World Generator Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 1295 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY. INC.
World Generator Company, Inc. and International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.). Cases
13 CA 16980. 13 CA 16985 2, and 13 CA 17017
June 19. 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBH1RS JENKINS, Mt RPHY, ANI) TRt SI)AI. I
On March 9, 1979. Administrative Law Judge
Stanley N. Ohlhaum issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel
filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge, to
modify his remedy,' and to adopt his recommended
Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, World Generator
Company. Inc., South Holland, Illinois, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, except that
the attached notice marked "Appendix B" is substi-
tuted for that of the Administrative Law Judge.4
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and
it hereby is, dismissed as to all allegations not found
to constitute violations of the Act.
i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevart evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard DOn Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt, proforma. the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's dismissal of the allegations contained in par. VlIl(a) of
the complaint.
3 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & eating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962). for
rationale on interest payments.
4 The Administrative Law Judge inadvertentdy failed to conform the no-
tice with his recommended Order. We shall correct the notice accordingly.
APPENDIX B
No I IE ro EMPIOYEESS
PosIt D BY ORDER OF IF
NAII()NAI. LABOR REIATIO()NS BOARI)
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing, at which all sides had the opportuni-
ty to present evidence, the National Labor Relations
Board has found that we have violated the National
labor Relations Act, and has ordered us to post this
notice and to abide by the following:
As employees, the National Labor Relations Act
gives you these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To tform, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of your own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WII. NI question you concerning your
union membership, affiliation, sympathies, de-
sires, activities, or other rights or actions guaran-
teed to you under the National Labor Relations
Act.
WE WILt. NOT threaten to discontinue or close
our business or to move it away, or threaten that
you will lose your jobs or benefits or suffer any
other job or economic reprisal in case of union-
ization or in case you vote a union in, or in case
you attempt to bargain collectively with us
through a union.
WE WILL NOT discharge, terminate, lay off,
furlough, suspend, refuse or fail to reinstate, re-
call, or rehire, or in any way change the job sta-
tus of any employee because she or he engages in
union activity, or exercises, tries to exercise, or
continues to exercise any right under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT do any of these things, or other-
wise violate the National Labor Relations Act,
directly or indirectly, in order to destroy or dissi-
pate the collective-bargaining status of your law-
fully designated union representative, or in order
to induce you to cease from acting through such
representative in order to bargain with us collec-
tively, as you have the right to do.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of
your rights guaranteed by the Act.
WE WILL offer Ruby Paulton immediate and
full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent po-
sition, without prejudice to her seniority or other
242 NLRB No. 191
1295
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and WE
WIL. pay her, with interest, for all wages and
benefits lost by her because of that discharge.
WE WlitL remove from all books and records
any entry or mention indicating that the termi-
nation of Ruby Paulton was because of any work
absence on her part in contravention or infrac-
tion of any of our rules, requirements, or policies,
or because of any fault or work-related defi-
ciency or shortcoming on her part, and WE WILL
refrain from making any such report or state-
ment voluntarily or in response to any inquiry
from any employer, prospective employer, em-
ployment agency, unemployment insurance of-
fice, or reference-seeker.
WE WII.i., upon request, recognize and bargain
collectively in good faith with International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW), as
the exclusive bargaining representative of our
employees in the following appropriate collec-
tive-bargaining unit, and we will embody in a
signed agreement any understanding reached:
All full-time and regular part-time production,
maintenance, and warehouse employees em-
ployed by us at our facility located at 530
West 162nd Street, South Holland, Illinois,
but excluding office clerical employees, plant
clerical employees, professional employees,
technical employees, outside truck drivers,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
All of our employees are free to join or not to join
any union, or to exercise any other right under the
National Labor Relations Act, as they see fit, without
interference, restraint, or coercion from us in any
form.
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY, INC.
DECISION
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT; ISSUES
STANLEY M. OHLBAUM, Administrative Law Judge: This
consolidated proceeding' under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151, el seq. (herein called
the Act), was heard before me in Chicago, Illinois, for 11
days between April 20 and July 10, 1978. All parties partici-
pated throughout by counsel and were afforded full oppor-
tunity to present evidence, arguments, proposed findings
I Based on a consolidated complaint issued against Respondent Employer
by the Board's Regional Director for Region 13 on December 23, growing
out of charges filed by the Charging Party Union on October 21 (Case 13-
CA-16980), October 25 (Case 13 CA-16985-2), and November 3, 1977
(Case 13-CA-17017). The consolidated complaint was amended at the out-
set of the hearing to include a number of additional alleged violations of
Section 8(aXI) of the Act (G.C. Exh. 2). Unless otherwise specified, dates
throughout this decision refer to 1977.
and conclusions, and briefs. Forty-eight witnesses were
called. Post-trial briefs were received from General Counsel
and Respondent by October 30, 1978. The voluminous
transcript,' exhibits, and briefs have been carefully consid-
ered.
The principal issues presented are whether Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act through co-
ercive interrogations of employees concerning their Union
activities. sympathies, and desires (Section 8(a)(1) ); threats
of economic and other reprisals in the event of unionization
(Section 8(a)(1)): edischarge of, and failure and refusal to
reinstate, the leading union advocate, Respondent's em-
ployee Ruby Paulton, because of her unionizing activism
(Section 8(a)(3) and () ) and failure and refusal to recog-
nize and bargain collectively with the Charging Party
Union as the duly designated representative of a conced-
edly appropriate collective-bargaining unit of Respondent's
employees, while engaging in the foregoing allegedly un-
lawful actions in order to dissipate and destroy the majority
representative status of the Union so as to abort the free
and uncoerced statutory representation election contem-
plated by the Act (Section 8(aX5) and (1) ). thereby forfeit-
ing the right to such an election and warranting entry of a
remedial bargaining order.
Upon the entire record and my observation of the testi-
monial demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
II. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondent has been and is an
Illinois corporation engaged in rebuilding generators and
other automobile parts, located at 530 West 162d Street,
South Holland, Illinois, where, during the calendar year
antedating issuance of the complaint, a representative pe-
riod, it purchased and received goods valued at over
$50,000 directly in interstate commerce from places outside
of Illinois.
I find that at all material times Respondent has been and
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act; and that at those times
the Charging Party Union (herein called UAW) has been
and is a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the
Act.
111. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES: FACTS AS FOUND
After setting forth material preliminary background in-
formation, I will present the events of the case chronologi-
cally.
A. Background
Respondent Employer is a Chicago area-based rebuilder
of automobile generators and other automotive components
such as starters, alternators, and water pumps. Its sole
stockholder is its president, Paul J. VanderPloeg, father of
company vice president for sales and administration Doug-
2 Certain errors in the transcript are hereby noted and corrected.
1296
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY. INC.
las B. VanderPloeg, who, with company vice-president for
production and maintenance David H. VanderPloeg. runs
the business. Another family member. Sales Manager Da-
vid L. VanderPloeg, is in charge of Respondent's ware-
house. Paul VanderPloeg's sister-in-law Marion Vander-
Ploeg also is in Respondent's employ. in its office; and her
son Glenn VanderPloeg, Paul's nephew, who lives with her,
was at the time of this hearing said to be employed there as
a rank-and-file water pump rebuilder. At times here mate-
rial, Charles R. VanderVeen was Respondent's office man-
ager,3 Duane VanderWood was supervisor of its teardown
department, Bill Smith was its supervisor in charge of its
starter department, and Bill McKettrick was, until March
29, 1978, its supervisor in charge of its alternator and water
pump department.
Two union organizing campaigns have taken place in Re-
spondent's establishment since 1976, each by a different
union: the first, in 1976, b Industrial Workers Union. Lo-
cal 8, Laborers International Union of North America
(Case 13-RC-14104; August 11, 1976, election outcome 23
for and 30 against representation: results certified without
objection); the second, involved here, in the summer-fall of
1977 (Case 13-RC 14545, petition filed October 3, 1977;
election, scheduled for November 22, cancelled November
21 pending hearing of the instant consolidated unfair labor
practices cases based on charges filed on October 21 and 25
and November 3; petition withdrawn, January 20, 1978).
During the latter (1977) campaign, here involved, the
Charging Party Union succeeded as will be shown-in
obtaining signatures on its representation authorization
cards from a clear majority of employees in the production,
maintenance, and warehouse employees unit conceded to
be appropriate for collective bargaining (G.C. Exhs. 3[aj-
3[rr], 15[a], 15[b], 38-39, 42-43, 55-56, 64-65, 69, and J.
Exh. I with Appendices A-F). When, on or about August
26, 1977, the Union offered to establish its majority repre-
sentational status and requested recognition and collective
bargaining (G.C. Exh. 5), Respondent refused, claiming "a
good faith doubt as to your majority status" (G.C. Exh. 6,
August 29, 1977).
On October 3, 1977, following Respondent's refusal to
recognize or bargain collectively with it, the Charging Party
Union here filed its petition with the Board seeking formal
certification through a statutory representation election un-
der the Act (G.C. Exh. 32).' On the next day, October 4, as
will be shown, Respondent summarily discharged from its
employ the chief union protagonist in both 1976 as well as
1977 unionizing campaigns, Ruby Paulton, who had been
satisfactorily in its employ for over 4 years, and Respondent
has since continued to refuse to reemploy her. Respondent
concedes-as will also be shown-that it was aware of the
Union's organizing activities as well as Paulton's leadership
therein, within a context of continued strenuous opposition
to union representation of its employees and to collective
bargaining.
3 According to Respondent's Eployee' Handbook (G.C. Exh. 10, p. 2).
Charles R. VanderVeen was also the company treasurer, while Ruth L. Van-
derPloeg was the company secretary.
'4 The Union's revised petition of October I I (G.C. Exh 33) corrected the
typographical error in its October 3 petition that the bargaining unit con-
sisted of 165, rather than 65, employees.
Interlaced with the foregoing, during the 1977 union or-
ganizational campaign. were, as was alleged and will be
shown, various incidents invasive of Respondent's employ-
ees' statutorily guaranteed rights to organize themselves for
collective bargaining-managerial interrogations concern-
ing their organizing activities, as well as managerial threats
to their jobs and economic work prospects in the event of
continued union adherence.
B. August
Following the described unsuccessful 1976 attempt at
collective bargaining. Respondent's employees renewed
that effort in 1977, concededly with Respondent's knowl-
edge, under the leadership of Ruby Paulton, who in late
July or early August sought out and introduced the Charg-
ing Party Union as the employees' potential collective-bar-
gaining representative. Union organizing meetings, hand-
billing, and union representation authorization card-signing
solicitation followed, to the extent that-as shown below
("V," infra )-by the end of August the Union had obtained
signed representation authorization cards from a clear ma-
jority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. As
has been indicated, the Union's proffer of proof to that
effect and request to bargain collectively on behalf of those
employees were summarily rejected by Respondent. which
indicated the Union's recourse should be to the Board (i.e.,
presumably for a statutory representation election under
the Act; G.C. Exhs. 5 & 6).
The consolidated complaint (pars. VIll[f] and [g]) alleges
that in August-during the union handbilling/meetings/
collective-bargaining authorization card-signing cam-
paign-Respondent interrogated employees concerning
their Union activities and threatened them wiih economic
reprisals in the event of unionization. In support of this
allegation, the testimony of Respondent's former starter de-
partment employee Derrick Turner, a singularly impressive
witness whose testimony on direct examination was
strongly solidified on cross-examination, establishes that at
the plant entrance in August he was approached by Super-
visor Bill Smith. who inquired of him whether anybody had
given him a union card. Turner did not respond directly,
instead asking Smith what would happen if the Company
found out somebody was passing out such cards. Smith in-
formed him that the employee would "just [be] termi-
nate[d]" adding that unions do not obtain better wages or
working conditions but that "the company just do that."
Turner then asked "what would happen if a company don't
want the union," to which Smith responded, "The)' just
shut the doors and sometimes they just move away."
Concerning the foregoing, Respondent's Supervisor
Smith, who continues in its employ after about 10 years,
while recollecting a conversation with Turner at the time in
question, at first professed not to be able to recall even the
subject of the conversation or who started it. At some point,
however, Smith's memory apparently began to function.
since he also testified that-contrary to Turner's testi-
mony-it was Turner who asked Smith, and not Smith who
asked Turner, about the Union, in response to which Smith
responded that he (Smith) kept "[my] opinion to myself."
No reason is apparent why Turner would open up such an
inquiry with his supervisor, nor is Smith's professed punctil-
1297
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ious reticence persuasive. Although Smith denies that he
asked Turner whether he had received (or signed) a union
card, he himself characterizes his recollection of the conver-
sation as "pretty vague." while at the same time denying
that he indicated any employee passing out union cards
would be terminated. During cross-examination Smith pro-
fessed to remember additionally that the word "card" was
not even mentioned. Smith also denied saying, specifically,
that Respondent would close its doors or move away in the
event of unionization.
In the resulting posture of the record, after close observa-
tion of the conflicting witnesses in question-Turner and
Smith-upon the basis of comparative testimonial demea-
nor I much prefer and credit the better recollection and
testimony of Turner. who-in contrast to Smith's defective
or selective recall, unpersuasive testimonial delivery. and
unsatisfactory testimony in other respects (infra. "D. Octo-
ber," re Paulton)-testified straightforwardly, with assur-
ance and candor, and convincingly, and who strongly with-
stood a cross-examination which served to fortify his direct
testimony.
Accordingly crediting Turner's described testimony. I
find the allegations of paragraphs VIII(f) and (g) of the
amended consolidated complaint sustained.
The consolidated complaint further alleges (pars. Vlll[i]
and [h]) that in late August or early September Respondent.
through its vice president, Douglas VanderPloeg, interro-
gated an employee concerning his union activities and
views and threatened him with economic consequences-in
this instance, refusing to consider his request for a raise--
because of those activities or proclivities.
Concerning this, Respondent's former alternator depart-
ment lathe operator Rodger Humphery testified that when
he saw VanderPloeg at his (Humphery's) work station dur-
ing breaktime on the occasion in question, he asked Van-
derPloeg for a raise, reminding him it was "time." Accord-
ing to Humphery, VanderPloeg asked him if he had
received a union card, but Humphery denied it even though
he had not only received but signed one.6 VanderPloeg
Respondent urges that any interrogation of Turner was at worst "de
minimis': and that as to economic threats it was at worst a statement refer-
ring to oher plants rather than an announcement of what would necessarily
occur at Respondent's plant. I reject both contentions, since, upon the basis
of an infinitude of reported cases spanning the two generations since enact-
ment of the Act, which it should not be necessary to reiterate, employer
interrogation of employees as to their union activities and proclivities, of the
variety here described, has been consistently ruled improper; and, as to the
described remark regarding "shutlting] ... doors and . .. mov[ingl away,"
there is no reason to assume Smith made it abstractly and without intended
relevance to the existing situation. As such, and regarding it realistically in
the frame of reference of the Board's storehouse of experience in industrial
relations matters, as also explicated in a plenitude of reported cases, it was
clearly intended to be taken seriously in application to the existing situation,
and was thus intended and reasonably taken by the employee, in direct
relationship to that situation, as a potent threat tojob and economic security
in the event of unionization and continued insistence upon the federally
guaranteed right of employees to bargain collectively. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617, 619-620 (1969): N.LR.B. v. Exchange Parts
Companv, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964); Henry 1. Siegel Co., Inc. v. N.L.R. B., 417
F.2d 1206, 1208, 1214 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970):
Wigwam Mills, Inc.. 149 NLRB 1601. 1611, 1618 (1964). enfd.. 351 F.2d 591
(7th Cir. 1965).
'Cf. Bonnie Bourne, an individual d/b/a Boune Co. v. N.L.R.B.. 332 F.2d
47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964).
thereupon told Humphery that it would be better if he did
not take one since "the UAW is one of the highest unions
around." According to Humphery. Vander Ploeg added
that Humphery could not get a raise until he could "see
what was happening with the cards" and until an ongoing
job evaluation system was completed.'
VanderPloeg denies that he asked Humphery whether he
had received a Union card. Upon the basis of my observa-
tion of testimonial demeanor within the frame of reference
of the record as a whole. I credit Humphery's testimony
that VanderPloeg did indeed ask him, under the described
circumstances, whether he had received a Union card- an
impermissible, intrusive interference with Humphery's pro-
tected organizational activities. Respondent again contends
that this, also, as in the aforedescribed episode between Re-
spondent's Supervisor Smith and its employee Turner, was
at worst "de inimis." Apparently Humphery himself did
not so regard it, since he answered the question untruth-
fully. presumably apprehensive of the possible conse-
quences of a truthful response. As to the complaint allega-
tion that Respondent denied Humphery a wage increase
because of his union or protected concerted activities. 1 find
it not sustained by the proof. Not only is there no specific
proof that VanderPloeg was aware of Humphery's union
membership or activity, if any. but VanderPloeg's explana-
tion is uncontradicted that raises at the time were awaiting
the outcome of a job evaluation survey then in process,
upon conclusion of which and institution of a new pay scale
on September 12 about a dozen other employees also re-
ceived no raise.
C. Septembher
Union organizational activities and meetings continued
throughout September, with additional collective-bargain-
ing authorization union cards signed.
The complaint also alleges (pars. VIII[el and Vlll[a])
that in late September or early October Respondent again,
this time through its Supervisor McKittrick threatened em-
ployees with economic or other reprisals in the event they
designated the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
Testifying concerning these, Respondent's alternator de-
partment subassembler Ellen Wieser swore that during the
last week of September (complaint par. VIlI[ej), she heard
McKittrick inform employees that if he had known that
recently discharged employee Betty Weber had come on
the Company's parking lot, he "would have kicked her a-
off the property"; that Ruby Paulton's daughter could not
' Humphery failed to obtain a raise even after the job evaluation system
was placed into effect.
T Cf Bourne, supra, fn. 6.
I in his testimony concerning the episode in question. VanderPloeg can-
didly admitted that it was he and not Humphery who brought up the subject
of Union and union cards; that he told Humphery that the Company was
opposed to a union and hoped the employees would not support it; and that
during this conversation he "may well have . .. urge[dl Humphery not to
sign a UAW authorization card . . because the company was opposed to the
union. that we prefer they not sign the card because we didn't want the
union in and signing the card could possibly get the union in" (at this time,
Humphery had already signed his Union card on August I ). VanderPloeg
also concedes that he may also have told Humphery that UAW dues were
"particularly high." If this were all that the conversation had consisted of, I
would not find it violative of the Act.
1298
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY, INC.
obtain needed surgery because her father (i.e., Ruby Paul-
ton's husband) was on strike; and that the employees
needed no more than "a couple of weeks" under a union,
that if there were no materials on hand "[I] would have to
send [you] home because that is the way the Union oper-
ates." McKittrick places a different slant on his remarks on
this occasion. Denying, unpersuasively in my estimation,
that he made the remark ascribed to him concerning Betty
Weber, McKittrick's version is that he merely "might have
... told her to leave"-a hardly likely restrained gentility, it
would seem. And although he flatly denies making the de-
scribed remark concerning Ruby Paulton's daughter's in-
ability to obtain needed surgery, I have grave difficulty in
believing that Wieser's testimony concerning this is a fabri-
cation. Finally, according to McKittrick, he merely com-
mented that he "wished . . . some of these people had a
union for two weeks and if they seen how it operated and
what it was like, I was quite sure they wouldn't want it
then."' 0
Considering McKittrick's various versions, I much prefer
and credit that of Wieser, an impressive witness who testi-
fied with an openfaced candor and persuasiveness which
McKittrick's testimonial delivery lacked. Furthermore,
Wieser, still in Respondent's employ when she testified,
took the stand at the risk of incurring her employer's dis-
pleasure and retaliation-an economic hazard we have
been instructed" should be counted in her favor in assessing
her credibility. Accordingly and upon comparative demea-
nor observations crediting Wieser's described account of
what McKittrick said on the described occasion, I find it to
have been threatful and coercive to the employees, as well
as without factual foundation or warrant, and made with
the intent and effect of serving as a warning to the employ-
ees of economic reprisal at Respondent's hands if they con-
tinued their union support and adherence. Cf. N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-620 (1969); N.L.R.B.
v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964); Hen-
ry I. Siegel Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 417 F.2d 1206, 1208, 1214
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970); Wigwam
Mills, Inc., 149 NLRB 1601, 1611, 1618-19 (1964), enfd.
351 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1965).
As to the later episode (Complaint par. VlfIa]), Wieser
testified that during the last week of September or in early
October, McKittrick pointed out to her and other employ-
ees that other companies were going out of business "be-
cause they have got a union in there." According to em-
ployee Bedor, who was also there, McKittrick added, "You
people will be sorry." For his part, McKittrick acknowl-
edges that, in the context of telling employees he thought
they were "foolish for passing out the union literature," he
added that "on the radio this morning I heard on the way in
that Zenith is moving to Mexico... because they had union
problems... [So did] Motorola ... for the same reason....
10 In view of irresolvable imprecision, confusion, or uncertainty on the part
of McKittrick, as well as other witnesses, as to dates, it is possible that the
last-quoted statement by McKittrick may have been made in October in
connection with the episode descnbed by Wieser infra "D. October" in con-
nection wth par. Vlll(d) of the consolidated complaint, q.v.
" George Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305, fn. 2 (1961), enforced as modi-
fied. 308 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1962): W. Willard Wirtz v. B. A. C. Steel Products,
Inc., 312 F.2d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1962).
I think you gentlemen are foolish." McKittrick denies using
the expression "You people will be sorry."
I do not believe McKittrick's latter remarks, absent other
context, may be regarded per se as comprising an economic
threat violative of the Act, since they were hardly more
than a statement of what some other companies had in fact
done (coupled with a contextual possible personal estima-
tion-"you ... are foolish" and "You ... will be sorry"-
of anticipatible possible regrets)."
It is accordingly found that the allegations of paragraph
VIII(e), but not those of paragraph VIII(a), of the consoli-
dated complaint, have been established.
D. October
It will be recalled that after Respondent's rejection of the
Union's offer to establish its majority representational cre-
dentials, the Union filed its petition for certification based
upon a statutory representation election, on October 3. On
or about that date, according to the consolidated complaint
(par. VIII[d]), there occurred still another episode by Re-
spondent's Supervisor McKittrick involving interrogation
concerning employee Union views and activities.
On the occasion in question, according to her testimony,
Respondent's currently employed" subassembler Ellen
Wieser was approached and asked by Supervisor Mc-
Kittrick when the election would be held and "What do
you people want?" She answered, "Well, we would like job
security, for one thing."
Although McKittrick denies asking Wieser when the
election would be held and at first denied asking her what
she or other employees wanted from a union, he then con-
ceded he did indeed ask her or "might have asked her" what
she "hope/d] to gain by getting a union in. " He claims not to
be able to recall what immediately preceded this question,
but concedes that after Wieser indicated that the Union
would bring job security he carried the conversation further
by remarking that "good workers don't have to worry
about their jobs" or that "a good employee does not have to
worry about job security"; and that he also told Wieser that
Company Vice President Douglas VanderPloeg had a list of
six companies that had closed their doors within 6 months
to a year after the UAW had been elected to represent their
employees.
Crediting Wieser's described testimony (not materially
disputed by McKittrick), I find the complaint allegation in
question (par. VIII[d]) concerning improper interrogation
of an employee by Respondent through its Supervisor Mc-
Kittrick, on or about October 3, concerning the employee's
Union affairs, established.
E. October 4. Respondent's Discharge of Ruby, Paulton
On October 4, one day after the Union filed its petition
with the Board for certification based upon a statutory elec-
12 I do not regard McKittrick's statement as being in the same category as
the aforedescribed response (that companies "just shut the doors" and
"move away") of Supervisor Smith (supra, "B. August") to employee Tur-
ner's question as to "what would happen if a company don't want the union"
(Emphasis supplied.)-a fairly direct indication, message, or signal that Re-
spondent's employees could expect likewise. While the line is not easy to
draw, I believe it fair to draw it in this fashion in the particular circum-
stances.
I] See fn. I I. supra
1299
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion under the Act, Respondent summarily discharged the
known union leader in the plant, Ruby Paulton. The cir-
cumstances were as follows.
Up to the time of her precipitate discharge on October 4,
under circumstances to be described, Ruby Paulton had
been in Respondent's continuous employ, first as an assem-
bler in its alternator department and then in its starter de-
partment, for upwards of 4 years, at a starting salary of
$3.00 and final salary of $3.72 per hour, under Supervisor
Bill Smith. No issue is raised as to the satisfactory nature of
her services during her tenure of employment, which, ac-
cording to Supervisor Smith's testimony on cross-examina-
tion, was one of the longest in Respondent's factory, where
there is a "substantial employee turnover." Thus, at the
time of her discharge, Paulton was one of Respondent's
most senior employees.
There is no question that, to Respondent's knowledge,
Paulton was the originator, sparkplug, and persistent prime
protagonist of Respondent's employees' attempts to achieve
the unionization and collective bargaining which Respon-
dent adamantly opposed." It was Ruby Paulton who, con-
cededly to the knowledge of Respondent, had introduced a
union into Respondent's plant in 1976 and led the nearly
successful attempt for collective bargaining at that time.
And credited testimony of Paulton, corroborated by UAW
International Representative and Organizing Department
Vice President Albert R. Verri, establishes that it was on
the invitation of Paulton that the UAW initiated the 1977
organizational campaign at Respondent's plant, in late
July. Paulton thereupon not only herself joined that Union
but also attended its organizational meetings, distributed its
organizing literature, and solicited employees to sign its
bargaining authorization cards and turned those cards over
to the Union, thus spearheading the employees' 1977 union-
ization attempt as she had that of 1976. While distributing
union literature near the plant entrance before work in Au-
gust, Paulton was approached by Supervisor Smith and
warned, "I see your friend [UAW organizer Al Verri] is
here. Be sure he stays by the road."
On or about September 1, following an x-ray and other
medical tests, Paulton learned that it was essential that her
18-year-old daughter, who lived with her, undergo a chole-
cystectomy. Paulton immediately, on the morning of Sep-
tember 1, informed Supervisor Smith of this and said that
in consequence she (Paulton) would have to be away from
work for about a week in order to tend her daughter
through this major surgery. Smith assured Paulton-as al-
ready stated, one of Respondent's most senior employees-
that there "would be no problem." At that time, Paulton's
daughter's surgery was scheduled for September 19; how-
ever, on Sunday, September 25, Paulton was informed by
the hospital that her daughter's admission was deferred to
Wednesday, September 28.'5 On the next morning, Mon-
" No suggestion is here intimated that Respondent had no right through
lawful means to oppose its employees' unionization.
's The postponement of the scheduled September 19 surgery was because
of uncertainty regarding insurance coverage of Paulton's daughter, who was
apparently included under Paulton's husband's coverage with Aetna Insur-
ance Company at his place of employment Allis-Chalmers, whose employees
were out on strike. When Paulton inquired from Respondent whether her
daughter was covered by Paulton's policy, she was informed that she was
not.
day. September 26. at her workbench, Paulton notified Su-
pervisor Smith that she had received a call from the hospi-
tal the day before, to bring her daughter in for admission on
Tuesday afternoon, September 27, for surgery on Wednes-
day, September 28, and that Paulton would, as previously
indicated, have to be off for "at least a week, maybe a little
longer," since there was nobody at home to take care of her
daughter-just the two of them, mother and daughter, lived
together., Smith again reassured her that he would make
the necessary arrangements, including obtaining Paulton's
needed paycheck for her on Tuesday at noon (instead of, as
normally, at the end of Tuesday afternoon) if she would
remind him the next morning. This she did, on the next
morning (Tuesday, September 27), and Smith did indeed
procure her paycheck for her by noon as he had indicated
he would. That same morning, when she saw Respondent's
Supervisor McKittrick near her workbench, she told him,
too, about her daughter's imminent surgery. 7
Accordingly, Paulton left work for the described purpose
and period, with Respondent's knowledge and permission,
at noon on Tuesday, September 27, and took her daughter
to the hospital that afternoon as required. Her daughter
underwent the indicated surgery on the next day, Septem-
ber 28, returning home on Monday, October 3. On Wednes-
day, October 5- promptly on conclusion of the indicated
estimated week's absence Paulton telephoned Smith and
notified him she would definitely be in to work on the fol-
lowing Monday, October 10, but that if she could have Fri-
day afternoon, October 7, to take her daughter to the hospi-
tal for removal of sutures, she could return to work the very
next day, Thursday, October 6. Smith asked her to talk to
Douglas VanderPloeg. VandgerPloeg informed her without
further ado that she was terminated because she had been
away for over 3 days after having told Smith she would
only be away for Tuesday afternoon, September 27)?8 Paul-
ton disputed this, insisting to VanderPloeg that she had in-
formed Smith she would have to be away for a week or
longer to take care of her daughter during and immediately
after her surgery since there was nobody else to do so, and
had received Smith's permission. VanderPloeg responded
that his own wife had died during surgery without his being
there and that he considered his job as more important;'9
and he said that Paulton's terminal paycheck would be
ready for her the next day. To Paulton's question, "Is that
it?", VanderPloeg's response was a curt "Yes." When Paul-
ton called for her pay on the next day, she was handed a
terminal paycheck together with a "Termination Notice"
signed by VanderPloeg, stating she has been terminated as
of October 4 for "having absented yourself from work for 5
t6 Paulton heatedly denies, and I fully credit her testimony, that she asked
Smith for only Tuesday afternoon off.
1 I credit Paulton's testimony to this effect over McKittnck's professed
inability to recall and his subsequent seeming denial.
s As already indicated, I totally credit Paulton's testimony that she had
told Smith no such thing: and that. indeed, she told Smith precisely what she
testified to as described and found above.
1' Although VanderPloeg agrees that during this conversation he indicated
to Paulton that it was her obligation to report to work regardless of her
daughter's condition, pointing out to her that when his own wife had died in
the hospital he had reported to work because "I owed it to] my employer,"
VanderPloeg's perhaps Valjeanesque standard is wholly beside the point
here since, as Paulton insisted and I believe and find. Paulton had received
express authorization for her absence.
1300
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY, INC
consecutive days without notification" by alleged reason of
which "you are considered to have voluntarily terminated
your employment here" (G.C. Exh. 9). Since the assigned
reason was wholly contrary to the true facts, as detailed
above (and as I find), Paulton declined to sign the "Termi-
nation Notice." which so states at the bottom thereof ("Em-
ployee would not sign": id.). Paulton informed fellow em-
ployees about her discharge and her belief that it was
because of her union activities. Credited testimony of fel-
low-employees ' confirms the preeminent Union organiza-
tional leadership role which Paulton played among them in
Respondent's plant."
Respondent contends that it discharged Paulton only be-
cause she absented herself from work for over 3 days i.e..
September 28 30. Wednesday through Friday22 without
permission. The short answer to this is that, as I find (in
company with the Illinois Department of Labor," crediting
Paulton-a witness who impressed me indelibly as a person
of thorough probity and honesty --Paulton did not absent
herself without permission, but, on the contrary, did in fact
have permission to be away in connection with her daugh-
ter's described surgery: and I do not credit Respondent's
contrary denials, which I find to be wholly unpersuasive
and unworthy of belief.
20The substantially chilling, if not cataclysmic. effect upon her fellow-
employees and their organizational campaign and activities. of her discharge,
at the time and under the circumstances it occurred, must be visualized and
assessed in these terms. See "III F" and "V." infra
"2 On or about February 27. 1978, following a hearing. the Illinois Depart-
ment of Labor determined, over Respondent's testimony and opposition,
that Paulton "did not voluntanly leave her job but was discharged for ab-
sence from work which had been previously reported to the appropriate
supervisor" G.C. Exh. 11).
22 Although earlier as well as dunng Smith's direct examination Respon-
dent conceded that it does not contend that Paulton was discharged for work
absences other than these 3 days, and that no contention is raised as to
Paulton's work qualification or efficiency, counsel later unfurled the conten-
tion that any failure by Respondent to "rehire" Paulton subsequent to her
discharge "would" in part have been based upon reevaluation of her possibly
unsatisfactory previous attendance record and overall performance as an
employee. I reject this contention, since l1) it is palpably speculative and has
in no way been credibly established; (2) the record credibly establishes the
contrary; (3) at a much earlier stage of the hearing, Respondent's adminis-
trative head Douglas VanderPloeg indicated that if Paulton had applied to
be rehired he would have rehired her; (4) Respondent insists Paulton never
applied for reinstatement or rehire; (5) it presupposes, contrary to fact and
finding here, that Respondent's termination of Paulton was justified and not
in violation of the Act; (6) 1 do not credit such a contention as the true
reason for Respondent's refusal and failure to reinstate or ehire Paulton;
and (7) crediting Paulton, I find that she did in fact report back and attempt
to resume the job from which she had been unlawfully ousted by Respon-
dent, any "issue" of "rehire" thus not being reached. VanderPloeg conceded
at the hearing that at no time did Paulton indicate she had quit, was done or
through with, or had abandoned her job, but that, on the contrary, at all
times she continued to act as if she were still an employee of Respondent;
and that he did not indicate she should "reapply" for her job, nor did she do
so, and that it is fair to say that she indicated she wished to resume her job
Under these circumstances, there was no necessity for her to "reapply" for
her job, nor was it in any way indicated to her that she should or could.
21 Supra fn. 21. This is not to suggest that the Illinois decision is determina-
tive of the issue herein. Cf. N.LR.B v. Pacific Inermountain Express Com-
pany' and International Broherhood-of-Teamsers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers of America. Over-The-Road and City Transfer Drivers Helpers,
Dockman & Warehousemen, Local No. 41, AFL, 228 F.2d 170. 176 (8th Cir
1955), cert. denied. 351 U.S. 952 (1956): Duquesne Electric and Manufacur-
ing Company, 212 NLRB 142 (1974), enfd., 518 F.2d 701 3d Cir. 1975);
Aerovox Corporation. 104 NLRB 246, 247 (1953)., enfd. 211 F.2d 640 (D.('
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954).
Respondent's administrative head Douglas VanderPloeg
freely concedes company awareness of Paulton's persistence
in attempting to organize employees in the first (1976) as
well as the second (1977) unionization campaign, including
the facts that in the first campaign she distributed pam-
phlets and was the union observer at the statutory represen-
tation election, and that in the second campaign she again
distributed pamphlets and solicited employees to sign union
cards. Indeed, VanderPloeg concedes knowledge that Paul-
ton has been the leading union exponent among Respon-
dent's employees. VanderPloeg also concedes that Respon-
dent's official policy has been against UAW representation
by its employees. and that it went so far as to distribute to
its employees during the 1977 Union organizational cam-
paign a 32-page list, furnished by its counsel, of companies
in which various types of strikes had allegedly occurred
(some, assertedly. with "violence reported," "court injunc-
tion issued," and "arrests made." but with no details fur-
nished) or which had shut down, following selection by em-
ployees of the UAW as their collective-bargaining
representative (G.C. Exh. 8).
Respondent's position, as explicated by VanderPloeg. is
that Paulton notwithstanding her insistent denials to the
contrary, which I credit "voluntarily quit." VanderPloeg
insists that when someone is absent for 3 days he assumes
the absentee "has no interest in their job" -as indicated by
Respondent in its October 4, 1977, notice of termination to
Paulton, signed by VanderPloeg, that "Having absented
yourself from work for 5 consecutive days24 without notifi-
cation, you are considered to have voluntarily terminated
your employment here" (G.C. Exh. 9). VanderPloeg insists
this is mandatory under company policy as enunciated in
its Emplovee's Handbook, which states that "It is the em-
ployee's responsibility to notify the Personnel Department
either by phone or by written message of his absence. Re-
peated and chronic absenteeism are considered cause for dis-
missal. Unexcused absences of three consecutive days wsith-
out notification will be in:erpreted as oluntary termination
or reason for dismissal. For good reas.ons emplorees mat he
given leave of absence or excused absence status for a reason -
able period of rime during which time no salaries will be
paid: seniority during leave of absence will be maintained."
and which lists "Chronic absenteeism or tardiness" among
"offenses . .. against good conduct . . . considered serious
and adequate reasons for dismissal" (G.C. Exh. 10, pp. 4, 6.
and 7; emphasis supplied); while "leaving the job without
authorization" is included among "other types of mis-con-
duct which may result in disciplinary action " (but not speci-
fying dismissal or discharge; id., p. 7; emphasis supplied).
The same company regulations specify that "A progressive
system of disciplinary action will be followed," ranging
from mere "verbal reprimand" for the "lst offense" (erased
if unrepeated for 2 months) to "written dismissal notice"
only for the "fourth offense-same infraction" (id., p. 7).
With regard to Respondent's administration of these
24 According to VanderPloeg Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. and Monday
(September 28-October 3), the intervening Saturday seemingly included.
)This appears to be In contrast to Supervisor Smith's testimony, intra, of a 3-
day absence on Wednesday through Friday. September 28 30 for a reason
allegedly unknown to him.) It is plain that such a "rule" cannot and does
not by its very terms-apply where the employee has given notification and
also. as here, received permission to he absent.
1301
D)ECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"rules." even without taking into consideration the vague-
nesses and ambiguities therein, the fact that--contrary to
Respondent's seeming contention, which I do not credit
the rules were not required to be applied "automatic[all]"
or woodenly and that considerable leeway could be exer-
cised regarding them even as worded, and the further fact
that Respondent could of course waive its own "rules." it is
observed that in the cases of its employees Eusebio and
Miguel Barron, who absented themselves in excess of 3
days without permission and a week or two bey ond the tin
specifically stipulated by them and authorized by Respondent
to visit their ailing mother in Mexico, they were each reem-
ployed or rehired after their return, after VanderPloeg had
seen fit to warn at least one of them that "You workers
should go easy, be careful about the union."
5 This is in
contrast to Paulton, who, even after an authorized leave,
was never reemployed or rehired despite her long and satis-
factory tenure of employment with Respondent. It is also
observed that-- in further contrast to Paulton-in the case
of Respondent's employee Jeffrey R. Wilkins, who had ab-
sented himself for over 3 days "without proper notice to our
firm," Respondent wrote him a letter on March 17. 1976,
that "Unless we hear from you within the next two days
from receipt of this letter, we will terminate your employ-
ment on our records" (G.C. Exh. 61). '
Within the frame of reference of conceded company
knowledge of the reason for Paulton's absence and her con-
cededly having previously informed the Company thereof,
VanderPloeg further concedes that it is his Company's pol-
icy to communicate with even probationary employees to
ascertain why they have not come to work; in Paulton's
case, however, VanderPloeg acknowledges this was not
done,27 even though Paulton had been in Respondent's em-
ploy for over 4 years with no dissatisfaction over the quality
or quantity of her work performance. Furthermore. Re-
spondent's own witness, Supervisor McKittrick. testified
that he gave his subordinate employee Karen Cruz no less
than three warnings for absenteeism, without discharging
her. From these and other circumstances it is fair to regard
the "3-day rule" in question as in any event neither rigid
nor inflexibly applied in actual practice, but rather as one
intended to permit Respondent to clear its records of unre-
liable employees or employees who have simply abandoned
their employment under circumstances where there is no
indication that they will return, or where there is indication
that they will not return-none of which categories is in any
sense applicable to Paulton here, who had, furthermore, spe-
cifically sought and obtained leave of absence and who had
made it entirely clear that she would be back to her job.
I2 Undisputed by VanderPloeg at the hearing.
26 VanderPloeg's incredible testimony indicating that it is his Company's
practice to communicate only with probatinmarv employees who have ab-
sented themselves from work, and not with permanent employees (like Paul-
ton, satisfactorily employed there for over 4 years), is belied by his conces-
sion that Jcffrey Wilkins, to whom Respondent's above-quoted letter (G.C.
Exh. 61) was addressed, was not a probationary but a regular employee. And
I regard as little short of preposterous the pure speculation of Respondent's
Supervisor Smith that the letter to Wilkins "may not have been mailed out":
signed as it was by Respondent's officer and Personnel Manager C. R. Van-
derVeen, it was in any event an authoritative declaration of company policy.
27 It would clearly seem this was because the reason for Paulton's absence
was well known to Respondent, as I am convinced and find it indeed was.
VanderPloeg concedes that he was well aware that Paul-
ton's daughter was scheduled for surgery, having been so
informed some weeks earlier in September or mid-Septem-
ber not only by Paulton but by company bookkeeper or
clerk DeJong as well as Supervisor Smith (who had indi-
cated Paulton had told him [Smith so). According to Van-
derPloeg, if Paulton had requested prior permission to be ab-
sent for this reason it would have been granted and she would
not have been terminated And VanderPloeg also concedes
that he knew that Paulton told Supervisor Smith on Sep-
tember 27 that she was going to the hospital that afternoon,
that Smith made a note of it in the records and so reported
to him (VanderPloeg) the next day.28 and that Paulton un-
successfully remonstrated with VanderPloeg that she had
indeed received permission from Smith to be away from
work under the circumstances.
Asked specifically at the hearing whether Paulton would
have been "rehired," in much the same fashion as the Bar-
ron brothers, supra, if she had physically presented herself
at the plant and asked for her job "back" (as distinguished
from mere job "resumption"). VanderPloeg testified that
she would have been put back to work. On later question-
ing, however, VanderPloeg conceded that he did in fact
have what he characterizes a "brief telephone conversa-
tion" with Paulton on this very subject, wherein he told her
that he regarded her as having "voluntarily quit" her job-
a position with which, being thoroughly contrary to fact,
Paulton did not concur. I do not credit any indication or
implication in VanderPloeg's testimony that Paulton did
not seek return to her job-a contention which, under all of
the circumstances, flies in the face of the facts, and which I
cannot and do not accept.9
Respondent's Supervisor Bill Smith, whom Paulton kept
closely informed about her daughter's impending surgery
and from whom she obtained permission to absent herself
in connection therewith in accordance with her requests,
testified extensively on this subject. Because of repeated in-
consistencies and other testimonial deficiencies and short-
comings, my preference for Paulton's testimony was an easy
choice.
To begin with, Smith-in company with his superior
Douglas VanderPloeg--acknowledges Paulton's preemi-
nence in union organizational activities and Respondent's
continuing opposition thereto, including Smith's (and other
managerial personnel's) distribution to employees of a 32-
page struck-plant list to detach or dissuade them from
union adherence.
Smith concedes that Paulton informed and spoke to him
on about three occasions concerning her daughter's illness
and her concern over a suspected malignancy. Although
28 Notwithstanding this, when VanderPloeg resumed the witness stand at a
much later stage of the trial, he testified that it was only on September 29 or
30 that he learned from Supervisor Smith that Paulton had absented herself
for 3 days (including that day) without leave or notifying the Company.
Although I do not believe that this was the first time Smith (or Paulton)
indicated or VanderPloeg knew or understood that Paulton would be away
in connection with her daughter's surgery, it is theoretically conceivable that
VanderPloeg's testimony to this effect was intended to be no more than a
statement of strictly accurate hstorical fact namely, that Paulton "had"
now in fact been absent for 3 days--in accordance (as here found) with her
previous notification to the Company and its permission; but. so viewed,
VanderPloeg's testimony is absent of significance.
29 See fn. 22. supra
1302
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY. IN('.
Smith incredibly denied on cross-examination that there
was any mention of' the possibility of surgery in connection
with Paulton's work absence, he had testified on direct ex-
amination that Paulton had apprised him that surgery was
scheduled for around September 19 and that she would
need time off. He acknowledges that he reassured her that
"we could probably work something out for some time." '
According to Smith, Paulton notified him in mid-Septem-
ber that her duaghter's surgery was being "cancelled": al-
though he insisted on direct examination that she at no time
brought it home to him that the surgery was being resched-
uled, on cross-examination he appeared to abate the rigor
of this position through qualifying his earlier testimony on
direct examination so as to limit the notification concerning
surgery "cancellation" to September 19, its originally
scheduled date, only.
According to Smith, on September 26, Paulton asked him
only for 1/2 day off on the following afternoon, September
27 (Tuesday). for the purpose of "going to the doctor." Al-
though Smith testified on direct examination that Paulton
indicated she wished to take her daughter to the doctor, on
cross-examination Smith attempted to modify this by insist-
ing that no mention of her daughter was made by Paulton.
but that Paulton merely told him that "[ amj going to the
doctor . . . Ruby [Paulton], herself."' In view of this and
other testimonial inconsistencies, Smith's generally demon-
strated testimonial elasticity. his proclivity for hedging and
evasiveness, and his halting and otherwise unfavorable tes-
timonial demeanor, I reject and do not credit Smith's testi-
mony that Paulton asked for only a half day off in connec-
tion with her daughter's impending major surgery and
convalescence, that Paulton did not indicate how long she
would be away, that he was unaware of the anticipated
length of her absence, and that he did not authorize it. To
the contrary, I fully credit Paulton's testimony, as re-
counted above, that she explicitly informed Smith how long
she would be away and that her absence was expressly au-
thorized.
As already indicated, Smith's testimony is replete with
inconsistencies and hedges, as well as assertions I am un-
able to accept since I am persuaded they are simply mis-
leading or untruthful. In addition to the examples already
afforded, in his direct examination Smith first testified that
he informed VanderPloeg on September 29 (Thursday) that
Paulton was not in, and that that is all that he said. In
response to an ensuing leading question, however, he added
that he also told VanderPloeg that he was "not aware of
any reason ... she had not called." On cross-examination,
Smith further added that the foregoing amplification was in
response to a question by VanderPloeg, and that-in con-
Irast to VanderPloeg's testimony, supra-he did not tell Van-
0 Smith characterized Paulton's work as not indispensable, and testified
that in her absence it could readily be done by another employee.
a1 Cross-examination yielded still another version from Smith. After pro-
fessing inability to "recall," he insisted on the correctness of yet another,
earlier position statement in writing, supplied to the Board's General Coun-
sel, that Paulton did not so much as mention "doctor" at all but had merely
asked for an afternoon off for "personal business." In view of Smith's earlier
contrary assertions under oath, other instances of testimonial inconsistency
and evasiveness, and his unsatisfactory testimonial demeanor, within the
framework of the record as a whole, I also find this version by Smith to be
wholly unworthy of credit.
derPloeg that Paulton had taken her daughter to the hospi-
tal because he (Smith) was unaware tof this testimon I
am constrained to regard as rankly untruthful. Smith had
already testified, on direct examination, that the suspicion
had "dawned on me" that Paulton's absence might be con-
nected to her daughter's surgery. but that he did not share
this realization with VanderPloeg although he also testi-
fied that he had informed VanderPloeg a week earlier that
Paulton's daughter was scheduled to be hospitalized for sur-
gery. With much seeming embarrassment, seeming reluc-
tance or apprehensiveness, and hedging. Smith finally ap-
peared to acknowlege that he did, indeed, in mid-
September for "the first time" inform VanderPloeg that "I
[Smith] told Ruby [Paulton] that we could probabl make
arrangements for her to take time off" in connection with
her daughter's impending hospitalization.
Douglas VanderPloeg concedes that Respondent has au-
thorized and excused employee absences for 3 or more
days. within a policy or practice of granting such permis-
sion informally and verbally."
