Xiaozhou Fu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 1, 2019

14164627 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/164,627 01/27/2014 Xiaozhou Fu CS41261 1009
21924 7590 08/01/2019
ARRIS Enterprises LLC
Legal Dept - Docketing
101 Tournament Drive
HORSHAM, PA 19044
EXAMINER
DONABED, NINOS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2444
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ARRIS.docketing@commscope.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte XIAOZHOU FU, TAT KEUNG CHEN, KURTIS A. LI, and
FAN WANG
____________

Appeal 2018-0072691
Application 14/164,627
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JAMES B. ARPIN, HUNG H. BUI, and JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH,
Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1–7, all of the pending claims. App. Br. 8 (Claims
App’x). Claims 8–13 are cancelled. Id. at 9. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 In this Decision, we refer to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
March 13, 2018); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 17,
2016); the Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.,” mailed June 26, 2018); the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 9, 2018); and the originally-filed
Specification (“Spec.,” filed January 27, 2014). Rather than repeat the
Examiner’s findings and determinations, and Appellants’ contentions, in
their entirety, we refer to these documents.
2 Appellants assert ARRIS Technology, Inc., is the real party-in-interest.
App. Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ recited methods “relate[] to the field of data transmission
particularly data transmission using Type-Length-Value (TLV) message
formats.” Spec. ¶ 2. Appellants’ Figure 1 is reproduced below.

Figure 1 depicts:
A Type-Length-Value (TLV) Message 100 can be a digital
message sent between two devices and/or applications that
comprises one or more pieces of information or data, known as
TLV Elements 102. . . . The type 104 or tag of a particular TLV
Element 102 can be a binary code that represents the TLV
Element 102’s type. The length 106 of a particular TLV Element
102 can be a binary code that represents the size of the data in
the TLV Element’s value 108. . . . The value 108 can be the data
payload of the TLV Element 102. By way of non-limiting
examples, the value 108 can be data such as a number value in
integer, double, long, float, or any other format, a string of
characters, binary data, or a complete sub-TLV Element 102 that
has its own type 104, length 106, and value 108.
Id. ¶ 29. The Specification explains, “the rigid structure of predefined
message formats can create incompatibilities when message structures are
updated, unless both the sending and receiving elements are made aware of
the updated message structure.” Id. ¶ 4. The recited methods provide “a
message engine that allows the flexible nature of TLV messages to be used
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with any network element and with any type of TLV-based message
protocol.” Id. ¶ 8. In particular,
Each message engine can be loaded with configuration files, such
as Type Definition Files and Layout Definition Files, associated
with a particular protocol that allow the message engine to
generate and/or parse TLV message in that protocol, such that
the engine can process new or revised protocols by loading new
configuration files rather than updating the application itself.
Id.
As noted above, claims 1–7 are pending. Claim 1 is independent.
App. Br. 8 (Claims App’x). Claims 2–7 depend directly or indirectly from
claim 1. Id. at 8–9.
Claim 1, reproduced below with a disputed limitation emphasized, is
representative.
1. A method of generating a Type-Length-Value message,
comprising:
receiving output from a sender at a message engine in a
server;
loading one or more configuration files associated with a
Type-Length-Value (TLV)-based protocol onto said message
engine, wherein said one or more configuration files describes
information about one or more message elements;
generating a TLV message at said message engine by
creating and ordering said one or more message elements into a
TLV message according to said one or more configurations files,
wherein a field for each message includes all of type, length and
value information; and
transmitting said TLV message from the message engine
of the server over a network to a receiver.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name3 Number Published Filed
Shah US 2007/0124439 A1 May 31, 2007 Aug. 3, 2006
Okuda US 2010/0144360 A1 Jun. 10, 2010 Feb. 16, 2010
The Examiner rejects claims 1–7 (1) under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent ineligible subject matter and (2) under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
rendered obvious over the combined teachings of Okuda and Shah. Final
Act. 1, 5. We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s
findings in the Final Action and the Answer as our own and add any
additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address the rejections below.
ANALYSIS
Patent Ineligible Claims
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”). According to the Court, concepts determined to be abstract
ideas and, thus, patent ineligible, include (1) certain methods of organizing
human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at
219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); (2) mathematical formulas (Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and (3) mental processes (Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
In Diamond v. Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical
formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook). Nevertheless, the
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Court noted that “[i]t is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.” Id. at 187; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Even if the individual components were known, “an inventive concept can
be found in the ordered combination of claim limitations that transform the
abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of
that abstract idea” (emphasis added).).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we next “must examine
the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. Office Patent Eligibility Guidance
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the Office
applies the Court’s two-part test, the Office published revised guidance on
the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).4 In Step One of our analysis, we

4 This guidance supersedes previous guidance memoranda. See 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.”).
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look to see whether the claims, as written, fall within one of the four
statutory categories identified in § 101. Id. at 53 (“Examiners should
determine whether a claim satisfies the criteria for subject matter eligibility
by evaluating the claim in accordance with the criteria discussed in MPEP
2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a statutory category (Step 1) and the
Alice/Mayo test for judicial exceptions (Steps 2A and 2B)”).
Under the guidance, we then look to whether the claim recites:
(1) Step 2A – Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Step 2A – Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP5
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).

