Wook Chung et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 27, 20212020006447 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/895,360 09/30/2010 Wook Jin Chung 320723-US-NP (M15.073) 7648 148708 7590 12/27/2021 Buckley, Maschoff & Talwalkar LLC 50 Locust Avenue New Canaan, CT 06840 EXAMINER SHANMUGASUNDARAM, KANNAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2168 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/27/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): microsoft@bmtpatent.com usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte WOOK JIN CHUNG, MICHAEL JOSEPH PAPALE, SERGIO MARIO DIAZ-CUELLAR, COLIN CLAYTON TIDD, CHAD STEVEN ESTES, and JORDAN MARCHESE Appeal 2020-006447 Application 12/895,360 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOHN A. EVANS, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 6–7, 9–17, 19, 22, and 23. Claim 4 is also pending and is objected to. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies to Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-006447 Application 12/895,360 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to techniques for evaluating a query against a content set comprising various content items. Spec. ¶ 6. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of evaluating queries comprising at least one token against at least one content set respectively comprising content items respectively having at least one identifier, the method comprising: for each of a plurality of the content items, indexing the content item in the content index by storing a plurality of identifiers associated with the content item in the content index, and by storing an identifier weight in the content index in association with each of the plurality of identifiers, the identifier weight associated with a given identifier and a given content item representing a likelihood that the given identifier would be used in a search for the given content item; and fulfilling a query by: identifying candidate content items indexed in the content index by matching one or more tokens of the query to one or more identifiers associated with each candidate content item in the content index; for each respective candidate content item, calculating a rank score based on the stored identifier weight associated with the one or more respective identifiers matching the one or more tokens of the query; and presenting the candidate content items sorted according to the rank scores. Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App.). Appeal 2020-006447 Application 12/895,360 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Katariya et al. (“Katariya”) US 6,473,753 B1 Oct. 29, 2002 Dagtas et al. (“Dagtas”) US 2003/0093260 A1 May 15, 2003 Kishimoto US 2003/0131538 A1 July 17, 2003 Judd et al. (“Judd”) US 2004/0039734 A1 Feb. 26, 2004 Carol et al. (“Carol”) US 2005/0289108 A1 Dec. 29, 2005 Goodman et al. (“Goodman”) US 2006/0218115 A1 Sept. 28, 2006 Bitan et al. (“Bitan”) US 2007/0043723 A1 Feb. 22, 2007 Oliver et al. (“Oliver”) US 2012/0084300 A1 Apr. 5, 2012 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10–12, 16, 19, and 22 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Carol, Dagtas, and Goodman. Final Act. 2–7. Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, and Oliver. Final Act. 8. Claims 9 and 17 stand rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, and Bitan. Final Act. 8– 10. Claims 13–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, and Judd. Final Act. 10– 13. Claim 23 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, and Katariya. Final Act. 13–14. Appeal 2020-006447 Application 12/895,360 4 ANALYSIS Based on Appellant’s arguments, we select claim 1 as representative of claims 1–3, 6–7, 9–17, 19, 22, and 23. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2013); see also Appeal Br. 6. The Examiner found, inter alia, that Goodman teaches determining the weight of text (identifiers) in a document (content item) most likely to be used in a query. Ans. 4 (citing Goodman Abstract, ¶ 8). The Examiner found that Goodman teaches that the queries involving text from within the subject line of an email are given more weight than those same terms in the body of the email. Id. The Examiner also found that Goodman teaches “a weight that is specific and associated with the identifier, as being related to the specific term, and specific content item as being related to emails with subject lines.” Id. at 5. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because the combination of Carol, Dagtas, and Goodman does not teach or suggest the limitation for each of a plurality of the content items, indexing the content item in a content index by storing a plurality of identifiers associated with the content item in the content index, and by storing an identifier weight in the content index in association with each of the plurality of identifiers, wherein the identifier weight associated with a given identifier and a given content item represents a likelihood that the given identifier would be used in a search for the given content item, as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 7. In particular, Appellant argues that “the weight described in Goodman is document field-specific (e.g., email subject text may be provided greater weight than email body text),” and not “identifier (e.g., ‘Joe’)-specific and is not content item (e.g., contact card)- specific.” Id. at 8. Appeal 2020-006447 Application 12/895,360 5 Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred. Appellant’s argument that Goodman teaches storing only field-specific weightings, as opposed to identifier-specific weightings is not persuasive in light of Goodman’s teaching that the text within a field is weighted, not the field itself. See Ans. 4 (citing Goodman ¶ 8). Claim 1 requires “storing an identifier weight in the content index in association with each of the plurality of identifiers.” The claim further recites “the identifier weight associated with a given identifier and a given content item representing a likelihood that the given identifier would be used in a search for the given content item,” but provides no details regarding how the likelihood that a given identifier would be used in a search is determined. Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner’s interpretation of the disputed limitation as broad enough to include taking an identifier’s field position into consideration when determining the likelihood, as taught in Goodman, is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the Specification. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Carol, Dagtas, and Goodman teaches or suggests the disputed limitation, as recited in claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, as well as claims 2, 3, 6–7, 9–17, 19, 22, and 23, grouped therewith.2 2 In the event of further prosecution of this application, we leave it to the Examiner to consider a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02. Appeal 2020-006447 Application 12/895,360 6 CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 6–7, 9–17, 19, 22, and 23. DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 6, 7, 10–12, 16, 19, 22 103(a) Carol, Dagtas, Goodman 1, 2, 6, 7, 10–12, 16, 19, 22 3 103(a) Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, Oliver 3 9, 17 103(a) Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, Bitan 9, 17 13–15 103(a) Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, Judd 13–15 23 103(a) Carol, Dagtas, Goodman, Katariya 23 Overall Outcome 1–3, 6–7, 9–17, 19, 22, 23 RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2013). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation