Willy J. Hardin, Complainant, J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 16, 2000
02990003 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 16, 2000)

02990003

03-16-2000

Willy J. Hardin, Complainant, J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), Agency.


Willy J. Hardin v. Agency for International Development (AID)

02990003

March 16, 2000

Willy J. Hardin, )

Complainant, )

)

) Appeal No. 02990003

)

J. Brian Atwood, )

Administrator, )

Agency for International )

Development (AID), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On November 13, 1998, Willy J. Hardin (the complainant) filed an appeal

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission) from

a final (third-step) agency decision dated October 7, 1998, concerning

his grievance filed against the agency dated April 29, 1998.<1> In his

grievance, complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against him

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA) of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission hereby

accepts the appeal in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly determined that

complainant failed to prove that the agency discriminated against him

based on race, sex, age and retaliation when he was judged unqualified

for consideration at the GS-12 level, and was subsequently not selected

for a position to which he had applied.

BACKGROUND

Complainant filed a grievance on April 29, 1998, regarding his

non-selection for the position of Public Affairs Specialist (the

Position), and regarding the agency's determination that he was

not qualified for consideration for the Position at the GS-12 level.

He claimed that he had been discriminated against on the bases of race

(Black), sex (male), age (DOB: 2/19/40) and retaliation (prior EEO

activity). The Position was advertised as a GS-9/11/12 position, with

promotion potential to the GS-12 level, if initially filled at the GS-9 or

GS-11 level. The Vacancy Announcement specified that applicants needed

one year of specialized experience "in or directly related to the line

of work of the position," and that "to be creditable, this experience

must have been at least equivalent to the next lower grade level in

Federal Service." Complainant alleged that he had been disqualified

for merit promotion consideration at the GS-12 level for discriminatory

(among other improper) reasons. He was instead given the opportunity to

be interviewed for the Position at the GS-11 level, but was not selected.

In its third-step agency decision, the deciding official found that

complainant had been properly classified as not having the requisite

"specialized experience" at the next lowest level of the position in

question. In other words, complainant did not have the experience at the

GS-11 level that would qualify him to immediately move into the Position

at a GS-12 classification, which he indicated on his application was his

preference. She found that while complainant had general experience that

would have rendered him qualified for the position at the GS-11 level,

his experience was not specialized enough to promote him to the GS-12

position directly from his current position, as a Loss/Damage Claims

Examiner, GS-11. The decision also found that complainant had not shown

that the agency's reasons for not classifying him at the GS-12 level, and

for not selecting him for the Position, were a pretext for discrimination

based on his race, sex, age or prior EEO activity.

Complainant also claimed that he had been discriminated against regarding

his initial hiring grade level and several other promotions, dating

from September 1989 to January 1998.<2> The agency decision found

that these issues were untimely raised under the collective bargaining

agreement between the agency and the union, and denied the portion of

the grievance pertaining to those issues. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The EEOC Regulation found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be

codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.401(d)), provides

that a grievant may appeal to the Commission from a final decision of

the agency, the arbitrator or the Federal Labor Relations Authority on

a grievance when an issue of employment discrimination was raised in a

negotiated grievance procedure that permits such issues to be raised.

The Commission's regulations, in conjunction with 5 U.S.C. � 7121(d)

of the Civil Service Reform Act, provide that where a negotiated

grievance procedure permits an allegation of discrimination to be

raised and considered, an employee wishing to raise an allegation of

discrimination must elect the forum in which to pursue the matter.

Thus, such a complaint of alleged employment discrimination may be

raised under either the statutory procedure (EEO process) or the

negotiated grievance procedure, but not both. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.301.

If the employee should elect to raise an issue of discrimination in a

negotiated grievance procedure, the employee has the right to appeal the

agency's final decision on the grievance concerning the discrimination

issue to the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.401(d).

The record of the present case establishes that the agency's grievance

procedure gives employees the option of raising employment discrimination

claims. Pursuant to this right, complainant filed the present grievance

raising allegations of discrimination. Under these circumstances, the

Commission has the authority to review the agency's grievance decision

on complainant's discrimination claims, and the present appeal from that

decision is properly before the Commission.

The agency found that under the grievance procedure outlined in the

collective bargaining agreement between the agency and the union, the

complainant had untimely raised issues in his grievance. In Johnson

v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Request No. 05910188

(March 20, 1991), the Commission held that it does not have jurisdiction

to review procedural determinations by an agency solely related to the

grievance process and the collective bargaining agreement, such as the

timeliness of the filing of the grievance or the timeliness of filings

of appeals from the original Step 1 decision. Therefore, we find that we

do not have jurisdiction to review complainant's appeal on these issues.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency

presented evidence that it had properly classified complainant for

consideration for the Position at the GS-11 level, and not at the GS-12

level, due to his lack of specialized experience relevant to the job

duties of the Position. The Selecting Official would have filled the

Position at the GS-12 level only with a person who would have needed

no further training on the performance of the duties, which she felt

complainant would need given his background. The agency also stated that

complainant had been fairly considered along with the other applicants

for the Position and that the selectee for the Position, who was hired

at the GS-9 level, was regarded by the Selecting Official as having

demonstrated that she was the stronger candidate based on her writing

and research abilities, her interpersonal skills and her ability to be

"team-oriented, self-directed and motivated." We find that the agency

has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Since the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate that the

agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. We find

that complainant has failed to do so. Although the complainant argued

extensively that the agency had engaged in a pattern of discriminating

against him based not only on his race, age and sex and in retaliation

for previous EEO activity, he also alleged that the agency was improperly

motivated by his complaints to the agency's Inspector General regarding

alleged waste, fraud and abuse. He further claimed that his complaints

regarding other alleged violations by the agency of government regulations

and statutes motivated the agency's actions, and that his status as a

disabled veteran had not been properly taken into account when qualifying

him for the Position. After a review of the record in its entirety,

we find that the agency properly determined that complainant was not

qualified at the GS-12 level, given that the specialized experience he

claimed to have was more accurately deemed to be only relevant general

experience for the Position. We also note that the fact that the

selectee for the Position was a Black female only four years younger than

complainant strongly contradicts his claims of race and age discrimination

because she was of the same race as complainant and close in age to him.

We therefore find that complainant did not show that the agency engaged

in discrimination when it chose the selectee for the Position over him.

Therefore, the agency's determination that complainant failed to establish

that he was discriminated against was correct.

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 16, 2000

______________ __________________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________ __________________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where

applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended,

may also be found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2 At least two of the non-selections which complainant referenced

were the subject of a separate complaint, pursued through the EEO

process, and were appealed to the Commission in Hardin v. Agency for

International Development (AID), EEOC Appeal No. 01974241 (July 2, 1999).

In that appeal, the Commission affirmed the agency's adoption of an EEOC

Administrative Judge's Recommended Decision finding no discrimination.