. That is, one of
ordinary skill would not understand the modules—implemented in logic—to
be structural components as the term is used in the means-plus-function
analysis. See Appellant’s Spec. ¶ 18 (describing the “logic architecture” in
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functional terms, as used to “manage one or more platform resources”),
Spec. ¶ 22 (describing “a set of logic instructions stored in a machine- or
computer readable storage medium”).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 19 is
properly construed to be invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Final Act. 5–7.
B. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
Appellant’s argument challenging the Examiner’s finding of
indefiniteness is substantially the same as the argument challenging the
Examiner’s invocation of means-plus-function. See Appeal Br. 20
(“Furthermore, Appellant submits that structure does exist for the features
interpreted under § 112(f). For example, the features interpreted by the
Office under § 112(f) are part of a logic architecture.”). Appellant, however,
fails to identify any structure, such as an algorithm, to persuade us the claim
terms are not indefinite. See Examining Computer-Implemented Functional
Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 59
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“For a computer-implemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim
limitation, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the
claimed specific computer function, or else the claim is indefinite under 35
U.S.C. 112(b).”). We find the Specification provides at most examples, but
no algorithms (or rules) the modules would follow in performing the claimed
functions. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 16, 17; see also Figure 2 (depicting block
diagrams of the various modules), Spec. ¶ 79 (“[S]pecifics with respect to
implementation of such block diagram arrangements are highly dependent
upon the platform within which the embodiment is to be implemented, i.e.,
such specifics should be well within purview of one skilled in the art.”).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding the
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Specification “fails to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention” of claim 19. Ans. 22.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 19 is indefinite. Appellant
does not present additional substantive arguments for the remaining claims.
See Appeal Br. 18–20. Accordingly, we do not find the Examiner’s 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) rejection of claims 1, 6, 19, 25–27, 32, and 33 is in error.4

Obviousness
Appellant does not separately argue the claims. See Appeal Br. 21,
24. We select claim 19 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant argues the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is in error:
[The claim] recites “wherein the remediation module is to
determine whether involvement of the user is required to resolve
the one or more conflicts, wherein when the involvement is not
required, the remediation module is to determine whether user
approval is required for one or more platform changes to
resolve the one or more conflicts, and wherein the remediation
module is to automatically implement the one or more platform
changes when the involvement is not required and the user
approval is not required” (Emphasis Added). The cited prior art
does not disclose or suggest this combination of features.
Appeal Br. 21. Particularly, Appellant contends that Agrawal teaches
“power scheme modifications occur when the battery life is predicted to last

4 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to determine
whether the claims lack sufficient written description support. See 84 Fed.
Reg. at 61 (“When a claim containing a computer implemented 35 U.S.C.
112(f) claim limitation is found to be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) for
failure to disclose sufficient corresponding structure (e.g., the computer and
the algorithm) in the specification that performs the entire claimed function,
it will also lack written description.”).
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through an event (i.e., no conflict is detected),” whereas the claim
“specifically relates to automatically resolving conflicts.” Appeal Br. 21,
22. Appellant further contends that “Kelly in no way relates to power
management, or automatically allowing for changes to power management
settings to resolve the power conflict identified by Agrawal,” and that “it
would not be obvious to incorporate the disclosure of Kelly into Agrawal as
suggested by the Examiner.” Appeal Br. 23, 24 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments fail to show the Examiner errs in finding the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested the limitations
of claim 19. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for
obviousness is not . . . that the claimed invention must be expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.”).
Here, the Examiner correctly finds Agrawal teaches or suggests the
system will “determine whether involvement of the user is required to
resolve the one or more conflicts,” and “automatically implement the one or
more platform changes when the involvement is not required” because
Agrawal teaches a “battery life management unit” that determines “if the
battery power is estimated not to last throughout the one or more scheduled
events” and selects “power schemes . . . that do not require user involvement
to resolve conflicts.” Final Act. 10 (citing Agrawal ¶¶ 15, 20). Agrawal
discloses “if the battery power is estimated to last throughout the scheduled
event (e.g., the scheduled two-hour presentation or a scheduled two-hour
flight), the battery life management unit 150 causes the portable device 110
to automatically switch to a preferred power scheme.” Agrawal ¶ 20.
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We disagree with Appellant that Agrawal’s power scheme is switched
automatically only when “no conflict is detected.” Reply Br. 6. Agrawal’s
resolution (e.g., switching power schemes) does not indicate Agrawal’s
system did not determine a conflict (e.g., insufficient predicted battery).
That is, Agrawal teaches or suggests the battery will last through an event
because the power scheme is selected based on the upcoming schedule.5 See
Agrawal ¶ 18 (battery power is estimated based on factors including the
available power schemes). Agrawal explains that the “suggested power
schemes” are the ones that will “result in the battery lasting throughout the
scheduled event,” suggesting that other (non-chosen) power schemes will be
insufficient. Agrawal ¶ 20. One of ordinary skill, therefore, will understand
Agrawal suggests resolving a conflict automatically by switching to a
preferred power scheme, in the same manner as claimed. See Spec. ¶¶ 15,
16.
We also disagree with Appellant that the Examiner errs in finding one
of ordinary skill would modify Agrawal with Kelly “for automatically
implementing changes when user approval and/or user involvement is not
required to perform the changes.” Final Act. 11; contra Reply Br. 7.
Although Kelly teaches that the user approval and automatic changes relate
to downloading software updates (see Kelly 14:15–24), we find no evidence
suggesting that one of ordinary skill would be compelled to adopt Kelly’s
relevant teachings only in the context of software updates. See Lear Siegler,
Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Neither is the
practitioner in reading the [cited] patent disclosure compelled to adopt every

5 If not to preserve power, why else would Agrawal adjust the power
scheme?
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single aspect of its teaching without the exercise of independent
judgment.”); see also In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973)
(“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to
combine their specific structures”). Rather, we agree with the Examiner that
“Kelly broadly disclosed the widely applicable concept of checking whether
user approval is needed before initiating a desired action or operation,” and
“it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to incorporate this
additional ‘check’ to the system of Agrawal.” Ans. 27, 28. We find the
Examiner’s analysis constitutes articulated reasoning with rational
underpinnings sufficient to justify the conclusion of obviousness. See In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 19, or the remaining claims, is in error.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 7, 12,
13, 18, 19,
25–33
101 Eligibility 1, 6, 7, 12,
13, 18, 19,
25–33

1, 6, 19,
25–27, 32,
33
112(b) Indefiniteness 1, 6, 19,
25–27, 32,
33

1, 6, 7, 12,
13, 18, 19,
25–33
103 Agrawal, Begole,
Kelly
1, 6, 7, 12,
13, 18, 19,
25–33

Overall
Outcome
1, 6, 7, 12,
13, 18, 19,
25–33

Appeal 2019-001463
Application 14/105,676

19
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED