01970567
10-14-1999
William Hilton v. United States Postal Service
01970567
October 14, 1999
William Hilton, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01970567
v. ) Agency No. 1D-209-1001-96
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Appellant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning his
complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq,
Accordingly, the appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960,
as amended.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether appellant has proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that agency officials discriminated against him on the
bases of race (White), religion (non-Mason), and reprisal (prior EEO
activity and union grievance) when he was sent to a work area that was
isolated and away from his bid area.
BACKGROUND
Appellant, a Mailhandler, alleged his manager (Manager) discriminated
against him on December 1, 1995, by sending him to an isolated work
area away from his bid area based on appellant's race (white), his
non-affiliation with the Masons, and reprisal. Appellant testified he
filed EEO complaints on October 19, and 22, 1995, and December 2, 1995,
and filed a union grievance over a prior move from his bid area which
was resolved October 13, 1995. The resolution provided that appellant
would be permanently moved back to his bid area. Appellant testified he
was the only White re-wrap Mailhandler moved and that his manager told
him he was moved because of a grievance filed by the union regarding
clerks crossing crafts.
Appellant stated that certain managers were members of the Masons and that
these managers gave preferential treatment to other members. Appellant
stated that he believed his immediate supervisor (Supervisor), a Mason,
was involved in the decision to move him, and that if appellant was a
Mason, he would not have been moved. Appellant stated that his religious
beliefs (unspecified) forbid his membership in that organization.
The Manager stated that he was not aware of either appellant's prior
EEO activity or the grievance resolution until it was brought to his
attention by a union shop steward. The Manager said he then immediately
moved appellant back to his bid area. He admitted telling appellant he
moved him because of a union-filed grievance regarding clerks crossing
crafts. The Manager said "nixie" work is clerk work whereas appellant
is a Mailhandler assigned to re-wrap duties.<1> The Manager stated he
is not a Mason.
Appellant's Supervisor, a Mason, stated he was not involved in the
decision to move appellant. He stated he was aware of appellant's past
EEO activity but said he did not take reprisal action against him.
The agency issued a final decision finding no discrimination. The agency
stated that because appellant failed to cite any religious beliefs he
did not have a bone fide religious belief and therefore could not have
informed the agency of any need for accommodation. The agency stated
that, assuming arguendo, the Manager stated legitimate reasons for his
actions which appellant failed to prove were a pretext for discrimination,
The agency stated that the record evidence revealed that appellant
had not engaged in any EEO activity prior to the date of the alleged
discriminatory action, and therefore dismissed appellant's allegations
of reprisal for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Appellant's complaint presents the issue of whether the agency subjected
him to disparate treatment on the bases of race, religion and prior
protected activity. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
provides an analytical framework for proving employment discrimination
in cases in which disparate treatment is alleged. First, appellant must
establish a prima facie case by presenting enough evidence to raise
an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. The
agency may rebut appellant's prima facie case by articulating legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, and if the agency does so,
appellant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's
reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Id.
The Commission notes that the McDonnell Douglas analysis need not be
adhered to in all cases. Where the agency has established legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision, the trier of fact
may dispense with the prima facie inquiry and proceed to the ultimate
stage of the analysis, that is, whether the complainant has proven by a
preponderance of evidence that the agency's explanations were a pretext
for actions motivated by prohibited discriminatory animus. See United
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
The Commission finds that the agency articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for moving appellant. His duties at the "nixie"
desk were inconsistent with his position as a re-wrap Mailhandler.
We find that appellant failed to show that the stated reason was a
pretext for prohibited discrimination based on religion.<2>
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an
allegation of reprisal, appellant must show: 1) that he engaged in
protected activity, e.g., participated in a Title VII proceeding; 2)
that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the protected
activity; 3) that he was disadvantaged by an action of the agency
contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and 4)
that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for
Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass), affirmed,
545 F. 2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F. 2d
80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burrus v. United telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc.,
683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
Appellant engaged in protected activity just prior to the alleged
discriminatory act when he filed EEO complaints in October 1995, and
filed a grievance regarding his first move. There is no evidence that
appellant's Manager was aware of that activity or that appellant was
moved as a result. Although appellant's immediate Supervisor was aware
of his EEO complaints, the Supervisor was not involved in the decision
to move him.
Assuming arguendo, the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action, that is, appellant's work assignment. The manager
explained that appellant, a re-wrap mailhandler, was performing clerk
duties at the "nixie" desk. Appellant has failed to show that the stated
reasons were pretextual. Thus, the Commission finds that the agency did
not discriminate against petitioner with regard to the December 1, 1995,
move.
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Oct. 14, 1999
_________________________ ___________________________
DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director
1 Appellant was working on the "nixie" desk when the manager moved him.
2 The agency erroneously analyzed appellant's allegation of religious
discrimination as an allegation of denial of religious accommodation.
Appellant did not claim the agency failed to accommodate his religious
views. He claimed his religion precluded his membership in an
organization many agency managers belonged to, and that those managers
favored other member-employees with preferential treatment.