Within a week after her discharge, Respondent replaced
Paulton with a newly-hired employee.3
Respondent's discharge of Paulton presents the classical
case of an employer's precipitate discharge. upon flimsy.
contrived, and pretextual grounds, of a satifactory em-
ployee of long seniority who has assumed leadership of an
attempt by the employees to associate themselves to bar-
gain collectively with an employer adamantly opposed
thereto. While. of course, employers need not thvor unions
or collective bargaining, and may, indeed, actively oppose
them, such opposition must--like employees' and unions'
organizational attempts, as well- he limited to lawful
means and measures. Lawful means and measures do not
include the discharge. upon the spurious and pretextual
grounds here advanced, of an employee who lawfully leads
the employees in pursuit of their statutorily guaranteed
right to engage in collective bargaining for their economic
betterment. Paulton's persistent leadership in the employ-
ees' unionizing attempts in two campaigns was well known
to Respondent. who likewise conceded its continuing oppo-
sition thereto. Paulton was a long-term, satisfactory em-
ployee--one of Respondent's most senior on its rapidly
turned-over staff. When Paulton became aware she would
have to be absent to tend her teenage daughter. who lived
with her, for about a week in connection with essential ma-
jor surgery, she promptly informed Respondent and was
assured that leave without pay would be arranged. When
she learned of the actual reporting date to the hospital, she
immediately apprised Respondent thereof, receiving no in-
timation that her hold on her job would in any way be
imperiled. Her job was in no way essential or unique, a
substitute or stand-in being readily and actually' at hand.
32 While there is in evidence (G.C Exh. 79) a list, prepared by Respon-
dent, of employees terminated for absences of 3 or more days. it may be of
doubtful accuracy since neither of the Barrons. supra. is mentioned therein.
Futhermore. it is noted that of the 25 listed, with the exception ,it only 3
(Paulton, Schroeder, and Abrons), 22 were employed tfor less than a year and
20 of those for less than 6 months man) for only a few days or weeks.
VanderPloeg concedes that some may simply have abandoned their jobs.
Paulton worked for Respondent for over 4 years and in no way abandoned
her job. It is clear tht the list in question is in no way determinative of the
issue here.
1 I.e., Don Arpin.
1303
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Having obtained permission to absent herself for the indi-
cated meritorious purpose, in no way did she violate or fail
to comply with Respondent's so-called "automatic" policy
for separation for unexcused absence of 3 days' duration;
nor did Respondent have any such "automatic," rigid or
inflexible policy: nor did Respondent in actual practice in-
variably apply any such policy in the way it applied it to
Paulton. Respondent's administrative chief, Douglas Van-
derPloeg, conceded that at no time did Paulton in fact quit,
abandon, or relinquish her job, or act as if she did: and
that, on the contrary, she at all times acted as if she ex-
pected and wished to resume her work. He further concedes
that if she had applied to be "rehired," she would have been
taken back; however, since she never relinquished her job
and was not lawfully discharged therefrom, there was no
factual or legal necessity for her to apply to be "rehired" to
a job she continued to hold. Paulton was precipitately dis-
charged, without any prior notification or inquiry, within I
day after the Union filed with the Board its petition for a
statutory election in view of Respondent's refusal to deal or
meet with it unless officially certified. But Respondent was
apparently unwilling to await the results of the free election
it purportedly sought. Instead, tampering with the fair and
free election conditions which the law requires and which
alone can assure the reliability of the ballot, Respondent
struck at the employees' leader and precipitately discharged
her. It makes no sense that Paulton would give up or jeop-
ardize her retention of a job she needed, by not seeking and
obtaining a routine unpaid leave of absence which Respon-
dent concedes was available to her for the asking. 4
It is apparent that Paulton had become an intolerable
thorn in Respondent's side because of her persistent and
seemingly or potentially (see "V," infra) successful leader-
ship of the 1977 unionizing campaign which threatened to
bring to Respondent's plant that collective bargaining to
which it remains unshakeably opposed, even though it is
based on its employees' exercise of a federally guaranteed
right. It is clear that Paulton was discharged by Respondent
to throw havoc into its employees' unionization effort and
to destroy it through summary removal of its leader at the
apex of the battle.
"[W]here the discharge in question involves the 'key' em-
ployee in an organizational drive, it may supply shape and
substance to otherwise equivocal circumstances" (N.L.R.B.
v. Davidson Rubber Company, 305 F.2d 166, 169 (Ist Cir.
1962); see also N.L.R.B. v. W. C. Nabors, dbla W. C.
Nabors Company, 196 F.2d 272, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied 344 U.S. 865 (1952)-although it must be said
that the circumstances in the instant case are far short of
"equivocal." An employee regarded by his employer as
"dissident and annoying," or a burr in his side because of
his union activism or persistent pursuit of collective bar-
gaining, does not thereby target himself for discharge be-
yond the pale of the Act's rescue; the contrary is the very
purpose of the Act. Duo-Bed Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 337 F.2d
3I reject, as not established by substantial credible or credited evidence
upon the record as a whole, the suggestion or implication, credibly disputed
by Paulton, that she in effect expressed or indicated a desire to trade off her
job for Respondent's acquiescence in not contesting a claim she might make
for unemployment insurance benefits.
850, 851 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1965).
Nor do employees discharge a seasoned employee for re-
placement by one green and untried. N.L.R.B. v. Davidson
Rubber Conmpan, supra,' N.L.R.B. v. Local 776, IATSE
(Film Editors), 303 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied 371 U.S. 826.
The evidence fully persuades me and I find that Paulton's
union organizational leadership was the only reason for her
discharge (and for Respondent's refusal and failure to per-
mit her to resume her job), and not her absence-an-
nounced in advance, excused, and authorized, in any
event-in connection with her daughter's described surgery,
which Respondent utilized and advanced as a pretext to
mask and conceal its true reason for that discharge.
The complaint (pars. Vil[b] and [c]) alleges that in mid-
October-shortly after the filing of the Union's election pe-
tition and Respondent's discharge of Paulton-employees
of the proposed collective-bargaining unit were further
threatened with economic reprisals by Respondent's super-
visor McKittrick in the event the Union became their col-
lective-bargaining representative.
Respondent's employee Karen Cruz-still in Respon-
dent's employ at the time of this hearing" and an impres-
sive witness-testified that, in the presence of fellow-em-
ployee Johnny Houston, after she remarked to Supervisor
McKittrick, who was working alongside of her (Cruz) that
where her husband was employed supervisors did no man-
ual work, McKittrick pointed out that that was because it
was a union shop. McKittrick added, however, that under a
union if there were no materials for her to work with she
would be "sent home without pay" and, further, that if
Respondent's plant became unionized "the doors will be
closed immediately . .. 'til a contract is drawn up, and both
parties agree on it," and that, since the Company could not
give the employees anything more than they had, he could
"almost guarantee that ... if the Union gets in, within one
year the Company will move out." McKittrick also insisted
that if the shop were unionized, the Union "would make
[me] fire [you] because of [your] attendance [record]." Cruz
insists, and I believe her, that McKittrick appeared to make
these statements in all seriousness. Later that day, Cruz in-
formed a fellow-employee of what McKittrick had told her.
Johnny Houston, a lathe operator also still in Respondent's
employ and on the occasion in question under Supervisor
McKittrick, in part corroborating Cruz's testimony, testi-
fied that McKittrick also pointed out, "We will move be-
cause nothing in here is bolted down" and that in the event
of unionization Respondent would "close down and move
to ... Arizona." 36
McKittrick's testimony as to the foregoing was less than
satisfactory and oscillated from direct through cross and
redirect examination. Thus, while on direct as well as cross-
examination he conceded he indicated to Cruz that in a
unionized shop he would be "watching" her instead of
working with her, and professed to be unable to recall any
)" See fn. I , supra.
'6 While Houston at times obviously misspoke and made several correc-
tions in his testimony, observation of his general demeanor and appraisal of
his intellectual level and testimonial caliber persuade me that these mis-
speakings were no more than innocent mistakes and that the corrections
were made in good faith, that he was an honest witness, and that any short-
comings in his testimonial quality were not because of prevarication.
1304
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY, INC.
more, on later direct as well as cross-examination he con-
ceded that he "could have" or "probably" also told her that
under union, as distinguished from existing nonunion, con-
ditions she could or "probably would have to" he sent
home in the absence of supplies. While denying, on direct
examination, that he ever made the other remarks attrib-
uted to him by Cruz, nevertheless during cross-examination
he conceded that he "may" have mentioned to Cruz a shut-
down or plant move, but only in connection with the union-
ization of a company other than Respondent. He also con-
ceded, on cross-examination, that he "may" also have told
Cruz that under unionized conditions she would "probably
. . be terminated" because of her poor attendance record:
on redirect examination, he amplified this to state that what
he said to Cruz was that "the agreement between the union
and the company requires you, to have specific amounts of
attendance and if you exceed this, it's mandatonr then . . .
that you have to [be] dischargeldJ." 7 Notwithstanding his
foregoing testimony on redirect examination, on recross-
examination McKittrick blandly denied that his discussion
with Cruz included mention of union contracts with Re-
spondent or any other company. For these reasons as well
as my clear preference for the testimony of Cruz based
upon comparative testimonial demeanor as observed, I
credit the described testimony of Cruz and find the allega-
tion (complaint, par. VIII[b]) in question established.
Respondent's alternator department assembler Carmen
Diaz, still in its employ, testified credibly that in mid-Octo-
ber, during a morning workbreak in the employees' lunch-
room, her then Supervisor McKittrick, viewing some union
literature on the table, informed employees that "if the
union come to this company, in time they [i.e.. the Com-
panyl go out for business because they can[not] pay the
much money" [sic]. In effect McKittrick perhaps indirectly
denies this, since he insists that an employee (Shirley Aring)
other than Diaz is the only one to whom he has talked in
the lunchroom concerning the Union, although he concedes
he has seen Diaz there; 8 and that he "thinks" he also told
her that he had heard that another company was moving to
Mexico because of "union problems."
Since my reaction to Diaz as a witness is that she was
utterly credible, I find the allegation in question (complaint,
par. Vll[c]) established.
F. Purpose of Respondent's Unfair Labor Practices
The complaint further alleges (par. X) that Respondent's
purpose in engaging in the foregoing unfair labor practices
was to undermine, dissipate, and destroy the majority rep-
resentative status of the Union and thereby to render im-
possible the fair and uncoerced election which the Act con-
templates.
17 Emphases added. These statements appear to have been totally without
factual basis, since there was no agreement and also no reason for regarding
any such supposed provisions as "requiredl]" or "mandatory"-although
provision of such professedly knowledgeable information to employees could
hardly have been intended or regarded as other than sinster and coercive to
employees at whom it was beamed.
3 Diaz did not testify that the described remarks were made to her alone
or to her specifically, but merely that she was there when McKittrick made
them and that she heard him make them.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of unfair labor
practices, and considering their nature, extent, and timing, I
can find and conclude no other than that it was indeed
Respondent's purpose, in engaging in those unlawful ac-
tions within the framework of its acknowledged continuing
antiunion animus, to undermine and destroy the Union's
representative status and to abort and preclude the fair and
uncoerced free election which the Act contemplates and
provides for the purpose of best ascertaining employees'
representation desires. Here the Employer sought to have it
"both ways." While refusing out of hand to acknowledge or
even meet with the Union. but instead insisting on an elec-
tion upon the ground that it entertained "a good faith
doubt as to your majority status ... [and] believed matters
such as these are best handled under the procedures of the
National Labor Relations Act" (G.C. Exh. 6), Respondent
was not content to abide by the outcome of a fair and unco-
erced election in good faith under the Act which it invoked.
but instead embarked upon a course of unfair labor prac-
tices, in contravention of the Act, clearly designed to de-
stroy that Union majority status as to which it professed "a
good faith doubt," and by its coercive actions to ruin the
atmosphere required for a fair election. Particularly repre-
hensible as well as highly coercive was Respondent's dis-
charge of its long-term employee Ruby Paulton, the leader
of its employees' organizational efforts, under the circum-
stances described-no less than a ruthless decapitation of
the head of those activities, participation in which is guar-
anteed by the law of the land.
Respondent's commission of the unfair labor practices
found could have been for no purpose other than to dissi-
pate and destroy the representative status of its employees'
collective-bargaining agent. and to destroy the conditions
for an uncoerced and fair election under the Act, and I so
find.
Upon the foregoing findings3" and the entire record. I
state the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction is properly asserted in this proceeding.
B. By engaging in the following acts, under the circum-
stances described and found in "Ill," supra, Respondent
has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, and
has thereby violated Section 8(aXI) of the Act:
1. Interrogation of employees.
2. Threatening employees with plant shutdown, removal,
discharge, and other economic consequences and reprisals
in the event of unionization and attempts to bargain collec-
tively.
C. By discharging its employee Ruby Paulton on Octo-
ber 4, 1977, and failing and refusing at all times since then
to permit her to resume her job, or to reinstate, reemploy,
or rehire her, under the circumstances described and found
in "III," supra, Respondent has discriminated in regard to
the hire, tenure, and terms and conditions of employment
of its employees to discourage membership in a labor or-
ganization, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act; and
has, further. interfered with, restrained and coerced its em-
19 Recapitulated in Appendix A. [Appendix A omitted from publication.]
1305
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployces in the exercise of' their rights under Section 7, in
violation of Section 8(a)( 1), of' the Act.
D. Respondent's discharge of' Ruby Paulton and its
other unfair labor practices in violation of the Act have
been with the purpose, intent and effect of coercing and
discouraging its employees from continued lawful adher-
ence to, membership in, support of. and activities on behalf
of the Charging Party Union herein, as well as to prevent
the Union from becoming and acting as their certified col-
lective-bargaining representative, so as to undermine said
Union's representative status and dissipate and destroy its
majority standing, and to rendor impossible or impractica-
ble a free and uncoerced electoral choice on their part in
the statutory election procedures provided under the Act.
E. Respondent's failure and refusal to recognize and bar-
gain collectively with the Charging Party Union herein as
the duly authorized bargaining representative of its employ-
ees in the appropriate bargaining unit at all times on and
since August 29, 1977, under the circumstances described
and found in "II1," supra, and with the purposes and effects
set forth in Conclusion "D," supra, has constituted and con-
stitutes a continuing violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. as set forth in paragraph XII of the complaint.
The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time production, mainte-
nance, and warehouse employees employed at Respon-
dent Employer's facility located at 530 West 162nd
Street, South Holland. Illinois. but excluding office
clerical employees, plant clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, technical employees, outside truck
drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
F. The aforesaid unfair labor practices have affected, af-
fect, and unless permanently restrained and enjoined will
continue to affect, commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
G. It has not been established by substantial credible
evidence that, as alleged in paragraphs VIII(h) and XIV of
the complaint, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by refusing to consider an employee's request for a
raise because of the employee's union and/or protected
concerted activities.
H. It has not been established by substantial credible
evidence that, as alleged in paragraphs VIII(a) and XIV of
the complaint, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by threatening an employee, on the particular occasion
in question, with economic and/or other reprisals of the
Union became the bargaining representative of the employ-
ees.
THE REMEDI)Y
We come now to the matter of remedying Respondent's
unfair labor practices here. With regard to the unfair labor
practices consisting of the violations of Section 8(a)( )
which have been found, the usual cease and desist provi-
sions in such circumstances should be required. Insofar as
the Section 8(a)(3) violation growing out of the unlawful
discharge of Ruby Paulton is concerned, Respondent
should, as is also usual in situations of that type, be re-
quired to reinstate Mrs. Paulton to her former (or. if not
available, to a substantially equivalent) job, without preju-
dice to her seniority and other emoluments, together with
backpay and interest, to be computed as explicated by the
Board in F W. Woolworth C'ompan'v, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
and Florida Steel Corporation,. 231 NLRB 651 (1977); and
Respondent should be required to preserve and make avail-
able to the Board's agents its records for backpay computa-
tion and compliance determination. The usual Notice to
Employees posting should also be required.
There remains the question of whether, under the cir-
cumstances shown, a bargaining requirement should be im-
posed, as sought in the complaint (par. XI) and urged by
General Counsel, under the authority of N'.L.R.B. v. Gis.sel
Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
In the Gissel case, the Supreme Court unanimously in-
structed us that, under circumstances analogous to those
here, to limit remedy to an election "would in effect be
rewarding the employer and allowing him 'to profit from
[his] own wrongful refusal to bargain' ... while at the same
time severely curtailing the employees' right freely to deter-
mine whether they desire a representative. The employer
could continue to delay or disrupt the election processes
and put off indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any
election held under these circumstances would not be likely
to demonstrate the employees' true, undistorted desires"
(395 U.S. supra at 610-11): and that a bargaining order
without an election is appropriate when an employer who
has refused to recognize a union holding majority bargain-
ing authorization credentials has, in the interval while
awaiting the statutory election which he has-as here-in-
sisted upon, engaged in "practices which . . . have the ten-
dency to undermine [union] majority strength and impede
the election processes" (id. at 614), with the prospect of
erasure of the effects of such actions and insurance of a fair
election slight, so that "employee sentiment once expressed
through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a
bargaining order" (id at 614- 15).
If this instruction from our highest Court means any-
thing, it is that an employer professing good-faith doubt of
a union's majority and insisting upon a statutory election to
prove it, may not exploit the time interval while awaiting
that election to attempt, through coercive practices against
his employees, in violation of the Act, to dissipate and de-
stroy the union's majority and abort that free and unco-
erced ballot process contemplated by the framers of the Act
and entrusted to the Board to assure.
Were the unfair labor practices here sufficiently serious
to warrant a Gissel bargaining order? In my view, it is plain
that they were; either of two of them alone would warrant
if not require such an order. These two were Respondent's
pretextual and flagrantly unlawful discharge of Ruby Paul-
ton, the leader of its employees' aspirations to exercise their
statutorily guaranteed right to bargain collectively, which
Respondent continues adamantly to oppose; and its threats
to shut down or remove its plant in the event of unioniza-
tion. It would be difficult to imagine coercion or threats
more potent to employees, or carrying more powerful
weights to them to abandon their organizational efforts-
lawful and guaranteed to them under the Act-than the
summary decapitation of their head and the threat that
their livelihoods would be extinguished through plant clo-
sure or removal. If such actions and threats do not warrant
1306
WORLD GFENERATOR COMPANY. INC.
a Gissel bargaining order, then the message of Gi.sel is
meaningless.
As has often been reiterated since the generations span-
ning enactment of the Act, and as it should not be neces-
sary to reintone to knowledgeable counsel at this late dated
discriminatory discharge of a union leader is the "surest
method of undermining a union's majority or impeding an
election process" (N.L.R.B. v. Sitton Tank Company,. 467
F.2d 1371, 1372 (8th Cir. 1972); see also N.L. R.B. v. Henr
Colder Company, 447 F.2d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 1971) and
"goes to the very heart of the Act" (,4. J. Krajcwski Manu-
facturing Co., Inc., 180 NLRB 1071 (1970), alone warrant-
ing a Gissel bargaining order. Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 610
and 614; Siton, supra, cf. Texaco, Inc.. (Evansville, Indiana
Bulk Station) 178 NLRB 434 (1969), enfd. 436 F.2d 520
(7th Cir. 1971).
It has likewise repeatedly been pointed out, so that reiter-
ation at this late date should also be unnecessary, that-as
again cautioned by the Supreme Court in Gissel, supra at
619-20-"[T]he Board has often found that employees,
who are particularly sensitive to rumors of plant closings,
take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest fore-
casts." Such threats, expressly excepted from the "free
speech" proviso of Section 8(c) of the Act, have consistently
been treated as unlawful. Cf. e.g., N'.L. R.B. v. Virginia Elec-
rric & Power Company, 314 U.S. 469, 477, 478 (1941): Wig-
wam Mills, Inc., 149 NLRB 1601, 1610 11, 1618 (1964),
enfd., 351 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1965).
Under these circumstances, a Gissel bargaining order is
singularly appropriate here, at any rate if the Union held a
valid "card" majority in the bargaining unit when, on Au-
gust 29, 1977, (Complaint. par. VII, admitted in Answer) it
requested and Respondent refused recognition and collec-
tive bargaining. We shall accordingly now address the ques-
tion of the Union's "card" strength on that as well as suc-
ceeding dates, in terms of the arithmetic of the composition
of the concededly appropriate collective bargaining unit.
The following table shows the Union's "card" (i.e., bar-
gaining authorization designation) strength, as herein estab-
lished and found, on the dates indicated, together with the
stipulated (J. Exh. I) total number of employees in the ap-
propriate bargaining unit, and the resulting percentage rep-
resentational strength of the Union:
1977
8/27
8/29 43/
9/3
9/10
9/17
9/24 48/
Valid
Cards
in Unit
35 42/
35 44/
38 45/
41 46/
37 47/
36 49/
Total
Unit
Erlps.
63
65
64
67
67
67
% Union
Rep. in
Strength
in Unit
56%
54%
59%
61%
55%
54%
" One is wistfully reminded of the overly optimistic hope of Judge Goxd-
nch over a generation ago,. that "What the Ninth Circuit said a decade ago
It is thus apparent that on the date of the U nion's recog-
nition/bargaining request (August 29). as well as thereafter
for at least approximately I month, the Union held bar-
gaining authorization cards from a clear majorit 3 of Re-
spondent's unit employees.
In contesting some of these cards. Respondent relies
heavily on certain testimony of Paulton, who solicited some
cards, to the effect that she (as well, possibly, as union offi-
cial Verri) informed employees that the cards 'sere intended
for or only for an election. Viewed in totality, however,
Paulton's testimony is by no means clearly or unequivocally
is even clearer now. "... the time has come when the undanientals underly-
ing the Wagner Act need not be the subject of treatises in eer opinion . ..
for enforcement . ..' N LR.B. . borrea Packing Co., 9 (ir., 1940, 1 F.2d
626, 630." L R B v. enmnmetal, Ina. 182 F.2d 817, 819 (3d ('ir 1950).
4 See njia It is noted that by stipulation (J. Exh. I) there has been in-
cluded as a member of the appropriate bargaining unit here Stanley Platek
(not a union card signer). notwithstanding Platek's testimony (which I credit)
that he has been Respondent's "bench leader or supervisor" for approxi-
mately 6 or 7 years, with employees serving under him, who comply ("right
to the penny," according to him) with orders given toi them (he calls them
"my help") by him on his own independent authority; that he was expressly
informed (In November 1977) by General Foreman Smith that he Platek)
was classified as a "supervisor": that his recommendation Ior employee pay
raise carried weight and was adopted; and the corroboraling testimony of
employee witnesses Hollis and Twombly (likewise credited by me) that they
as well as other employees carried out work orders received from Platek.
whom they (as well as he himself) regarded as in charge of them and as their
"boss."
It is also noted that under the same stipulation Sandy Nagel (not a union
card signer) is also included in the bargaining unit, notwithstanding the ftact
that, as a $200 weekly salaried employee with the position title of "Assistant
Supervisor," her "responsibility" inlcudes "Supervision of all employees for
production" in Resondent's Vandustrial Park building, with "Authonty" to
"Discipline up to warning with 2 days off. Work assignments Recommend
hiring and firing." G.C. Exh 10).
It is further noted that Glenn VanderPloeg (not a union card signer), the
nephew of Respondent's sole stockholder and president, Paul J Vander-
Ploeg, has by the same stipulation also been included in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit
42 I.e.. Schaub (8/15), Wieser (8/25). Zamora (8/12), Twombly (8 241.
Huizenga (8'12), Paulton (8ill). Nelson (8. 14). R. Humpherey ("Rodger
Humphrey") (8/I ), Macedo (8/12), D. Wybourn (8/25). McMahon (8 12)1.
A. Perez (8/22). O Perez (8, 23). Bedor (8/12,) Macias ('Macius." 812), E.
Barron (8 12). K. 'Wvbourn (8/11), Schultz (8,23). Socarras (8, 12), Stock-
dreher (8/25. Boykin (8/11). Proctor 8/12). V. Perez (8 /12). Patrick (8/121.
Carter (8/11). M. Barron 8'12) Van Hiet (8/111, B. Humphrey (8/23).
Reyes (8/12). Bracks (8/12)., Boender (8/12). Diaz (8/12). Bnnk (8/12),
Turner (8/11). and Lawrence (8/11). Figures in parentheses are the 1977
effective dates of each of the union bargaining representation authonzation
cards.
1 I.e.. date of Union's recognition/bargaining request upon Respondent
Employer and date of the latter's rejection thereof.
" I.e., same as in fn. 42, supra. It is noted that on the stipulated unit
composition list (Appendix B to J. Exh. I) for this date (August 29), the
name Charles Bracks appears twice. It being stipulated that the repetition is
in error; he has been counted onlI once for each purpose (i.e. card signing
and unit membership).
" I.e., same as in fn. 42, supra. less Bracks (8/12), plus Bieganowski (9/2).
DeYoung (9/ ), Pachowitz (9,2), and Peterson (8/30)
4 I.e., same as fn. 42, supra. less Bracks (8/12), plus Bieganowski (9'2).
C(ruz (9/7). DeYoung (9i ),. Kaszula (9/7), Pachowitz (9/2). Petersoin (t8,30).
and Weber (9/7).
7Il.e. same as in fn. 42. supra, less Bracks (8/12), Brink (8/12). and
Twombly (8, 24). plus Bieganowski (9/21, Cruz (9,7). DeYoung (9 I1. Kas-
zula (9,7). and Pachowitz (9,2).
* The parties have stipulated that they do not rely upon any date subse-
quent to September 24.
14 I.e., same as in fn. 42. upra, less Bracks (8' 12). Brink (8/12). R. Hum-
pherey (8,11), Lawrence (8/11). Patrick (8:12). Turner (8/l). and
Twombly (8/:24), plus Bieganowski (9/2), Cruz (9!7), DeYoung (9 I). Hollis
(9/19), Houston (9,'21). Kaszula (9/7), Newell (9<21). and Pachowitz (92)
1307
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to that effect, and after careful consideration of her entire
testimony I am persuaded that to the extent she so testi-
fied-disregarding, arguendo. for this purpose, her modifi-
cations and corrections of her testimony--she was simply
confused and insufficiently semantically knowledgeable or
alert as to the possible legal implications of the word "only"
in the subtly suggestive questions deftly pitched at her by
astute cross-examining counsel. Of course so much of her
testimony as indicates that Verri informed the employees
that the cards would or could be used for an election is in
no way inconsistent with the use of the cards for recogni-
tion/bargaining purposes without the necessity for an elec-
tion unless the Employer insisted upon an election as in-
deed Paulton in effect testified credibly on redirect
examination. That the latter is substantially what Verri told
the employees is borne out by the credited testimony of
Verri and the overwhelming, mutually corroborative, con-
sistent, credited testimony of a huge array of highly credible
witnesses that neither Verri nor Paulton nor any other card
solicitor told them that the cards would be used only for an
election, nor that those who signed the cards would not
have to pay a union initiation fee.
The cards in question, filled out and signed by the em-
ployees, plainly state "A UTHORIZA TION TO UA W" and
"I, [name] authorize UAW to represent me in collective
bargaining" (face), and "This card will be used to secure
recognition and collective bargaining for the purpose of ne-
gotiating wages, hours, and working conditions" (reverse).
As to the union authorization cards specifically solicited
by Paulton, the testimony of the card signers themselves,
persuasively delivered and strongly maintained on vigorous
cross-examination, and which I fully credit, was as follows.
Bieganowski insists that Paulton did not say to him that the
only purpose of the card was for an election, nor that he
would not have to pay a union initiation fee if he signed the
card. Paulton did inform him that the employees were try-
ing to organize a union in the plant and told him to sign the
card if he wanted a union to represent him. After taking the
card home, reading both sides, filling it out and signing it,
he returned it to Paulton the next day or a few days later,
stating to her that he "wanted the union" in the plant. Hui-
zenga testified that Paulton told him that "[We are] trying
to organize and get a union in the shop ... if enough people
[are] interested in signing cards, that [we] would give the
union the right to start bargaining with the company."
Paulton did not say the card was only for the purpose of an
election, nor that if he signed it he would not have to pay an
initiation fee. Huizenga read both sides of the card, filled it
in, signed it, and handed it in to another employee. Mc-
Mahon likewise testified that Paulton did not say to him
that the only purpose of the card was for an election, nor
anything regarding union initiation fees. Schaub testified
that Paulton merely asked her if she (Schaub) "want[ed] a
card from the union to sign for the union," and that Paul-
ton did not say that the only purpose of the card was for an
election, nor that if she signed it she would not have to pay
an initiation fee. Twombly testified that when handing him
the union card Paulton told him it was to get union repre-
sentation, and that she did not say it was only for the pur-
pose of an election, nor did she say anything about a union
initiation fee. After reading both sides of it, he filled it in
(except for the word "starter," in connection with his de-
partment), and signed it. Similarly. Bedor testified that
Paulton informed him that the purpose of the card was to
have the Union represent the employees, and he insists that
she said nothing about an election. After reading both sides
of the card, he filled it in and signed it. Likewise Pachowitz
(who misdated his card "8-2" instead of "9-2," 1977-he
did not enter Respondent's employ until a few days before
September 2) insists that Paulton did not say to him that the
only purpose of the card was for an election, nor that an
initiation fee would be waived if he signed the card. After
taking the card home, reading both sides, and discussing it
with friends, he signed and returned it to Paulton on the
following day.50
Union International Representative and a vice president
of its Organizing Department, Albert R. Verri. a seasoned
veteran of over 20 years in this work, testified credibly that
he initiated the union campaign here upon invitation of
Paulton. Verri credibly insists that he never told employees
that the cards were "for an election only," nor that anyone
who signed a card would have his initiation fee waived. I
also credit Verri's further testimony, amply corroborated by
many employee witnesses, that at the initial organizational
meeting he explained to them that sufficient cards were
needed to represent a clear majority of employees so as to
warrant requesting the Company to negotiate, and that, in
the event the Company refused to recognize the Union, the
NLRB could be petitioned for an election: and also that, in
accordance with union policy, new employees are "exoner-
ated normally" from initiation fees, before or after election
and whether or not they join the Union, and that normally
those required to pay initiation fees would be employees
coming in subsequent to negotiation of a union contract.5'
It is noted that a Union Newsletter (G.C. Exh. 19), distrib-
uted a week or two before its election petition to the Board
(i.e., around mid-September), supports Verri's testimony as
to the initiation fees.
It would serve no useful purpose to regurgitate the volu-
minous testimony of the large array of employee witnesses
assembled by General Counsel to establish the validity of
their union bargaining representation authorization cards.
By way of example, unit employee Ellen Wieser testified
persuasively that she received her union authorization card
from Verri at the second organizational meeting, where
Verri told the employees that-as clearly stated on both
sides of the card-the cards were for the purpose of having
the Union "represent [employees] in bargaining." After
reading the card, she signed it. Verri did not say to employ-
ees at any meeting she attended that those who signed cards
before an election would not have to pay initiation fees. By
50 Although, according to Pachowitz, responding to a leading question on
cross-examination, Paulton did tell him "something like" the purpose or on])
purpose of the card was to know how many employees were interested in the
Union, this is not inconsistent with intent on his part to have the Union
represent him in collective bargaining, particularly since he testified he read
and considered both sides of the card before signing it.
s1 Such a statement is unexceptionable. Irwindale Division, Lau Industries.
a Division of Phillips Industries, Inc.; 210 NLRB 182 (1974); B. F Goodrich
Tire Company a Division of the B. F Goodrich Company, 209 NLRB 1175
(1974).
1308
WORLD GENERATOR COMPANY. IN('.
way of further example. unit emnplofee Karen ruz testi-
fied. also with high credibilit . that she receis ed her union
authorization card from Bett' Weber. who told her it was
to authorize the nimon to represent her in collective bar-
gaining: and that \Weber did Nor sa. to her that the card
was onl, to he used fr an election. nor that if she signed it
she would not have to pay an initi;ation ee. B3 wvay of' tinal
example. the testimon} of Bohb\ Carter. another highl}
credible and persuasis e witness, is t pical as to the circum-
stances under which he received and signed his union au-
thorization card. He testified that he received his card from
Verri at the first organizational meeting (August I I . Verri
told the employees then as well ts at subsequent meetings
that the cards were to authorize the tInion to bargain for
the emplo,,ees, that after he accumnulaled more than half he
would request recognition from the Emplo\er, and that if
recognition was not voluntaril forthcoming the Inion
would then petition the Nl RB for an election. Verri did nfol
saN that the cards would be used onl\ for the purpose of an
election. Nor did Verri say that emploees ho signed
cards would not have to pay initiation ees, but only that
employees hired after union recognition would have to pas
initiation fees. Carter read both sides and filled out. signed.
and returned the card. Clear and convincin testimonl of
numerous other card signers is uneqluiocall and oer-
\whelmingl to the same general effect i.e.. Nelson. Soc;lr-
ras. Diaz. Eusebio Barron, McMahon. 'eber. Schultz.
Kaszula. 1ouston, Newell. Wybourn, Schaub. Rees, Mi-
guel Barron. Macedo. Zamora. Macias. Arturo Perez.': Vic-
tor Perez. Bieganowski. 1lollis. Humphres. IHuizenga.
TwomblN, Stockdreher. Turner. Humpher}. Proctor. alind
Boykin. LUpon the basis of the overwhelmingl persuasive
weight of the cumulatively corroborative testimon' of so
massive an array of highly credible witnesses. I can do no
other than find and conclude, as I do. that to the extent that
some aspects of Paulton's testimon mai be viewed as
equivocating or even to the contrar. it is simpl, confused
or mistaken: that in fact neither Verri nor she nor an} other
card solicitor informed or indicated to an, emplo,ee that
the union cards would be used onl for the purpose of an
election. or that union initiation fees would be waived for
an card signer: and that the signing emploees clearl\
comprehended, understood, and intended those cards. in
accordance with their clear terms. as hargaining authoriza-
tion designations."'
52 Notwithstanding Perez's English language shortcomings. I nevertheless
beliese and find thai he hasicall understod the union card in question ii he
fior negotiating authorization purposes and that he signed i with the minen-
tion of authorizing the Union to represent him n negotiations: and that he
was at no time told the card was limited Iio or intended tInlk tor the purpolse
of obtaining an election. It is not essentia It the alidits o1 such an aluthorl-
zation that it, signer he totalls literate in 'he English tongue. nor ire the
intended henefits of the Act restricted to those who are fluenl in Inghish.
Ruht ('C,,n rer C,,rinpar. 213 NI.RB 724. 727 1974). enlld 519 F 2d 1375
6th ('it. 975): N.L.R.B . Amenrican 4rt /Indtlrttik. I . 415 F.2d 1223.
1339 (5th (' it. 1969): .%tu iork Patient i l I h 'a (;tiiliair 4 a uhini,
S,'ii ( and 4nerai an eudt al Suppl/ei 228 Nl RB 1127 4 1977)
3 Respondent produced hlee emplosee silieses i, Ioetl , on the suhject
of union authori/alion cards I he first it these. tIetnor Van tiel. estilied
that she attended the :nl on's inillil orgini,,i.oni nl meeiing. where on itu-
gusl I I she signed it, hargaining autlhrliZllton clrd She caii thIl during
It has ing been salisltaclorilN established that the Iinion
held s.alid bargaining authori7altion designations rom a
clear majorits of the employees in the appropriate bargain-
ing unit at the times here material. including the date of the
l nion's recognition/b'hargaining request and Rcspondent's
rejection thereof. in sies of Respondenit's described unfair
labor practices ieswed ithin the Supreme (Court's instruc-
tion in (;iol and other controlling decisions. I shall reconm-
mend a bargaining rder here (his%,, i'ra, . 7 caco.,
hit.. 178 NI RB 434 (1969), entd., 436 1 .2d 52 (7th C(ir.
1971 .
I pln the hbasis of' the foregoing indings of 'aclt. conclu-
sions otf law, and the entire record in this consolidated pro-
ceeding. and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. I hereh
issue the tollowin recommended:
Ichlnged n cross-exsilnation to helore the meeting P'auton slaid t her
thit " The ard mtelnl a iile It we had enough cards e c lid *ote."
and Iht this 1 .ilh.l 1i Paultonl said Van llel a lad, ,it eemingl\ Imalure
· ear uh, ,c iesintlon. was conused. irascihle. and I helese incredible. also
slaled Ihat she .a, Illunle to recad lte card Uhich sheconcedes i filled n
allogether in her handiriling hecause he did not hive her glasses with
her She "explainl" Ihl leat h incredibls claiming Io hate remembered
whal the hblank spaces clled i;r from recollectlon im1 ianther uniln card she
had seen haboul 4-1 i2 or 5 ears pres iouslI. On cross-es\.linatlon. houweser,
she conceded he ,I, abhle tI read the card and it Iict at the Irlal itlhout
glasses did red silole it the print n the card. while hfe hli claiming she t.a
unahle toi reid ther word, i Ihe same ize print on the samie rd She
conceded 1;i t he neer sought the return or int. ah d lllion ot the card he
signed In n1)o .i doe, she dispute the accounl ol uIilln official , err lpilir)
which I hiae credited :a to h.it he Iold the eIniplo\ee al this tlecti)g to
he the purpose ot the lauthorilzaltlon card, and the use to shlch the. stould he
put tFinall, while I credit Plllon's rehuttal estriion1) tha he did nol tell
Vlan Ifiel Ihat the card isullI he used to oblain a "vole" r n thing ihaboul
an election, ecen it an thlel' account of whal Paulton allegedls ild her
were to he tiedlied it would ilot he nclonsistent with the character. as I here
find. teo'the card execuleds h\ S n tliel as a .ihd unitonl hrgainlig luthorila-
tion desigilation notillhs.llding an retrospectie conlrars rumlnatllons
hb Vin Iiel ( .eg. 1 R f (;uI PtlAml ('. 395 UI.S s575. 84. )8
11909}: 1 '/h,. I,' s S'. 1 R . 43 1 2d 52() 524 (7th ('ir. I9711. 1. R 8
. mi,.imristlu 4r, Inl'stw. it, . qura, 4 Sit ('it. 1969 . cert denied. 197 S.
990 (t 19 704: Itiiri'il'imi t iL,. t il.4ropa'al 4grui ulra Iplemcni
'AorAIer,, A I 41. ('l( X I. R B tPreslto Prdti s (Coimpani. Ir.lI.
392 F.2d 8)1. 807 8 Dt) ( lr. 19671. cerl. den:ed 392 l' S. 906 ( 1968): I E.
lnersieimtial I iort .i. Fl t l. Rdl. nd ,tti hiiu- I,'rAeri 4FI. ('0O
.N . R B (S A ,< tialt l ti,,ll l ( t1wiiiii p li . concurring iopinion I
Burger. J 352 I 2d 361l. 33 164 (I)( ('lr 1965,. cert denied 382 S. W12
(i965): \ I R B ( uirbr rian l-r ('- Orprralo. ?, 351 2d 917 th ('ir
19651: I R s lid Ii t t liI me[ listen S-rc' Im 339 i2d 958
963 (7111 (r 1964) nder these circumstances. I find that \San llel's card
should he counted 1l taid for representa tiun deilgnatlrn purposes.
l he second emploee produced hs Respondent. Michael J Buder. lesit-
fled merel th. t he w . tl 11on some unpecified dalte h' crd lliltOr
Boikin that it hie ilgned a .ard it would help get ;n election lIor a unton Ind
that he wiuld not hate to p;l! ,in initiation lee On crorss-examiniatin Buder
aJded that Bsokin also indlcatled t him on this 'cisln thatn the UInin
would or could hbargain with the emplo) er ior better wv ges. henefits. pensrion.
and nsurance I redit Bo kin's testinlon that he neer t old In) emplosee
that the onl puirpose of such aI ct rd was It, ohtailn in electllOn. or thalt it
signed no intllttltin tee ,otIIdI haile te he pald Moreo er, hairglining repre-
.entatltln use it1' uch a card. i1 ccordancte with it, pi. in langage. i, in nri
was nconllistent llh Buder', tetimonN e.en if credited I-urthermre, no
union aIliltorl/eatlirn card lto Buder is here in issue. since he ne.er signed ;Ins
The third emploee. )Doinld E. 5 ,hourn. estified that he signed hi,
union auhoril/ation card Lter it a. gi en to him h tfellow erinplosee Bedor.
who onl lsaid to him thait "ce ilre ging tol Ir t get i union In I osru want
to sign it. ikal : t ,,iU don't. on dIon' hate to " \A',hourn placed the card
Into hil pcketl. ald ler signel and returned It to Bedor. killir Ig Ihat it
wUs in .\ulilhrizallin to l \" t nder llhee clrcirumnltlnces . hourn's
card plinls quaiilltic' 1 i .i std h.irgllali g .ut1uiilorliiillonli desigl.llin .1nd
,,. fintel
1309
I) t(CISI()NS OF NA IIONNAL LABOR REILATIONS BOARD
ORD ER5 4
The Respondent. World Generator Company, Inc.,
South Holland, Illinois, its officers, agents. successors, and
assigns. shall:
1. (ease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning their or other
employees' union membership. affiliation, sympathies, de-
sires, activities, or other protected cocerted activities, so as
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of any right set forth in Section 7 of the National l.abor
Relations Act as amended.
(b) Threatening employees with closure. shutdown, or
removal of its plant or business, or loss of employees' jobs
or benefits, or other job or economic reprisals, in the event
its employees effect or maintain union affiliation or adher-
ence, or in the event of unionization or employees' persis-
tence in attempting to exercise their right under the Act to
bargain collectively with Respondent.
(c) Discharging, terminating the employment of, laying
off, furloughing, suspending, or otherwise in violation of the
Act altering the employment status of any employee, or
threatening so to do, or filing or refusing to recall. rein-
state, or rehire, any employee because she or he has exer-
cised or proposes to exercise or continue to exercise any
right under the National Labor Relations Act as amended:
or directly or indirectly so doing, or threatening to do so, so
as to discriminate in regard to the hire, tenure, or terms or
conditions of employment of any employee because she or
he exercises or proposes to exercise or continue to exercise
such right or engage in such activity.
(d) Directly or indirectly engaging in any), of the forego-
ing actions or activities or any like or related act in order to
dissipate the collective-bargaining representational status of
its employees' lawfully designated collective-bargaining
representative, or f'or the purpose of causing its employees
to discontinue or refrain from exercising their right to bar-
gain collectively with Respondent. or otherwise so as to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exer-
cise of their rights under the Act.
(e) Failing or refusing to bargain collectively in good
faith with International Union, United Automobile. Aero-
space, Agricultural Implement Workers of Amrerica (U AW)
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its
employees in an appropriate unit consisting of all full-time
and regular part-time production, maintenance, and ware-
house employees employed at Respondent's facility located
at 530 West 162nd Street. South Holland, Illinois. but ex-
cluding office clerical employees, plant clerical employees,
professional employees, technical employees. outside truck
drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in the National
Labor Relations Act.
(f) In any other manner interftering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization or their rights to form, join, or assist any labor
54 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Naional labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order which filhws herein shall, as pro-
vided in Sec. 102.48 ofr those Rules and Regulations. be adopted ,s5 the
Board and become its tindings conclusions. arid Order, and all .ibjectins
thereto shall be deened uiaived tr all purposes.
organization: to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing: to engage in concerted activi-
ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection: or to refrain rom any' and all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be af-
fected by an agreement lawfully requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment. as autho-
rized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by' the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. ''ake the following affirmative actions, necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Ruby' Paulton immediate, full, and uncondi-
tional reinstatement to her former job (or. if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job) with Re-
spondent, without prejudice to her seniority and other
rights, privileges, benefits, and emoluments, including but
not limited to any pay and wage rate increases to compara-
ble employees since Respondent's termination of Ruby
Paulton; and make Ruby Paulton whole for any loss of
income, benefits. and emoluments (including overtime, holi-
clay and vacation pay, and time off, and hospitalization,
medical, and other insurance claims and benefits, both per-
sonal and derivative and dependents'. if any, and expendi-
tures in lieu thereof during any noncoverage period until
her reinstatement hereunder), together with interest, in the
manner set forth in "The Remedy" portion of the Decision
of which this Order forms a part.
(b) Expunge from all of Respondent's books and records
any entry or mention indicating or to the eflect that the
termination of Ruby Paulton was because of any work ab-
sence on her part in contravention or infraction of any of
Respondent's rules. requirements, or policies, or because of
any fault or work-related deficiency or shortcoming on her
part: and refrain from making any such report or statement
voluntarily or in response to any inquiry from any em-
ployer. prospective employer. employment agency., unem-
ployment insurance office, or reference-seeker.
(c) Preserve and, upon request. make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, wage rate and other records, work schedules,
production reports and data, social security payment rec-
ords. timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records and entries necessary to determine the
amounts of backpay and other sums and benefits due un-
der. and the extent of compliance with, the terms of this
Order.
(d) Upon request. recognize and bargain collectively in
good faith with International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace. Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), as of August 29. 1977,' as the exclusive bargaining
representative of Respondent's employees in the aforesaid
appropriate collective-bargaining unit, with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment. and embody in a signed contract
any understanding reached.
"(1: lraditng P,i. /,c.. 219 NLRB 298, 300 301 (1975): I..R B v
Elrag/e taleria/ IlandlNig, Inc, 558 F.2d 160. 163. 168 (3d ('r. 1977): Ann
lee Sportellr. Inm. . A v. RB 543 F 2d 739. 744 (I)Oth (Cir 1976). 'he
barglining request and refusal. as well as the inception of' the unfair labor
practices here. were all in August. ('C ('lre, Inc, 237 NLRB 798 1978).
1310
WORLI) GENERATOR C(OMPANY, IN(C.
(e) Post at its plant premises at 530 West 162d Street.
South Holland. Illinois, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix B." " Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Board's Regional Director for Region 13
shall. after heing signed by Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, be posted in said premises by Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it, for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places. includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customaril'
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced. or covered h\ any other
material.
(f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order. what steps Respondent
has taken to comply therewith.
II Is FURIIER ORDERED that the consolidated complaint
herein, dated December 23, 1977. as amended, be and it is
In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of' Appeals, the words in the notice "Posted h order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to ai Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
hereby dismissed as to all allegations not herein iound and
determined to have been violative of the Act (ti.e.. pars.
Vll[al and [h i thereot)."
5 Respondenl urges that this entire proceeding must be dismissed. on the
authorit of Proin-ial Ilousec Inc s % 1. R B. 6X F2d 8 (6th ('lr 1978)
an objections to election c.se here a Board agent allended nd as "a1 palrt
of" ( t I I a union orgamnational meeting because of the lleged i"im-
proper conduct" ( Rep hr , p 61 ) o a Board agent in obhtaining nsestig.alp e
statements from emplhees "aIt .i t AW meeting" lidl allegedl\ held on
No,,ember 30, 1977. In no a, has it been establihshed that the Board a.gent
engaged n anS Impr(opriets. r that his actions n .an wa arllcted the
merits of this proceeding or arrant Its dismissal. To begin with, the state-
ments in question were not obtained at any "!A*,\ meeting,'" lah eecling.
although originall) scheduled. not ha'ing in lict been held at a.ll, i. t AW
represenltilme Verrl credibl sore and as I beliese and find Inste.d of the
presiousls scheduled and cancelled union meellng. Board agent I.lserion
(ttalvorsen conferred with potential witnesses in this proceeding al the silame
lhKation, communit motel in D)ol ton. Illinois Since the *occa sion in ques-
tion as not in f.act a iunin meeting at all and not a single vitness tesftied
that t was notvwithstanding opportunit, expressls oflered for that purpose).
no union business was transacted. and. urthermore. the non here hd long
prior thereto secured bargaining authorization cards frontm a clear majorri of
the unit emploxess with no contention that even a single card w.is ohtailied
or solicited on the occasion in question, whlch clearls consisted ot onl a
routine pretrial investigatise conference between Board agent lal\,irsen and
emplosees I reject Respondent's contertiln is, totall, ithout merit
1 11