Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 6, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 921 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

WOLVERINE WORLDWIDE, INC.
Wolverine Worldwide, Inc. and United Brick and
Clay Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 14-
CA-11838
February 6, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On September 28, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
John C. Miller issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions, and Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Wolverine Worldwide,
Inc., Hannibal, Missouri, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN C. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard before me in Hannibal, Missouri, on December I I
and 12, 1978. The complaint alleged that Wolverine World-
wide, Inc. (herein called Respondent), engaged in interroga-
tions, threats, and surveillance of employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. It was further alleged that Respondent discrimina-
torily terminated one employee and suspended another in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including briefs
filed by the parties and my observation of the witnesses and
their demeanor, I make the following:
' Alternatively referred to as Riverview Park. I credit the testimony of
Woodhurst and McGrew that Supervisor Worland engaged in surveillance at
Nipper Park. As the complaint did not allege this as a violation, and as
247 NLRB No. 137
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of shoes, boots, and related products and
maintains its principal office and place of business in
Rockford, Michigan. Respondent's plant located in Hanni-
bal, Missouri, is the only facility involved in this proceeding.
The complaint alleges that Respondent's Hannibal plant
manufactured and sold products valued in excess of $50,000
which were shipped to points outside the State of Missouri.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
the Respondent is, and has been at all times material, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Jean Woodhurst, an alleged discriminatee, credibly testi-
fied that after receiving a second written warning and a 3-
day suspension for absenteeism on June 19, 1978, she was
put in contact with Junior Richards and Jim Mosley of the
United Brick and Clay Workers of America, AFL-CIO
(herein called the Union), in July 1978, and thereafter she
distributed some 20 union authorization cards and asked
employees if they wanted to sign cards on behalf of the
Union. She attended four union meetings, at least one of
which was held at her home. By letter dated July 26, 1978,
Union Representative Mosley advised Respondent that
employees Donna Swon, Sharon McGrew, Ann Farrell, and
Jean Woodhurst were on the union organizing committee.
On July 30, 1978, the Union held a fish fry in Riverside
Park for the hourly rated employees of Respondent, which
was attended by approximately 30 to 50 people. The conduct
involving 8(a)(1) allegations began with alleged surveillance
by Edward Walker, Respondent's plant manager on July 30,
1978, and interrogation of and threats to employees by
Walter Brewer, general plant manager, and Gary Holifield,
foreman. The alleged 8(a)(3) allegations concern the termi-
nation of Jean Woodhurst and the -week suspension of
Sharon McGrew on September 1, 1978. The 8(a)(l) allega-
tions will be discussed in chronological order hereafter, and
then the allegations of discriminatory discharge and discrim-
inatory suspension will be discussed.
B. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
(1) Plant Manager Edward Walker created an impression
of surveillance by driving past a union-sponsored picnic at
Riverside Park' in Hannibal, Missouri, on July 30, 1978.
Jean Woodhurst credibly testified that, while employees
were talking and eating at the picnic July 30, 1978, Walker
drove by in his blue car. She stated she saw him and
recognized the car because he usually drive it to work. Her
testimony is not disputed that Riverside Park is out of the
counsel for the General Counsel did not amend the complaint, I consider it as
pertinent background only.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
way and would not be the normal traffic pattern for Mr.
Walker if he were going to or from the plant. I do not credit
Walker's testimony that he did not recall being in the area. If
this were the only incident found in this case, I would
ordinarily dismiss the allegation on the ground that the
conduct alleged was isolated. Because of additional findings
discussed later herein, I find that Walker's presence at the
union-sponsored picnic created an impression of surveillance
of union activities, which I find violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
(2) Since on or about August , 1978, Respondent's
foreman, Gary Holifield, created an impression of surveil-
lance by taking his breaks next to employees who were union
supporters, actions which he had not done in the past.
Jean Woodhurst testified that following the July 30, 1978,
fish fry, Foreman Gary Holifield and engineer Bob Brown
were present in her work area when she and employee
Donna Swon took their breaks, including their luncheon
breaks, and that such conduct occurred through most of the
month of August and that it was unusual. In contrast,
Holifield, who was in charge of that department, denied any
surveillance and stated he went home most of the time for
lunch. He further stated that he talked to Brown, plant
engineer, about three times during the month and that, when
the "fitting department" was on break, he regularly went to
the "process 82" department, which had been having
production problems and was located adjacent to Wood-
hurst's work area. While I do not doubt that Woodhurst
believed she and Swon were getting extra attention from
Holifield, the fact that he was foreman of the department
and was required to oversee the operation made his presence
required in the area. I also credit Holifield that he normally
went home for lunch. His presence was also required there
:r in the adjacent work area embracing the process 82
:epartment. Accordingly, I find insufficient credible evi-
ience to support this allegation of surveillance and recom-
mend that it be dismissed.
(3) On or about September 26, 1978, Holifield is alleged to
have interrogated and threatened an employee with dis-
:harge because of her union sympathies and support.
Ann Farrell credibly testified that on September 26, 1978,
shortly after finishing a discussion with Walter Brewer,
general plant manager, Holifield approached her and asked
her why the union man had not shown up, referring to a
preelection meeting in St. Louis, and she replied that she did
not know or care and wanted to be left alone. He then asked
her if she was happy working, and she answered, "Yes."
Holifield then stated he was glad to hear that; she was a
good worker and he did not want to lose her.
Since Respondent (and Holifield, as foreman) was aware
,f Farrell's being on the organizing committee, when the
nion representative did not show up for the preelection
neeting in St. Louis, it was natural to ask an employee on
:he organizing committee what had happened. Moreover,
iccording to Farrell's own testimony, Holifield said he was
glad to hear that she was happy because she was a good
avorker, and he did not want to lose her. While it is true that
3eing happy may have implied that Farrell was no longer
nterested in a union, it also indicated she would not be
ooking for another job. The conversation was ambiguous at
,est, and I fail to perceive a threat to her continued
employment. Accordingly, even crediting the testimony of
Farrell, I find that the interrogation of Farrell by Holifield
on September 26, 1978, did not constitute either unlawful
interrogation or a threat, and I recommend that these
allegations be dismissed.
(4) On October 17, 1978, Foreman Gary Holifield
interrogated an employee about her union activities. Farrell
credibly testified that on Tuesday, October 17, 1978,
someone from the Machinists Union was handing out cards
and notices in front of Respondent's plant that there was
going to be a union meeting. As she prepared to go to work
Holifield asked her if she was responsible for the man in
front, and she replied, "No." Holifield stated he was glad to
hear that because he was going to "holler discrimination"
because he did not get one (card or notice). Farrell told him
he could have hers if he wanted one.
Holifield's testimony was substantially in accord with that
of Farrell, and he indicated he approached her in a joking
manner. Regardless of whether Holifield was joking or not,
the inquiry may have been designed to, and did, elicit a
response from Farrell indicating what, if anything, she had
to do with the union representative handing out cards and
notices about a union meeting. I find that how the inquiry
was broached was immaterial because it was an improper
inquiry which elicited this individual's reactions and sympa-
thies to a new union organization effort. Accordingly, I find
Holifield's inquiry of Farrell on October 17, 1978, an
unlawful interrogation violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(5) On or about September 26, 1978, Walter Brewer,
Respondent's general plant manager, interrogated an em-
ployee concerning her union sympathies.
This incident also involved employee Ann Farrell. She
credibly testified that on September 26, 1978, Walter Brewer
asked her why they the union did not show up in St. Louis
where there was supposed to be a hearing on an election
petition. She explained that on Monday, the day before this
conversation, the union and employer representatives were
to meet about a petition for an election. It was on the
following day that Brewer asked her why the union man did
not show up, and she responded that she did not know
anything about it; that she had not been informed. Brewer
further informed her that Plant Manager Edward Walker
had waited in St. Louis until noon and nobody showed up.
Brewer also stated that this meant that the Union could not
come in because they did not show up. Brewer then asked
whether she liked working there, and she replied, "Yes." He
tnen questioned, "[D]oesn't it make any difference to you
whether the Union comes in or not?" She responded, [N]ot
really because no one is going to go by it anyhow." Further
on in her testimony she stated that Brewer asked her if she
was for the Union, and she said, "Yes," that some of the
things needed to be changed there. The above incident
occurred just prior to similar questioning by Holified about
the Union's failure to show up in St. Louis.
Brewer denied asking Farrell if she was in favor of the
Union, although his testimony was along similar lines that
he asked Farrell why the Union did not show up. According
to his version, Farrell stated that she did not care and that
she was happy, and he expressed his satisfaction that she was
happy and tried to explain the things they were trying to do
at Wolverine.
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WOLVERINE WORLDWIDE. INC.
Between the different versions, I credit Farrell that she
was asked if she did not care if the Union came in and
whether she was for the Union. While Brewer's initial
inquiry about why the union representatives did not show up
at St Louis may not have been illegal or coercive, subsequent
questioning about her feelings about the Union constitute
unlawful interrogation. It is logical that, upon learning that
Farrell, a union committeewoman, no longer was enthused
about the Union, Brewer's interest in her changed position
prompted further inquiries about her sympathies and sup-
port of the Union. I find that these further inquiries
constituted improper interrogation that is violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. The 8(a)(3) Allegations-The Alleged Unlawful
Termination and Suspension
The complaint alleged that on or about September 1,
1978, Jean Woodhurst was unlawfully terminated and
further that on the same date Sharon McGrew was unlaw-
fully suspended for 7 days. With some variations, both
employees were disciplined for absenteeism or failure to
show up for work.
Suspended pending discharge hearings on the same day as
Woodhurst, was terminated were Sharon McGrew and
Sandy Rickey. The three women went to see Ed Walker, the
plant manager, who advised Woodhurst she was discharged
because of "chronic absenteeism" and that McGrew and
Rickey were terminated because of their refusal to work on
Saturday.
Holifield testified that the Company's disciplinary proce-
dures were: (1) oral warning, (2) written warning, (3) written
warning and 3-day suspension, (4) written warning-dis-
charge. He further testified that total absences, regardless of
whether excused or not, were what mattered. He did
indicate that leaves of absence were granted for long
illnesses, and a good attendance record was I day absent a
month. Poor attendance was four absences in a month.
A review of Woodhurst's and other employees' attendance
records follows:
Jean Woodhurs. Jean Woodhurst was hired on March 10,
1978, and terminated on September 1, 1978, for chronic
absenteeism. Her absence record was as follows: In March
she was not absent; in both April and May she was absent
for 1 day, but was not disciplined; in June she missed 4 days
from work, and received a written reprimand on June 5 and
a second warning and 3-day suspension on June 19; in July
she was not absent; and in August she missed 3 days from
work, resulting in her third warning and termination on
August 28.
In elaboration of Woodhurst's absences, the following was
based on undisputed attendance records or Woodhurst's
credited testimony.
Woodhurst was absent I day in April, I day in May, 4
days in June, and 3 days in August. She was suspended on
August 28, 1978, pending a discharge hearing in part
because she did not work on Saturday, August 26. The
Company required employees to work Saturday when work
was available, and an absence from Saturday scheduled work
was rated equally with an absence during the week. There is
little factual dispute about the absences in question.
Woodhurst was absent from work on Saturday, June 3.
She received a written warning for failure work. Her absence
was prompted by her inability to get a babysitter. Wood-
hurst was absent sick on June 12 and 13 and again on
Saturday, June 17. On Monday, June 19, she was called in
by Holifield, given a 2nd written warning, and suspended for
3 days for "missing 3 days out of 6." When she argued that
she had missed only 2 days, Holifield informed her that
Saturday was a regular working day. It was subsequent to
her second warning and 3-day suspension that she contacted
Jim Mosley, a union representative. Thereafter she solicited
employees to sign union authorization cards and attended
four union meetings and a fish fry sponsored by the Union at
Riverview Park on July 30, 1978.
On August 8 Woodhurst missed work because her little
boy was sick. On August I , a Friday, she was given her
check and advised that she was to work on Saturday, August
12. She told Holifield she was going out of town, and he told
her she had better be at work. On August 12 her sister called
in to say she would not be in to work. She did not receive
any discipline for her absence on August 12. Woodhurst did
not go to work on Saturday, August 26, because a coworker,
Sharon McGrew, whom she rode with, was sick. When she
reported to work on Monday, August 28, she was advised by
Holifield that she had missed too much work and was
suspended. Sharon McGrew, Sandy Rickey, and Woodhurst
were all suspended that same day. The employees were
granted a hearing on their discharges on September 1, 1978.
At the hearing Woodhurst questioned why others who had
absentee records worse than hers were not getting fired. She
was advised that they were not there to answer her
questions, and her discharge was upheld.
The record is replete with instances where a number of
employees' absences were tolerated while others were disci-
plined. A review of the disparate'treatment is in order.
[Employee Minnie Blaine missed approximately 31 days
of work in 1978 before finally being terminated on August
28. Despite 7 days of absence in May, employee Vickie
Graham received no discipline. Employee Jackie Kerley
received no discipline, not even an oral warning, for 3 days
of absence in June. Employee Sharon Miner did not receive
any discipline, including any oral warnings, although she
was absent 6 days in April, 4 days in June, and 3 days in
July. Her first warning occurred in August. Employee
Dorothy Shannon received no warnings (written or oral)
despite absences of 12 days in May and 5 days in September.
Employee S. Gard did not receive any oral or written
warnings despite absences of 4 days in August and 3 days in
September.]
