01a54477
11-08-2005
William H. Hill, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
William H. Hill v. United States Postal Service
01A54477
November 8, 2005
.
William H. Hill,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A54477
Agency No. 1K-206-0061-04
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning his formal EEO complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a Custodian, PS-2,
at the agency's Southern Maryland Processing and Distribution Center
in Capitol Heights, Maryland. Complainant filed a formal complaint
on September 7, 2004, claiming that he was discriminated against on the
bases of sex (male) and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:
(1) beginning on July 26, 2004, he was no longer utilized as an Acting
Supervisor (204-B); and
(2) beginning July 24, 2004, he was not utilized as a Mailhandler.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of
his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge
or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When
complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29
C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.
In its FAD, the agency found no discrimination. The agency found that
complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex and reprisal
discrimination. Further, the agency concluded that although complainant
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, management
nevertheless articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons which
complainant failed to show were a pretext for discrimination.
The record reflects that from April 20, 2004 to July 26, 2004,
complainant worked as an Acting Supervisor. The record contains an
affidavit from the Manager, Maintenance Operations (Manager). Therein,
the Manager stated that beginning July 26, 2004, she decided not to use
complainant in the capacity of Acting Supervisor, Maintenance Operations
position (claim (1)). Specifically, the Manager stated that when she
was asked to assume the position of Manager, Maintenance Operations,
she was informed that she could use �whomever I felt could stabilize
the custodian operations." The Manager stated that she placed another
employee (female) in the position of Supervisor, Maintenance Operations
"because she is a very good supervisor." The Manager stated that she was
unaware of complainant's prior EEO activity. Furthermore, the Manager
stated that complainant's sex was not a factor in her determination not
to utilize him as the Acting Supervisor.
With respect to complainant's claim that on July 24, 2004, he was not
utilized as a Mailhandler, the Manager stated that to her knowledge, no
employee in the maintenance craft has ever been utilized as a Mailhandler
(claim (2)). The Manager further stated that because no manager would
authorize complainant to work as a Mailhandler, she was certain that
no one was responsible for not utilizing complainant as a Mailhandler
as of July 24, 2004. Furthermore, the Manager stated that "on July 24,
2004 and afterwards, [complainant] has worked in the capacity of a Level
2 Custodian, his position title of record."
The record also contains an affidavit from the Supervisor, Maintenance
Operations (Supervisor). Therein, the Supervisor stated that she had no
knowledge regarding the reason that complainant was no longer supervisor.
However, the Supervisor doubted �that it has anything to do with his sex
(claim (1))." The Supervisor further stated that she was not aware of
complainant's prior EEO activity. Regarding claim (2), the Supervisor
stated that because complainant is a Custodian under the Clerk craft,
he could not "cross craft" and work as a Mailhandler. Furthermore,
the Supervisor stated that she was not aware of any management officials
utilizing Custodians or other Maintenance employees in the capacity as
a Mailhandler.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that
a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to
the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the
complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder
by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of
a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third
step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether
complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
The Commission determines that the agency articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, as discussed above.
Moreover, we find that complainant has not demonstrated that the agency's
articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 8, 2005
__________________
Date