Wright Plastic Products

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 28, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 635 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS
Wright Plastic Products, Inc.' and Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO.
Case 7-CA-15883
January 28, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND PENELLO
On September 20, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas R. Wilks issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.2
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the
Administrative Law Judge that a bargaining order is
warranted in this case.
The record discloses that union activity was initiat-
ed on or about December 6 and that the Union
attained majority status on December 9, when 8 of the
15 employees in the unit signed authorization cards.
Respondent embarked on its course of unlawful
conduct almost immediately after the onset of union
activity. Shop closure threats were made by Respon-
dent's president, Gordon Wright, to employees Judy
Montague, Judy Barcroft, and Floyce Abernathy.
Barcroft, Abernathy, and employee Idella Morehouse
were interrogated concerning their union sympathies,
and Respondent's supervisor, John Hickey, threatened
employees Mary Hood and Cindy Lerch with changes
in benefits and working conditions. On December 13,
approximately a week after the initial union activity,
Respondent unlawfully discharged the eight employ-
ees who had signed authorization cards.
In measuring the impact of Respondent's actions,
we note initially that the discharge of employees
because of union activity is a serious unfair labor
practice which invariably creates a deep and lasting
impression on employees,' who are heavily dependent
on their jobs for their livelihood. Similarly, a plant
closure threat constitutes "one of the most potent
instruments of employer interference with the right of
employees to organize ... ."' Because such a threat
suggests possible loss of livelihood, a long-term coer-
cive influence is again inevitable.' In this case the
coercion was intensified because the source of the shop
247 NLRB No. 101
closure threats was Respondent's president. Addition-
ally, it is clear that in such a small unit there was
ample opportunity to spread this harmful influence to
all the employees.
It is therefore unlikely that the impact on the
employees would be diminished by the passage of time
between the unfair labor practices and the issuance of
a bargaining order. In any event, the swiftness and
severity of Respondent's reaction to the organizational
activity indicates that it is deeply committed to its
antiunion position, and consequently there exists a
substantial likelihood that Respondent would resume
its unfair labor practices if an election were directed.
We find that Respondent's unfair labor practices
had a "tendency to undermine majority strength and
impede the election processes."7 In light of the long-
term coercive impact and the substantial likelihood of
the recurrence of unfair labor practices, we also find
that there is only a slight possibility that traditional
remedies could erase the impact and insure a fair
election. We therefore conclude that, on balance,
employee sentiment as expressed through the authori-
zation cards would be better protected by the issuance
of a bargaining order."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Wright Plastic Products,
Inc., Potterville, Michigan, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, except that the attached
notice is substituted for that of the Administrative
Law Judge.
' Respondent's name was formerly MW Industries Inc. At the hearing
Respondent's counsel noted that the name has been changed to Wright Plastic
Products, Inc.
'The Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order directs that an offer
of reinstatement be made to employees Cindy Lerch and Lois Donohue. The
record indicates that both employees were reinstated on a probationary basis
on December 14, 1978, but there is no evidence as to whether they were
employed beyond the probationary period. Therefore, we leave for the
compliance stage of this proceeding the issue of whether Lerch and Donohue
have been properly reinstated.
' Unless otherwise specified, all dates herein refer to 1978.
' Jim Baker Trucking Company. 241 NLRB 121 (1979).
' Chemver Laboratories. Inc. v. N.LR.B., 497 F.2d 445, 448 (8th Cir. 1974).
Kurz-Ksch, Inc.. 239 NLRB 1044 (1978): Hedstrom Company, a
Subsidiaryof Brown Group, Inc.. 235 NLRB 1193 (1978).
' N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Ca. Inc.. 395 U.S. 574,614 (1969).
' Members Jenkins and Penello agree with the Administrative Law Judge
that the bargaining order should issue as of December 9, 1978, the date on
which the Union attained its majonrity. However, in accordance with his
separate opinion in Beasley Energy. Inc.. d/b/a Peaker Run Coal Company
Ohio Division #1. 228 NLRB 93 (1977), Chairman Fanning would issue a
prospective bargaining order.
635
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Following a hearing and the taking of evidence, the
Board has found that we engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act. The Board has ordered us to cease and desist
from such conduct and to take certain affirmative
action. In compliance with the Order of the Board, we
hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our
employees concerning their and other employees'
support for a union.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
plant closure, loss of benefits, or changes in
working conditions if they choose to be represent-
ed by a union.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, by discharging any employee or otherwise
discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure or
terms and conditions of employment because of
their union activities, sympathies, or affiliation.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by the Act.
WI WIl.l offer Mary Hood, Floyce Abernathy,
Idella Morehouse, Judy Barcroft, Judy Mon-
tague, Cindy Lerch, and Lois Donohue immedi-
ate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or,
if such jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without loss of seniority or
any other rights or benefits previously enjoyed,
and WE WILL make them and William Hoffman
whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered by reason of the termination of their
employment on December 13, 1978.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative since December 9, 1978, of
the employees in the following appropriate unit,
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment:
All full-time and regular part-time production
and maintenance employees employed by
Wright Plastic Products, Inc., at its place of
business located in Potterville, Michigan, but
excluding all casual, irregular part-time em-
ployees, office clerical employees, professional
employees, confidential employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS R. WILKS, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this case was held on July 10 and 11, 1979, in Mason,
Michigan, based on a charge filed against MW Industries,
Inc.,' herein called Respondent, by Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, and a
complaint issued by the Regional Director alleging that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
coercively interrogating its employees concerning union
activities, by threatening its employees with economic
reprisals, and by discharging employees because of their
union activities. The complaint further alleges that the
aforesaid unfair labor practices are of such gravity as to
warrant the entry of a remedial order requiring Respondent
to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
in the appropriate unit.
Respondent filed an answer which denied the commission
of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record in this case, including my observation
of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the oral
arguments made by the parties, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained
its principal office and place of business in Potterville,
Michigan, where it is and has been engaged in the manufac-
ture, sale, and distribution of plastic ejection mouldings and
related products. During the fiscal year ending September
30, 1978, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its
business operation, manufactured, sold, and distributed at its
Potterville, Michigan, place of business, products valued in
excess of $500,000, of which products valued in excess of
$50,000 were shipped from said place of business directly to
points located outside the State of Michigan.
Respondent admits and I find that it has been at all times
material herein an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
' The current name of Respondent as corrected at the hearing is Wright
Plastic Products, Inc.
636
WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The chief executive officer and part owner of Respondent
is Gordon Wright. For several years Respondent has
operated on a three-shift basis, employing a total of 15
regular full-time employees, including machine operators
and lead persons. It has on a sporadic basis utilized the
services of so-called casual part-time employees. The 15
employees are apportioned to the three shifts equally, in that
there are four machine operators and one lead person
assigned to each shift. Also assigned to each shift is a
foreman, an admitted supervisor within the meaning of the
Act. Between the foreman and Wright, in the hierarchy of
supervision, there is also a general manager.
In 1974, Gordon Wright hired James Montague as the
general manager. Montague served in that capacity until he
was fired on November 15, 1978. During the same period of
time that James Montague served as general manager, his
son, James Montague, Jr., served as first-shift foreman. He
was discharged on the same date as his father. Gordon
Wright testified that the basis for the discharge of the
Montagues was his conclusion that a irreconcilable personal-
ity conflict existed between himself and James Montague,
Sr., and James Montague, Jr., did not perform his duties
satisfactorily. While James Montague, Sr., was employed by
Respondent, he hired a number of employees, including
Judy Montague (his daughter), Judy Barcroft, Idella More-
house, (Judy Barcroft's mother), Mary Hood (Judy Bar-
croft's sister), Floyce Abernathy, Cindy Lerch, and Lois
Donohue.
On or about the date of the termination of James
Montague and son, Wright summoned Judy Montague into
his office and assured her that although she might harbor ill
feelings toward him, it was his intention to retain her in his
employment, inasmuch as her work was satisfactory. She
agreed to remain in the employ of Respondent.
B. The Union Organizing Efforts
On or about December 6, Floyce Abernathy contacted
union organizer Allen Ropp and discussed possible unioni-
zation of Respondent's employees. A meeting was arranged.
Subsequently, employees Abernathy, Hood, Lerch, Dono-
hue, Montague, Barcroft, and Hoffman met at the home of
employee Montague where unionization was discussed with
union representatives Allen Ropp and Donald Allen. Ropp
distributed union authorization cards and explained to the
employees present that he would obtain the Employer's
recognition of the Union as the collective-bargaining agent
of the employees based upon either an election or the
presentation of the cards to the employer. The employees
read the cards, signed them, and returned them to Ropp.
Thereafter, on the same day, Barcroft and Hood visited with
their mother at the home of a third sister. There Morehouse
read the card and signed it and deposited it in the mail to
union representative Ropp. All the authorization cards
clearly designate the Union as collective-bargaining agent of
the employees.
Respondent's Reaction to the Union Organizing Effort
Judy Montague testified that on or about the Wednesday,
prior to the Saturday union meeting, while she was working
as a machine operator on the first shift (8 a.m.-4 p.m.),
Gordon Wright came up to her and spoke to her while they
were alone. He told her that he had heard that a petition was
being circulated to organize a union. According to Mo-
ntague, she remained silent, whereupon Wright stated,
"Well, if you guys try to organize, I'll just close the doors."
Montague remained silent as Wright walked away.
Judy Barcroft was employed as a lead person on the first
shift. Her duties were nonsupervisory in nature and entailed
substituting for machine operators in sequence so that they
might receive their lunch period and breaktime. At 10:30
a.m. on Monday, December I 11, according to Barcroft, she
was at her job, near machine no. 2, when Wright approached
her and stated: "I hear you're trying to get a union started in
here?" She responded, "No." He then asked her if she had
signed anything. Again, she responded negatively. Wright
persisted and stated: "I'm hurt ... if you are, I'm going to
get a job like anybody else and turn this place into a tractor
storage." She testified that Wright then proceeded in the
direction of Floyce Abernathy, who was also employed on
that shift as a machine operator.
According to Abernathy's recollection, she recalled that
some time just about noon on December 12, she observed
Wright engage Barcroft in conversation, not far away.
Because of the noise level, she did not hear what was said but
did hear Wright utter the word "union." Wright then
proceeded in her direction and talked with her alone at her
machine. Wright asked her if she had a petition out for a
union. She responded "no," at which point, she said, Wright
stated that if she did, he would close the place and make it a
tractor barn, and go back to selling machinery. Abernathy
testified that Wright further stated that whether or not she
voted for a union was her business, but that he would close
the place. She did not respond but continued working, and
he left.
Idella Morehouse testified that third-shift Foreman John
Hickey, an admitted supervisor, approached her as she was
ready to leave her job near the end of the third shift, at 8
a.m. Saturday. According to her, she asked Hickey whether
he was going to the union meeting, to which Hickey
responded, "No, are you?" She responded, "No, I'm going
to my daughter Kathy's." Morehouse testified that Hickey
again approached her on Monday night (i.e., after midnight,
and thus Tuesday morning) while she was alone at her
machine and asked her, "Are you going to vote for the
Union?" She responded that she did not understand the
Union, but that she would probably go along with the
majority of employees. According to her, she stated further
that it was not necessary that she vote for it because she felt
that "her days were numbered anyhow." That ended the
conversation. She explained in cross-examination, with a
credible, convincing demeanor, that because of her advanced
age, she was not sure how much longer she would continue
working, and that is why she made that particular response
to Hickey.
Third-shift employee Mary Hood testified that while she
was engaged in her job as a machine operator with fellow
637
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
operator Cindy Lerch, and in the presence of lead person
Kathy Casey, Hickey approached them and engaged in a
conversation on Monday, December 11. Hickey asked them
whether they had heard that some employees were interested
in a union. They responded that they had heard such
rumors. Hickey then asked each of them whether she was for
or against the Union. According to Hood, both she and
Lerch were noncommittal in their response and indicated
that they did not have enough knowledge to form an
opinion, whereas Casey responded more positively, "No, I
don't want it." According to Hood, Hickey then narrated his
experience about a business that he had previously owned
and how a labor organization had tried repeatedly to
organize it. Hickey told them that there was no way the
employees at that business would have obtained union
representation. Further, Hickey went on to state that if the
Union were successful in organizing Respondent's employ-
ees, they would not have the same working conditions they
then enjoyed; i.e., there would be more "fooling around like
you do now," no smoking, no radios, no talking to Hickey
unless an employee had a specific problem with his machine;
and a minute's tardiness would not be forgiven. Hickey then
told them that if they had a change of mind on the subject
they should let him know. At that point, he left.
Both Gordon Wright and John Hickey denied the
aforesaid conversations. They denied that any conversation
of that nature occurred, and denied knowledge of union
activities on or about those occasions.2 Basically, the
credibility resolution here must be premised upon a demea-
nor considerations. From the standpoint of demeanor, I
found the employee witnesses far more convincing than
either Hickey or Wright. The employees were assured,
responsive, and dispassionate. They made no attempt was
made to embellish or augment testimony. Abernathy made
no attempt to corroborate Barcroft, but merely testified
honestly that she could only hear one word of the conversa-
tion between Barcroft and Wright. Furthermore, they
appeared to give their testimony without any indication of
parroting each other; e.g., Barcroft and Abernathy recalled
the conversations as occurring on two different dates, and
their testimony was not precisely identical as to the time.
One fixed it at 10:30 a.m., the other fixed it closer to
noontime. The employees testified with spontaneity and
responsiveness, and a certainty that survived a searching
cross-examination. The most unconvincing witness was John
Hickey. He evidenced in his demeanor a belligerence and
hostility. His answers were tinged with vagueness and
qualifications. His denials, with respect to the alleged
confrontations concerning union activity, were almost eva-
sive; thus, for example, when asked whether he discussed the
subject of the Union with Morehouse, or the subject of an
employee meeting with Morehouse, he responded, "I don't
remember it taking place. . . I don't think so, no." When
asked about having a conversation on December 11 with
employees Hood, Lerch, and Casey, he testified that he did
not "recall" such a conversation. Finally, he conceded that
for a period of 16 years he was the owner of a business which
a union attempted to organize on several occasions, but the
union effort had just "faded away." He did not deny that he
Gordon Wright testified that he first became aware orf union activities on
or about December 14 or 15. In a statement signed by Wright and attached to
had related this experience to the employees. Although
Gordon Wright was somewhat more assured than Hickey, I
found his denials to be made with a complete lack of
conviction. Moreover, as will be discussed below in more
detail, his trustworthiness as a witness in general suffered
because of internal consistencies and inconsistencies with
testimony of Green and Hickey in regard to the basis for the
subsequent discharge of the alleged discriminatees.
Accordingly, I credit the testimony of employees Aberna-
thy, Morehouse, Barcroft, Montague, and Hood with respect
to the alleged confrontations between them and Gordon
Wright and John Hickey regarding the union organizing
effort.
C. The Discharges
James Montague's position as general manager was to be
filled ultimately by his replacement David Green. Green was
hired on December I and reported for duty on December 4,
on a Monday. He testified that during the first week of his
employment, he acted as a de facto first-shift foreman,
inasmuch as a new foreman had not yet been hired, and that
he spent the time getting to know employees and making
employee evaluations.
On the morning of December 13, at about 8 o'clock,
Green summoned employees Montague, Barcroft, and Aber-
nathy to his office. He told them that they were being
terminated permanently, that the third shift was being
eliminated, and that the reason for their terminations was
their attitudes. Green testified that he told them that their
attitudes caused a personality conflict between them and
himself, and them and other employees on the first shift, and
that he was attempting to reorganize the "chaos" in plant
operations and to start from the beginning. According to
Green, one of the employees asked if their work performance
was at fault, and he told them no, it was not. He explained to
them that there was a "division" between two groups of
employees on the first shift, and that their attitude, as he saw
it, was unacceptable. The employees asked to speak to
Wright. Green left the office and Gordon Wright appeared.
Gordon Wright explained to the employees that the Respon-
dent was eliminating its third shift. The employees protested
their seniority, and Wright rejected that contention, indicat-
ing that seniority "don't count." Upon the employees' threat
to resort to the Labor Board, Wright told them that such
effort would be futile and that he would never reinstate
them.
Earlier on the same day, Green had spoken to the
employees of the night shift and told them that they were
terminated permanently and that the third shift was being
eliminated. They received paychecks for the previous week
and for the 2 days of the second week in which they worked.
Thus, they were terminated in the middle of a workweek.
The normal workweek commences on Monday. Hoffman,
who was not at the plant, received a telephone call from
Green to inform him that he was being terminated.
Respondent's answer, he admits to having learned of union activities no
earlier than January 9.
638
WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS
Respondent's Proffered Reasons for the Discharges
Wright testified that he did, indeed, offer Judy Montague
continued employment after the discharge of her father,
James Montague. According to Wright, however, he became
dissatisfied with her as an employee in the period of time
between November 15 and December 13. He testified that
this was a gradual process. He could only explain the basis
for his dissatisfaction in general terms, attributing it to her
attitude toward him. He explained that she did not talk to
him. He did not explain how this interfered in any way with
productivity. He further explained that her performance was
inadequate. The inadequacy, he explained, was that she did
not exert any "extra effort." He did concede, however, that
she did her work tasks as she was requested to perform
them, and that she did her share of the work although
previously she had done more than her share of the work.
