William W. Mih, Complainant,v.Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 12, 2000
01992527 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 12, 2000)

01992527

04-12-2000

William W. Mih, Complainant, v. Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.


William W. Mih, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01992527

) Agency No. F-97-5052

Janet Reno, )

Attorney General, )

Department of Justice, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant filed the instant appeal from a decision dated January 13,

1999 dismissing complainant's complaint (alleging that complainant was

terminated from the agency in September 1995 on the basis of his age)

for failing to state a claim is proper pursuant to the regulation set

forth at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37656 (to be codified and hereinafter

cited as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1)).<1>

The agency found that complainant was not an employee of the agency.

The agency found that:

[Complainant was] a source of information for the FBI [Federal Bureau

of Investigation] from 1984 through 1995. [Complainant was] remunerated

solely for providing information. In March, 1992 [complainant] relocated

and [was] no longer in a position to provide information of value.

Therefore, [complainant's] payments were decreased and finally,

[complainant was] closed as a source in September, 1995. . . .

[Complainant's] status as a source indicates that the extent to which

the FBI had a right to control the means and manner of [complainant's]

performance did not rise to the level affording [complainant] the

protections of an �employee� under the ADEA. Moreover, [complainant]

did not work in FBI office space, nor did the FBI otherwise provide

[complainant] office space or equipment; [complainant] did not receive

a salary, but [was] paid in cash based on the information [complainant]

provided; [complainant was] not afforded employee benefits, including

annual leave and retirement; the FBI paid no social security taxes on

[complainant's] behalf . . .

In view of the above, [complainant does] not have standing to file a

complaint of discrimination because [complainant was] not at any time

an employee of the FBI within the meaning of the ADEA.

Complainant argues that he was an employee of the agency because the

agency controlled the means and manner of his employment.

In order to determine whether an individual is an employee under

Title VII, "the Commission will apply the common law of agency test,

considering all of the incidents of the relationship between the

[complainant] and the agency . . ." Ma and Zheng v. Department of

Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962390 and 01962389

(June 1, 1998). In Ma the Commission held that "the application of the

Spirides [Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979)]

test has not differed appreciably from an application of the common law

of agency test." Id. (citation omitted).

In Ma the Commission described the common law of agency test as follows:

In [Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, (1992)], the

Court adopted the factors listed in [Community for Creative Non-Violence

v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-752 (1989)], as part of the common-law test

for determining who qualifies as an "employee" under ERISA: the hiring

party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is

accomplished; the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities

and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship

between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign

additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's

discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment;

the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the

work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the

hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the

tax treatment of the hired party. 503 U.S. at 323-324. The Court also

referenced the Restatement (Second) of Agency �220(2)(1958) as listing

nonexhaustive criteria for identifying a master-servant relationship,

and Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 Cum. Bull. 296-299 as setting forth 20 factors

as guides in determining whether an individual qualifies as a common-law

"employee" in various tax law contexts. The Court emphasized, however,

that the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase

that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of

the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being

decisive." 503 U.S. at 324, quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. Of America,

390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).

Ma, EEOC Appeal No. 01962390.

We note that, although not dispositive of the issue, complainant referred

to himself in written correspondence as a �consultant� to the agency.

On appeal, the agency argues (citations omitted):

At the outset of his relationship with the FBI, [complainant] was told

that he was not an employee of the FBI. At no point did [complainant]

enjoy the privileges of FBI employment beyond compensation for services

rendered. [Complainant's] sole task was to provide information.

While security guidelines were imposed on the [complainant], these

guidelines were not sufficient to conclude that the FBI exercised

control over the means and the manner in which [complainant] obtained

information to present to the FBI. [Complainant] was not required to

work at set intervals of time, nor account for his hours during the day.

He was free to choose the manner in which he made contacts with subjects

he reported on. . . .

[I]t is clear that the degree of control exercised over [complainant]

was not significant enough to deem [complainant] an employee within the

meaning of the ADEA.

The Commission finds that the evidence, in the form of a statement from

an agency employee who was complainant's �contact agent� with the FBI,

supports the agency's findings. The Commission finds that under the

common law of agency test as described in Ma, complainant was not an

employee of the agency. Therefore, we find that the complaint does not

state a claim.

The agency's decision dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 12, 2000

DATE

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_____________________ _________________________ Date

Equal Employment Assistant1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations

governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process went into effect.

These regulations apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at

any stage in the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission

will apply the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999),

where applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations,

as amended, may also be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.