01A04726
03-22-2002
William J. Congleton, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.
William J. Congleton v. Department of Justice
01A04726
March 22, 2002
.
William J. Congleton,
Complainant,
v.
John Ashcroft,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A04726
Agency Nos. I-99-H026, I-99-H035, I-99-H057, I-99-H070, I-00-H002
Hearing No. 100-A0-7181X
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant filed this timely appeal with this Commission from a final
decision (FAD) by the agency, see 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.402, 1614.405,
1614.504(b), regarding the agency's determination and payment of
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to the terms of the
settlement agreement into which the parties had entered on February 22,
2000. For the following reasons, the FAD is MODIFIED, and the matter
REMANDED to the agency for processing as ordered below.
BACKGROUND
The settlement agreement at the heart of the matter provided, in pertinent
part, that:
The Agency agrees to pay reasonable attorneys fees and expenses to the
law firm [representing complainant] . . . . The firm [representing
complainant] agrees to submit an itemization of such fees and expenses
to the Agency within thirty (30) days of the date of the full execution
of this Agreement. The Agency agrees to provide its response, if any,
to this submission within thirty (30) days after its receipt of this
submission. The agency further agrees to pay all undisputed attorneys
fees and expenses within thirty (30) days of the date that the Agency's
response is due. The parties reserve the right to submit any disputes
concerning attorney's fees and/or expenses to the EEOC. . . .
On February 29, 2000, complainant's counsel (counsel) submitted a petition
for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in its representation of
complainant in the underlying complaints of discrimination. This fee
petition included a Verified Statement and Affidavit by the attorney
who handled the vast majority of the representation in the matter,
indicating his professional qualifications and experience; a summary of
all fees and expenses incurred, totaling $104,925.68; and a fourteen-page
itemized description of these fees and expenses, including the date of
each chargeable event, the attorney performing the action, a description
of the action, the time spent, the applicable hourly rate, and the total
cost incurred (time spent multiplied by hourly rate). The petition also
contained a copy of a �Laffey matrix,� indicating the appropriate hourly
rate for the representation provided.
The fee petition was received by the agency on March 6, 2000, and, on
March 31, 2000, the agency issued its first decision on the petition,
denying the request in its entirety. In its denial, the agency challenged
the hourly rate of $340.00 requested for four of the attorneys involved
in the representation, including the attorney handling the majority of
the representation, and also the lower hourly rate of $245.00 for another
attorney involved in the case.<1> The agency also denied the request
for payment for 2.25 hours expended by four attorneys other than the
attorney handling the bulk of the representation, as only that attorney
had been designated as counsel in the notice of representation previously
provided to the agency. The agency also denied the petition's request for
reimbursement of $1,071.93 in expenses, because of �lack of specificity�
in the petition. The agency further denied the 303.3 hours requested
for reimbursement by the designated representative, stating that the
amount of hours was �excessive, repetitive and redundant, and therefore
unreasonable.� The agency also stated that the hours spent each day
had been �consolidated . . . without a further breakdown,� rendering it
impossible to determine how much time was spent with complainant �and
whether such communications were necessary or frivolous.� The agency
concluded that it could not make a determination as to the reasonableness
of the petition �without more specifics.�
In a letter dated April 14, 2000, counsel, on behalf of complainant,
contacted the agency regarding the denial, responding to each point
raised by the agency. After receiving no response to this letter,
counsel sent a letter, dated May 17, 2000, to the agency's EEO Director.
In that letter, counsel alleged that the agency was in breach of
the settlement agreement, and requested that the agency specifically
implement its terms. Specifically, complainant alleged that the agency
failed to abide by paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement when it failed
to pay the reasonable attorney's fees and expenses as requested in the
fee petition, and that it also failed to pay the undisputed amount of
fees�$41,752.00�within the required time frame.
On June 21, the agency issued its second, and final, decision on
the fee petition. In its FAD, the agency approved $41,752.00 of the
requested $104,925.68. The agency denied the entire $1,071.93 requested
as compensation for expenses incurred during the representation,
including costs for faxing, photocopying, postage, and long distance
telephone charges. The FAD stated that the reason for the denial was
the failure of counsel to identify the documents faxed, copied, or sent,
or the nature of any of the listed costs. The agency also denied as
unreasonable or otherwise unavailable for payment 182.75 of the claimed
305.55 hours expended on representation. The FAD stated that 134.4
of those rejected hours were unreasonable because the fee petition was
filled with vague and obscure descriptions for the time spent, without
sufficiently identifying the purpose and necessity for the actions,
and that many of the described actions appeared to have been redundant,
excessive, or otherwise unnecessary. However, the agency provided no
explanation of how it arrived at the specific number of hours it found
to be reasonable. The agency also stated that 46.35 of the denied hours
were unavailable for payment because they were for representation provided
prior to the filing of complainant's first complaint of discrimination.
The FAD also stated that it appeared many of the hours expended were spent
preparing complainant's second through fifth complaints of discrimination,
as well as a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. The FAD
further stated that it did not contest the hourly rates requested
by counsel. The agency concluded that 122.8 hours were reasonably
expended for representational activities, and agreed to pay counsel for
that number of hours at the hourly rate of $340.00. The agency issued
a check for $41,752.00 which was received by counsel on July 13, 2000,
22 days after the FAD was issued. This appeal followed.
On appeal, complainant claims the agency is in breach of the settlement
agreement, challenging the agency's determination of the reasonable
number of hours of representation. Complainant also claims that the
agency was not in compliance with the settlement when it failed to pay
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses within 30 days of the receipt of
the fee petition, and failed to pay the uncontested fees within that same
period. Complainant further requests that we impose sanctions against
the agency for its delay in paying both reasonable fees and uncontested
fees pursuant to the settlement agreement, that we award interest on
any unpaid reasonable fees, and that we award reasonable attorney's fees
and expenses associated with counsel's settlement enforcement efforts.
The agency disagrees with counsel's contentions on appeal, and asks that
we deny counsel's requests for additional fees and expenses.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of
contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (Dec. 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(Aug. 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (Dec. 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
As stated above, paragraph 9 of the agreement explicitly provides that
the agency �agrees to pay reasonable attorneys fees and expenses� to
complainant's counsel. There has been no challenge to the integrity
or validity of the agreement itself, nor to the contractual right of
complainant's counsel to be paid for its reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses incurred during representation of complainant in the settled
matter. Nor has our review of the evidentiary record disclosed any
infirmity in the execution of the settlement agreement. Accordingly,
there is no question as to complainant's entitlement to payment of
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a).
There is also no challenge to the hourly rates requested by counsel,
or to the sufficiency of the documentation submitted in support of
the requested rates. The question before the Commission on appeal is
what are reasonable attorney's fees and expenses associated with the
representation of complainant in this matter.
Expenses
As stated above, the agency denied the entire $1,071.93 requested as
compensation for expenses incurred in the representation of complainant,
including costs for faxing, photocopying, postage, and long distance
telephone charges. The Commission has recognized that adequate
documentation of the expense incurred and the nature of the expense is
required in order to receive reimbursement of costs. Davis v. Department
of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05901213 (Mar. 1, 1991). For example,
failure to submit copies of applicable telephone bills is fatal to an
attorney's request for reimbursement of telephone toll charges. Id.
In the present case, the description for each expense item was minimally
sufficient to indicate the nature of the cost�for photocopying, long
distance, etc.�but there are no bills or other financial records to
verify the actual costs incurred for which reimbursement is requested.
Accordingly, the agency's denial of expenses in the present case was
appropriate, as counsel's failure to provide sufficient documentation
verifying the costs incurred rendered it impossible to determine whether
the requested amount for expenses is reasonable.
Attorney's fees�February 16, 1999 through March 18, 1999
The agency denied payment for the 48.35 hours<2> documented as
expended during this period of time, stating that attorney's fees are
not recoverable from the pre-complaint period prior to the agency's
being notified of the representation, with the exception of such fees
being allowed for �a reasonable period of time . . . for any services
performed in reaching a determination to represent a client.� The FAD
continued, stating that the agency believed two hours was a reasonable
time to make such a determination, and therefore awarded two hours for
this time period.
The Commission's regulations provide that agencies �are not required to
pay attorney's fees for services performed during the pre-complaint
process,� with one exception not applicable to the instant matter.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iv). Nor are agencies required to pay
attorney's fees for periods of representation prior to the agency's
being notified of such representation, with the exception of fees �for
a reasonable period of time . . . for any services performed in reaching
a determination to represent the complainant.� Id. The Commission has
previously found that an attorney may reasonably expend up to two hours
to determine whether to represent a complainant. Vincent v. Department
of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05941012 (Feb. 27, 1996). Accordingly,
we find that the agency properly denied all but two hours of the fees
claimed for the period prior to complainant's filing of his first formal
complaint on March 18, 1999.
Attorney's fees�March 23, 1999 through February 23, 2000
As discussed above, the agency found that only 122.8 of the 257.2 hours
requested for this period were reasonable, and provided no explanation
for how it arrived at this specific number of hours. In determining the
number of hours reasonably expended, the Commission recognizes that the
attorney is not required to record in great detail the manner in which
each minute of his or her time was expended. Bernard v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998) (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12 (1983)). However, the
attorney does have the burden of identifying the subject matter on which
the time was spent, which can be documented by submitting sufficiently
detailed contemporaneous time records to ensure that the time spent was
accurately recorded. Id. (citing National Association of Concerned
Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to
exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary. Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
Our review of the fee petition indicates that many of the hours expended
providing representation during this period were sufficiently documented
with contemporaneous descriptions to inform the agency of the nature and
purpose of counsel's activities, and that most of these activities were
appropriate in light of the nature of the case. We do not agree with
the agency that descriptions such as �review documents from client re:
retaliation; telephone call to client (.15 hour),� �review EEOC sex
harassment guidelines (.1 hour),� or �review memo of client re: return
to regular duties; telephone conference with client re: affidavit,
settlement; review fax from client re: service weapon (.25 hours)� were
so vague or obscure as to preclude an understanding of the nature and
purpose of the time spent.
We also disagree with the agency's determination that a number of the
representational activities engaged in were unnecessary or inappropriate.
For example, while the agency concluded that time spent on attempts
to mediate the matter was unreasonable after an agency official told
counsel that the agency was not interested in mediation, the parties
did eventually engage in mediation which, it is uncontested, helped
lead to the ultimate settlement of the matter. We cannot agree that
counsel's continued efforts to resolve the complaints in that manner
were unreasonable representational activities, or that the amount of
time so expended was unreasonable.
However, we do agree with the agency that a number of descriptions in
the petition are sufficiently vague to preclude a determination as to
whether or not the representational activities described involved pre-
or post-complaint activity. For example, some of the descriptions refer
to work on retaliation claims, and retaliation claims are present in
each of the five complaints filed by complainant, making any general
reference to �retaliation� difficult to properly attribute to pre- or
post-complaint activity. We also agree with the agency that some of the
hours, such as those expended on preparing complainant's second through
fifth complaints of discrimination and the complaint filed with the
Office of Special Counsel, were unavailable for payment. Accordingly,
we agree that a reduction of the fee amount requested in the petition
is appropriate.
We disagree, however, that the amount of reduction affected by the
agency was appropriate under the circumstances of the case. When a fee
reduction is in order based on excessive hours, it is not necessary for
the Commission to perform a detailed analysis to determine precisely
the number of hours or type of work for which no compensation is
allowed; rather, it is appropriate to reduce the hours claimed by an
across-the-board reduction. Bernard v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998) (citing Finch v. Postmaster
General, EEOC Request No. 05880051 (July 15, 1988)). The agency did
not employ an across-the-board reduction in hours, instead dividing the
entire period of representation into sections and reducing the hours
in each section by specific amounts. However, it did not provide any
detailed guidance as to how it came to those reduction amounts, and our
review reveals that the number of hours disallowed was excessive.
Therefore, after a thorough review of the fee petition at issue, as
well as the arguments of each party regarding the agency's reduction
of hours in its FAD, including arguments not specifically addressed
in this decision, we find that the agency was not in compliance with
the settlement agreement when it reduced the requested number of hours
reasonably expended on representation to 122.8. As discussed above,
many of the hours listed in the fee petition are sufficiently documented
to support a determination as to whether the time spent was reasonable,
that the nature and purpose of the so-described activities of counsel
were for the most part reasonable, and that some of the descriptions are
sufficiently vague to preclude a determination as to whether, or how many
of, the hours claimed were expended on pre- or post-complaint activity.
Accordingly, we conclude that an across-the-board reduction of 25% of
the hours requested in the fee petition for the period from March 23,
1999 through February 23, 2000 is appropriate in this case. Counsel thus
reasonably provided 192.9 hours of representation during this period.
Sanction request
Counsel requested that the agency be sanctioned for its delayed payment of
reasonable fees, delayed payment of uncontested fees, and other alleged
behavior relating to the payment of fees and costs pursuant to the
settlement agreement. We decline this request. The settlement agreement
makes clear that the agency was required to respond to the fee petition
withing 30 days of its receipt, and make payment of any uncontested fee
amounts within 30 days of the due date of it's response to the petition.
While the agency's first decision on the fee petition was timely issued
on March 31, 2000, 25 days after receiving counsel's fee petition, the
�uncontested� fee amount was not paid until July 13, 2000. This payment
was made within 30 days of the agency's second, and final, decision on the
fee petition, but the second decision was, while in response to counsel's
submission of additional information in support of the fee petition,
untimely issued on June 20, 2000. As a result, the �uncontested� fee
amount did not become uncontested until that date, well after payment
of any uncontested amounts was due under the settlement agreement.
While we disagree with the agency's decision on the reasonableness of the
requested fees, there is no indication that the agency's initial complete,
and subsequent partial, denial of fees and costs, or its ultimate payment
of the undisputed amount of attorney's fees, was delayed as a result
of bad faith or some other improper motivation. Therefore, we conclude
that the agency's conduct in this case did not warrant sanction.
Interest
Counsel also sought an award of interest on the amount of reasonable
fees not already paid by the agency. Although the Commission has held
that interest is available to compensate for the loss in the value of
money that results from a delay in payment, such an award has generally
been restricted to those situations where the Commission has authorized
a specific award of attorney's fees and the agency unduly delayed in
making the required payment. See Cole v. United States Postal Serv.,
EEOC Petition No. 04950009 (Feb. 19, 1997) (allowing interest award for
an approximate three-year delay in payment subsequent to a specific
sum being awarded). In the instant case, the amount of reasonable
fees and costs has been continuously in dispute between the agency and
complainant's attorney during the period of delay. Therefore, we do
not find that these circumstances warrant an award of interest.
Attorney's fees and costs associated with pursuit of this appeal
Counsel also requests on appeal an award of reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in its attempts to enforce the settlement agreement,
up to and including the instant appeal. The Commission has awarded
reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with the successful
enforcement of a settlement agreement. Thomas v. Smithsonian Institute,
EEOC Request No. 05970889 (Sept. 25, 2000); Allen v. Department of the
Interior, EEOC Request No. 05970352 (Aug. 11, 1999). Accordingly, we
agree that in this case counsel is entitled to an award of reasonable fees
and costs incurred in its efforts to enforce the settlement agreement.
Therefore, we remand the matter to the agency for a determination of
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred by counsel in seeking
to enforce the settlement agreement.
Conclusion
In summation, we conclude that counsel reasonably expended the following
amounts of time in representing complainant in the settled matter:
2 hours during the period prior to the filing of complainant's first
complaint on March 18, 1999, and 192.9 hours during the period from the
filing of complainant first complaint to the conclusion of the matter
on February 23, 2000. An award of attorney's fees is determined by
calculating the lodestar, i.e., by multiplying a reasonable hourly fee
times a reasonable number of hours expended, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433;
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B), and there is no challenge, by the
agency or the Commission, as to the reasonableness of the $340.00 and
$245.00 hourly rates requested by counsel. Therefore, it is the decision
of the Commission that counsel is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
as follows: $66,147.00 for 194.55 hours at the hourly rate of $340.00,
plus $85.75 for .35 hour at the hourly rate of $245.00, offset by the
earlier payment of $41,752.00, for a total amount due of $24,480.75.
Counsel is also entitled to payment by the agency of reasonable attorney's
fees and expenses incurred in seeking enforcement of the settlement
agreement, to be paid by the agency in addition to the amount listed
above. The agency's June 21, 2000 decision on counsel's fee petition
is MODIFIED, and the matter REMANDED to the agency as ordered below.
ORDER (C0900)
The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:
The agency shall pay to complainant's counsel for reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in the representation of complainant up to and including
the execution of their settlement agreement the sum of $24,480.75,
as described above.
Complainant's counsel shall submit to the agency a verified statement
of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred in attempting to
gain the agency's compliance with paragraph 9 of the February 22, 2000
settlement agreement, including fees incurred in the prosecution of
this appeal. Counsel shall submit this statement within thirty (30)
days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process
the claim for attorney's fees and expenses as detailed below in the
statement entitled �Attorney's Fees.�
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled �Implementation of the Commission's
Decision.� The report shall include supporting documentation verifying
that the corrective action has been implemented.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by
the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to
the agency�not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office
of Federal Operations�within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision
becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's
fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
�Right to File A Civil Action.� 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0900)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion
of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion
of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after
one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your
complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until
such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.
If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,
identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
�Agency� or �department� means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
(�Right to File A Civil Action�).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 22, 2002
Date
1 The petition indicates that, of the five
attorneys involved in counsel's firm's representation of complainant, for
a total of 305.55 hours of representation, the attorney who handled the
majority of the representation was responsible for 303.3 of those hours,
with the other four responsible for a cumulative total of 2.25 hours.
Of that 2.25 hours, 0.35 hours were billed at the $245.00 hourly rate,
and the rest at the $340.00 hourly rate.
2 The FAD incorrectly tabulated the hours claimed for this period
as 48.15.