According to Wright, Barcroft and Abernathy exhibited
the same attitude as Montague. However, according to
Barcroft, when Green was hired as general manager on
December 4, he was introduced to her by Wright, who told
Green, in reference to Barcroft: "If you got any questions,
ask her, she knows just about everything." Abernathy
testified that during Wright's frequent visits and discussions
with employees in the shop, he periodically told her that she
was doing a good job, and that such compliments continued
even after the discharge of James Montague and up to the
date of the union organizing activity. Wright merely
testified, with an extremely uncertain demeanor, that he did
not "believe" that he complimented Abernathy between
November 15 and December 13, and that he did not "think"
that he complimented Barcroft in the same period. He did
not specifically deny the testimony of Barcroft. I credit the
far more certain and convincing testimony of Barcroft and
Abernathy and conclude that they were indeed compliment-
ed with respect to their work performance and ability
subsequent to the discharge of James Montague.
Wright testified that as Green performed the duties of
firstshift foreman and made his observations, he and Green
engaged in discussions concerning the abilities of the
employees. According to Wright, he told Green that it was
his decision that some employees must be terminated. He
stated that he told Green that he wanted to discharge Judy
Montague, Judy Barcroft, and Floyce Abernathy. The
reason for his decision was that Judy Montague was the
daughter of James Montague and had maintained ill feelings
toward Wright. As to Judy Barcroft and Floyce Abernathy,
Wright considered them to be close friends of Judy Mon-
tague. and in his "mind" there was a "clique" between those
employees. The record does not contain sufficient evidence
on which a conclusion can be made about that allegation.
Furthermore, Wright testified that he decided on December
II to fire other employees: Hoffman, Cindy Lerch. Lois
Donohue, Mary Hood, and Idella Morehouse. He testified
that the basis for his decision to discharge Hoffman was that
Hoffman had submitted his declaration of an intention to
quit his employment as of January 2 to enter the Navy;
Morehouse was discharged because she was Judy Barcroft's
Hickey testified in very general terms that the other employees on the
third shift were slow workers, and he testified extremely vaguely that they had
poor attitudes; e.g., Morehouse's attitude "wasn't the greatest in the world,"
mother, and, according to Wright, for the subordinate
reason that she was not "suited" for the type of work
Respondent performed. He decided to discharge Hood
because she was Judy Barcroft's sister and, according to
Wright, she had exhibited difficulty in keeping up with the
work. Wright explained that although Hood and Morehouse
had been on the third shift, he had had an opportunity to
observe their work habits in the past. Furthermore, he
testified that he had obtained a corroborating opinion in this
regard from Green, who had observed the employees.
Wright testified that Cindy Lerch and Lois Donohue were
fired because he and Green had decided that they must
either hire replacements for the discharged employees or
terminate the third shift because of a depression in the sales
volume of the business in the month of December. Casey
was not discharged because of her status as a leader. She
transferred to the first shift. However, she did not replace
the discharged leader, Judy Barcroft, but rather was as-
signed to a machine operator classification. No advance
warnings of the discharges were given to the employees.
At first, Wright testified that had he not discharged the
employees, because the ariount of work had reduced he
could not have carried all the employees in December.
Respondent's average sales volume over the years that it has
engaged in business has been approximately 70,000 per
month. The figures have ranged anywhere from $50,000 to
$100,000. December 1978 sales were approximately $52,700.
Wright testified that December is a traditionally slow part of
the season. In the past, several employees had been laid off at
times of slow business, according to Wright. However, he
recalled no layoffs of the entire third shift ever having
occurred in the past. Hickey testified that no third shift
employees were laid off in 1977 or 1976. According to
Hickey, the decision to terminate the third shift came as a
surprise to him.
Wright went on to testify, however, that the selection of
the individuals for termination on December 13 was simply
made on the basis of their relationship with other employees,
"as opposed to work habits." Thus, for example, he testified
that he had no objection to the work performances of
Donohue or Lerch. He testified that he had received reports
on their work performances from Green and Hickey, and he
had also made observations of their work. Thus, he would
have been in a position to know the quality of their work. He
testified that he had no objection to their work abilities.
Hickey had an exceptionally low opinion of the attitudes and
abilities of all employees on the third shift. In cross-
examination, when asked whether there were any good
employees on his shift, he responded, "Yes, Cindy [Lerch]."
As an afterthought, he also added that Kathy Casey, the
lead person, was a good worker. but that Cindy Lerch had a
problem of attendance. with respect to Friday afternoon.'
Wright testified, however, that when he made the "final"
decision to discharge the employees on December 12 and
discussed Lerch with Green, it was Green's opinion that
Lerch's performance was "marginal." Wright's opinion, like
Hickey's, was that her work performance was good, with the
exception of absenteeism. Finally and inexplicably, Wright
and with respect to Mary Hood, "I don't think her attitude was too good
either."
639
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
testified that his main objection to certain employees, and
the basis of his decision to terminate them, was the close
relationship six of them enjoyed, and that had it not been for
"those relationships," the layoffs would not have been made
and in any event, their jobs would have remained "open."
However, Wright made it clear, as did Green, that all eight
employees were permanently terminated and none of them
was to be considered a laid-off employee.
In certain significant areas, Green's testimony is at
variance with that of Wright with respect to the basis for the
terminating the employees. Not only did Green fail to
corroborate Wright with respect to discussing the economic
factor for eliminating the third shift, Green specifically
testified that Wright made no allusion to the sales volume in
his discussions about the discharges. Green testified that a
mere cursory reference was made to sales charts, on or about
December I 11, but not with reference to a comparison of the
sales of December 1978 with those of December 1977. He
testified that the only purpose of discussing the sales chart
was to familiarize Green with Respondent's systems.
Green's elimination of the economic factor as the motiva-
tion for the discharges left him in the difficult position of
attempting to explain, in his testimony, that he entertained
the expectation of maintaining the same production level,
despite the fact that 8 of 15 employees were terminated. He
very generally, evasively, and hesitantly testified in abstract
terms that he simply had the opinion that such a reorganiza-
tion on a two-shift basis could maintain production. Yet
Hickey, in contradiction to Gordon Wright, and inconsis-
tently with Green, testified that there was always pressure
upon him to maintain production of the night shift. Hickey
testified that this pressure continued on until the date the
night shift was terminatied in December. Further, he
testified that because of his efforts in prodding and cajolling
employees to keep up their production, the actual level of
production of the night shift was about equal to that of the
second shift. According to Green, the second shift was the
highest producing shift of all three. Surely, if there were a
depression in sales which affected the December output on
or about December 13, or if there were a slowdown in
production, then Hickey would not have felt the continuing
pressure to maintain production. In any event, according to
Hickey, the production of the third shift was just as good as
that of the second shift, despite his low opinion of the speed
of the employees on the third shift.
Whereas Wright testified that he decided to discharge
some employees on December II, Green testified initially
that on December 12 he and Wright talked about the
"possibility" of terminating employees and eliminating the
third shift. He testified that he discussed with Wright reports
of the "complaints: of the foreman about the third shift's
productivity and the lack of cooperation of the employees."
Furthermore, Green reported to Wright his opinion of the
attitude problems of certain employees. Green testified that
he and Wright agreed as to which employees to terminate,
and that the only disagreement came when Wright wanted
to terminate the group leader, Kathy Casey, as well as all the
other employees, whereas Green wanted to retain Casey.
Furthermore, Green testified that it was his decision in the
first place to terminate the entire third shift. Surely, if
economics were a factor, Wright would have initiated that
idea, not Green. In any event, Green testified that part of the
reason for his desire to retain Casey was Hickey's report that
she was a good worker. In any event, Green gave Hickey no
idea that the third shift was to be terminated.
With respect to the alleged work deficiency of the
employees, Green testified that Judy Barcroft exhibited a
poor attitude. When pressed for an explanation, he hesitant-
ly explained that she reluctantly accepted his changes in
procedure. That is to say, in the past, the machine operators
would retrieve the plastic mouldings from the machine and
place them in a bag or on a table, then remove them to a box,
and carry the box over to a central area. It was Green's
decision to have the group leader now transport the box to
the central area. When Barcroft was told of this, she
allegedly responded that it was not her job, but readily
agreed to go ahead and do it upon Green's order. He
complained that on one unspecified occasion, Barcroft failed
to respond to the request of machine operators to transport
the box. He then went on to testify that as to her job duties,
Barcroft "did what she had to." He testified that on the
Tuesday following his Monday hiring, he had a couple of
talks with Barcroft and impressed upon her that he would be
changing procedures and that she responded that she would
"try." He testified that she did not improve, but that at no
time thereafter did he inform her that she was not improv-
ing.
In further explanation, in cross-examination, Green con-
ceded that he at no time discussed attitude problems with
either Abernathy or Judy Montague, nor did he discuss any
production problems of theirs with them. Nor did he discuss
attitude problems or production problems with Lerch or
Donohue, Morehouse or Hood. He conceded that there was
no production problem, from what he could observe, with
Hoffman. Testifying with evasion and hesitancy, he ex-
plained that Abernathy, although she seemed to be doing the
job on the machines, was acting "a little scatterbrained,
having a good time-which there's nothing wrong with that.
She got the job out." His complaint with respect to Judy
Montague was that she became so engrossed in her job that
she tended to "block everybody else out while working, and
not acknowledge your presence." However, he also com-
plained that she talked to Floyce Abernathy or Judy
Barcroft. He did not specify in what particular manner such
conversation interfered with anyone's production. In fact, he
went on to explain that Judy Montague got the job done
"some of the time." He then explained that on an unspeci-
fied date, he pointed out to her that she should "do better,"
and that, in fact, she did respond by performing better "most
of the time."
With respect to Idella Morehouse, Green testified that he
observed her and that she appeared to be a slow worker, and
that she did not get out the "work like she could." He
characterized Hood as "very slow," but conceded that at no
time did he ever speak to Morehouse and Hood about their
productivity. With respect to Cindy Lerch, he characterized
her as "fast, personable, and willing to do what the foreman
asked." He testified that the basis for his recommending her
discharge was absenteeism on Fridays.
Green testified very generally that other shifts entertained
complaints about the third shift. When asked for an
explanation and for details, he said there were complaints
640
WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS
about cleanliness of the machines and the arrangement of
boxes, and "little things." However, he conceded that the
responsibility for cleanliness falls not only on the unit
employees, but also on the foremen. He gave no other details
or examples.
With respect to Lois Donohue, Green found her to be a
quiet, friendly employee of average speed in productivity.
With respect to the nature of the work performed by these
employees, it is obviously of a highly routine, mechanical
nature. The moulding machines run on a 24-hour-a-day
basis except when they are shut down for change of moulds.
Some jobs are automatic, and others are semi-automatic.
Green admitted that the operator has virtually no control
over the speed of the machines, per se. With respect to the
semi-automatic operation, when the mould opens, the
operator must open the door, reach in, take the part out,
close the door, and place the part on a pile. He testified that
approximately 130 to 150 moulds are completely automatic,
so the operator does not have to open the door and has
absolutely no control over the speed of the operation.
Green testified that during his first week of employment
he used a stop watch to measure the operation of the
machine operators and calculated an average time which he
considered to be fair in light of the speed of some employees
and slowness of others. Despite his later testimony that
during his past experience as a supervisor it has been his
practice to reduce reprimands and employee confrontations
to written form, Green conceded that at no time did he
reduce to writing any conclusions or reprimands with
respect to the productivity of individual employees during
his first 1-Y weeks of employment preceding the December
13 discharges. He failed to testify as to what specific figure
was appropriate for the machine operator with respect to the
processing of parts. He merely testified that each shift was to
produce 2,000 parts per shift. Thus, no employee was
informed as to what her production goal was to be. No
employee was informed in writing as to what objection
Green had about her performance. In any event, the
slowness that Green and Hickey observed in so many
employees on the third shift must have been compensated by
some magical performance by a single employee so as to
maintain the productivity level of the third shift at about the
level of the second shift, according to Hickey's uncontradict-
ed testimony. Indeed, Green did not testify specifically as to
the deficiency in productivity of the third shift as a whole.'
In redirect examination, Green testified as to the divisions
of opinion between himself and Wright about various
employees. He testified that Wright had a different point of
view concerning Judy Barcroft, in that Wright objected to
her attitude problem; i.e., she resisted the authority of Green
who replaced General Manager Montague. According to
Green, Wright had the same opinion as to Judy Montague
and Floyce Abernathy because in Wright's opinion, Aberna-
thy was a good friend of the discharged general manager,
Judy Montague's brother.' Green testified that Wright found
Idella Morehouse objectionable because she was Judy
I Green testified that his rationale for discharging more than half of the
employees was a desire to avoid "contaminating" good employees with bad
employees; i.e., "you start building-I don't care--anything-and you keep
one person that should be gone. You build a couple more. There's always a
tendency, the ones you're trying to build up might go in their direction. It
might be the one bad apple in the barrel that's going to spoil the whole barrel."
Barcroft's mother. According to Green, Wright objected to
Hood because she was the sister of Judy Barcroft and,
supposedly, a friend of Montague. Green testified that he
thought that Wright objected to Hoffman because Hoffman
was also a friend of Montague. Finally, he testified that
Wright's view was the same as his own with respect to Lerch
or Donohue.'
D. Postdischarge Events
The idea that Respondent could maintain the same level
of production after discharging more than half of its
employees came to an abrupt demise within a short period of
time. Within a matter of days after the termination, Green
commenced communicating with casual part-time employ-
ees, called them to work, and commenced training them as
permanent employees.
On or about December 14, Lerch and Donohue came back
to the plant and asked Wright whether they had been
discharged because of the union organizational meeting, and
they further pleaded for reemployment. Wright testified that
he thereafter talked to Green, and they both agreed to
reinstate Lerch and Donohue. Wright testified that he told
Green that as far as he was concerned, if they needed more
employees it was all right with him to rehire Lerch and
Donohue. He testified that it was Green who considered
Lerch's performance to be "marginal," but that he, Wright,
had no objection to Lerch's performance. In any event,
employees admittedly were needed to maintain the predis-
charge level of production, and Lerch and Donohue were
reinstated on a probationary basis. Wright conceded that in
past practice no employee who was laid off and subsequently
recalled was required to serve a probationary period of
employement. However, he insisted that probation for Lerch
and Donohue was Green's idea. The two employees thus
were required to sign statements, countersigned by Green,
which stated in part as follows:
Lois [Cindy] and I have agreed upon a work trial period
from 12/14/78 to 1/5/78 to establish what kind of
worker she is. If she proves to be a good worker, she
will continue to work here; If she proves unsatisfactory,
she will be dismissed.
The statements were signed on December 14 and the
employees were reinstated during the week of December 13.
Green testified that he used the foregoing statement because
of his past policy of documenting work problems in order to
avoid later contradictions about the confrontations with the
employees.
In January, the Respondent ran ads in the newspaper,
soliciting employment applications for machine operators.
Between January 6 and January 8, the Respondent hired
new full-time employees and reinstated the third shift with
"five or six" employees. Wright attributed the resumption in
business to an unexpected new order from one of his
There is no evidence in the record to support these conclusions of
friendships that supposedly existed outside of the work relationships.
I Hickey testified that he had reported to Green, early in Green's
assumption of duties, that he, Hickey, considered Lois Donohue to be a slow
worker.
641
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
customers. Reinstatement was offered to no other dis-
charged employee besides Lerch and Donohue.'
In the final analysis, the economic factors revealed by
Wright's testimony were immaterial to the terminations of
the eight employees. Wright had originally testified that
three factors were involved in the termination of the
employees: the personal relationship among six of the
employees, poor work performances, and economic factors.
Ultimately, at different points in his testimony, he admitted
that their terminations were not related to either work
performance or to economic factors. Thus, had it not been
for the "relationships" among certain employees, there
would have been no terminations. All of the testimony of
Respondent's witnesses Wright, Green, and Hickey as to
work performance and other factors proved to be an exercise
in evasive generalities premised upon a shifting basis.
Respondent's witnesses engaged in testimony which revealed
internal inconsistencies as well as inconsistencies with the
testimony of fellow witnesses. The demeanor of Wright,
Green, and Hickey was at various times strained, hesitant,
uncertain, evasive, and unresponsive, and at all times
unconvincing. I conclude that there is no basis for Respon-
dent's alternative contention that economics was a motivat-
ing factor in the discharges, and that the employees' work
performance was not a factor in those discharges. I conclude
that Respondent has failed to adduce probative and convinc-
ing evidence that the employees exhibited any attitudinal
problems because of their relationship with the discharged
general manager which in any way interfered with their
work performance.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. 8(a)(1) Violations
In view of the factual findings above, I find that
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by the
conduct of its agents Gordon Wright and John Hickey, by
coercively interrogating employees concerning their and
other employees' support of the Union and by threatening its
employees with plant closure, loss of benefits, or changes in
working conditions.
B. 8(a)(3) Violations
I have found above that Respondent discharged eight
employees, i.e., a majority of its employee complement and
the very employees who signed union cards, within a matter
of days after their union activities and after Respondent had
expressed animosity and hostility to those union activities in
the form of violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As
concluded above, the reasons advanced by Respondent for
those discharges do not withstand scrutiny and are patently
and transparently false. In the oft-cited case of Shattuck
Denn Mining Corp. (Iron King Branch) v. N.L.R.B.. 362
F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966), the court reasoned:
Actual motive, a state of mind, being the question, it
is seldom that direct evidence will be available that is
With respect to Lerch and Donohue, there is no explanation as to why the
probationary period was based upon a demonstration of good work perfor-
mance when no question or objection had been raised about their work
not also self-serving. In such cases, the self-serving
declaration is not conclusive; the trier of fact may infer
motive from the total circumstances proved . . . If he
finds that the stated motive for discharge is false, he
certainly can infer that there is another motive.
I find that Respondent's proffered defense for the dis-
charge of the employees is false and pretextual. I therefore
conclude that Respondent discharged eight employees for
the only other known motivation; i.e., its animosity and
hostility to employees' union activities. Clearly, Respondent,
by its own admission, directed the discriminatory conduct
toward a core of employees because of certain alleged
relationships. Because those relationships were not shown to
have been related to the reasons advanced by Respondent, I
can only conclude that it was because of their suspected
relationship to the union organizing activity. Assuming
Respondent did not know the specific identity of all
employees who engaged in union activity, it was well aware
that such activity was going on, and it directed its interroga-
tions to employees who actively supported the union effort.
In any event, I conclude that the termination of the third
shift and the discharge of 8 of 15 employees by Respondent
on December 13 was motivated by a desire to discourage
union membership and activities broadly. In Rock Tenn
Company. 234 NLRB 823. 825 (1978) the Board in overrul-
ing an administrative law judge held that:
Where a layoff such as here is for the purpose of
discouraging union membership and activities in gener-
al and is not necessarily directed at the activities of
particular individuals, all victims of such a layoff are
entitled to the same treatment and relief without regard
to the extent of their union activities.
Accordingly, I conclude that the lack of specific evidence of
Respondent's knowledge of individual employees and the
difference in union activity between individual employees is
immaterial in that I conclude that Respondent discharged
all eight employees because of its general desire to frustrate
and dissipate employee support of the Union.
C. Majority Status of The Union
The complaint alleges that all full-time and regular part-
time production and maintenance employees employed by
Respondent, but excluding office clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, confidential employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate
for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of the
Act.
Respondent neither admitted nor denied the appropri-
ateness of the aforedescribed unit. The record reveals that
Respondent maintained a unit of production and mainte-
nance employees consisting of lead persons and machine
operators who performed the same job functions and who
shared a community of interest with respect to conditions of
employment. The only other employees employed by the
Respondent are managers and supervisors who are excluded
by the Act, a secretary, and an accountant who was also the
performance in the first place by Green. Similarly, Green did not explain why
Donohue was placed on such probation in view of his testimony that she had
been a quiet, friendly employee of average speed, who "chugged along."
642
a
WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS
wife of the owner and chief operator of the enterprise,
Gordon Wright. Clearly, the secretary and Wright shared no
community of interest with the other production and
maintenance employees inasmuch as they performed their
duties in a separate office area. Moreover, their duties were
distinct and dissimilar from the production and maintenance
employees.
The Board has long held that a production and mainte-
nance unit is presumptively appropriate for purposes of
collective-bargaining in the absence of any contrary evi-
dence. Appliance Supply Company, 127 NLRB 319 (1960).
Respondent having adduced no contrary evidence, I con-
clude that a production and maintenance unit is an appropri-
ate bargaining unit.
On or about December 9, Respondent employed 15
production and maintenance unit employees who were
employed on a regular and full-time basis. Prior to that date,
Respondent also had occasion to call upon certain employ-
ees whom it maintained on a list, as casual, irregular
employees, to satisfy a temporary need. In accordance with
longstanding Board policy, I conclude that the appropriate
bargaining unit herein should exclude the irregular, casual
employees of Respondent. G.C. Murphy Company, 171
NLRB 370, 371 (1968). After the December 13 terminations
Respondent resorted to part-time employees in order to
maintain its prior level of production. The natural inference
is that these employees may have worked on a regular basis
thereafter. Accordingly, I would include regular part-time
employees within the appropriate bargaining unit.
On December 9, 1978, 8 of 15 employees in the appropri-
ate bargaining unit executed union authorization cards. The
General Counsel properly showed the authenticity of these
cards, in part by the testimony of several of the signators,
and in part by the testimony of an employee who attended
the union meeting of December 9 and the union representa-
tive who distributed the cards to the employees after having
indicated to them the purposes of the card. Delight Bakery,
Inc., 145 NLRB 893, 904 (1964), enfd. 353 F.2d 344 (6th
Cir. 1965). From the testimony of the employee witness and
the testimony of the union agent, and from the totality of
circumstances in which the cards were solicited, I conclude
that the employees read the authorization cards prior to
executing the cards. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 242
NLRB 492 (1979).
Although the face of the cards clearly indicated that the
signator was authorizing the Union to represent her for
purposes of collective-bargaining, there is testimony in the
record indicating that the card solicitor expressed to the
signator that in addition to a demand for recognition, an
intended purpose of the card was to obtain an election.
However, there was no evidence that any employee was told
that the only purpose of signing a card was for the purpose
of obtaining an election.' In Walgreen Company, 221 NLRB
1096 (1975), the Board stated:
There is nothing inconsistent between obtaining
authorization cards in order to demonstrate sufficient
employee interest in representation to warrant an
election and in using the cards to demonstrate a union's
majority.
'Cf. Cumberland Shoe Corporation. 144 NLRB at 1268. 1269(1963).
' Respondent took no position with respect to the appropriateness of the
unit, nor the scope of the unit, nor the employee status of any person.
In Levi Strauss d Co., 172 NLRB 732, 733 (1968), the
Board stated:
That employees are told in the course of solicitation
that an election is contemplated, or that a purpose of
the card is to make an election possible, provides in our
view, insufficient basis in itself for vitiating unambigu-
ously worded authorization cards on the theory of
misrepresentation.
Finally, the Supreme Court declared in N.L R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 606-607 (1969):
[E]mployees should be bound by the clear language of
what they sign unless that language is deliberately and
clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words
calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget
the language above his signature. There is nothing
inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says
the signer authorizes the union to represent him and
then telling him that the card will probably be used first
to get an election . . . We cannot agree with the
employers here that employees as a rule are too
unsophisticated to be ound by what they sign unless
expressly told that their act of signing represents
something else.
Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel has
established that as of December 9 the Union obtained
authorization as exclusive bargaining agent from eight
employees. A final question arises as to whether the card of
employee Hoffman ought to be considered in determining
whether the Union obtained majority status as of December
9.' According to the uncontradicted testimony of Respon-
dent's witnesses, Hoffman had previously notified Respon-
dent of his intention to quit and to enter the Navy on or
about January 2. However, it is clear that as of December 9,
Hoffman was still actively employed by Respondent as a
regular full-time employee, and would have continued at
that employment until January 2 had he not been terminated
by Respondent on December 13. It is well established that
an employee is considered a member of the bargaining unit
even though he may have previously tendered his resignation
which was to become effective at some future date. Colecraft
Mfg. Co., Inc., 162 NLRB 680, enfd. in part 385 F.2d 998
(2d Cir. 1967); WCAR, Inc.., 203 NLRB 1235 (1973).
Accordingly, I find that as of December 9, and at all times
until his termination on December 13, employee Hoffman
was a member of the bargaining unit. I further find and
conclude that the Union was designated on December 9 as a
bargaining agent by a majority of the employees in the
appropriate collective-bargaining unit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent constitutes an employer within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union activities and by threatening its employees with
643
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plant closure, loss of benefits, and changes of working
conditions if they choose to be represented by a union,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discharging as of December 13, 1978, employees
William Hoffman, Mary Hood, Floyce Abernathy, Idella
Morehouse, Judy Barcroft, Judy Montague, Cindy Lerch,
and Lois Donohue, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees employed by Respondent at its place
of business located in Potterville, Michigan, but excluding
all casual part-time employees, all office clerical employees,
professional employees, confidential employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropri-
ate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, it shall be recommended that Respondent cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act, and to post an
appropriate notice to employees.
It having been found that Respondent discharged employ-
ees Mary Hood, Floyce Abernathy, Idella Morehouse, Judy
Barcroft, Judy Montague, Cindy Lerch, Lois Donohue, and
William Hoffman on December 13, 1978, it shall be
recommended that Respondent be required to offer all of
them except William Hoffman, who had voluntarily given
notice of his termination effective January 2, 1979, full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and to make all of them, including William
Hoffman, whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered by reason of discrimination against them. Any
backpay found to be due shall be computed in accordance
with a formula set forth in F. W Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), with interest thereon to be computed in the
matter prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB
651 1977. '0
The General Counsel urges that an order be granted
requiring Respondent to bargain with the Union as of the
date the Union obtained the majority status among the
employees, on which date the Respondent simultaneously
commenced its unfair labor practices. The complaint herein
does not allege a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act,
inasmuch as at no time did the Union make a request or
demand for recognition or bargaining. Such a demand by the
Union was mooted for all practical purposes by Respon-
dent's swift and thorough decimation of the bargaining unit.
Respondent's assault upon its employees' attempts to obtain
collective-bargaining representation was so immediate and
egregious as to render illusory the possibility of a fair
'o See, generally, Isis Plumbing d Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
"In the event no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 or the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
election. I therefore agree that Respondent's conduct was so
substantial and pervasive as to warrant a bargaining order,
commencing as of December 9, 1978, the date on which the
Union obtained this majority status. Trading Port, Inc., 219
NLRB 298 (1975); Beasley Energy, Inc., d/b/a Peaker Run
Coal Company, Ohio Division, 228 NLRB 93 (1977); James
Innaco, d/b/a Skyline Transport, 228 NLRB 352 (1977);
Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., supra.
In view of the serious and extensive nature of Respon-
dent's unfair labor practices, which affected most of the
employees, a broad cease-and-desist order shall be recom-
mended. Hansa Mold, Inc., 243 NLRB 853 (1979).
Upon the basis of the entire record, the findings of fact,
and the conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Wright Plastic Products, Inc., Potter-
ville, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their and other employees' support for a union.
(b) Threatening employees with plant closure, loss of
benefits, and changes in working conditions if they choose a
union to represent them.
(c) Discharging employees or otherwise discriminating
against them in any manner with respect to their tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment
because they have engaged in activity on behalf of Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to self-
organization, to join, form or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other aid or protection.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Mary Hood, Floyce Abernathy, Idella More-
house, Judy Barcroft, Judy Montague, Cindy Lerch, and
Lois Donohue immediate and full reinstatement to their
former positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice, to their
seniority or other rights, and privileges, and make them and
William Hoffman whole for any loss of earnings in the
manner set forth in the section herein entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive bargaining representative since December 9, 1978,
of the employees in the unit described below, with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed contract. The appropriate unit is:
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
644
WRIGHT PLASTIC PRODUCTS
All full-time and regular part-time production mainte-
nance employees employed by Wright Plastic Compa-
ny, Inc., at its place of business located in Potterville,
Michigan, but excluding all casual, irregular part-time
employees, confidential employees, and guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) Post at its place of business in Potterville, Michigan,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by him for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days of this Order, what steps Respondent has
taken to comply herewith.
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
645