Williams, Merrell M.; Boy's Restaurant, Inc.; Girl's Restaurant; Jumbos d/b/a Farm Boy Restaurant; Farm Boy Restaurant Nos. 2 and 3

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 26, 1982

265 N.L.R.B. 506 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Merrell M. Williams; Boy's Restaurant, Inc.; Girl's
Restaurant; Jumbo's d/b/a Farm Boy Restau-
rant; Farm Boy Restaurants Nos. 2 and 3 and
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees In-
ternational Union, Local 703, AFL-CIO. Case
31-CA-10172
November 26, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On June 2, 1982, Administrative Law Judge
Frederick C. Herzog issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Merrell M.
Williams; Boy's Restaurant, Inc.; Girl's Restaurant;
Jumbo's d/b/a Farm Boy Restaurant; and Farm
Boy Restaurants Nos. 2 and 3; Santa Maria,
Arroyo Grande, Pismo Beach, and San Luis
Obispo, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, except that the attached
notice is substituted for that of the Administrative
Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good
faith with Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, Local 703,
265 NLRB No. 70
AFL-CIO, by repudiating our tentative agree-
ments upon the subjects of meal credits and
cost-of-living increases in wages.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights to form, join,
or assist, or be represented by the above-
named Union.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with the above-named Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of our employees
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions
of employment and, if an understanding is
reached with said Union, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement. The unit of
our employees for whom we will negotiate
with the aforesaid Union is as follows:
All chefs, dinner cooks, second cooks, bar-
becue or broiler cooks, fry cooks, cook's as-
sistants, pantrymen or women, bakers, wait-
ers, waitresses, dishwashers, janitors, yard-
men, carhops, cashier-hostesses, busboys,
busgirls, bartenders, cocktail waitresses, and
bar boys at our restaurants in Santa Maria,
Arroyo Grande, Pismo Beach, and San Luis
Obispo, California.
MERRELL M. WILLIAMS; BoY's RES-
TAURANT, INC.; GIRL'S RESTAURANT;
JUMBO'S D/B/A FARM BOY RESTAU-
RANT; FARM BOY RESTAURANTS
Nos. 2 AND 3
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FREDERICK C. HERZOG, Administrative Law Judge:
Based upon a charge filed on July 10, 1980, by Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees International
Union, Local 703, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union),'
against Merrell M. Williams, as an individual and as
owner or part-owner of Boy's Restaurant, Inc., Girl's
Restaurant, Jumbo's d/b/a Farm Boy Restaurant; and
Farm Boy Restaurants Nos. 2 and 3 (herein collectively
referred to as Respondent), the complaint herein was
issued by the Acting Regional Director for Region 31 of
the National Labor Relations Board on March 11, 1981,
together with a notice of hearing for November 3, 1981.
The complaint alleges, in general, that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(aX)() and (5) of the Act on March 9,
1980, by its repudiation of certain tentative agreements
reached during the course of collective-bargaining ses-
sions between the Union and Respondent in late Febru-
ary 1980.
X The name of the Union appears as amended at the hearing.
506
MERRELL M. WILLIAMS
This case was heard before me at Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, on November 3, 16, 17, and 18, 1981. All parties
appeared and were afforded the right to participate, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence in support of their positions. Moreover, the par-
ties were afforded the right to file briefs and make oral
argument at the conclusion of the hearing. Counsel for
the General Counsel argued orally on the record and
chose not to file a brief. Briefs were filed on behalf of
the Charging Party and Respondent.
Based upon the record2 as compiled, plus my consid-
eration of the briefs filed by the Union and Respondent,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Boy's, Girl's, Jumbo's, and Farm Boy Restaurants Nos.
2 and 3 are respectively alleged by the complaint to have
operated restaurants in the area of Santa Maria, Arroyo
Grande, Pismo Beach, and San Luis Obispo, and to have
purchased and received goods or services valued in
excess of $5,000 annually from sellers or suppliers locat-
ed within the State of California which received such
goods in substantially the same form directly from out-
side the State of California, and to have had gross rev-
enues in excess of $500,000 annually. It is further alleged
that Boy's, Girl's, Jumbo's, and Farm Boy Restaurants
Nos. 2 and 3 are affiliated business enterprises, constitut-
ing a single integrated business enterprise and a single
employer within the meaning of the Act, which are now,
and at all times material herein, have been employers en-
gaged in commerce and businesses affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Respondent's answer failed to deny the truth of the alle-
gations.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent is
now, and at all times material herein has been, an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges that the Union is now, and has
been at all times material herein, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Respondent's answer fails to deny this allegation and I
accordingly find it to be true.
IfI. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
(1) The complaint herein alleges that Respondent en-
gaged in collective bargaining with the Union in Febru-
ary 1980 and reached agreement on "substantially all
terms and conditions" of a contract, and, more specifical-
ly, that (1) waiters and waitresses would be given the
option of taking their meals at Respondent's premises
during their working day or, to receive $2 per day in
a Respondent's motion to reopen the record for the limited purpose of
receiving into evidence certain documents inadvertently omitted was
granted, without opposition from the General Counsel or Respondent
lieu of meals, and (2) wages would be annually increased
pursuant to a formula based on the increase in the cost of
living up to an 8-percent (annual) limit. Finally, the com-
plaint alleges that on or about March 5, 1980, Respond-
ent repudiated such agreements on grounds that, among
other things, its negotiator lacked authority to bind Re-
spondent in these respects.
Throughout this proceeding the Union sought to intro-
duce evidence or to argue that the parties to the negotia-
tions reached a complete agreement on February 29,
1980, and that the terms of that agreement are sufficient-
ly well defined by competent evidence to enable me to
order Respondent to sign it, under the apparent theory
that proof of agreement upon "substantially all" terms is
sufficient to satisfy the test of H. J. Heinz v. N.LR.B.,
311 U.S. 514 (1941), wherein it was held that an employ-
er violates Section 8(aX5) of the Act by refusing to sign
an agreed-upon contract.
However, even if the theory were valid, it would not
be of help to the Union in this case. As previously noted,
it is not alleged in this case that all terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement were agreed upon, but only that
"substantially all" such terms were agreed. Moreover,
counsel for the General Counsel announced at the hear-
ing that, "At no time does the General Counsel contend
that this entire document s was a final and binding [con-
tract] on the parties."
To the contrary the Union's contention in this case
that Respondent failed to sign an agreed-upon contract
was the subject of a partial dismissal by the Regional Di-
rector on October 31, 1980. The Union's appeal to the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
was denied on February 17, 1981.
Additionally, it was acknowledged by counsel for the
Union during the hearing herein that the Union has filed
still another unfair labor practice charge against Re-
spondent, asserting that Respondent has failed or refused
to sign an agreed-upon collective-bargaining agreement.
As stated in the brief filed by the Union:
. . .since a subsequently filed charge (Case 31-CA-
11507) not now before this Honorable Judge re-
mains pending investigation and consideration by
the General Counsel, the General Counsel's repre-
sentative was obliged, at the hearing, to disavow
any intent to urge that a document [G.C. Exh. 7]
"prepare[d] and present[ed] to the Employer for
signature" subsequent to the date of the General
Counsel's comment on appeal from partial dismissal
of the Heinz theory allegation of this charge, and
sent to the Respondents for signature in August
1981 constitutes the final agreement reached by the
parties in February 1980.
Under the circumstances there can be no doubt that I
am precluded from deciding the question of whether or
not a complete agreement was reached by the parties to
these negotiations. It is well settled that the General
' Referring to G.C. Exh. 7. the document prepared by the Union's at-
torney, Silver, in August 1981 and thereafter presented to Respondent
with a demand that it be signed.
507
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Counsel (and, derivatively, the Regional Director) has
exclusive authority under Section 3(d) of the Act to in-
vestigate, issue, and prosecute complaints, and, as a con-
sequence, to control the theory under which complaints
are prosecuted. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union 903 (Hinton Commercial
Contractors; Inc.), 230 NLRB 1017 (1977), and Winn
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 567 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.
1978).
The Union's argument that it is merely asserting a
theory contained within the General Counsel's wording
of the complaint is at variance with its continued asser-
tion in another case of the precise point previously dis-
missed by the Regional Director, and sustained on appeal
by the General Counsel.
Accordingly, I conclude that the issue before me is
limited to the question of whether or not Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by repudiating the
two tentative agreements referred to in the complaint.
(2) However, I also find and conclude that I am not
precluded, as urged by Respondent, from deciding even
this narrow question. Respondent's argument is to the
effect that the complaint should be dismissed because of
unwarranted delay in its prosecution, which has worked
to the prejudice of Respondent.
Respondent has failed, however, to indicate the
manner in which it has been prejudiced, aside from gen-
eralized argument. And, in view of the fact that a great
deal of the "delay" in this case appears to have resulted
from administrative actions by the Regional Office and
the Office of the General Counsel which dramatically re-
duced the amount of evidence and issues to be heard
against Respondent in this case, it seems unlikely that
Respondent could have persuasively argued the point.
Additionally, it has been held that the doctrine of
laches has no application to cases brought before the
Board, an agency of the United States Government en-
gaged in the exercise of public or governmental func-
tions. See W.C. Nabors d/b/a W.C. Nabors Company, 134
NLRB 1078, fn. 3 (1961); Artcraft Upholstering Company,
Inc., 228 NLRB 462 (1977).
I conclude that Respondent's motion to dismiss the
complaint should be, and it hereby is, denied.
B. Background
For some years the Union has represented employees
in certain of the restaurants operated by Merrell M. Wil-
liams.4
The most recent collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the parties extended from April 1, 1975, to March
31, 1980.
During the term of this collective-bargaining agree-
ment, a dispute arose between Respondent and the Union
as to whether or not California law permitted Respond-
ent to claim credit against the wages owed employees
for the value of meals eaten by the employees during the
4 The complaint alleges, and Respondent's answer fails to deny, it at
the restaurants in question the unit may be described as follows:
All chefs, dinner cooks, second cooks, barbecue or broiler cooks, fry
cooks, cook's assistants, pantrymen or women, bakers, waiters, wait-
resses, dishwashers, janitors, yardmen, carhops, cashier-hostesses,
busboys, busgirls, bartenders, cocktail waitresses, and bar boys.
course of their employment. The dispute led to arbitra-
tion, as well as lawsuits filed by both the Union and the
State of California against Respondent. These lawsuits
were still pending in February 1980.
In early February 1980, Respondent and the Union ex-
changed correspondence advising one another of their
intent to engage in negotiations toward a new collective-
bargaining agreement to supplant that which was about
to expire. Pursuant to this exchange of letters, as con-
firmed by telephone conversations between the attorneys
for the Union and Respondent, negotiating sessions were
scheduled for February 28 and 29, 1980.
C. The Negotiations
On February 28, 1980, the Union met to negotiate
with Respondent at the offices of Respondent's attor-
neys, Clark and Tomigal. Both Clark and Tomigal were
in attendance on behalf of Respondent. The Union was
represented by its attorney, Silver, its secretary-treasurer,
Ted Zenich, and an official of its International affiliate,
Paul Meister. Soon after the meeting's outset Clark an-
nounced that, while he and Tomigal were generally au-
thorized to negotiate and conclude an agreement with
the Union on Respondent's behalf, there were certain
items which would require the specific authorization of
Respondent. He advised the Union that he would notify
it in appropriate instances and seek additional authority if
required to reach an agreement. He assured the Union
that arrangements had been made to enable him to reach
his client by phone.
As mentioned, the parties to the negotiations had pre-
viously exchanged their proposals" for a new collective-
bargaining agreement. The Union requested that Re-
spondent make a proposal on "economics," noting its dis-
agreement with Respondent's position that such matters
be reserved for discussion until tentative agreements had
been reached on "non-economic" matters. Clark obliged,
offering a wage increase of 6 percent for a 3-year con-
tract. The parties then went through a point-by-point
review and explanation of the Union's proposals and Re-
spondent's proposals.
The meeting was adjourned after approximately 5
hours, but its participants then repaired to a bar located
in the same building, and informal conversation contin-
ued between them. One subject of such conversation was
the possibility that their chances of reaching an agree-
ment might be enhanced if the Union were to drop its
lawsuit against Respondent.6
The parties resumed their negotiations late in the fol-
lowing morning, at the same location and with the same
persons present, except for Meister. The point-by-point
discussion of proposals continued, based in part upon in-
* It is undisputed that Clark reiterated what had been set forth on Re-
spondent's written proposal, that it reserved the right to add to, delete, or
modify any proposals at any time prior to the reaching of a complete
agreement. Indeed, the Union announced similar reservations, and added
that ratification by its membership would be necessary in order to have a
collective-bargaining agreement.
I The Union's proffer of evidence concerning its reasons for agreeing,
on the following day, that its lawsuit(s) would be dismissed was rejected.
It suffices that the agreement was made, for whatever reason, and that
each party make concessions in an effort to reach total agreement.
508
MERRELL M. WILLIAMS
formation and authority Clark had been given when he
telephoned Respondent's business offices that morning,
before the beginning of the day's negotiations. 7 Each
side modified previously stated positions and, as on the
first day of negotiations, reached tentative agreements.
Sometime after a break for lunch, Silver began a recit-
al of a series of proposals which the Union deemed es-
sential to a complete accord. According to Silver he was
interrupted by Clark, who broached the possibility of
reaching a "package" agreement. Clark stated that he
could not make such a proposal unless he secured further
authorization from his client, Respondent, but went on to
say that he would be willing to contact the client if the
Union would first indicate its willingness to agree to
such a package. The Union announced its agreement,
whereupon Clark left the negotiating table to telephone
his client.
Clark again called Respondent's offices and spoke to
Hall. Once again I credit his testimony that he mistaken-
ly assumed that Hall had Williams with him, that the in-
formation conveyed to Hall was being relayed to Wil-
liams, and that Williams had knowledge of and approved
the authorizations given him by Hall. Thus, after speak-
ing to Hall for approximately one-half hour, Clark re-
turned to the bargaining table.
Upon his return Clark recapitulated the terms of Re-
spondent's package offer and advised the Union's negoti-
ators that he had authority to make such an offer. The
Union's negotiators accepted. Silver agreed to prepare
the document memorializing the collective-bargaining
agreement which had apparently been reached.8
D. The Withdrawal From Tentative Agreements
Following the conclusion of the meeting of February
29 Clark telephoned Respondent's offices. This time,
however, he spoke to Williams, rather than Hall. When
Clark told Williams of the agreements he had reached
with the Union, Williams told him that he (Clark) had no
authority to make the proposals concerning either meal
credits or cost-of-living wage increases. At that point in
their conversation it became clear to Clark that he had
been incorrect in his assumptions earlier that day that
Williams had been with Hall at the times that Clark
spoke with Hall about the negotiations and the extent of
his (Clark's) authority. Clark and Williams concluded
their conversation with the understanding that Williams
would consider his position and "get back" to Clark.
It was not until March 5, 1980, that Clark heard from
Williams. And the message was that Williams would not
abide by the agreements regarding meal credits or cost-
of-living raises.
I Clark spoke by phone with Respondent's controller, Hall. Clark testi-
fied, and I credit him in such testimony, that he mistakenly assumed that
Hall was accompanied by Merrell Williams throughout this telephone
conversation.
a As noted earlier, Silver did not, however, prepare and present the
document for signature by Respondent for another 1-1/2 years in August
1981.
Clark telephoned Silver that same evening, 9 advising
him of Williams' position.t Clark offered to resume ne-
gotiations and explained the circumstances leading to his
"embarrasment"; i.e., his assumptions regarding the
whereabouts of Hall and/or Williams.
Several days later Clark telephoned Silver again. He
offered to again explain to Silver what had happened,
even going so far as to offer to allow Silver to tape-
record their conversation. Additionally, he offered to
allow the Union to examine Respondent's books.
Instead, the Union's membership ratified the agreement
on March 17, and thereafter Silver sent Clark a letter ad-
vising that the Union expected Respondent to execute
their collective-bargaining agreement. I '
While the record is uncertain as to the exact date
when the Union took action which resulted in the dis-
missal with prejudice of its own and the State's lawsuits
against Respondent, it is crystal clear that the Union had
been informed of Respondent's repudiation well before it
took whatever actions resulted in the dismissals.
E. Conclusion
Under any view of the evidence in this case no one
can doubt that, at the least, the parties to the negotia-
tions believed that they had reached the sort of agree-
ment which the Board has characterized as "a contract
to make a contract." Summer Home for the Aged, 226
NLRB 976, 977, fn. 5 (1977), enforcement denied 599
F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1969), on record 249 NLRB 737
(1980). Certainly Respondent has made no attempt to
deny that it reached such an agreement with the Union.
Nor does Respondent's evidence even tend to dispute the
contention of the General Counsel and the Union that it
later reneged upon its agreements. Finally, there appears
to be no dispute that among those agreements were two
calling for: (a) employees to receive a meal credit of S2
per day in lieu of meals, and (b) employees to receive a
cost-of-living increase during each of the 3 years of a
proposed agreement, up to an upper limit of 8 percent
annually.
From all this I conclude that Respondent's repudiation
of its "contract to make a contract" must be held to be
violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
By all that appears, Clark was vested with authority
sufficient to satisfy the law's requirements. The Act does
not require that the person conducting the negotiations
have absolute authority to bind in each and every in-
stance, but only that the degree of authority be suffi-
ciently broad to permit negotiations to proceed without
undue delay. And, in instances such as this, where addi-
tional authority on specific subjects is sought, it suffices
s Clark made no mention of any problem with the agreement during
an intervening phone conversation with Silver, on either March 3 or 4,
1980.
10 While Clark's affidavit fails to mention the cost-of-living raises as
"sticking points" with Williams, I find that Clark's testimony at the hear-
ing was credible. In any event, Silver's own testimony was to the effect
that Clark mentioned the cost-of-living raises as an impediment to agree-
ment when he called on the evening of March 5.
" The Union, however, excuses its failure to present a document to
Respondent for execution for another 1-1/2 years by labeling any such
presentation as a futility.
509
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
if arrangements have been made to allow it to be ob-
tained with reasonable promptness.
Here Respondent's violation does not stem from any
defect in its grant of authority to Clark. It results from
its repudiation of tentative agreements explicitly and ad-
mittedly authorized by Hall, an officer of Respondent
cloaked with ostensible authority to reach agreement.
I cannot find Respondent's failure to make sure it had
clear channels of communication between itself and its
negotiator to be consistent with the duty to bargain in
good faith.
THE REMEDY
The Charging Party urges that I do more than order
that Respondent cease and desist its unlawful conduct. I
find its arguments unpersuasive, however.
As shown earlier herein, I am precluded from examin-
ing or deciding the question of whether or not a com-
plete agreement was, in fact, reached between the par-
ties. But I cannot avoid commenting that, while many
tentative agreements were obviously reached by the par-
ties, many of their exact details have never been clear to
me. Even as to the two specific proposals which are the
subject of this case I am unable to determine the exact
language in which they would have been written had no
repudiation occurred. Moreover, it seems unnecessary to
the resolution of this case that their exact language be
determined. Not only is such language subject to change
in further bargaining, but it will clearly be among the
primary subjects of litigation should a complaint be
issued in the charge now pending investigation.
Nor do I find any warrant or authority for ordering
Respondent to implement, retroactively or otherwise, the
provisions of its tentative agreements on meal credits and
cost-of-living raises.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(aXS5) and (1) of the
Act by repudiating its tentative agreements upon the sub-
jects of meal credits and cost-of-living increases in
wages.
4. Said unfair labor practices have affected and, unless
permanently restrained and enjoined, will continue to
affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 12
The Respondent, Merrell M. Williams; Boy's Restau-
rant, Inc.; Girl's Restaurant; Jumbo's d/b/a Farm Boy
Restaurant; and Farm Boy Restaurants Nos. 2 and 3,
Santa Maria, Arroyo Grande, Pismo Beach, and San
Luis Obispo, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Internation-
al Union, Local 703, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees in the unit described
below by repudiating or withdrawing from previously
accepted proposals for terms and conditions for employ-
ment. The appropriate bargaining unit consists of:
All chefs, dinner cooks, second cooks, barbecue or
broiler cooks, fry cooks, cook's assistants, pantry-
men or women, bakers, waiters, waitresses, dish-
washers, janitors, yardmen, carhops, cashier-hostess-
es, busboys, busgirls, bartenders, cocktail waitresses,
and bar boys, at Respondent's restaurants in Santa
Maria, Arroyo Grande, Pismo Beach, and San Luis
Obispo, California.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request bargain collectively and in good faith
concerning rates of pay, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment with the above-
named Union, as the exclusive representative of its em-
ployees in said unit, and embody in a signed agreement
any understanding reached.
(b) Post at its facilities referred to above, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."' 3 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 31, after being duly signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to ensure that said notices ae not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
'" All outstanding motions inconsistent with this recommended Order
are hereby denied. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by
Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations
Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
ha In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
510