Winett, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 27, 1962

135 N.L.R.B. 1305 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

WINETT, INC. 1305
whom no employment is immediately available shall be - placed upon a preferential
hiring list with priority determined among them by such system of seniority or other
nondiscriminatory practice as heretofore has been applied in the conduct of
Respondent 's business and thereafter, in accordance with such list , shall be offered
reinstatement as positions become available , and before other persons are hired
for such work.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record
in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Truck Drivers Union No. 677, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Ind., is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of .the Act.
2. Oates Bros., Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the
Act.
3. All regular and regular part -time over -the-road and local chauffeurs or truck-
drivers employed at Respondent 's establishment in Shelton , Connecticut , including
warehouse and maintenance employees and helpers, but excluding office clerical em-
ployees, executives , watchmen , and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. On July 13, 1960 , and at all times thereafter the Union has been and now is
the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 ( a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on September 23, 1960 , and thereafter to bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain , Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (l) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Winett, Inc. and K .C. Joint Board , International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union , AFL-CIO. Case No. 17-C-4-1794. Feb-
ruary 27, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 14, 1961, Trial Examiner Earl S. Bellman issued his
Intermediate Report herein, finding that the Respondent had engaged
in unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the
Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter the General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown].
135 NLRB No. 130.
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and briefs, and the entire record. The Board affirms the Trial Ex-
aminer 's rulings and adopts his findings and conclusions.'
ORDER
The Board adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner.
The Board further orders that the complaint be dismissed to the extent
recommended by the Trial Examiner.
1 In the absence of exceptions thereto , the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Respondent
did not, through Supervisor Kaplanis , threaten to discharge an employee on the day after
the election to discourage union activity or membership is adopted pro forma.
We find merit in the General Counsel 's contention that the Trial Examiner was In-
correct insofar as he relied , in his finding as to Superintendent Hand ' s credibility, on the
fact that she was "more prepossessing" than the two employees and on the observations
of another Trial Examiner in a different proceeding Nevertheless , we agree with the
Trial Examiner that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Superintendent
Hand in fact pinned "vote no" signs on two employees , and we therefore adopt his
recommendation that this allegation be dismissed
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, pursuant to due notice and with all parties represented, was
heard before me, Earl S . Bellman , the duly designated Trial Examiner , in Kansas
City, Missouri , on August 29 and 30 , 1961 , upon a complaint duly issued by the
General Counsel on June 23; 1 particulars furnished on August 9 by the General
Counsel ; and a duly filed answer of the Respondent , denying all allegations as to
unfair labor practices . The issues litigated were whether or not Winett , Inc., herein
called the Respondent , "particularly between" May 1 and 10 of this year, engaged in
various subsequently enumerated violations of Section 8(a) (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the General Counsel and the Respondent argued orally on the record.
After the close of the hearing , all parties entered into a "Stipulation for Correc-
tion of Record ," which is dated September 6, has been duly noted , and hereby is
made part of the record . In addition , the General Counsel and the Respondent
have filed briefs which I have carefully considered.2
Upon the entire record and my observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Winett, Inc., is a Kansas corporation , having its plant and principal place of busi-
ness in Kansas City, Kansas, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
infants' and children's wear. In the course and conduct of its business the Re-
spondent ships annually, to points outside of the State of Kansas , goods, articles, and
commodities , valued in excess of $50,000. The Respondent 's answer admits that
it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and I find that it will
effectuate the policies thereof to assert jurisdiction.
1 When the year Is herein omitted , It will be understood to be 1961. The Union 's charge
was filed and served on May 8. An amendment to the complaint was granted , without
objection , at the hearing
2 The Respondent ' s brief contends essentially that my failure to require at the hearing
that the General Counsel permit the Respondent "to examine the statements of two wit-
nesses" called by the General Counsel "was error within the meaning of " decisions cited
in said brief. I have painstakingly considered the Respondent 's contentions , In the light
of the record in the instant matter with respect to the two witnesses involved , and find
them without merit. My rulings with respect to said matters are hereby reaffirmed.
Cf. Premier Panels, Inc., 126 NLRB 305, 310, footnote S.
WINETT, INC.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
1307
K.C. Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, the
Charging Party which is herein called the Union, is admittedly a labor organization,
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The setting and the issue
The events in issue herein occurred shortly after the Respondent and the Union
executed a stipulation for certification upon consent election on Friday, April 28,
1961. During the first part of that week, Trial Examiner Sidney Linder conducted
a hearing involving the Respondent's Kansas City plant, herein called the plant, in
what the Respondent's brief refers to as "the April 24 proceeding," and which will
herein be called the prior proceeding .3 On Monday of the following week, May 1,
the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region approved the aforesaid stipulation.
Pursuant thereto an election was conducted in a unit of the Respondent's employees
on Tuesday, May 9, which the Union lost 4 Thus the period "particularly" in
issue herein, May 1 to 10, 1961, began on the Monday upon which the Regional
Director approved the election stipulation and concluded with the day following
the Union's loss of the election. During this period, a campaign for and against
the Union was waged among the employees of the Respondent's plant, literature
being distributed by the Union, by a group of employees who were against unioniza-
tion, and by the Respondent, which also was opposed to the Union.
There are four individuals named in the General Counsel's pleadings in the instant
matter by and through whom it is alleged that the Respondent acted illegally during
the above period. They are George Winett, Ethel Winett, Dorothy Hand, and
Carolyn Kaplanis. George Winett and Ethel Winett both admittedly are officers
and responsible agents of the Respondent. Neither was called as a witness .5
Dorothy Hand, admittedly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, is superin-
tendent of the plant. She was a witness in the prior proceeding and was the only
witness called by the Respondent in the instant matter. Carolyn Kaplanis, also
admittedly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, is the supervisor of the
finishing department.
Considering the testimony of the seven witnesses called by the General Counsel--
two men who are representatives of the Union, but not employees of the Respondent,
and five women who are employees or former employees of the Respondent-together
with the pleadings and the testimony of Superintendent Hand, eight interrelated
8(a) (1) issues are presented for determination. To assist in orientation, these issues
will now be epitomized, using the names of the principal individuals involved, and
following the essentially chronological sequence in which I have determined that
it will be expeditious to discuss them, rather than the sequence used in the pleadings.
However, the subparagraphs of the complaint and of the particulars which are in-
volved are given as an aid to identification. Thus presented for determination are
S This prior proceeding, of which the General Counsel asked during oral argument that
I "take official notice," was a consolidated one, combining Case No 17-CA-1741, which
involved the same parties as the instant matter, with Case No. 17-CA-1759-2, in which
Winett, Inc., was also respondent, but an individual, Frances A. Riedel, was the charging
party. Sharply divergent positions of the parties in the instant matter as to the bear-
ing of this prior proceeding on the issues in the case at bar have been carefully considered,
along with the ultimate holdings therein. As to the pleadings in said proceeding, the
complaint alleged several types of 8(a) (1) violations, some similar to those in the instant
matter, and discriminatory terminations of 12 women employees, 11 on dates from
January 30 to February 6, and of complainant Riedel on February 17. The Respondent's
answer, as amended at the hearing in the prior proceeding, essentially denied that it had
engaged in any unfair labor practices since about February 9; denied that it had engaged
in surveillance through Superintendent Dorothy Hand's attending, upon invitation, a
union meeting ; denied that it had discriminatorily discharged Riedel; admitted that the
other 11 women were terminated to discourage membership in the Union ; and asserted
that said 11 employees were reinstated without prejudice to their seniority or other rights.
4 There is nothing in the record to show whether or not any objections to the election
were filed, but in any event, the case at bar does not involve objections to the election.
5 When the name "Winett" is used herein without further identification, it will be
understood to designate Mrs. Ethel Winett.
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
whether or not the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by the following
alleged conduct:
1. Mrs. Ethel Winett's threatening to call the police if "a union organizer" did
not move away from the plant entrance to distribute union literature. (Paragraph IV
(d) of the complaint.)
2. Supervisor Carolyn Kaplanis' threatening employees prior to the election that
she (Kaplanis) would be discharged if the Union won the election. (Paragraph IV
(f).)
3. Winett's creating "the impression of surveillance" during a conversation the
day before the election with employee Ruby Griffith. (Paragraph IV(a)-particu-
lars (1).)
4. Superintendent Dorothy Hand's pinning "Vote no" signs on the clothing of
employees Martha Kepler and Freeda Knight the morning of the election. (Para-
graph IV(e).)
5. Winett's engaging in "surveillance" by observing the distribution of union
literature in front of the plant during the period prior to the election. (Paragraph
IV (a).)
6. Discriminatorily preventing its employees from distributing literature and/or
soliciting for the Union inside its plant. (Paragraph IV(d).)
7. Supervisor Kaplanis' threatening to discharge employee Kepler the night after
the election to discourage union activity or membership. (Paragraph IV(c).)
8. Winett's creating "the impression of surveillance" the day after the election by
a remark to employees Knight and Gwinn. (Paragraph IV(a)-particulars (2).)
On July 27, Trial Examiner Lindner issued his Intermediate Report in the prior
proceeding, finding, on the basis of the earlier-noted pleadings, that the Respondent
had discriminatorily discharged 11 employees,6 on dates ranging from January 30
to February 6, 1961, and that the Respondent:
Through George Winett, Ethel Winett, and Dorothy Hand interrogated its
employees about their union activity, threatened its employees with reprisals,
including discharge and closing down the plant if the employees joined the
Union or engaged in union or other concerted activity, and created the im-
pression of surveillance of union meetings and other union activity of its em-
ployees in violation of Section 8(a) (l) of the Act.
As to the only issues contested and litigated in the prior proceeding-the alleged
surveillance of Superintendent Hand and the discharge of Riedel on February 17-
Trial Examiner Lindner concluded that said allegations had not been sustained and
should be dismissed. He also made certain later-discussed observations as to the
credibility of Hand as a witness.
On August 25, 4 days before the hearing in the instant matter opened, the Board
issued its decision in the prior proceeding. Reciting that no exceptions had been
filed to the Intermediate Report, the Board adopted the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of Trial Examiner Lindner, thereby ordering that the Respondent
cease and desist from the above-described unfair labor practices found therein and
from "in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise" of their rights; that the Respondent offer reinstatement to the 11
employees and make them whole for any losses suffered, if it had not yet already
done so; that the Respondent post appropriate notices; and that the allegations
which had been litigated, as above described, be dismissed. The record in the
instant matter does not establish when or to what extent there may have been
compliance with either the Intermediate Report or with the Board's order in the
prior proceeding
In turning to matters now in issue, it will be helpful to have a picture of the
Respondent's plant and its setting in Kansas City, Kansas.
The main plant building is located on the south side of Russel Street, which is
paved and is wide enough to carry two-way traffic when cars are parked on both
sides of it. Directly across the street from this main building, herein called the
plant, the entrance to which faces north, there is a church building, herein called the
church to distinguish it from the plant, the entrance to which faces south toward the
plant .7 The church was acquired by the Respondent the latter part of March of this
year to provide additional plant space, and four of the Respondent's employees started
0 Two of said eleven, Nina Heather and Roberta Johnson, were witnesses for the General
Counsel in the hearing before me.
It was in front of the church, facing toward the plant, that Winett stood during her
later discussed observation of the distribution of union literature.
WINETT, INC. 1309
working in it on a "sample line" about the middle of April. Thus at the time of the
events in issue, four employees worked in the church and the remainder in the plant.8
There is a sidewalk in front of the church on the north side of Russel Street, but
there is no sidewalk on the south side of Russel Street in front of the plant, which
sets back about 10 feet from the curbing. However, there is a driveway about 10
feet wide which runs from the street, where employees evidently park their cars,
to the main entrance of the plant, also referred to as the double doors. While there
are some other doors mentioned in the testimony, employees use these double doors.
in entering and leaving the plant, and this main entrance, which predominantly
figures in the testimony, will be referred to either as the double doors or as the
entrance.
Bearing in mind the foregoing issues and setting, we proceed to consider the:
above-enumerated issues in sequence, along with related or subsidiary issues and
contentions raised by the evidence, oral arguments, and briefs .9
B. The matters in issue and conclusions pertaining thereto
,1. Threatening to call the police
This issue concerns undenied testimony as to what Mrs. Ethel Winett said, about
a week before the election, to two nonemployee representatives of the Union, John
Curtis and Robert Sedgwick, who, along with several employees of the Respondent,
distributed union literature in front of the plant.
This is the gist of the testimony of Representative Curtis as to an incident which
occurred one morning within a week prior to the election. Those distributing union
leaflets in the morning, before work started at the plant at 8 o'clock, would some-
times stand in the area in front of the plant just south of Russel Street "very near
the curb at the entrance of the plant" where there would be a sidewalk "normally."
On the morning in question , Winett told Curtis, as he was standing near the curb
on what he "didn't think" was company property, to "get off of the property or they
would call the law, that that was private property." Curtis did not modify his place
or method of distributing union literature because he felt that he was "in a safe
location."
A similar incident also occurred about a week before the election, as to which
three witnesses testified. According to Representative Sedgwick, at a time when he
was standing by the double doors "on the driveway out of the mud" about midway
between the curb and the plant building, Winett asked him "to get off the property
otherwise she would call the police." Employee Nina Heather testified that she heard
Winett tell Sedgwick "did he want to move or her call the police," that Sedgwick
"wasn 't on company property" and that he was standing "where a sidewalk should
have been." Heather also testified that Sedgwick continued to stand there and that
Winett "never did" call the police. Employee Roberta Johnson testified that when
Sedgwick was passing out handbills on the opposite side of the entrance from her,
about "half way between the building and the street," she overheard Winett say,
"Will you move or shall I call the police?"
Despite what Winett said to Curtis and Sedgwick , police were not called. On
the other hand , it is clear that what Winett said to Sedgwick was overheard by
two women who were at that time employees of the Respondent. However, while
Heather and Johnson both were distributing union literature also, there is nothing
in the record to warrant an inference that they understood that Winett's remark
was directed also to them.
The General Counsel, alluding only to the Sedgwick incident , contends that,
while it is true that there was no sidewalk where Sedgwick was standing , it "obviously
is the proper location for a sidewalk"; that if it is not public property, the area is
at least `subject to an easement"; and that if this was not so it "would be incumbent
upon the respondent to have shown that this was actually private property."
The Respondent, also addressing itself to "an incident ," the one involving Sedg-
wick, contends, among other things , that it was "one isolated trivial incident which
was ignored" by the Union; that the police were not called ; and that an employer
can restrict nonemployee organizers from company property where there is ready
access to employees by other means. The last contention is made, however, in the
8 While I do not find the number of employees in the testimony , the Union's charge
refers to "approximately 80," and the General Counsel's particulars to "approximately
79 eligible voters "
9 While I have, of course , duly considered all such matters , only those which impress me
as being sufficiently significant will hereinafter be discussed.
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
section of its brief dealing specifically with solicitation and distribution inside the
plant, and is incorporated on this issue only by reference.
The Respondent not only failed to call Winett as a witness or to produce any
evidence on what is here in issue, but I find no specific contention in its oral
argument or in its brief that the area in front of the plant here involved actually
is its property.
In my opinion, it cannot be determined definitively, upon the above-recited
evidence, whether or not the area by the plant entrance where Sedgwick and Curtis
stood is part of the Respondent's property, as Wlnett essentially claimed in her
threat to Curtis to call the police. Patently it was not within the Respondent's
physical enclosure, was where a sidewalk normally would have been, and ap-
parently was customarily used by the public. Moreover, the Respondent, within
whose knowledge this matter particularly comes, could have produced evidence as
to the extent of its property if it supported Winett's statement that the area was
the Respondent's property.
In view of the Respondent's failure, under all of the circumstances here apper-
taining, to do anything to support Winett's claim that the Respondent's property
was being transgressed, it is reasonable to infer, and I do, consistent with such
-evidence as we have and the physical appearances, that the area is not normally
treated as company property, and that the Respondent was not justified in attempt-
ing to exclude nonemployee representatives of the Union from said area. Accord-
ingly it follows that by attempting to deny "a union organizer," the term used in
the complaint, Sedgwick, access to its employees in the area by its entrance where
a sidewalk normally would have been, the Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights under Section 7 of the Act. And
since, as hereinafter appears, this occurred within a framework of other unlawful
acts by the Respondent, it was not an isolated or trivial incident, as the Respondent
contends. Nor is it material that the Respondent did not actually call the police,
as the threat to do so, made in the presence of employees, was necessarily coercive
in nature, even though Sedgwick did not move from the area involved, or Curtis,
for that matter.
I therefore find that by attempting to exclude a nonemployee agent of the Union
from the above-mentioned area, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.10
2. Threatening the discharge of a supervisor
This issue pertains to uncontradicted and credited testimony of three employees
as to statements made by Supervisor Carolyn Kaplanis. According to Freeda Knight,
then an employee in the finishing department under Kaplanis' supervision, on May
5, the Friday before the election, Kaplanis told Knight and Martha Gwinn, another
finishing-department employee, while Knight was driving Kaplanis and Gwinn
home, that Ethel Winett "had informed her [Kaplanis] that if the Union got in
that she [Kaplanis] would be fired."
On the Sunday before the election, according to employee Nina Heather, who
was not under Kaplanis' supervision but had been told by a friend that Kaplanis
"thought I was mad and wanted me to call her," Heather telephoned Kaplanis and
told her that she was not mad. Kaplanis asked Heather how she thought the
election would go. Heather told Kaplanis what she thought, and Kaplanis then
said that if the Union got in on Tuesday, she (Kaplanis) would be fired on Wednes-
day. Heather asked "why" and Kaplanis answered that Mrs. Winett "had taken
her into the boiler room and had told her that."
According to employee Ruby Griffith, Kaplanis, her supervisor, came to her
at work a few days before the election, and told her that if "the union was voted
in that she, Kaplanis, would be fired, and Ethel Winett had implied that to her."
Griffith then learned from several other finishing department employees that Kap-
lanis "had told them the same thing." So she telephoned Kaplanis and told her
that she thought that she "was the only one you told that to." Kaplanis replied that
she had decided to tell "the other girls" and implied that Winett "felt like that we
thought enough of her [Kaplanis] to vote against the union to save her job." 11
10 Cf. Hartland Plastics, Inc, 93 NLRB 439, 440, footnote 2, and Gibbs Corporation,
129 NLRB 709.
11 It should be noted that Griffith also testified that Kaplanis was "well liked," but on
cross-examination conceded that Kaplanis was something short of being well liked. How-
ever, the Respondent dropped the line of inquiry into the question of just bow well liked
Kaplanis actually was when the General Counsel, after asserting that the essential thing
WINETT, INC. 1311
It is the basic contention of the General Counsel that the necessary effect of the
foregoing conduct of Kaplanis , an admitted supervisor who still works for the
Respondent but was not called as a witness , was to make employees feel that if
such a thing could happen to their supervisor , they too could be fired if they voted
for the Union in the election . On the other hand , the Respondent , citing several
Board decisions , essentially contends that the General Counsel cannot prevail on
this issue because it was neither alleged nor proved that Kaplanis, who scarcely could
threaten to discharge herself , was actually threatened with discharge because of "her
failure to engage in anti-union activities or other unfair labor practices expressly
demanded of her by her superiors."
Having duly considered the Respondent 's contentions and its cited cases, which
deal primarily with the fact that supervisors normally are exempt from the pro-
tection of the Act except in circumstances such as where a discharge is established
to have been for failure of the supervisor to engage in antiunion activity demanded
by the employer , I am of the opinion that the cited cases are inapposite and that the
Respondent 's contentions do not meet the basic issue here posed. This is not a
question of why or whether Winett actually made any threat at all to discharge
Kaplanis; there is no 8(a )( 3) allegation as to Kaplanis. The fundamental problem
is whether or not what Kaplanis told various employees , mostly under her supervision,
as to what and why Wineit had said that Kaplanis would be discharged would nor-
mally have had , under all of the circumstances, the necessary effect of interfer-
ing with, restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the Act.
It is my considered judgment that a critical examination of what Kaplanis told
employees during a short period just before the election on May 9, coming as it did
about 2 weeks after the Respondent publicly had admitted in the hearing in the prior
proceeding that it had earlier terminated 11 employees to discourage membership in
the Union and because "of said employees ' membership and interest in, and activity
on behalf of the Union ," i2 requires an affirmative answer to the foregoing crucial
question . Hence I find that the Respondent , through the above statements of
Supervisor Kaplanis, the effectiveness of which as a threat to the job security of
employees is not diminished by its apparently novel and devious nature, violated
Section 8 ( a)( I) of the Act.
3. Impression of surveillance during Winett 's conversation with Griffith
This issue concerns uncontradicted and credited testimony of employee Ruby
Griffith , mentioned in the immediately preceding section hereof , as to a conversation
which took place with Winett on Monday, May 8, the day before the election. On
the preceding Saturday afternoon , May 6, Griffith, accompanied by Martha Kepler,
the employee whom Supervisor Kaplanis allegedly threatened to discharge later, had
called on employee Mary Morrissey at her home to solicit Morrissey for the Union
and to see how she felt about the election . In addition , Griffith also had called that
same weekend on two other employees , Staretta Braden and Betty Thomas, to visit
with them and to see how they felt about the election.
It was thus on the first working day following her visits to the homes of the
aforesaid three 'employees , and when Griffith had gone to Winett 's office on the
afternoon of May 8 to get her paycheck , that the conversation in issue occurred. On
that occasion , Griffith had with her a baby who belonged to a friend who was not
feeling well . Winett, whose observation of the distribution of union literature in
front of the plant during this period is subsequently discussed , asked Griffith how
she found time to babysit with all of her other activities "such as calling on people."
Griffith told Winett that she did that on weekends. Winett, however, said , "Week-
ends and evenings ," but Griffith replied that she spend her evenings taking care of
her own children.
The General Counsel, citing "some cases along the general line," urges that
Winett's "very pointed remark " to Griffith created the impression of surveillance.
The Respondent contends essentially that the General Counsel 's cited cases are not
in point; that Winett's remark to Griffith was "nothing more than a normal and
involved was a supervisor who used "her official position in order to sway the em-
ployees," stated that he was not making any contention on the basis of Kaplanis actually
being well liked.
12 The Respondent contends essentially that the holdings as to unfair labor practices in
the prior proceeding, all of which were based on "the pleadings for the purpose of the
April 24 proceeding only" and not upon findings based upon litigated issues,-should not
be considered as background with respect to the issues herein. I find this contention to
be without merit. '
1312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
friendly inquiry literally made countless times in social intercourse;" and that said
remark does not justify the conclusion the General Counsel urges.
Deliberation on the issues here raised has convinced me that, although Winett's
remark differs from more obvious statements found in the cases cited by the General
Counsel, a discerning appraisal of what Winett had to say to Griffith on the after-
noon preceding the election, when considered in total context, shows that said remark
would necessarily have had the effect of creating,in the mind of employee Griffith
the impression that Winett was letting her know that Winett was aware of Griffith's
union activity in visiting the homes of other employees. Moreover, I am also con-
vinced that Winett, who was desirous of avoiding unionization, must have known what
the necessary effect of her remark to Griffith would be. Accordingly, although the
question is a close one, I find that, all factors considered, Winett's remark to Griffith
on May 8 cannot be construed merely as normal and friendly social intercourse, but
actually was a very pointed one by which the Respondent created the impression of
surveillance, in violation of Section 8(a)fl) of the Act.
4. Pinning on of "Vote no" signs
On the day of the election, Tuesday, May 9, a number of employees, including
Supervisor Kaplanis, wore "Vote no" signs in the plant These signs, which were
average-size sheets of paper with the foregoing two words on them, were pinned on
employees' back and were worn until the election took place around 4 o'clock that
afternoon. Superintendent Hand, who did not wear such a sign herself, did nothing
about the signs, except to tell employees to take them off when they went across the
street to vote. There is no evidence that any other signs were worn that day in the
plant or that any attempt was made to wear signs favoring the Union in the election.
The issue now before us stems from flatly contradictory testimony as to whether or
not, on the morning of May 9, in the plant, Dorothy Hand pinned such "Vote no"
signs on the clothing of employees Martha Kepler and Freeda Knight, both of whom
have been mentioned hereinabove. The essence of the conflicting testimony of the
three individuals involved is now set forth.
This is Kepler's version of how the "Vote no" sign, which she wore until time for
the election, got pinned on her that day:
When I went to work that morning, just as II went inside the door, why, Dorothy
grabbed ahold of my coat and Martha Thompkins helped her also, and before I
ever had time to time in they were trying to pin this sign on my dress but I
had on my coat. Well, when they didn't succeed I went upstairs and timed in,
and when I came back down the stairs Dorothy Hand and Martha Thompkins
both followed me back to the coat rack, and I took off my coat and immediately
they pinned a sign on my back.
Knight testified that when she "timed in," Hand pinned a "leaflet" on her back
with "Vote no" written on it; that she did not ask to have it pinned on; that she wore
it all day until told to take it off by a representative of the Board at the time of the
election; and that she did not take the sign off after Hand pinned it on because "I
knew if I would take it off they'd know I was for the Union."
This is the pertinent testimony of Dorothy Hand, who has been superintendent
of the plant for about 7 years, as to Kepler's testimony. Hand unequivocally denied
on direct examination that she had pinned a "Vote no" sign on Kepler's back on
election day; explained that Kepler had asked her to pin one on but that she had told
Kepler to get someone else as she "didn't have time"; and testified that Kepler had
a sign pinned on her but that she "didn't know for sure who did it." Hand's testi-
mony on cross-examination as to the foregoing is consistent with her direct.
When first asked on direct examination about pinning a "Vote no" sign on Knight,
Hand answered that she "didn't even recall seeing her there that morning."
Handthen flatly denied having pinned such a sign on Knight. On cross-examination,
Hand again unequivocally denied putting such a sign on Knight, and explained that
while Freeda Knight was not there "early" on election day, she was there when work
began, as Knight would "usually split the bell." 13
The credibility problem thus posed, to which I have given long and thoughtful
consideration, is difficult and perplexing, primarily because there was nothing in
the demeanor of any of the three witnesses which persuaded me that she was testi-
fying untruthfully on this matter. True, there are two witnesses against one, but that
one, Superintendent Hand, was generally more prepossessing than Knight or Kepler,
and I do not close my eyes to the fact that, as the Respondent stresses, Trial Ex-
. This is plant, vernacular meaning to come to work between the two bells, the first of
which rings at 2 minutes before 8 and the second at 8 a.m.
WINETT, INC. 1313
aminer Lindner's Intermediate Report in the prior proceeding, albeit with respect
to other circumstances and different conflicting witnesses, comments quite favorably
on Hand's credibility, referring to her as "a reliable, sincere witness" whose testi-
mony was "forthright and convincing." Further, I do not find the flaws in Hand's
testimony to which the General Counsel points, but find it essentially consistent and
not implausible.
I see no point in protracting this report by discussing various factors related
to this puzzling credibility problem or by analyzing possible explanations pro and
con. Having considered all such matters, the scales remain in balance and it comes
down to this. While the issue is certainly not free from doubt, the General Counsel
has, in my opinion, failed to meet his burden of proof by establishing that Super-
intendent Hand, in fact, pinned "Vote no" signs on employees Kepler and Knight.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to reach any legal question pertaining to this issue,
and I will recommend that said allegation be dismissed.
5. Surveillance
This issue concerns Ethel Winett's observing the distribution of union literature
in front of the plant during the period from about May I until the election. The
evidence as 'a whole leaves no doubt that while she was on the sidewalk in front
of the church, Mrs. Winett, admittedly an officer and responsible agent of the
Respondent,14 observed the distribution of union literature to employees entering
the plant on several mornings during the election campaign.
The Respondent concedes that Winett "observed what was going on," but con-
tends essentially that she did so "while performing normal duties" which she had
been doing for some time in opening the plant and the church before work, and that
she had, in continuing to do so, also "even observed the Independent Workers Group,"
herein called the nonunion group, distributing its literature. It should be noted that
said group distributed literature to employees coming to work not only in front of
the plant, where the union distribution of literature took place, but also in the plant
just inside the double doors, where Winett herself stood when she distributed leaflets
in the evening, to employees at the end of the day.
While there is inconsistency in the evidence as to when Winett first began appear-
ing across the street from the plant in the morning, the church had been purchased
and was in use prior to May 1, and Hand testified that Winett, who "takes her time"
about doing things, had for some time prior to May 1 customarily been arriving
before 8 o'clock to open both the plant and the church. In any event, the General
Counsel contends that regardless of whether or not Winett had been "in the habit of
opening the plant" before May 1, during the period in issue she "was standing there
watching what was going on." Hence, I will assume that, for some time prior to
the election campaign, crossing Russel Street to the church, opening the church, and
then returning to the plant, had been part of Winett's usual activity 'before work
started at 8 a.m.15
14 While the record fails to define precisely Mrs. Winett 's position, counsel for the
Respondent in oral argument referred to George Winett as "my client." The relation-
ship of the church to the plant has already been described in the paragraph which con-
tains footnote 7
15 In view of the above, an ably argued and briefed legal question, to which I have
given careful consideration, is of diminished significance However, in view of the
importance of the question procedurally, I hereby grant the pending motion of the General
Counsel to strike all of the testimony of witness Martha Kepler, called by the General
Counsel, which was elicited on cross-examination by the Respondent outside the scope of
Kepler's direct examination . The Respondent was permitted to engage in cross -examination
involving matters admittedly outside the scope of the direct, after refusing to make the
witness his own. This procedure was permitted, subject to a motion to strike, when
the Respondent insisted that such leeway should be accorded tinder section 491 070 of the
Missouri statute entitled "Cross-examination of Witnesses-Scope," concerning which the
General Counsel was not prepared to argue when Kepler was on the stand The pertinent
part of said section provides, excluding exceptions not here material, that:
A party to a cause, civil or criminal, against whom a witness has been called and
given some evidence shall be entitled to cross-examine said witness . .. on the
entire case . . .
While I am convinced that it is Missouri law, where the hearing was conducted, rather
than Kansas law , where the alleged violations occurred , which would be controlling, if
the Respondent 's contentions were to prevail , I am not convinced that a Board Trial
634449-62-vol. 135-84
1314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Having analyzed the contentions and the cited cases, it is my opinion that to have
a factual basis for holding that Winett engaged in open surveillance would require
that the evidence show that upon returning from unlocking the church in the
morning, Winett was not merely pausing as a cautious pedestrian before re-crossing
Russell Street, but rather was standing for periods of time sufficient to justify
the conclusion that she was deliberately rather than incidentally observing the
distribution of union literature. Hence it is necessary to examine in some detail
testimony as to this point.
Representative Sedgwick credibly testified that he distributed union literature in
the morning almost every day during the period in issue; that he saw Mrs. Winett
on a number of occasions "standing across the street opposite the double doors";
that she was "just standing" there facing the handbilling and "looking at us" from
across the unobstructed street; and that Winett could have seen who was taking the
handbills. Sedgwick, who particularly impressed me as a truthful and accurate
witness, testified that during the 10-day period in issue, Winett got to the plant
around 20 minutes to 8, and that before work started he remembered "Mrs. Winett
on the outside mostly during that ten-day period."
Other witnesses similarly testified about seeing Winett in front of the church
watching the distribution of literature in front of the plant on mornings during the
period in issue. For instance, Nina Heather testified that every day when she
distributed union literature, Winett watched the handbilling; that Winett was sta-
tioned across the street on the sidewalk in front of the church; that she had her back
to the church and was facing the plant; and that Winett was "just standing with her
arms crossed watching us, everyone that came in." In addition, Roberta Johnson
testified that in watching the Union pass out handbills, Winett took a post on the
sidewalk in front of the church and "stood with her arms folded just watching us
pass the pamphlets out."
It will be remembered that Winett was not called as a witness. Hence, she made
no denial of the foregoing testimony as to her behavior. In my opinion, that testi-
mony establishes that during the period of the campaign just before the election,
Winett's practice was not merely that of making a prudently safe return from across
the street after unlocking the church, but was rather one of stationing hereself con-
spicuously with folded arms to observe for appreciable periods of time, the distri-
bution, by the union group as well as by the nonunion group, of union literature to
employees entering the plant.
In my opinion, the foregoing behavior of Ethel Winett constituted open surveil-
lance for the same basic reasons which the Board spells out in its recent decision in
General Engineering.is Although it is true, as the Respondent contends, that said
decision deals with the threat implicit in photographing employees while they are
engaged in any kind of union activities, I find that for an official openly to observe
such activity personally is comparably coercive. Moreover, the fact that the non-
union group also was observed does not, under the circumstances here prevailing,
mitigate or negate the impact of said surveillance. Further, in my judgment, none
of the cases cited by the Respondent is sufficiently in point to serve as a basis for
excusing Winett's conduct. And finally, I find without merit the Respondent's con-
tention, based on the decision in Peyton Packing,17 that to find surveillance now,
when surveillance was litigated and dismissed in the prior proceeding, would smack
of harassment. What is here involved as surveillance is a different type of activity,
by a different individual, and limited to a period of time which does not begin
until after the close of the hearing in the prior proceeding. Accordingly, I con-
clude and find that by Winett's above conduct the Respondent engaged in surveil-
lance, in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
Examiner is required, under all of the laws and authorities appertaining, to follow such
a broad approach to cross-examination In fact, without adopting all of the General
Counsel's reasoning, I am persuaded that the essential policy urged, which I have fol-
lowed and believe is the one traditionally followed in Board proceedings, that of holding
cross-examination to the scope of the direct unless a party is willing to make a witness
his own, is the most orderly and expeditious one to follow In short, while I realize that,
as the General Counsel concedes in his brief, "the Trial Examiner has great leeway
with respect to the scope of cross-examination," I am striking the cross-examination here
involved for essentially the reasons stated in Ralph's Wonder, Inc., 127 NLRB 1280,
1290, footnote 10, with respect to a similar Massachusetts provision.
'- See General Engineering, Inc., and Harvey Aluminum (Incorporated ), 131 NLRB 901.
17 Peyton Packing Company , Inc, 129 NLRB 1358, 1360.
WINETT, INC. 1315
6. Discriminatorily preventing its employees from distributing union
literature inside the plant
At the outset, it should be noted that this issue relates not to outside union rep-
resentatives but to employees of the Respondent and to whether or not the Re-
spondent , inside its plant , discriminatorily prevented them "from distributing litera-
ture and/or soliciting for the Union." 18
It has already been noted that during the election campaign union literature
was distributed before work in front of the plant by employees as well as by non-
,employee representatives of the Union . The evidence as a whole shows that while
,employees active in the nonunion group distributed literature in front of the plant,
they also distributed their literature just inside the double doors as employees entered
the plant for work . 19 No employee distributing union literature appears to have
done so inside the entrance of the plant. It will also be remembered that while
"Vote no" signs were worn on election day inside the plant, the evidence does not
show that any attempt was made to wear signs favoring the Union.
Similarly the evidence does not show that any employee distributing union litera-
ture tried to do so inside the plant, asked for permission to do so, or was prevented
or prohibited from doing so. Nor does the record show that any representative
,of the Union sought permission for employees of the Respondent to distribute
union literature inside the plant, or protested the fact that employees in the
nonunion group were distributing literature just inside the double doors. And
although it appears that distribution of literature in opposition to the Union by
Winett just inside the double doors took place only in the afternoon , I am con-
vinced by the evidence as a whole that the Respondent was well aware that the
nonunion group was distributing its literature at said location in the morning.
Moreover , there is no showing that the Respondent had any kind of no-solicitation
:rule in its plant , and it is not alleged that the Respondent violated the Act by its own
distribution of leaflets 20
Clearly there actually was a difference in where the union employees and the non-
union employees distributed their literature . Both groups of employees distributed
literature , without interference from the Respondent , in front of the plant, despite
Winett's earlier-discussed remarks to Representatives Curtis and Sedgwick about call-
ing the police if those two individuals did not get off company property. The
difference is that much of the distribution by the nonunion group was done, with
the Respondent 's knowledge , inside the double doors, while the union employees,
who never tried to or sought permission to do so, did not distribute there.
While this issue is not free from doubt , having painstakingly considered all of the
contentions of the parties , including the weight attached by the General Counsel to
"The General Counsel sought to amend the complaint during oral argument to include
an incident which occurred outside the plant , involving Winett's assisting a crippled
employee , Dorothy Coleman , in leaving her car just before work was to start , and while
Representative Curtis was standing by the car talking to Coleman The motion to
amend was denied as untimely, but testimony as to the incident has been duly considered,
both as background and as a litigated incident No purpose would be served by present-
ing the testimony given by witnesses Curtis, Sedgwick, Heather, Knight, and Hand as to
this incident because it is my opinion that when all factors are considered , Winett hon-
estly may have believed that Coleman was being prevented from getting to work on time,
even though Curtis, who was standing beside her car, did not intend to prevent Coleman
from doing so In this connection , it is noteworthy that Heather testified that she heard
Winett "remark that poor little Dorothy couldn 't even get out of her car," and that
Hand testified that Coleman , "an excitable person ," upon reaching her work station ex-
plained that "some of the union fellows were talking to her and she just couldn't get out
of her car ," and that if Mrs Winett had not "come to my rescue I wouldn ' t have been
here on time ." Accepting the position that the matter was fully litigated , the weight of
the credible evidence does not establish , in any event , that Winett's activity in connection
with the Coleman incident constituted an unfair labor practice In addition, evidence
of Winett 's opposition to the Union is not significantly buttressed by any reasonable
inference with respect to the Coleman incident.
10 One witness for the General Counsel, Roberta Johnson , explained that the nonunion
group "started each morning on the outside [ of] the door and as it got cold they'd move
their position inside "
20 In my opinion , the weight of the credible evidence does not warrant an inference
that employees in the nonunion group assisted Winett with her evening distributions ;
that supervisors of the Respondent assisted the nonunion group with its distributions in
the morning ; or that the literature being distributed by the nonunion group and by the
-Respondent , respectively, was the same literature.
1316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
what Winett said about calling the police, I do not believe that it can be found,
absent the factors previously explained, that the Respondent discriminatorily pre-
vented its employees from distributing literature inside the plant. This is so pri-
marily because I do not believe that, despite the antiunion background in this case,
it must necessarily be inferred that any request would have been met by refusal, or
any attempt by prohibiting, so far as employees are concerned. True, although
she had not followed words by action, Winett had emphatically indicated to two
nonemployee representatives of the Union disapproval of their distributing union
literature on what she referred to as company property. But even though said action
is found to be violative of the Act, the Respondent's antiunion attitude and un-
lawful conduct, as shown by that and by the total context of this case, does not
warrant holding that the Respondent has acted illegally on a matter upon which it
has not actually been put to the test.21 Hence, it will be recommended that this
allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
7. Threatening to discharge an employee
The issue is whether Supervisor Carolyn Kaplanis threatened to discharge em-
ployee Martha Kepler to discourage union activity or membership.
This is Kepler's uncontradicted testimony as to what Kaplanis told her on May 9
after the election was over.
She [Kaplanis] told me the night after the election that I would be fired the
coming Tuesday night, and she said that she would not fire me, and she said
that George would have to do it, and she said that she didn't know what he
was going to fire me over, but she said for me to wait until Tuesday night and
she bet that George would fire me.
Kepler also testified, but without furnishing any details, that she thereafter "was
fired on Friday after that Tuesday night."
It will be remembered, as detailed above in section III, B, 3, that Kepler had
accompanied employee Griffith the preceding weekend on one of the three calls
that Griffith made on employees in their homes, namely the call on Morrissey.
The General Counsel argues that Griffith's call on Morrissey "having become known
to management, Mrs. Kepler having been along, her presence there also obviously
was known." This does not follow, as we do not know which or how many of
Griffith's three calls Winett may pointedly have referred to in her remark to
Griffith the day before the election. However, since Kepler may well have learned
from Griffith, in the meantime, of Winett's remark, and since Kaplanis' prediction
was made just after the election, Kepler understandably could have believed that
the predicted discharge, which Kaplanis said that "George," apparently referring
to George Winett, would have to make, would be because of the Union, even
though Kaplanis specifically stated that she did not know what George Winett "was
going to fire [Kepler] over."
There is nothing in the record to show that any charge has ever been made tt at
the actual discharge of Kepler was violative of the Act. Thus Kepler's actual dis-
charge, which essentially fulfilled Kaplanis' prediction that it would be made, was
for some reason or reasons which the record does not reveal. Hence, since the
actual discharge was made for reasons unknown to the record, I fail to see how its
prediction, in language which made no reference to the Union, can be construed as
a threat to discharge an employee because of the Union, when the employee is not
shown to have been known to the Respondent for union membership or activity.
Accordingly, I find that the evidence does not support this allegation of the com-
plaint and will recommend that it be dismissed.
8. Creating the impression of surveillance by Winett's remark to
Knight and Gwinn
The issue rests solely on uncontradicted testimony of employee Freeda Knight as
to a remark by Mrs. Winett on May 10. Knight testified that the day after the
election, as she and employee Martha Gwinn were leaving, Winett said to them,
"Don't be so disappointed, you didn't have a chance," and that nothing was said
in reply. There is no testimony as to what the facial expression of either Knight
or Gwinn may have been at the time Winett addressed her remark to them.
The General Counsel contends that this remark of Winett's was "a very pointed"
one which created the impression of surveillance because by it Winett essentially
21 In reaching this conclusion, I am well aware that I may erroneously be taking a
position too narrow and too legalistic in nature.
WINETT, INC. 1317
was saying that she had known all along that Knight and Gwinn -belonged to or were
for the Union . However , the record appears to be ambiguous as to what was true
in such respects as to Gwinn and Knight . Further, after duly canvassing all of the
possibilities, I think that what Winett said may have constituted nothing more
than an ineptly expressed attempt on her part to dissipate such feelings of disap-
pointment as there were among employees about the outcome of the election. In
any event, while Winett's remark might better have been left unsaid, I believe that
.it would stretch inference too far to find that this chance remark of Winett's violated
Section 8 ( a)(1) of the Act by creating the impression of surveillance . Hence it
will be recommended that said allegation be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent, described in section I, above,
have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The unfair labor practices herein found, considered in conjunction with unfair
labor practices found by the Board in the prior proceeding, are such as to indicate
an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act generally, and accordingly it is
reasonable to anticipate from such past conduct the commission of these and
other unfair labor practices in the future. Since the preventive purposes of the
Act may be thwarted unless the remedy is coextensive with the threat, it will be
provided that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon
the statutory rights of its employees.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Winett, Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. K.C. Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By threatening to call the police if a union organizer did not move away from
the entrance to its plant to distribute literature; by threatening its employees that a
supervisor would be discharged if the Union won a Board-conducted election; by
engaging in surveillance of its employees' distribution of union literature; and by
creating the impression of surveillance of union solicitation through home visita-
tion, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, by discriminatorily preventing employees from dis-
tributing union literature inside its plant; by threatening to discharge an employee
to discourage union membership or activity; by pinning "Vote no" signs on the
clothing of its employees while they were working in the plant; or by creating the
impression of surveillance by Winett's remark to employees Knight and Gwinn, dis-
cussed above in section III, B, 8.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Respondent, Winett, Inc.,
its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to call the police if a union organizer does not move away from
the entrance to its plant to distribute literature ; threatening its employees that a
supervisor will be discharged if the Union wins a Board-conducted election ; engaging
in surveillance of its employees ' distribution of union literature ; and creating the
impression of surveillance of union solicitation through home visitation.
1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1(b) In any other manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing its employees
in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor organizations , to join
or assist the Union or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from
any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Post at its plant and place of business at Kansas City, Kansas, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked "Appendix ." 22 Copies of said notice , to be furnished
by the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region , shall , after being duly signed
by the Respondent 's authorized representative , be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted, and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive
days. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region , in writing , within
20 days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report , what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.23
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges
that the Respondent has engaged in the activities specifically summarized under
paragraph 5 of Conclusions of Law.
22 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "A
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial'
Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order be enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order "
Qa In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT threaten to call the police if a union organizer does not move
away from the entrance to our plant to distribute union literature.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that any supervisor will be discharged
if the Union wins a Board-conducted election.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of our employees in the distribution of
union literature.
WE WILL NOT create the impression of surveillance of union solicitation
through home visitation.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor or-
ganizations , to join or assist K.C. Joint Board , International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection or to refrain from any and all such activities.
All our employees are free to become , remain , or refrain from becoming or re-
maining members of K.C . Joint Board , International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WINETT, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 1200
Rialto Building , 906 Grand Avenue, Kansas City 6, Missouri , Telephone Number:
BAltimore 1-7000, Extension 731, if they have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions.