244 N.L.R.B. 119 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

Woodville Plant

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 10, 1979

244 N.L.R.B. 119 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

W(X)DVII.I.E PLANT. I1VIN(;SF()N SHIPBtIIIIN (O Woo)dville Plant, Industrial Products Diiision of Lev- ingston Shipbuilding Company, a Delaware Corpo- ration and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. ('Case 23 CA 7333 August 10. 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING ANI) M iMBERS P NI I, () AND TRUtFSI)AIII On May 4. 1979, Administrative Law Judge Joan Wieder issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter. Respondent filed exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. as amended. the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, Woodville Plant. Industrial Products Division of Levingston Shipbuilding Com- pany, a Delaware Corporation, Woodville, Texas, its offices, agents, successors, and assigns. shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I Respondent excepts to the Administrative Law Judge's ruling made at the hearing and repeated in the Decision. denying Respondent's request for a continuance. Respondent contends that. contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's rulings, its contentions of "surprise and prejudice" are meritori- ous. While the essence of Respondent's contentions at the hearing was differ- ent and was adequately ruled on by the Adminstrative Law Judge. the in- stant contention is that Respondent was placed in the disadvantageous position of attempting to prove its case by testimony of an adverse witness. the General Counsel's witness Tudor. and should have been granted a con- tinuance to call its witness Wagley to refute Tudor's testimony. We reject Respondent's contention which, in our opinion. is at best frivolous. Respon- dent's affirmative defense is based on a contention that good-faith bargaining was rendered impossible after Union Agent Tudor allegedly assulted its su- pervisor. Wagley. Nonetheless. in spite of ample opportunity to prepare its defense, it did not call as a witness Wagley. the supervisor on whom its entire defense was predicated. And even more inexplicably. Respondent now con- tends, at least to the extent that we can understand its contention. that it should have been granted a continuance to call Wagley to testify, although at the hearing it neither attempted to call Wagley nor requested a continu- ance in order to produce him to testify. charges filed hb the U nited Brotherhood of (Carpenters and Joiners of America. AFL (C10. herein called the Union. on November 30. 1978.' the Regional Director for Region 23 issued a complaint on [)ecemhber 13. which was amended JanuarD 25, 1979.' he complaint. as amended, contends that Woodville Plant. Industrial Products Dixlision ,t l.e,- ingston Shiphuilding (ompan a I)Delawlare (Corporation. herein called Respondent or the Compan\ . violated Section 8(a)(5) and ( I) of the Act hby refusing to furnish information to the newly certified Union and refusing to meet and bar- gain with the Union as the duly certified. exclusive hargain- ing representative of its production and maintenance em- ployees. Respondent admits refusing to bargain with the Charging Party. "not onls to provide an 5 opportunity to review the Board's certification of the union h a nited States Circuit ('ourt of Appeals." but also because a union agent assaulted one of the Company's supervisors. therebh evidencing an atmosphere of bad aith. All parties were given a full opportunit to participate to produce relevant evidence. to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to file brief. Oral argument eavs waied. and the briefs submitted b Respondent and (iGeneral (ounscl have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record of the case and front m' obser.a- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor. I make the follow- ing: FINDIN(iS () FA( I I. THE B SINESS ()F KISP()NI)INI I Respondent. a Delaware corporation. operates a metal fabrication plant in Woodville. Texas, where it primaril 5 produces rolled and welded pipe. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint, the Company pur- chased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from origins outside the State of Texas. Respondent admits, and I find, that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. 1 HE ABOR OR(ANIZAION INV()I.LvI) The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. it. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR ILABOR PRA('Il( A. Backgound Respondent opened for business on March 18. On Au- gust 18. following a Board election in Case 23 RC-4669. the Union was duly certified as the exclusive collective-bar- gaining representative of Respondent's employees in the DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOAN WIEDER, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Livingston, Texas, on February 21. 1979. Upon I All dates herein are in 1978 unless otherwise staled. 2 The amended complaint differs from the original complaint In that it alleges the agency of John Durkas and further alleges that the refusal to recognize. meet, and bargain was for the purpose of testing the validity of the Board's certification 244 NLRB No. 18 119) I)t:( ISI()NS OF NAI ONAL. lABOR RE.AlI()ONS BOARD unit tound appropriate.' Respondent iled timely objections to the election. On September 14. 1978X. the Regional D)irec- tor issued a Supplemental [)ecision and C'ertifica tion ;f Representation overruling the objections to election. 'Ihe Board denied Respondent's request for review of' the Re- gional l)ireclor's Supplemental I)ecision on November 3. 1978. At the commencement of the hearing Respondent was infornied that in a proceeding alleging a violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(5). it is not entitled to relitigate issues which were or could have been litigated in a prior representation pro- ceeding. See Pirtsburgh Plrte G(ass (ormpatv' v. N.L. R. B.. 313 Ui.S. 146. 162 (1941): Rules and Regulations of' the Board. Sees. 102.67(f) and 102.69(c).4 Accordingly, only events occurring or discovered subsequent to the matters considered by the Regional Director in his Supplemental Decision and C('ertification of Representation on September 14, will be considered. B. Preliminan Matters Counsel for the General Counsel alleged that a portion of Respondent's answer was a sham and false, and was used as a dilatory tactic to defeat the purpose of Section 102.21 of' the Rules and Regulations. Based on this contention, the General Counsel made a motion to strike the answer of' Respondent from paragraph 7 to 13 of the amended com- plaint, sought a judgment on the pleadings. and requested censure of Respondent's counsel for willfully iling a false answer to the amended complaint. These motions were de- nied at the hearing. The General C(ounsel requested in its brief that the ruling on these motions be reconsidered. After review of' the record it is concluded that the answer could. in part. be viewed as an endeavor to preserve a position' and, in part, to assert an affirmative defenses to the alleged violation. Accordingly, reconsideration is denied. Respondent claims that it was not afforded a proper op- portunity to prepare its defense in view of the fact that it did not learn that the proceeding was set for hearing until February 3, 1979, when it was telegraphically advised that this matter would be heard on February 21. 1979, the same day as the hearing date in another complaint case pending against the Company.7 Respondent states it was uninten- tionally misled into believing that there would be two sepa- 'Official notice is taken of the record in the representation proceeding. Case 23 RC-4669. as the term "record" is defined in Sees. 102.68 and 102.69(g) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. Series 8. as amended. See LTV Electrosostems. Inc., 166 NLRB 938 (1967). enfd 388 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1968): Golden Age Beverage Company, 167 NLRB 151 (1967). enfd 415 F 2d 26 (5th Cir. 1969): InternOpe Company, v. Penello. 269 F.Supp. 573 ().(.Va. 1967) Follett Corporation. 164 NLRB 378 (1967). enjd. 397 F2d 91 (71 h ('r. 19681). Sec 9(d) of the NLRA. as amended. ' Respondent has not alleged herein that the matters considered in the representation proceeding should be considered herein as the subject of new- ly discovered or previously unavailable evidence or special circumstances. See Delta-Macon Brick and Tile Company, Inc. 196 NLRB 148 11972), and The Johnson & Hardin Company. 221 NLRB 379 (1975). bThe incident alleged as the affirmative defense did occur and requires a determination on the merits, despite the fact that Respondent's counsel ad- mitted he intended to take the issue of certification of the "5th ('ircuil." 7 The two complaint cases were not consolidated bh the General Counsel. and the exigencies of the situation were such as to lead to the determination that I did not consolidate the cases for purposes of hearing and decision rate hearings. While the telegram message of the General Counsel was not extremel\ clear, the matter as heard separately. and hence, Respondent was not misled. The possible confusion caused by the unclear telegram was not shown to have impaired preparation or in any other man- ner prejudiced Respondent. A second reason advanced is that the original complaint. issued in December. contained no notice of hearing and that the complaint was amended January 25, 1979. ust prior to the sending of the telegram setting the matter for hearing, which resulted in surprise. The claim of surprise was mnade even though Respondent admitted that the time permitted was slightly longer than that provided by the Board's Rules and Regulations. It was also argued that the scheduling of both proceedings for hearing on the same date W'as a tactical weapon instituted by the General Coun- sel to "float something by the board." 'I he two amendments made to the complaint did not greatly alter the basic mat- ters alleged and were accomplished prior to the notice of hearing. Further, Respondent has indicated no special cir- cumstances in this case showing that due process would require granting a continuance for preparation of the de- fense. Though Respondent claimed that significant factual questions are involved for which there has not been ade- quate time to prepare: not one specific allegation of un- availablity of a witness. inadequate time to investigate the facts, or any other specifics, argued to support the claim that additional time was required for preparation of the defense. The vague claim that the General (ounsel was attempting to "float something by the board" was unex- plained and is considered to be without merit. Also found to be without merit is the contention that there will be no prejudice to the government i the motion to continue is granted. At no time prior to the close of the hearing did it develop that the issues were more complex or required greater preparation than was apparent from the December complaint or from the time of denial of the motion at the beginning of the hearing. During the course of the hearing there was no suggestion that the defense was in any sense handicapped by a lack of preparation and, indeed, no spe- cific details to the contrary were set forth in Respondent's brief. Accordingly, after a review of Respondent's request ftor a continuance, it is concluded that good cause for a continuance has not been shown, and reconsideration is de- nied. C. The Event. Leading Up to the Charge On September 15, James Q. Stewart. the Union's execu- tive secretary, sent a letter to Respondent's plant manager, David Hardin. requesting a list of all employees in the bar- gaining unit, their date of hire, rate of pay, job classifica- tion, job description. number of paid holidays, paid vaca- tion schedule, insurance plan, pension plan, profit-sharing plan, and any other benefit currently being received by the unit employees. The letter also indicated that Stewart would contact Hardin at a later date to arrange their first bargaining session. It is undisputed that this letter was re- ceived on September 19 and that the requested information was not supplied. In fact, Respondent failed to give any response to the Union's request. 120 WOODVILLE PLANT. LEVINGSTON SHIPBUILDING CO. By letter dated November 7. Stewart renewed the Union's request for the above-described information. The letter was received November 9. It is undisputed that Re- spondent made no attempt to provide the requested infor- mation. John DurkayR did telephone Stewart to inform him that Respondent was not going to provide the information. that they "were interested in the United States Court of Appeals. Fifth Circuit, reviewing the validity of the elec- tion." The letter of November 7 also indicated that arrange- ments for the first bargaining session would be made at a later date. The above-quoted statement of Durkay and the Compa- ny's answer to the complaint in this case confused Stewart. To clarify the matter, Stewart mailed a letter to Joseph Molina, Respondent's attorney of record in the instant pro- ceeding, reiterating the request for information. This letter also attempted to ascertain if there were a misunderstand- ing as to the reason for the Company's refusal to bargain and asked that the Union be advised as to when the Com- pany could meet and bargain. No response to this letter was received. At the hearing Durkay stated that the Compan, was still unwilling to bargain with the Union on two grounds: (II the certification is not considered to be valid: and. (2) if certification is valid, that a union representative came to the Woodville Plant and assaulted a supervisor. The assault. according to Durkay. was perpetrated by an individual whom he believed would be a bargaining representative for the Union which destroyed the atmosphere necessary for good-faith bargaining. The assault was never reported to the Union, and no charge was filed by Respondent regard- ing the incident. The alleged assult involved a union organizer, James Tu- dor, and a supervisor named Wagley.? According to Tudor, whose account of the incident is uncontroverted, he drove out to the Woodville Plant to transport a "witness" in an investigation concerning an 8(a)( I) and (3) charge"' to a motel to meet with a Board agent. When Tudor arrived at the plant entrance, Wagley, who was in front of the plant with a bottle of liquor, drinking with two unnamed hourly employees, came over to the car. Wagley asked Tudor to get out of the vehicle and have a drink with him. Tudor explained why he was there, but Wagley insisted. Tudor did exit the car. Tudor described Wagley as intoxicated "he was just drinking and trying to argue with everybody." Wagley wanted to argue about the Union. saying "he don't like unions." Tudor made several attempts to reenter his vehi- cle, but Wagley stood in front of him. "with his fists up. trying to keep me from getting into my car." Tudor stated he ran out of patience and struck Wagley in the face "pos- sibly twice." The record is silent as to the amount of force used by Tudor and whether Wagley suffered any injury. The altercation was witnessed by the two hourly employees imbibing with Wagley. The incident occurred on the county road and not on the Company's property. s Durkay is currently representing Respondent in the capacit of hargain- ing agent and is an officer and an attorney for the Company 9 Wagley did not testify. The date of the incident was not specified i0 The charge was filed on September 19 and alleged wrongdoing by Wag- ley. Tudor was active in the organizing campaign at the Woodville Plant, but there was no showing that he repre- sented to Respondent or any employees that he would be active in negotiating the contract. In fact. Tudor w as not part of the Union's negotiating team, and there is no evi- dence indicating that the Union's officials knew of the above-mentioned incident. D. A, l,.si.s and Conclus ios Part of the statutory requirement to "bargain collective-l . . .in good faith"'' is the dutl of the Emplo,,er to pro',ide the Union. upon request, information sufficient to permit intelligent bargainining. See S. L. Allenl (apmi,o. Inc. I Nl.RB 714 (1936). In this proceeding it is admitted that a request for information was made. and it is not contended that the date requested was irrelevant. The only affirmative defense is the allegation that good-faith bargaining could not be conducted due to Tudor striking a supervisor': in the presence of hourly employees. Specifically, Respondent argues in its brief that its duty to bargain was suspended when the Union. through I udor assaulted a supervisor which was an activit "e,, idencing an atmosphere of bad faith." Citing Phe/lp. Dodge (op/Icr Product, Corpor tion, 101 NLRB 360 (1952). and Kohl'r/ (o., 128 NLRB 1062 (1960). The Kohler Co. case explained the Phelp s Dodge decision as follows: . . that where a Union is engaging in certain unlawful conduct, the Employer is not obligated to 'speak' with the Union or mav lawfully refuse to negotiate during rite course of such coinduct, these cases do not stand for the proposition, as apparently contended bh the Re- spondent, that under such circumstances its dut to bargain is completely relieved, or that it in turn, with impunity, may engage in unlawful conduct . . . . [Em- phasis supplied.] i Fn. 34. p. 1080.) The question is whether Tudor's actions were of such nature as to completely suspend Respondent's duty to bar- gain. The criteria in determining the issues are akin to those involved in the denial of bargaining order. As the Board stated in ,lfavisood Plt of/ Grede Plastics. . Divisio, o Grede Founairies. In,. 235 Nl.RB 363, 365 (1978): . . . there are five main factors to be weighed in consid- ering whether to den! a bargaining order because of union misconduct in the face of an 8(a)(5) finding that would otherwise require such a remedy. The factors ... are: the extent of the Union's interest in pursing legal remedies: evidence of deliberate plan- ning of the acts of violence and intimidation attribut- able to the Union: whether assaults bh union advo- cates were provoked: the duration of the lUnion's misconduct: and, finally. the relative gravity of the Union's misconduct as opposed to that of the Com- pany. The record discloses that from on or about September 15 until January,, when the charge was filed. the Ulnion repeat- ] Sec. 8td) of the Act " There has been no charge filed alleging that Tudor's conduct slaited Sec. 8(b)( 1 I)(A of the Act 121 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD edly acknowledged its interest in bargaining and repeatedly sought relevant information to that end. Despite Respon- dent's refusal to provide the requested information and Durkay's avowal that the Company considered the Union's certification invalid, the Union endeavored to deal lawfully with the situation and pursued only legal remedies. The record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the altercation resulted from deliberate planning by the Union. The altercation did not involve any negotiators. The one act of misconduct, under the circumstances described herein. including the fact that Tudor was rendering assistance in preparing an unfair labor practice charge involving Wag- ley, cannot be found to have unjustiably fettered the parties in participating in the Board's process free from coercion or restraint, Western Clinical Laborator. Inc.. 225 NLRB 725 (1976). As discussed more fully below, the altercation can- not be found to have been motivated by retaliatory or in- timidating purposes. If Respondent believed that the Tudor incident so diminished its bargaining posture to warrant indefinite suspension of bargaining, it could have communi- cated this posture to the Union, to ascertain, at the very least, if future negotiations were feasible under the circum- stances. Furthermore, additional safeguards for the Com- pany could have been sought through the Board's pro- cesses. However, Respondent merely chose to maintain its posture that it would not bargain for the months following the incident. The unrefuted evidence of Tudor demonstrates that a Union organizer struck an inebriated supervisor who had assumed a pugilistic posture in attempting to prevent Tu- dor's entry into his vehicle. The supervisor also verbally abused Tudor in making antiunion statements. The supervi- sor is found to have provoked the incident. The incident lasted minutes, and though resorting to violence should not be condoned, the isolated nature of the altercation, when considered in conjunction with the supervisor's highly in- flammatory conduct, is insufficient to justify a finding that the Union's disregard of the peaceful processes of the Act warrants suspension of bargaining or the withholding of a bargaining order. International Union of Operating Engi- neers, Local No. 948 (Osteopathic Hospital Founders Associ- ation, dh/a Oklahoma Osteopathic Hospital), 238 NLRB 113 (1978). The single altercation relied upon by Respon- dent has not evinced an intent to bypass the peaceful method of collective bargaining contemplated in the Act." Nor is it sufficient to warrant impinging upon the employ- ees' rights to be represented by the Union they chose. Finally, as stated in Kohler Co., supra, the employer's duty to bargain is not "completely relieved" by unlawful conduct, but is suspended "during the course of such con- duct." The course of the conduct in this proceeding has not been shown to be unlawful. While Respondent avers that it had good reason to believe Tudor was representing the Union due to his activities as an organizer, no inquiry was made to the Union regarding the incident, and the Com- pany failed to show that it investigated the circumstances surrounding the altercation. It is not claimed that any in- ml Union National de Trabajadores and i agent Arturo Grant (The Carbo- rundum CTompany of Puerto Rico and Carhorundum Caribbean, Inc i. 219 NLRB 862. 863 (1975). jury was inflicted. the duly constituted authorities were not called for assistance, and no charge was filed alleging that Tudor's conduct was unlawful. Furthermore. Respondent fails to explain why the Tudor incident was of such charac- ter to warrant suspension of the duty to bargain well be- yond "the course of such conduct." In view of the forgoing. it is found that Respondent's conduct constituted a viola- tion of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. Accordingly, it has not been shown that the Company's claim "bad faith" was warranted. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact. and upon the entire record in the case, I make the fiollowing: CON(I.tUSIONS OF LAW I. Woodville Plant, Industrial Products Division of Lev- ingston Shipbuilding Company. a Delaware Corporation. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFI. CIO. CLC, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following unit is appropriate for purposes of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All production and maintenance employees employed by the Employer at its Woodville, Texas. facilities, ex- cluding all office clerical, professional and technical employees, receptionist-secretary, guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. The Union is, and has been since September 19. 1978, the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit described above. 5. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union a list of all employees in the bargaining unit, their date of' hire, rate of pay, job classification. job description. number of paid holidays, the paid vacation schedule, and all other benefits currently being received by the unit members from Septem- ber 1978 to present. Respondent has engaged in and is en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. 6. Announcing on November 14, 1978, a refusal to bar- gain in good faith with the Union for a collective-bargain- ing agreement, and by failing and refusing at all times thereafter to bargain collectively with the above-designated exclusive bargaining representative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)i5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 8. The activities of Respondent set forth above. occur- ring in connection with the operations of Respondent. have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic. and commerce among the several States. and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. Tli R1iD)Y Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. Respondent will be di- 122 WOODVILlE.E PLANT. I.EVINGSTON SHIPBUILDING CO) rected to cease and desist therefrom and. upon request. fur- nish the Union the above specified relevant information. bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive repre- sentative of all employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. In order to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargain- ing agent for the period provided by law, the initial period of certification will be construed as beginning on the date Respondent commences to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representative of the appropriate unit. See Mar-Jac Poultr Companw , In.., 136 NLRB 785 (1962): Conmmerce Compan, dlbh/a lI.anlar Ho- rel, 140 N [.RB 226. 229 (1962). enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964). cert. denied 379 U.S. 817 (1964): Burneli Consiruc- tion (Companv 149 NLRB 1419. 1421 (1964). enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (lOth Cir. 1965). Upon the foregoing findings of tfact, conclusions of law. and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER' 4 The Respondent, Woodville Plant. Industrial Products Division of Levingston Shipbuilding Company, a Delaware Corporation, Woodville Texas. its officers. agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages. hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment. and refusing upon request to supply relevant in- formation needed by United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. AFL. CIO CI.C, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the unit de- scribed hereinabove. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action to eflectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employ- ees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment and, if an understanding is reached. embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Furnish upon request, to the above-named union, the above-described relevant information. (c) Post at its Woodville. Texas. facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" (opies of said no- 4 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 02.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall, as provided In Sec 10248 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all the objections thereito shall he deemed waived for all purposes. t In the event that this Order is enforced b a Judgment of a nted States Court of Apr.als, the words in the notice reading 'Posted b Order of tice. on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 23. after being duly signed by Respondent's represent- atise. shall be posted by Respondent immniediatel up1on receipt thereoft: and be maintained bh it for 61() consecuti c days thereafter, in conspicuous places. including all places where notices to) employees are customarily pos ted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not alteredl. defaced, or covered hb an other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director t r Region 23. in rit- ing. within 20 days from the date of this Order '. hatll steps Respondent has taken to comply ereilth. the National Lab,.r Rehlans Board" shall read "Posled P'ts,,il tO a Judg- ment of the nited States Court of Appeals Inlh,rcllg an Order ot he Na- tlional L.abor Relations Board " APPENDIX NO II l(, EPI ()YI: IS P SIItI) B N ORD R )I liIlI N \II()NAI I.,i()HR RII II()NS Bl\RI) An Agency of the United States (oserlment After a hearing at which all parties had the opportult to present evidence. it has been decided that we iolated the law and we have been ordered to post this notice. We in- tend to carry out the Order of' the Board and abide hb the following: W v- Iil Notl tail and refuse to negotiate in good faith 'with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Al-L. (). (. (I.. for collective- bargaining agreement. WI x I ot refuse to bargain collectivel] with the aforesaid I ni on by refusing, upon request, to suppl relevant information needed b said lUnion to repre- sent the production and maintenance employees em- ployed by us at the Woodville Plant. Vvi x11 I NoI in ans like or related manner interfere with. restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Acl WI- Illl recognize and. upon request. bargain col- lectively with the above-named Union as the eclusive representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit. with regard to rates of pay. hours of employ ment. and other terms and conditions of employ ment and. it an understanding is reached, embody such understand- ing in a signed agreement. Wt x\n i . upon request. furnish the aforesaid Union with a list of all employees in the appropriate unit. their date of hire. rate of pay . job classification. ob description. the number of paid holidays, the paid va- cation schedule. the insurance. pension. and profit- sharing plans. and any other benefits currentl. heing recei.ed by the employees of the unit. Wo(o)\ll I P \NI. INI)t SIRIAI PRO))t IS 1)1- S]IN Li, \IN(lSIION Stll'llL II ItI(. (stM'.N'N. \ Di A\A R I ()RPt)RI I IN1 123