Xuefei Guan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 6, 2019

13855130 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 6, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/855,130 04/02/2013 Xuefei Guan 2012P08113US01 7181
28524 7590 08/06/2019
SIEMENS CORPORATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
Orlando, FL 32817
EXAMINER
SUN, XIUQIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2863
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/06/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte XUEFEI GUAN, JINGDAN ZHANG,
KAI KADAU, and SHAOHUA KEVIN ZHOU
____________

Appeal 2018-008562
Application 13/855,130
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, MONTÉ T. SQUIRE, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.

CASHION, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellants1 appeal from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Siemens Corporation of Iselin, NJ, a U.S. corporation, and Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft of Munich, Germany, a German corporation, are
identified as the real parties in interest. App. Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention is generally directed to methods for probabilistic
fatigue life prediction using ultrasonic non-destructive examination (NDE)
data. Spec. 1. According to the Specification, there is a need to identify and
accurately quantify fatigue crack flaws for proper maintenance and to avoid
catastrophic events. Id. This is generally done through the technique of
nondestructive examination using ultrasonic testing (UT). Id. The
ultrasound raw data obtained from this technique is converted to physical
flaw size usually involving multiple steps, including probe tuning,
calibration, signal processing, and the final flaw size calculation. Id. at 1–2.
However, this conversion process can lead to unreliable results due to the
stochastic nature of flaws embedded in the target component because the
physical flaw size can have large variations for a given intensity of
ultrasound response signal. Id. at 2. In view of this and other uncertainties
that propagate through the life prediction model, maintenance
decision-making is detrimentally impacted and may lead to catastrophic
results. Id. The inventors address this problem by using a series of known
equations to provide a probabilistic prediction of fatigue life of the object
based on the estimate of the life of the object. Id. at 3–6. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the subject matter claimed and is reproduced below:
1. A method for probabilistically predicting fatigue life
in materials comprising:

in a processor, receiving a random variable for an actual
equivalent initial flaw size (EIFS) of a flaw in an object as
detected by an ultrasound transducer having a sensitivity and
diameter, the EIFS being a function of a reported EIFS, which
is a function of the sensitivity and diameter of the ultrasound
transducer, wherein the random variable is sampled from a
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distribution for a ratio of an actual EIFS to the reported EIFS
multiplied by the reported EIFS;

generating in the processor, random variables for
parameters of a fatigue crack growth equation from a
multivariate distribution, the multivariate distribution being
representative of at least one model parameter and a plurality of
experimental data points based on a Bayesian parameter
estimation;

solving the fatigue crack growth equation using these
random variables, the fatigue crack growth equation being a
function of the random variable for the actual EIFS and the
random variables for the parameters, the solved fatigue crack
growth equation providing an estimate of life of the object; and

providing a probabilistic prediction of fatigue life of the
object based on the estimate of the life of the object.

Independent claim 9 is directed to a non-transitory computer-
readable medium comprising a computer program product which
performs essentially the action steps of claim 1. Independent claim 17
is directed to a system (apparatus) to perform essentially the action
steps of claim 1.
Appellants request review of the Examiner’s final decision to reject
claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed
to non-statutory subject matter (i.e., an abstract idea) without significantly
more. Final Act. 2; App. Br. 7.
Appellants designate independent claim 1 as representative of the
subject matter presented by the independent claims. App. Br. 8, 11. In
addition, Appellants rely on the arguments presented for claim 1 to address
the rejection of all remaining claims. Id. at 11–12. Accordingly, we select
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claim 1 as representative of the subject matter claimed and decide the appeal
based on the arguments made by Appellants for claim 1.

ANALYSIS
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (ineligible subject matter)
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices, Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611;
mathematical formulas, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978); and
mental processes, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972). Concepts
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determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products,” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber,
smelting ores,” id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252,
267–68 (1854)); and manufacturing flour, Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876)).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see,
e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘“inventive
concept”’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
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ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
35 U.S.C. § 101, the 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “Guidance”).2 Under the
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes),
(designated as Step 2A (Prong 1) in the Guidance); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (designated as
Step 2A (Prong 2) in the Guidance).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception (designated as Step 2B in the Guidance).

2 We note that the Guidance was not available to the Examiner and
Appellants during the prosecution of the instant Application.
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Step 2A (Prong 1) and Step 2A (Prong 2) are used for the analysis
under the first step of Alice, while Step 2B informs the analysis under the
second step of Alice.
The Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner determines that, although representative claim 1 is a
process, the claim is directed to a judicial exception: an abstract idea.
Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 3. According to the Examiner, claim 1 is similar to claims
that the Federal Circuit has determined to be directed to a mathematical
algorithm. See Final Act. 2, 3 ((citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir.
1989), Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) and Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978)); see also Ans. 4 (additionally relying on Digitech Image
Tech., LLC v. Elec. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In
concluding that claim 1 is directed to patent ineligible subject matter, the
Examiner finds that the additional elements do not add significantly more to
the abstract idea because they are generically recited and/or conventional
and well-understood in the art. Final Act. 4; Adv. Act. 3.
Determination of Claims’ Statutory Category
Before any consideration as to whether a claim is directed to patent
ineligible subject matter, such as an abstract idea, we must first determine if
the claim falls under a statutory category, a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
There is no dispute between Appellants and the Examiner that the
claims fall under a statutory category under 35 U.S.C. § 101. App. Br. 3; see
generally Final Act. and Ans. Specifically, representative claim 1 is directed
to a method (process) defining an act or step, or a series of acts or steps,
“performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
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different state or thing.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (quoting Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)).
Having established that the claims fall within a statutory category, we
now follow the Guidance to analyze claim 1 to determine whether the claims
are directed to a patent ineligible subject matter.

Determination of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
a. Alice Step 1 (Office Revised Step 2A (Prong 1))
The Examiner determined that the subject matter of independent claim
1 is directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 2–4.
Under Step 2A (Prong 1) of the Guidance, we must first determine
whether the claims include any limitations that fall within the subject matter
groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section I of the Guidance.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–54.
As the Examiner notes, independent claim 1 comprises the steps of:
generating in the processor, random variables for parameters of
a fatigue crack growth equation from a multivariate
distribution, the multivariate distribution being representative of
at least one model parameter and a plurality of experimental
data points based on a Bayesian parameter estimation;

solving the fatigue crack growth equation using these random
variables, the fatigue crack growth equation being a function of
the random variable for the actual EIFS and the random
variables for the parameters, the solved fatigue crack growth
equation providing an estimate of life of the object; and

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providing a probabilistic prediction of fatigue life of the object
based on the estimate of the life of the object.

Ans. 2–3.
In addition, the claim defines an actual equivalent initial flaw size
(EIFS) as a function of a reported EIFS, which is a function of the sensitivity
and diameter of the ultrasound transducer, wherein the random variable is
sampled from a distribution for a ratio of an actual EIFS to the reported
EIFS multiplied by the reported EIFS and provides a probabilistic prediction
based on the solution to the fatigue crack growth equation.
Therefore, claim 1 recites mathematical concepts in the form of the
following mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
or mathematical calculations:
a. a fatigue crack growth equation from a multivariate distribution
(Spec. 12–13);
b. a Bayesian parameter estimation (id. at 14);
c. an actual equivalent initial flaw size (EIFS) as a function of a
number of parameters (id. at 11–12); and
d. a probabilistic prediction (id. at 15–16).
Thus, claim 1 recites the abstract idea of a mathematical concept in
view of the recited mathematical formulae and/or relationships.
Further, claim 1 recites various steps of generating variables from
equations and solving equations to arrive at other parameters. Under the
broadest reasonable interpretation, these steps, as drafted, are processes that
cover performance of the limitations in the mind but for the recitation of a
generic processor. That is, other than reciting a processor, nothing in the
claim precludes each step from practically being performed in the human
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mind. For example, the claim encompasses the user manually determining a
value for an actual EIFS and solving the fatigue crack growth equation to
obtain an estimate of life of an object from which a probabilistic prediction
of fatigue life is subsequently calculated. The mere nominal recitation of a
processor does not take the claim limitations out of the mental processes
grouping. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (stating that “the mere recitation of a
generic computer[, i.e., processor,] cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
Thus, claim 1 also recites the abstract idea of a mental process.
Appellants argue that the claimed invention does significantly more
than simply calculate crack growth through known mathematical equations.
App. Br. 7–8. Appellants’ assertion acknowledges that the claimed
invention involves mathematical concepts. While Appellants contend that
the claimed invention recognizes and addresses the uncertainty in detecting
and quantifying an initial flaw size in a new way (id. at 8), Appellants do not
explain adequately how the claimed invention does significantly more than
simply calculate crack growth through known mathematical equations.
With respect to the claimed invention being directed to a mental
process, Appellants argue that the claimed invention is not directed to a
mental process that can be performed in the mind or manually by a human
because the flaws measured are embedded in the material and are not visible
to the human eye. App. Br. 7–8. Appellants further argue that uncertainties
in measurement devices and environmental factors make the parameters for
detecting and measuring flaws difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
manually. Id. at 8.
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We do not find these arguments persuasive. As the Examiner notes,
the claimed invention relies on measurements taken by an ultrasound
transducer and it is from these measurements that the actual EIFS
calculations are based. Final Act. 4; Ans. 4; see Spec. 9. Therefore, the
human eye is not measuring the flaws. Moreover, Appellants have not
explained adequately why the human mind would not be capable of
manually performing the claimed calculations once the measurements are
taken.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1
recites an abstract idea. Final Act. 2–3; see generally Ans.

b. Alice Step 1 (Office Revised Step 2A (Prong 2))3
Having determined that the subject matter of claim 1 recites an
abstract idea, we now consider under Step 2A (Prong 2) of the Guidance
whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a
practical application of the exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. “A
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. When a
claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a

3 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Office Guidance). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
it under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Office Guidance). See generally
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50.
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practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id. at
51.
Independent claim 1 recites the additional elements4 of a processor
and an ultrasound transducer. These additional elements do not recite a
specific use for the probabilistic prediction of fatigue life to provide a
specific improvement over prior systems and only add insignificant
extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. See Ans. 3–4. That is, the
additional elements do not apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception. For example, claim 1 does not recite an improvement on how the
measurements for the random variable and actual EIFS are taken or how the
processor functions.
Citing to Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems. Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2018), Appellants assert that the claimed arrangement of
generating random variables from a probabilistic distribution represents an
improvement over prior art processes. App. Br. 10. According to
Appellants, the Finjan court found claims directed to a method for scanning
a downloadable file and attaching the results of that scan to the
downloadable itself to be patent eligible. App. Br. 10; Finjan, 879 F.3d at
1305. Appellants contend that, like Finjan, the claimed arrangement does a
great deal more while using conventional elements. App. Br. 11.
Appellants also cite to Thales Visionix. Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.

4 We use the term “additional elements” for “claim features, limitations,
and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial
exception.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24.

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2017), to further support the assertion that the claimed invention is not
within the realm of abstract ideas. App. Br. 11.
We do not find these arguments persuasive. As the Examiner notes,
Appellants’ reliance on Finjan is misplaced. Ans. 6. Both the Examiner
and Appellants recognize that the Finjan court found that “the method [in
question] . . . employs a new kind of file that enables a computer security
system to do things it could not do before.” App. Br. 10; Ans. 6; Finjan,
879 F.3d at 1305. That is, the invention in Finjan is directed to an
improvement in computer functionality. Ans. 6. The premise of Appellants’
arguments is that the claimed arrangement of generating random variables
from a probabilistic distribution represents an improvement over
deterministic generation of EIFS and crack growth, which required
conservative safety margins that decreased accuracy and increased
maintenance costs. App. Br. 9–10 (citing Spec. 2–3). Thus, Appellants do
not assert that the claimed arrangement represents an improvement in
computer (processor) functionality. See generally App. Br. Nor do
Appellants explain how the claimed arrangement would have resulted in an
improvement to computer (processor) functionality.
Appellants additionally argue that, like Thales, the claims use of a
novel arrangement of random variables based on probabilistic distributions
used in a crack growth equation removes the claims from characterization as
nothing more than an abstract idea. App. Br. 11 (discussing generally
Thales).
Appellants’ reliance on Thales is equally misplaced. As the Examiner
notes, the Court concluded that the claims in Thales were not directed to an
abstract idea because the claims did not try to tie up the equations or the use
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of physics principles themselves but, instead, sought to protect only the
application of physics to an unconventional configuration of sensors. Ans. 7
(discussing Thales, 850 F.3d at 1348–49). As the Examiner further notes,
the random variables recited in Appellants’ claims are merely used to
provide an input for making a probabilistic prediction of fatigue life in
materials based on a mathematical crack growth equation. Id.
We, thus, find nothing in the claims which goes beyond the abstract
idea to transform the claim into eligible subject matter. Therefore, each
claim as a whole does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application.
c. Alice Step 2 (Office Step 2B)
We next determine whether additional elements recited in the claims
provide “significantly more” than the recited judicial exception. That is,
whether additional elements provide an inventive concept. Our
consideration includes whether the additional elements represent well
understood, routine, and conventional activity.
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the
additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to
determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or
(2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we reevaluate
our conclusions about the additional elements discussed in the previous step.
Id.
As noted above, independent claim 1 recites the additional elements
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of a processor and an ultrasound transducer.
Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding that the claimed use
of a processor and an ultrasound transducer are well understood, routine,
conventional activities. Final Act. 3–4; see generally App. Br. In fact, the
Specification recognizes that the processor and ultrasound transducer used
are well understood, routine, and conventional. Spec. 1, 9 (“The image may
be, for example, a medical image of a subject collected by computer
tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, ultrasound, or any other medical
imaging system known to one of skill in the art.”), 19 (describing the
computer system used as a general purpose computer system).
Appellants also do not identify any inventive concept in the recited
combination of steps here or any specific arrangement of computing
components. Indeed, the claim’s focus is to provide probabilistic predictions
of fatigue life in materials, not a specific configuration of the processor. In
the claimed arrangement, the processor simply performs calculations.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that the
claimed processor and ultrasound transducer are well understood, routine
and conventional activities. Ans. 6. Further, courts have recognized the
performance of repetitive calculations by a computer as a well understood,
routine, conventional activity. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (recomputing or
readjusting alarm limit values); Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance
Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer required by some
of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the
performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose
meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”).
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We also reevaluate our conclusions about whether the recited
processor and ultrasound transducer integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Because the recited
processor adds nothing more than well-understood, routine, conventional
activities, those conclusions stand. Considering both our previous
conclusions and the findings about well‐understood, routine, and
conventional activity, we determine that the claimed method does not use
the processor and/or the ultrasound transducer in a way that indicates that
the claim provides an inventive concept.
Appellants argue that the lack of rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102
and 103 take the claimed invention out of the realm of abstract ideas. App.
Br. 9.
We also do not find this argument persuasive of reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection. The manner in which and the type of data the
conventional “processor” gathers, analyzes, calculates and outputs may be
unconventional. But a novel or nonobvious way of analyzing data would not
normally render patent-eligible a claim directed to a generic processor
functioning in an expected manner. This is so because a finding of novelty
or nonobviousness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that subject
matter is patent-eligible. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 592 (2013). The question
in step two of the Alice framework is not whether an additional feature (i.e.,
the calculation) is novel, but whether the implementation of the abstract idea
involves “more than performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and]
conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Content
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Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). This will
depend on whether or not the “processor” is simply acting as a conduit for
the abstract idea, as novel/nonobvious as that might be. Cf. In re TLI
Communications LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, the specification/claims support more strongly the view that the
“processor” is a conduit. “Taking the claim elements separately, the function
performed by the computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely
conventional.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79). Cf.
id. (“Considered ‘as an ordered combination,’ the computer components of
petitioner’s method ‘ad[d] nothing . . . that is not already present when the
steps are considered separately.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79)).
Therefore, the additional elements recited in independent claim 1 do
not provide “significantly more” than the recited judicial exception.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 for the reasons given above and presented by the Examiner.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1)(iv).
AFFIRMED