5 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP, Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
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C. Step One – Claims Are Directed to Statutory Categories
Appellants’ independent claim 1 and its associated dependent claims
are directed to methods (i.e., processes). App. Br. 8–9 (Claims App’x); see
MPEP § 2106.03. Thus, the pending claims are directed to a recognized
statutory category. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54.
D. Two-Part Alice/Mayo Test
1. Step 2A, Prong One – Claims Recite Abstract Idea
Applying the first part of the Alice/Mayo analysis (Step 2A), the
Examiner finds claim 1 recites the abstract idea of “generating and parsing a
message.” Final Act. 4. Referring to independent claim 1, the claimed
method broadly recites (1) receiving message content from a sender
(“receiving output from a sender . . .”), (2) determining information about
one or more message elements (“. . . said one or more configuration files
[associated with a Type-Length-Value (TLV)-based protocol] describes
information about one or more message elements”), and (3) generating a
TLV message by creating and ordering the message elements that include all
of type, length, and value information (“generating a TLV message . . . by
creating and ordering said one or more message elements into a TLV
message according to said one or more configurations files, wherein a field
for each message includes all of type, length and value information”). See
App. Br. 8 (Claims App’x). Thus, the Examiner determines “[t]he claims
are directed to the abstract idea of using categories to organize, store, and
transmit information.” Final Act. 4; see Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67
(Methods directed to such mental processes embody the “basic tools of
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scientific and technological work”); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While the
Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource [Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)] in cases like Mayo
and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[] analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds. . . as essentially mental processes within the abstract-
idea category.’”).
The Examiner further determines that the abstract idea recited in
claim 1 is similar to abstract ideas identified by the courts. In particular, the
Examiner determines the identified abstract idea is similar to previously
recognized abstract ideas, such as “collecting, displaying, and manipulating
data” (Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1340 (Fed Cir. 2017)) and “collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” (Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstrom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), and “collection,
storage, and recognition of data” (Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Ans. 7 (citing Federal
Circuit precedent); see Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“As the district court recognized, we have consistently held
that similar claims reciting the collection, transfer, and publishing of data are
directed to an abstract idea.”).
Claim 1’s limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation,
recite parsing message information and generating a message for
transmission, which falls within the broader category of “[m]ental
processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” 2019 Revised Patent Subject
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Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (footnote omitted). Thus,
we determine that the rejected claims recite an abstract idea. See Final Act.
4; Ans. 7.
2. Step 2A, Prong Two – Abstract Idea Is Not Integrated Into
Practical Application
The method recites that input is received by a sender “at a message
engine in a server,” a message is generated by means of “one or more
configuration files associated with a Type-Length-Value (TLV)-based
protocol [loaded] onto said message engine,” and the message is
“transmitt[ed] . . . from the message engine of the server over a network to a
receiver.” App. Br. 8 (Claims App’x). Appellants do not contend that any
of these additional elements, individually or as an ordered combination,
amounts to significantly more that than the identified abstract idea, such that
the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application.6 Id. at 6.
The Specification discloses that the additional elements are generic.
See Spec. ¶¶ 32 (describing senders and receivers as servers and clients (e.g.,
computers or mobile phones)), 36 (engines as intermediaries to senders and
receivers), 38 (describing configuration files), 71 (networks including
senders and receivers). The method of claim 1 merely recites generic
hardware and software, and the recited method is not linked to any particular
machine (MPEP § 2106.05(b)) and merely applies generic computer

6 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the
Office, we evaluate those considerations under first part of the Alice/Mayo
analysis (Step 2A of the Office guidance). See 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 nn.25, 27–32.
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hardware and software to perform the abstract idea (MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55 nn.27, 30. Moreover, the concept of a TLV message is itself well-
known in the field of art. See, e.g., Okuda ¶ 70, Figs. 5, 6, 14, 20; Shah ¶ 51,
Fig. 3.
The invocation of software functionality here does not apply or use
the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally
linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment. Ans. 5–6; see MPEP § 2106.05(e); 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.29. Thus, the
Examiner concludes “[t]he generic computer components are claimed to
perform their basic functions of receiving, loading, generating, and
transmitting data through the program that enables the processing a message.
The recitation of the one or more computer systems limitations amounts to
mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer.” Ans. 5.
We agree.
Further, the step of transmitting the TLV message to a receiver via a
network is merely insignificant, extra-solution activity associated with the
implementation of the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(g), 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.
Appellants also do not contend that the recited methods transform or reduce
a particular article to a different state or thing. See MPEP § 2106.05(c);
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55
n.28.
In view of Appellants’ Specification and claims, we determine that the
rejected claims do not recite:
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(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Thus, we conclude that the rejected
claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and
that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
3. Step 2B – Not Significantly More Than the Abstract Idea
Because we find that the claims are directed to an abstract idea and do
not integrate that abstract idea into a practical application, we next consider
whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the claims
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. As noted above,
applying second part of the Alice/Mayo test, the Examiner concludes, “[t]he
claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the
additional elements of the claim are routine or well-understood in the art,
such as receiving output from a sender of claim 1.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 7.
We agree.
The Specification does not assert that any of the recited components,
alone or in combination, are novel. On the contrary, the Specification makes
clear that the components and techniques recited in the rejected claims are
well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Spec. ¶¶ 32, 36, 38, 71.
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Appellants argue, because claim 1 is distinguishable over the
combined teachings of Okuda and Shah, the elements of claim 1 amount to
significantly more than the identified abstract idea. App. Br. 6. This
argument improperly conflates the test for § 101 with the separate tests for
§§ 102 and 103. See, e.g., Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d
1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim
directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or
abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive
concept necessary for patent eligibility.”); see also Diamond, 450 U.S. at
188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject
matter.”). Even if Appellants were to overcome the obviousness rejection,
as the Federal Circuit has explained, it is not “enough for subject-matter
eligibility that claimed techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of prior
art, passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim
for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101
inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.”);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (same for obviousness)); see Ans. 6–7. Thus, we agree with the
Examiner that the additional limitations in claim 1, individually or as an
ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than an abstract
idea.
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On this record, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 1
is directed to an abstract idea and fails to recite “significantly more” than the
identified abstract idea. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred
in determining that this claim is patent ineligible. Appellants do not argue
the eligibility of the dependent claims separately, and we find that the
dependent claims fall with their base claim. Therefore, we sustain this
rejection.
Obviousness over Okuda and Shah
Claims 1–7 stand rejected as rendered obvious over the combined
teachings of Okuda and Shah. Final Act. 4–10. For the reasons set forth
below, we sustain this rejection.
Independent claim 1 stands rejected as rendered obvious over the
combined teachings of Okuda and Shah. Id. at 4–8. Appellants do not
contest the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 2–7 separately. App.
Br. 6. The dispositive issue raised by Appellants with respect to claim 1 is
whether “the length described in Okuda is not identifying the message length
for a currently sent message with the message field as claimed in claim 1[,
and, i]nstead, the message length disclosed in Okuda is for a subsequent
message to be sent.” Id. at 8 (emphases added).
As noted above, claim 1 recites “generating a TLV message at said
message engine by creating and ordering said one or more message elements
into a TLV message according to said one or more configurations files,
wherein a field for each message includes all of type, length and value
information.” App. Br. 8 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds that Okuda teaches that “a controller may
generate a message parameter in accordance with the definition of the
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message type in the TLV definition table and insert the generated parameter
into a message to be transmitted to other devices, such as the [mobile station
(MS)].” Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Okuda ¶ 274). The
Examiner acknowledges that “Okuda does not expressly teach receiving
output from a sender at a message engine and generating a TLV message
that includes all of type, length, and value information,” but finds that Shah
teaches these limitations and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have had reason to combine the teachings of Okuda and Shah to achieve this
limitation. Id. at 6–7 (citing Shah ¶¶ 51, 52) (emphasis added); see Ans. 11–
12. Appellants contest neither the identified teachings of Shah nor the
Examiner’s reason for combining the teachings of these references. See
App. Br. 4–6.
In addition, the Examiner takes the position that the language of
claim 1 is broad enough to encompass the inclusion of “length” in currently
sent, as well as subsequently sent, messages. Ans. 9–10. Moreover,
although Okuda may not expressly teach that “a field for each message
includes all of type, length and value information” (App. Br. 8 (Claims
App’x) (emphasis added)), Okuda teaches that “the message parameter
includes identification information identifying a trigger message and a
message size indicating a data length of a message to be transmitted from
the wireless terminal to the wireless base station” (Okuda ¶ 15 (emphasis
added)). See Ans. 10–11 (citing Okuda ¶¶ 15, 45, 274)); see also Spec. ¶ 29
(“The length 106 of a particular TLV Element 102 can be a binary code that
represents the size of the data in the TLV Element’s value 108.”). Thus, the
Examiner concludes that Okuda teaches or suggests that “[a] message
size/length parameter is included as a message parameter in the generated
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message,” as recited in claim 1. Ans. 11. Thus, we find this challenge
unpersuasive.
We are persuaded that (1) the combination of Okuda and Shah teaches
or suggests all of the limitations of the pending claims and (2) a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of
these references in the manner proposed by the Examiner. Consequently, we
also sustain the obviousness rejection of the pending claims.
CONCLUSION
(1) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–7 under 35
U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
(2) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–7 as rendered
obvious over the combined teachings of Okuda and Shah.
(3) Thus, claims 1–7 are unpatentable.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–7.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED