William Hilton, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 14, 1999
01970567 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 14, 1999)

01970567

10-14-1999

William Hilton, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency


William Hilton v. United States Postal Service

01970567

October 14, 1999

William Hilton, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01970567

v. ) Agency No. 1D-209-1001-96

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning his

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq,

Accordingly, the appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960,

as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether appellant has proven by a preponderance

of the evidence that agency officials discriminated against him on the

bases of race (White), religion (non-Mason), and reprisal (prior EEO

activity and union grievance) when he was sent to a work area that was

isolated and away from his bid area.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, a Mailhandler, alleged his manager (Manager) discriminated

against him on December 1, 1995, by sending him to an isolated work

area away from his bid area based on appellant's race (white), his

non-affiliation with the Masons, and reprisal. Appellant testified he

filed EEO complaints on October 19, and 22, 1995, and December 2, 1995,

and filed a union grievance over a prior move from his bid area which

was resolved October 13, 1995. The resolution provided that appellant

would be permanently moved back to his bid area. Appellant testified he

was the only White re-wrap Mailhandler moved and that his manager told

him he was moved because of a grievance filed by the union regarding

clerks crossing crafts.

Appellant stated that certain managers were members of the Masons and that

these managers gave preferential treatment to other members. Appellant

stated that he believed his immediate supervisor (Supervisor), a Mason,

was involved in the decision to move him, and that if appellant was a

Mason, he would not have been moved. Appellant stated that his religious

beliefs (unspecified) forbid his membership in that organization.

The Manager stated that he was not aware of either appellant's prior

EEO activity or the grievance resolution until it was brought to his

attention by a union shop steward. The Manager said he then immediately

moved appellant back to his bid area. He admitted telling appellant he

moved him because of a union-filed grievance regarding clerks crossing

crafts. The Manager said "nixie" work is clerk work whereas appellant

is a Mailhandler assigned to re-wrap duties.<1> The Manager stated he

is not a Mason.

Appellant's Supervisor, a Mason, stated he was not involved in the

decision to move appellant. He stated he was aware of appellant's past

EEO activity but said he did not take reprisal action against him.

The agency issued a final decision finding no discrimination. The agency

stated that because appellant failed to cite any religious beliefs he

did not have a bone fide religious belief and therefore could not have

informed the agency of any need for accommodation. The agency stated

that, assuming arguendo, the Manager stated legitimate reasons for his

actions which appellant failed to prove were a pretext for discrimination,

The agency stated that the record evidence revealed that appellant

had not engaged in any EEO activity prior to the date of the alleged

discriminatory action, and therefore dismissed appellant's allegations

of reprisal for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Appellant's complaint presents the issue of whether the agency subjected

him to disparate treatment on the bases of race, religion and prior

protected activity. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

provides an analytical framework for proving employment discrimination

in cases in which disparate treatment is alleged. First, appellant must

establish a prima facie case by presenting enough evidence to raise

an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. The

agency may rebut appellant's prima facie case by articulating legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, and if the agency does so,

appellant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's

reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Id.

The Commission notes that the McDonnell Douglas analysis need not be

adhered to in all cases. Where the agency has established legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision, the trier of fact

may dispense with the prima facie inquiry and proceed to the ultimate

stage of the analysis, that is, whether the complainant has proven by a

preponderance of evidence that the agency's explanations were a pretext

for actions motivated by prohibited discriminatory animus. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).

The Commission finds that the agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for moving appellant. His duties at the "nixie"

desk were inconsistent with his position as a re-wrap Mailhandler.

We find that appellant failed to show that the stated reason was a

pretext for prohibited discrimination based on religion.<2>

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an

allegation of reprisal, appellant must show: 1) that he engaged in

protected activity, e.g., participated in a Title VII proceeding; 2)

that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the protected

activity; 3) that he was disadvantaged by an action of the agency

contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and 4)

that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass), affirmed,

545 F. 2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F. 2d

80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burrus v. United telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc.,

683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).

Appellant engaged in protected activity just prior to the alleged

discriminatory act when he filed EEO complaints in October 1995, and

filed a grievance regarding his first move. There is no evidence that

appellant's Manager was aware of that activity or that appellant was

moved as a result. Although appellant's immediate Supervisor was aware

of his EEO complaints, the Supervisor was not involved in the decision

to move him.

Assuming arguendo, the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its action, that is, appellant's work assignment. The manager

explained that appellant, a re-wrap mailhandler, was performing clerk

duties at the "nixie" desk. Appellant has failed to show that the stated

reasons were pretextual. Thus, the Commission finds that the agency did

not discriminate against petitioner with regard to the December 1, 1995,

move.

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 14, 1999

_________________________ ___________________________

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

1 Appellant was working on the "nixie" desk when the manager moved him.

2 The agency erroneously analyzed appellant's allegation of religious

discrimination as an allegation of denial of religious accommodation.

Appellant did not claim the agency failed to accommodate his religious

views. He claimed his religion precluded his membership in an

organization many agency managers belonged to, and that those managers

favored other member-employees with preferential treatment.