Respondent produced the attendance records of 42 of its
200 production employees. Counsel for the General Counsel
contends inter alia, that, of the records of 42 employees
produced, 5 had absences in excess of 20 days between
January I and September 1, 1978 and 12 employees missed
10 or more days during the same period.
The attendance records noted above establish to my
satisfication that Respondent's disciplinary procedure is
haphazard, at times inaccurate, and does not reflect any
uniform application of discipline, but reflects in many
instances the whims, caprices, or subjective judgments of
various supervisors.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Foreman Holifield testified that the failure to administer
discipline in several instances was an oversight. Employee L.
Hayes was absent on August 26, 1978 (a Saturday), and
Holifield admitted she did not have a good record and
should have received discipline. Peggy Noel, absent on
August 5, 1978 (a Saturday), according to Holifield, did not
have a good record and should have been given discipline.
The record establishes to my satisfaction that Respondent
administered its disciplinary system disparately. Despite
Holifield's assertion that it did not matter whether absences
were excused or not, some attendance records were marked
"S" for sick and "U" for unexcused, and there appeared to
be differences in the treatment afforded employees who had
illness in the immediate family, either children or a spouse,
as contrasted to illness of the individual employee.
With respect to Woodhurst and McGrew, however, the
key question is whether they received disparate treatment
because of their union activities. A critical point, admitted
by Woodhurst herself, is that she did not contact the Union
until a month after receiving her second written warning and
3-day suspension. Thus, if Woodhurst received disparate
treatment prior to the Union's coming on the scene, it could
not have been caused by her union activities or sympathies,
but simply represents the Company's inequitable administra-
tion of its disciplinary procedure. Was the Company's
reason for termination of Woodhurst based on reasonable
grounds, or did it amount to a more strict standard of
discipline for Woodhurst (and McGrew) because of their
union activities? In deciding this issue, I note that Donna
Swon and Ann Farrell were also listed as members of an
organizing committee and encountered no work-related
difficulties. Also, after the second written warning Wood-
hurst was absent on August 8, 1978, because of illness of
her little boy and received no discipline. She was also
scheduled to work on Saturday, August 12, and did not
report because she and her husband were going out of town,
despite an admonition that she had better be at work.
Woodhurst failed to report to work on Saturday, August 26,
because the driver of her carpool, Sharon McGrew, was sick.
Woodhurst had no driver's license and was unable to report
to work. Thus, she did miss scheduled work on two
Saturdays in a row. Certainly, it is not the Company's
responsibility to furnish her transportation to her job. The
record indicates that both Woodhurst and McGrew often
rebelled when Saturday work was mentioned, and that this,
inter alia, was a factor in their seeking union representation.
However, absent a contract, it is the Company's prerogative
to set the days and hours of work, and, even though
Saturday work may be anathema to many employees, it has
the right to require attendance by its employees.
In addition, I note that in addition to Minnie Blaine, who
had a much worse attendance record that did Woodhurst,
Sandy Rickey was also discharged for refusal to work on
Saturday. There is no claim here that she was discriminatori-
ly discharged. Moreover, there is no evidence to contradict
Holifield's testimony that Debbie Bremlett was absent on
August 26, 1978, and was also discharged.
Respondent, for whatever reason, be it pay, Saturday
work, or the nature of benefits given by the Company, had a
considerable turnover. Respondent submitted records of
individuals who were terminated for excessive absenteeism.
See Respondent's Exhibits 54, 55, 57, 58, and 59. The extent
of their absenteeism is not, however, set forth in the record.
With respect to Woodhurst, therefore, I conclude that,
while her termination may have been inequitable in light of
treatment afforded other individuals, I cannot find on this
record that it was prompted by her union activities or
sympathies. Accordingly, I recommend that the allegation
with respect to Woodhurst be dismissed.
Sharon McGrew. Sharon McGrew was active on behalf of
the Union, soliciting employees to sign union authorization
cards and attending union meetings and the union-sponsored
fish fry on July 30, 1978. She was initially suspended subject
to discharge for failure to work on Saturday, August 26,
1978, and after a hearing her penalty was reduced to a
week's suspension. She returned to work after the suspension
and voluntarily ceased employment with Respondent for a
better job on September 22, 1978.
With respect to events leading up to McGrew's failure to
work on Saturday, August 26, 1978, there was a sharp
conflict in testimony. David Jacobs, McGrew's supervisor,
and Sandy Maple, the leadwoman in the finishing and
packing departments, testified that it was company policy
that Saturday work was mandatory if employees were
notified prior to noon on Saturday. He further testified that
with respect to overtime on Saturday, August 26, a notice to
employees was posted on Wednesday, and, following cus-
tom, they reminded employees on Friday that Saturday
work was scheduled. When he reminded McGrew of the
Saturday work, she said she would not be there because she
did not have a babysitter. When she further responded that
she did not know if she could be there, he stated that she was
expected to be there. Her final response was simply, "[W]e
will see."
On Saturday, August 26, 1978, McGrew phoned the plant
and asked for Sandy Maple, but Jacobs answered the phone,
whereupon McGrew gave the phone to her husband, who
stated that Sharon would not be in to work that day and that
he had made an appointment for her with the doctor the day
before. Further conversation ensued, with Mr. McGrew
stating he thought that overtime on Saturdays should not be
mandatory, but voluntary. When asked whether Sharon
should bring in a doctor's slip, Jacobs stated it did not
matter, because, as far as he was concerned, she had lost her
job. Jacobs described the subsequent hearing on her suspen-
sion as a review by the personnel department to find out if
the suspension was justified or termination was called for.
He indicated that at the hearing it was decided she should be
returned to work after a week's suspension. Jacobs further
stated that McGrew stated she had never refused any work,
but stated she had often refused to work overtime during the
week and on Saturdays.
Sandy Maple, an overall operator or assistant to Jacobs
and a leadwoman, in effect corroborated Jacobs' testimony
that McGrew stated she would not be in on Saturday
because she did not have a babysitter. She stated that
McGrew made no comment or indication that she was ill
and offered the lack of a babysitter as the only reason for not
being available to work. She further confirmed that
McGrew, when told she was expected to be there, merely
commented, "[W]e will see."
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WOLVERINE WORLDWIDE. INC.
McGrew testified that on August 25, 1978, Jacobs
reminded her about the Saturday overtime work, and she
stated that she intended to come to work, but did not advise
Jacobs one way or the other. She denied that she told him
she did not have a babysitter. With respect to her calling in
on Saturday, she confirmed that Jacobs, who spoke to her
husband, stated she would probably be terminated because it
was a different reason than she had given him the day before.
When she reported to work on Monday, she was suspended
pending discharge, and, when she attempted to give a
doctor's excuse to Walker, the plant manager, he refused to
accept it. At the September 1 hearing on her discharge,
McGrew testified that Mr. Brewer stated she had never
refused work, and she was reinstated subject to the week's
suspension.
In view of McGrew's testimony that Jacobs stated to her
husband that she would be discharged because her reason for
not coming in, illness and a doctor's appointment, differed
from the reason she gave him, I credit the testimony of
Jacobs and Maple and find that she had previously indicated
she could not work because of a lack of a babysitter. Since
she was aware on Wednesday that they would be working on
Saturday, it seems apparent that she did not wish to work on
Saturday. This comports with her view that Saturday work
should be voluntary and that employees should not be
required to work on Saturday. While I might agree with
McGrew, the Company's policy was that, when other than a
skeleton crew was required on Saturday, work was mandato-
ry. In view of the credited testimony, I find that McGrew's
suspension was due to her attempts to get out of Saturday
work. While discharge appeared an overreaction, the subse-
quent modification of her penalty to that of suspension
appeared more reasonable. Reasonable or not, I cannot find
on the basis of the credited testimony that her suspension
was prompted by her union activities and sympathies.
Accordingly, I recommend that the allegation with respect
to McGrew be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Brick and Clay Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by terminating Jean Woodhurst on Sep-
tember 1, 1978, and by suspending Sharon McGrew on
September 1, 1978, did not violate Section 8(a)(3) or (1) of
the Act.
4. Respondent, by Walter Brewer and by Gary Holifield,
its agents and representatives, did unlawfully interrogate its
employees about their union sympathies and support in
violation of Section 8(a) 1) of the Act.
5. Respondent, by the conduct of Plant Manager Edward
Walker on July 30, 1978, gave the impression that it was
surveilling employees' union activities and thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. Respondent did not otherwise engage in conduct
violative of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in conduct
which created the impression that employees' union activi-
ties were under surveillance and engaged in unlawful
interrogation of employees about their union activities and
sympathies, I shall issue a cease-and-desist order and require
Respondent to post a notice that they will cease such
activities.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER:
The Respondent, Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., Hannibal,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Surveilling or giving the impression of surveillance of
employees' union activities.
(b) Interrogating employees about their union activities or
sympathies.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at the plant premises in Hannibal, Missouri,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of
said notice, on forms furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
: In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules
and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, he adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their
union activities or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that the union
activities of employees are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WOLVERINE WORLDWIDE, INC.
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