Whole Foods Market, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 24, 2015

363 NLRB No. 87 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

363 NLRB No. 87
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. and United Food
and Commercial Workers, Local 919 and Work-
ers Organizing Committee of Chicago. Cases 01–
CA–096965, 13–CA–103533, and 13–CA–103615
December 24, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND HIROZAWA
The issue in this case is whether the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining rules in
its General Information Guide (GIG) prohibiting record-
ing in the workplace without prior management approv-
al.1 We find, contrary to the judge, that the maintenance
of the recording rules is unlawful.2
A. The Rules at Issue
The GIG applies to all of the Respondent’s employees
and has been distributed to employees companywide.
The GIG contains two rules prohibiting recording in the
workplace. The first (on p. 25) appears under the sub-
heading “Team Meetings” and states:
In order to encourage open communication, free ex-
change of ideas, spontaneous and honest dialogue and
an atmosphere of trust, Whole Foods Market has
adopted the following policy concerning the audio
and/or video recording of company meetings:
It is a violation of Whole Foods Market policy to rec-
ord conversations, phone calls, images or company
meetings with any recording device (including but not
limited to a cellular telephone, PDA, digital recording
device, digital camera, etc.) unless prior approval is re-
ceived from your Store/Facility Team Leader, Regional
President, Global Vice President or a member of the
Executive Team, or unless all parties to the conversa-

1 On October 30, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Steven Davis is-
sued the attached decision. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the
exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Deci-
sion and Order.
2 The complaint alleged that 10 handbook rules were unlawful. The
parties reached a settlement with respect to nine of those rules, all ex-
cept the recording rule.
tion give their consent. Violation of this policy will re-
sult in corrective action, up to and including discharge.
Please note that while many Whole Foods Market loca-
tions may have security or surveillance cameras operat-
ing in areas where company meetings or conversations
are taking place, their purposes are to protect our cus-
tomers and Team Members and to discourage theft and
robbery.
The second rule (on p. 57) appears under the heading
“Team Member Recordings” and states:
It is a violation of Whole Foods Market policy to rec-
ord conversations with a tape recorder or other record-
ing device (including a cell phone or any electronic de-
vice) unless prior approval is received from your store
or facility leadership. The purpose of this policy is to
eliminate a chilling effect on the expression of views
that may exist when one person is concerned that his or
her conversation with another is being secretly record-
ed. This concern can inhibit spontaneous and honest
dialogue especially when sensitive or confidential mat-
ters are being discussed.
Although there was some confusion earlier in the pro-
ceedings,3 we find that both rules are before us for deci-
sion.4
B. Facts
The sole witness at the hearing was Mark Ehrnstein,
the Respondent’s global vice president for team member
services (human resources). Ehrnstein testified that he

3 At the hearing, the parties stipulated that “the rule at issue, the
‘Team Member Recordings’ rule found [on] Page 57, applies to all
Whole Foods employees in every region of the country,” and they
further “agree[d] that it’s just the first paragraph of the ‘Team Member
Recordings’ rule that’s at issue. . . .” Neither party appears to have
been aware of the discrepancy between the stipulation and the com-
plaint, which referred to the first rule but not the second. In their
posthearing briefs, both parties addressed both rules.
In his decision, the judge acknowledged the existence of both rules,
but stated that the second was “stipulated to be the rule at issue here.”
He found that rule to be lawful and said nothing about other one. In
exceptions, the General Counsel maintains that both rules were fully
briefed and contends that the judge should have ruled on both. In its
answering brief, the Respondent acknowledges the confusion and
agrees that both rules were discussed in the parties’ posthearing briefs.
The Respondent maintains that “the record clearly reflects that the
General Counsel's objection is to the concept of a no recording rule, not
the specific text of [either] rule” and that the judge’s analysis is appli-
cable to either rule.
4 In addition to the two rules, p. 53 of the GIG contains a list of “ma-
jor infractions” that may result in discharge. That list includes
“[r]ecording conversations, phone calls or company meetings with any
audio or video recording device without prior approval or consent.”
Our ruling here addresses the inclusion of recording on that list.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
drafted the GIG, which has been in effect since at least
2001. It applies to all areas of every store, including the
parking lot and the area in front of the store, and applies
to both employees and managers. The rule applies to any
electronic device that may be used to record images or
conversations. Ehrnstein testified that an employee on
worktime is precluded from recording a conversation
without prior management approval, regardless of
whether the employee is engaged in protected concerted
activity.
Ehrnstein testified that an essential part of the Re-
spondent’s “core values” and “culture” is that employees
have a voice and are free to “speak up and speak out” on
many issues, work-related or not. The Respondent,
Ehrnstein testified, has an open-door policy that encour-
ages employee input into their work lives, and the work-
ers “feel very comfortable” in voicing their opinions.
The Respondent holds a variety of meetings at which
employees have an opportunity to express their views
and opinions on various topics. For example, a “town
hall” meeting is held at least once per year at which re-
gional management leadership visit each store and meet
with the employees without store management present.
At these meetings, an “open forum” is held to discuss
work issues. Store management is later advised of the
general nature of the employees’ comments “in the ag-
gregate,” but the identities of the employees who spoke
are not disclosed. Ehrnstein testified that the recording
of these meetings would “chill the dynamic” because
workers would be reluctant to voice their opinions about
store management.
The Respondent periodically holds “store meetings” at
which employees speak about a variety of issues. “Team
meetings” are also held, at which the employees within
various departments discuss areas of mutual interest with
team leadership. In addition, at some team meetings, the
participants vote on whether to add a new employee to
the team. Ehrnstein testified that it is important that crit-
icisms voiced at those meetings not be identified as com-
ing from particular employees, in order to avoid disrup-
tion in team harmony.
Ehrnstein also testified that the Respondent’s internal
appeal process for employment termination decisions
would be adversely affected without a no-recording poli-
cy. When team members are terminated, they can re-
quest a review of the decision by a five-member panel of
their “peers.” The panel meets and reviews documents
submitted by the team member, discusses the discipline,
and votes on whether to uphold or overturn the termina-
tion. Ehrnstein testified that allowing recording would
have a detrimental effect on panel deliberations.
The Respondent also holds meetings at which employ-
ee requests for assistance from the Respondent’s Team
Member Emergency Fund are discussed. Those matters
are often confidential, involving financial need, family
death, illness, or personal crisis. Ehrnstein stated that
“open dialogue is critical to the process.”
C. Discussion
1. Applicable principles
A rule violates Section 8(a)(1) if it would reasonably
tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.5 If the rule explicitly restricts activities protected
by Section 7, it is unlawful.6 If it does not, there is no
violation unless: “(1) employees would reasonably con-
strue the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; [or] (2)
the rule was promulgated in response to union activity;
or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of
Section 7 rights.” Lutheran Heritage Village–Livonia,
supra, 343 NLRB at 647; Triple Play Sports Bar &
Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31, slip. op. at 6 (2014), enfd.
___ Fed.Appx. ___ (2d Cir. 2015). In analyzing work
rules, the Board “refrain[s] from reading particular
phrases in isolation, and . . . must not presume improper
interference with employee rights.” 343 NLRB at 646.
Any ambiguity in a rule must be construed against the
promulgator of the rule, here, the Respondent. See Lafa-
yette Park Hotel, supra, 326 NLRB at 828; Nor-
ris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992). An em-
ployer rule is unlawfully overbroad “when employees
would reasonably interpret it to encompass protected
activities.” Triple Play Sports Bar, supra, 361 NLRB
No. 31, slip op. at 7.
2. The judge’s decision
Applying the foregoing principles, the judge found that
the no-recording rule did not explicitly restrict Section 7
activity because it “does not prohibit employees from
engaging in protected, concerted activities, or speaking
about them,” and because “[m]aking recordings in the
workplace is not a protected right.” Noting that the Gen-
eral Counsel did not allege that the Respondent had
promulgated the rule in response to union activity or that
the Respondent had applied it to restrict the exercise of
employees’ Section 7 rights, the judge further found that
the rule “cannot reasonably be read as encompassing
Section 7 activity.” In so finding, the judge relied in part
on the rule’s own explanation of its purpose, the elimina-
tion of a chilling effect on the expression of views. Ac-

5 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d
52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
6 Lutheran Heritage Village–Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004).
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 3
cordingly, the judge concluded that the maintenance of
the rule did not violate Section 8(a)(1).
3. General Counsel’s exceptions
The General Counsel asserts that recording conversa-
tions in the workplace is a protected right, and he points
out that it is uncontested that the Respondent would ap-
ply and enforce the rules at issue in circumstances where
employees are engaged in Section 7 activity. According-
ly, the General Counsel argues, employees would rea-
sonably interpret the rules to prohibit their use of camer-
as or recording devices in the workplace for employees’
mutual aid and protection, “such as photographing pick-
eting, or recording evidence to be presented in adminis-
trative or judicial forums in employment related mat-
ters.”
4. Analysis
The rules at issue here prohibit the recording of con-
versations, phone calls, images or company meetings
with a camera or recording device without prior approval
by management. We find, contrary to the judge and our
dissenting colleague, that these rules would reasonably
be construed by employees to prohibit Section 7 activity.
Photography and audio or video recording in the
workplace, as well as the posting of photographs and
recordings on social media, are protected by Section 7 if
employees are acting in concert for their mutual aid and
protection and no overriding employer interest is present.
Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip
op. at 4 (2015). Such protected conduct may include, for
example, recording images of protected picketing, docu-
menting unsafe workplace equipment or hazardous work-
ing conditions, documenting and publicizing discussions
about terms and conditions of employment, documenting
inconsistent application of employer rules, or recording
evidence to preserve it for later use in administrative or
judicial forums in employment-related actions. Id.7

7 Thus, contrary to the dissent, we would not characterize recording
or photography as a solitary, nonconcerted act encompassing a “limited
scope of protected activity.” Rather, our case law illustrates a wide
array of protected uses for such devices. See White Oak Manor, 353
NLRB 795, 795 fn. 2 (2009), reaffirmed and incorporated by reference
at 355 NLRB 1280 (2010) (employee’s photographing of another em-
ployee did not cause her to lose the protection of the Act where the
photography was part of the res gestae of a concerted effort to induce
group action concerning the enforcement of a dress code), enfd. 452
Fed.Appx. 374 (4th Cir. 2011). See also Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356
NLRB No. 63 (2011) (employer unlawfully terminated employee for
secretly recording a meeting with his supervisor where employer did
not previously have a policy in place that prohibited such activity),
enfd. 677 F.3d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Opryland Hotel, 323 NLRB 723,
723 fn. 3 (1997) (in the absence of a rule, practice, or prohibition of the
use of tape recorders, such use does not constitute misconduct suffi-
cient to defeat reinstatement after an unlawful discharge); Sullivan,
Moreover, our case law is replete with examples where
photography or recording, often covert, was an essential
element in vindicating the underlying Section 7 right.8
Our case law, therefore, supports the proposition that
photography and audio and video recording at the work-
place are protected under certain circumstances.9

Long & Hagerty, 303 NLRB 1007, 1013 (1991) (refusal to rehire em-
ployee in part because he engaged in the protected concerted activity of
carrying a tape recorder in connection with a Department of Labor
investigation into union election irregularities violated Sec. 8(a)(1),
enfd. 976 F.2d 743 (11th Cir. 1992)). Cf. Gallup Inc., 334 NLRB 366
(2001) (promulgation of a rule prohibiting tape recording was unlawful
where it was enacted by the employer in response to union organizing
efforts), enfd. mem. 62 Fed.Appx. 557 (5th Cir. 2003).
8 See, e.g., Times-Herald Record, 334 NLRB 350, 354 (2001) (sur-
reptitious audio recording of meeting at which employer unlawfully
threatened employees admissible in Board proceeding), enfd. 27
Fed.Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2001); Painting Co., 330 NLRB 1000, 1003
(2000) (covert recording supported allegation that employer unlawfully
threatened to close the company), enfd. 298 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2002);
Arrow Flint Electric Co., 321 NLRB 1208, 1219 (1996) (surreptitious
recording was admitted in support of unlawful closure threat and dis-
charge allegations); Wellstream Corp., 313 NLRB 698, 711 (1994)
(surreptitious recording admissible in support of allegations that em-
ployer unlawfully solicited grievances and threatened employee);
McAllister Bros., 278 NLRB 601 fn. 2, 605 fn. 3 (1986) (recording of
meeting admitted to show that employer unlawfully engaged in direct
dealing), enfd. 819 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1987); Algreco Sportswear Co.,
271 NLRB 499, 505 (1984) (surreptitious recording admitted to support
allegations of unlawful threats); East Belden Corp., 239 NLRB 776,
782 (1978) (surreptitious recording of a meeting admitted to show that
employer unlawfully told employees that it did not intend to sign a
contract with the union), enfd. 634 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1980). See also
California Acrylic Industries, Inc., 322 NLRB 41 (1996) (photographs
taken by union organizer supported allegation that employer conducted
unlawful surveillance of the union agents' contacts with employees
during their lunch period), enfd. in relevant part 150 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.
1998).
9 In stating that “[w]hether a particular act of recording is protected
by Section 7 turns on the specific facts of each case,” the dissent
acknowledges that recording in the workplace constitutes protected
activity under certain circumstances. Indeed, as the dissent acknowl-
edges, any act of recording by a single employee that forms part of, or
is undertaken in furtherance of, a course of group action constitutes
concerted activity within the meaning of Sec. 7. Even in the absence of
group action, activity by one individual is deemed concerted if under-
taken in an effort to enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement or in order to initiate or induce group action. Meyers Indus-
tries II, 281 NLRB 882, 884, 887 (1986), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB,
835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984). While the
dissent seeks to portray such concerted recording activity as “unlikely”
—including by using a uniquely broad definition of “solitary” and
presenting several examples as the complete universe of such activity
—individual acts of recording have often been deemed concerted pro-
tected activity, as illustrated in cases like Hawaii Tribune-Herald and
other decisions cited above in footnote 7. In any event, we are not
making any findings as to whether particular recordings are concerted,
let alone finding that recording necessarily constitutes concerted activi-
ty. Nor are we holding that all rules regulating recording are invalid.
Rather, we find only that recording may, under certain circumstances,
constitute protected concerted activity under Sec. 7 and that rules that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
The rules at issue here unqualifiedly prohibit all work-
place recording. Although the dissent claims that em-
ployees would reasonably interpret the rules to protect,
not prohibit, Section 7 activity, the rules themselves do
not differentiate between recordings protected by Section
7 and those that are unprotected. That the rule contains
language setting forth an intention to promote open
communication and dialogue does not cure the rule of its
overbreadth. The Respondent’s witness testified that the
rules apply “regardless of the activity that the employee
is engaged in, whether protected concerted activity or
not.” Thus, the Respondent has effectively admitted that
the rules cover all recording, even that which is part of
the res gestae of protected concerted activity. In light of
the broad and unqualified language of the rules and the
Respondent’s admission as to their scope, we find that
employees would reasonably read the rules as prohibiting
recording activity that would be protected by Section 7.
See Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190,
slip op. at 5 (finding recording rules unlawful because
employees “would reasonably interpret these rules to
infringe on their protected concerted activity.”).10 Ac-

would reasonably be read by employees to prohibit protected concerted
recording violate the Act.
Similarly beside the point is the dissent’s argument that the “Re-
spondent’s rules would accommodate this scenario by permitting the
recordings if the parties to each recorded conversation gave their con-
sent.” Of course, whether employees’ recording activity is concerted
does not turn on whether they obtained the consent of all parties to the
conversation. But again, the ultimate issue presented in this case is
whether employees would reasonably read the rules to prohibit Sec. 7
activity. The reference to consent in some (but not all) of the rules
prohibiting recording makes it no less likely that employees would
view them as covering protected activity.
The dissent also asserts that the cases we cite in support of our deci-
sion implicitly contradict it, because those cases imply that employers
may lawfully maintain rules or policies regulating recording. But we
do not hold that an employer is prohibited from maintaining any rules
regulating recording in the workplace. We hold only that those rules
must be narrowly drawn, so that employees will reasonably understand
that Sec. 7 activity is not being restricted. As explained below, the
rules at issue here are impermissibly overbroad.
10 The Respondent contends that the rules are not unlawful because
they are limited to recording that takes place on working time, and do
not apply when the employee is not at work, or is on nonwork time
such as break time. We reject this argument. The rules do not differen-
tiate between recording on working and nonworking time.
We also find that the rules are unlawful because they require em-
ployees to obtain the employer’s permission before engaging in record-
ing activity on nonwork time. The Board has stated that any rule that
requires employees to secure permission from their employer as a pre-
condition to engaging in protected concerted activity on an employee’s
free time and in nonwork areas is unlawful. See Brunswick Corp., 282
NLRB 794, 795 (1987) (rule found unlawful that required employees to
obtain the employer’s permission before engaging in union solicitation
in work areas during nonworking time and required the employer’s
authorization in order to solicit in the lunchroom and lounge areas
during breaks and lunch periods); American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234
cordingly, we find that the rules would reasonably chill
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.11
The Respondent and the dissent rely on Flagstaff Med-
ical Center, 357 NLRB No. 65 (2011), enfd. in relevant
part 715 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2013), in which a Board
majority found that an employer policy that prohibited
the use of cameras for recording images in a hospital
setting did not violate the Act.12 The Flagstaff majority
found that in light of the weighty patient privacy interests
and the employer’s well-understood HIPAA obligation to
prevent the wrongful disclosure of individually identifia-
ble health information, employees would reasonably in-
terpret the rule as a legitimate means of protecting those
interests, not as a prohibition of protected activity. The
Respondent asserts that, similar to Flagstaff, its record-
ing rules are in place primarily to preserve privacy inter-
ests, including personal and medical information about
team members, comments about their performance, de-
tails about their discipline, criticism of store leadership,
and confidential business strategy and trade secrets. The
Respondent and the dissent further argue that the record-
ing rules are lawful because they contain an embedded
rationale—the encouragement of open communication—
that would lead a reasonable employee to understand
their lawful purpose.13

NLRB 1126, 1131 (1978) (finding unlawful rule requiring employees
to obtain permission before distributing union literature in nonwork
areas on nonworking time), enfd. 600 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1979). See
also Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, supra, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op.
at 4 fn. 10 (“Of course, the fact that these prohibitions are subject to
discretionary exemptions by the Respondent does not make them any
less unlawful.”).
11 Where reasonable employees are uncertain as to whether a rule
restricts activity protected under the Act, that rule can have a chilling
effect on employees’ willingness to engage in protected activity. Em-
ployees, who are dependent on the employer for their livelihood, would
reasonably take a cautious approach and refrain from engaging in Sec.
7 activity for fear of running afoul of a rule whose coverage is unclear.
See generally NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)
(“Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of
course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. . . .
And any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary
tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended
implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear.”).
12 The Flagstaff policy prohibited the use of electronic equipment,
including cameras, during work time, as well as “[t]he use of cameras
for recording images of patients and/or hospital equipment, property, or
facilities.” 357 NLRB No. 65, slip op. 4–5, 25.
13 The Respondent also argues that nonconsensual recording is un-
lawful in many of the states in which it operates. The Respondent’s
rules, however, are not limited to stores in those states; they apply
companywide. Moreover, the Respondent’s rules do not refer to those
laws and do not specify that the recording restrictions are limited to
recording that does not comply with State law.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 5
Flagstaff is plainly distinguishable. The Respondent’s
business justification is not without merit, but it is based
on relatively narrow circumstances, such as annual town
hall meetings and termination-appeal peer panels, and is
not nearly as pervasive or compelling as the patient pri-
vacy interest in Flagstaff; it thus fails to justify the rules’
unqualified restrictions on Section 7 activity.14 Accord-
ingly, we find that maintenance of the recording rules at
issue in this case would reasonably chill the employees
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.15 For these rea-
sons, we conclude that the rules are overbroad and vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Substitute the following for the judge’s Conclusion
of Law 3.
“3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by maintaining rules in its General Information Guide
that prohibit recording without prior management ap-
proval.”
2. Add the following as Conclusion of Law 4.
“4. The unfair labor practice affects commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.”
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, we shall order the Respondent to rescind the
unlawful rules.16 Pursuant to Guardsmark, LLC, 344
NLRB 809, 812 fn. 8 (2005), enfd. in part 475 F.3d 369
(D.C. Cir. 2007), the Respondent may comply with our
order of rescission by rescinding the unlawful provisions
and republishing its General Information Guide without
the unlawful rules. We recognize, however, as we did in
Guardsmark, that republishing the handbook could be
costly. Accordingly, the Respondent may supply the

14 The dissent also relies on cases holding that it is unlawful for any
party to insist to impasse on recordings of collective-bargaining or
grievance meetings. This argument is unpersuasive. Again, we do not
disagree with the dissent’s assertion that employers may have valid
policy reasons for instituting a recording rule. And, as stated above, we
do not hold that employers are forbidden from maintaining narrowly
drawn restrictions on recording. Thus, we are not, as the dissent sug-
gests, finding the Respondent in violation of the Act “regardless of
what it does.” Rather, we find the rules at issue here to be unlawful
because they would reasonably be read to prohibit all recording, includ-
ing that which we would find to be protected under the Act.
15 Chairman Pearce adheres to his dissent in Flagstaff and would
find the rules at issue here unlawful because they constitute an absolute
prohibition on all recordings that employees would reasonably construe
to include protected recordings. 357 NLRB slip op. at 13. However,
for the reasons set forth above, Chairman Pearce agrees that Flagstaff is
distinguishable.
16 Our Order requiring the rescission of the unlawful rules encom-
passes the reference to recording in the major infraction list on p. 53, in
addition to the recording rules on pp. 25 and 57.
employees either with inserts to the General Information
Guide stating that the unlawful rules have been rescind-
ed, or with a new and lawfully worded rule on adhesive
backing that will correct or cover the unlawfully broad
rules, until it republishes the handbook without the un-
lawful provisions. Any copies of the handbook that in-
clude the unlawful rules must include the inserts before
being distributed to employees. See, e.g., Triple Play
Sports Bar & Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31, slip. op. at 8.
We shall also order a companywide notice posting be-
cause the unlawful rules are in effect at the Respondent’s
other stores in addition to the stores at issue in this case.
“[W]e have consistently held that, where an employer’s
overbroad rule is maintained as a companywide policy,
we will generally order the employer to post an appropri-
ate notice at all of its facilities where the unlawful policy
has been or is in effect.” Guardsmark, LLC, supra, 344
NLRB at 812. See, e.g., Laurus Technical Institute, 360
NLRB No. 133, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2014). Accordingly,
because the rules found unlawful in this case applied at
the Respondent’s locations companywide, we shall pro-
vide for posting of a remedial notice at all of the Re-
spondent’s locations where the General Information
Guide containing the unlawful rules is in effect.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., Cheshire,
Connecticut and Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining rules in its General Information Guide
that prohibit the recording of conversations, phone calls,
images, or company meetings with any recording device
without prior management approval.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Revise or rescind the recording rules on pages 25
and 57 and the references to recording as a “major infrac-
tion” on page 53 of the General Information Guide and
advise employees in writing that it has done so and that
the unlawful rules will no longer be enforced.
(b) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the
current General Information Guide that (1) advise that
the unlawful recording rules have been rescinded, or (2)
provide the language of a lawful policy; or publish and
distribute to all current employees a revised General In-
formation Guide that (1) does not contain the unlawful
rules, or (2) provides the language of a lawful policy.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facilities in Cheshire, Connecticut, and Chicago, Illi-
nois, and at all its facilities companywide where its Gen-
eral Information Guide is in effect, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”17 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Directors for Regions 1
and 13, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since January 23, 2013.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Regions, file
with the Regional Directors for Regions 1 and 13 a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form
provided by the Regions attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 24, 2015
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting.
My colleagues find that Respondent’s no-recording
rules unlawfully interfere with, restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of rights protected under Section
7 of the Act. I respectfully disagree because the rules

17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
obviously are intended to encourage all communications,
including communications protected by Section 7.1
Two nearly identical rules are at issue here. One pro-
vides that employees may not “record conversations,
phone calls, images or company meetings with any re-
cording device . . . unless prior approval is received from
your Store/Facility Team Leader, Regional President,
Global Vice President or a member of the Executive
Team, or unless all parties to the conversation give their
consent.” The other states that employees may not “rec-
ord conversations with a tape recorder or other recording
device . . . unless prior approval is received from your
store or facility leadership.” Both rules contain an ex-
planation of their purpose—“to encourage open commu-
nication, free exchange of ideas, spontaneous and honest
dialogue and an atmosphere of trust,” and “to eliminate a
chilling effect on the expression of views that may exist
when one person is concerned that his or her conversa-
tion with another is being secretly recorded. This con-
cern can inhibit spontaneous and honest dialogue espe-
cially when sensitive or confidential matters are being
discussed” (emphasis added).
Not only are these no-recording rules aimed at foster-
ing collective activity and free expression, the same ra-
tionale has been fully embraced by the Board in a line of
cases making it unlawful for any party to insist to im-
passe on a recording or verbatim transcription of collec-
tive-bargaining negotiations or grievance meetings.
Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 NLRB 770, 773 fn. 9 (1978)
(“[M]any experts in the field of labor relations have ex-
pressed their opinion that the presence of a reporter dur-
ing contract negotiations has a tendency to inhibit the
free and open discussion necessary for conducting suc-
cessful collective bargaining.”), enfd. 639 F.2d 652 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 452 U.S. 961 (1981); Pennsylva-
nia Telephone Guild (Bell Telephone), 277 NLRB 501,
501–502 (1985) (insisting on recordings in grievance
meetings “may have a tendency to inhibit free and open
discussions”).
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s finding that
Respondent’s no-recording rules violate Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Unlike my colleagues, I would affirm the
judge’s decision to dismiss the complaint.

1 Sec. 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) gives
employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” and it
also gives employees “the right to refrain from any or all of such activi-
ties,” subject to an exception, not at issue here, relating to union-
security agreements.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 7
Discussion
The sole question presented here is whether Respond-
ent’s no-recording rules “reasonably tend[] to chill em-
ployees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”2 I be-
lieve they do not. The judge found, and it is undisputed,
that the rules do not expressly restrict Section 7 activity,
were not promulgated in response to Section 7 activity,
and have not been applied to restrict the exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights.3 And I agree with the judge that employees
would not reasonably interpret the rules to prohibit Sec-
tion 7 activity.4
To the contrary, as noted above, I believe employees
would reasonably read the rules to safeguard their right
to engage in union-related and other protected conversa-
tions. The rules themselves state their purpose: “to en-
courage open communication, free exchange of ideas,
spontaneous and honest dialogue and an atmosphere of
trust” and “to eliminate a chilling effect on the expres-
sion of views . . . especially when sensitive or confiden-
tial matters are being discussed.” The rules are no less
solicitous of open, free, spontaneous and honest conver-
sations about union representation or group action for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection than of other subjects
of conversation. And if employees want to record a con-
versation, they may do so upon mutual consent.
I believe it strains credulity to find that an employee
could reasonably interpret the no-recording rules to pro-
hibit Section 7 activity. But even if such an interpreta-
tion might occur, this is not sufficient to establish a viola-
tion under Lutheran Heritage Village. Rather, the Board
stated in Lutheran Heritage Village that where a work-

2 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d
52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
3 Cf. Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, slip op. at 1 (2011)
(finding rule prohibiting employees from making secret audio record-
ings of conversations unlawful because rule was promulgated in re-
sponse to protected activity), enfd. 677 F.3d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Gallup, Inc., 334 NLRB 366, 366 (2001) (finding rule prohibiting audio
or videotaping at work unlawful because it was promulgated immedi-
ately after the employer discovered the union’s organizing efforts),
enfd. mem. 62 Fed.Appx. 557 (5th Cir. 2003).
4 See Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646-647
(2004). I have previously expressed my disagreement with the first
prong of the Lutheran Heritage standard, under which a workplace rule
is deemed unlawful where the rule was neither promulgated in response
to nor applied to restrict Sec. 7 activity, if “employees would reasona-
bly construe the language [of the rule] to prohibit Section 7 activity,”
without regard to an employer’s legitimate reasons unrelated to the
NLRA for maintaining the rule. See, e.g., Lily Transportation Corp.,
362 NLRB No. 54, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2015); Conagra Foods, Inc., 361
NLRB No. 113, slip op. at 8 fn. 2 (2014); Triple Play Sports Bar &
Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31, slip op. at 10 fn. 3 (2014), enfd. mem. sub
nom. Three D, LLC v. NLRB, No. 14–3284, 2015 WL 6161477 (2d Cir.
Oct. 21, 2015). I would reexamine the Lutheran Heritage standard in
an appropriate future case. I agree with the judge, however, that the
rules at issue here are lawful under the Lutheran Heritage standard.
place rule does not refer to Section 7 activity, the Board
“[would] not conclude that a reasonable employee would
read the rule to apply to such activity simply because the
rule could be interpreted that way.” 343 NLRB at 647
(emphasis in original).5 In my view, a reasonable em-
ployee would understand that the Respondent’s purpose
in maintaining these rules is to promote open, free, spon-
taneous and honest dialogue—including dialogue pro-
tected by Section 7—not to prohibit Section 7 activity.
This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of
the Respondent’s legitimate and substantial reasons for
maintaining these rules, a consideration that our prece-
dent instructs us to factor into the determination of how
employees would reasonably interpret a disputed rule.6
According to Mark Ehrnstein, the Respondent’s global
vice president for team member services, those reasons
are embedded in the Respondent’s culture, one in which
employees are encouraged to “speak up and speak out”
and in which they participate to a remarkable degree in
discussions concerning sensitive or confidential matters.

5 Despite the Board’s clear rejection of the view that a rule is unlaw-
ful where it is merely possible that employees could read the rule to
restrict Sec. 7 activity, my colleagues’ recitation of applicable law
includes the statement that “[a]ny ambiguity in a rule must be construed
against the promulgator of the rule.” The word ambiguous means
“capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways.”
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ambiguous. Thus, a rule
is ambiguous if it could be read to prohibit Sec. 7 activity, among other
possible interpretations, regardless whether employees reasonably
would read it that way. Under Lutheran Heritage Village, however,
mere ambiguity is not enough to deem a rule unlawful.
6 See Flagstaff Medical Center, 357 NLRB No. 65, slip op. at 5
(2011), petition for review granted in part and denied in part 715 F.3d
928 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In Flagstaff Medical Center, the Board found
lawful a rule prohibiting taking photographs of patients or hospital
property. In so finding, the Board emphasized the “weighty” privacy
interests of the hospital’s patients and the hospital’s “significant interest
in preventing the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health
information, including by unauthorized photography.” 357 NLRB No.
65, slip op. at 5. Taking those interests into consideration, the Board
found that “[e]mployees would reasonably interpret FMC’s rule as a
legitimate means of protecting the privacy of patients and their hospital
surroundings, not as a prohibition of protected activity.” Id. My col-
leagues cite Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190 (2015),
where a panel majority struck down rules banning the use of cameras,
camera phones, audio visual recording equipment and other recording
devices. There, the majority relied on the fact that the employer did not
expressly “tie[] [the rules] to any particularized interest, such as the
privacy of its patrons.” Id., slip op. at 4. Here, by contrast, the Re-
spondent did expressly tie the rules at issue here to stated legitimate
interests. I did not participate in Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, but I
agree with former Member Johnson that reasonable employees in that
case would have understood the obvious reasons for the Hotel and
Casino’s camera-related rules without having them spelled out in ex-
press terms and would have “reasonably interpret[ed] [the rules] as a
legitimate means of safeguarding guest privacy and the integrity of the
Respondent’s gaming operations, not as prohibitions of protected activ-
ity.” 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 5 fn. 12.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
For example, employees meet to discuss requests for
assistance from the Respondent’s team member emer-
gency fund. Such requests often involve private matters,
such as a family member’s illness or death or a personal
crisis of the requesting employee. At “team meetings,”
employees may air criticisms of another employee pre-
liminary to voting whether to add him or her to the team.
Employees would most likely refrain from stating their
views candidly if they were being recorded. At “store
meetings,” confidential matters are discussed, including
real estate strategies, price competitiveness, competition
with new stores, and sales information. At “town hall”
meetings, regional managers visiting a Whole Foods
store meet with employees outside the presence of the
store’s managers to “get[] the pulse of the store.”
Ehrnstein testified that at some town hall meetings he has
attended, employees spoke critically of store manage-
ment. The judge found, and I agree, that “regional man-
agement leadership has an important interest in hearing
from employees any difficulty they had with store man-
agement,” and that employees “would certainly be inhib-
ited if [they] believed that their remarks were recorded”
at meetings where “candor and forthrightness in employ-
ee opinion was essential.” At still other meetings, five-
member “peer” panels convene to review employment
termination decisions. The panel members review rele-
vant documents, deliberate, and vote to uphold or over-
turn the discharge. The importance of protecting the
confidentiality of what is said and done at such meetings
cannot be overstated. Thus, based on their own experi-
ence of the Respondent’s participatory culture, employ-
ees would understand that the purpose of the rules stated
in the rules themselves—“to encourage open communi-
cation, free exchange of ideas, spontaneous and honest
dialogue and an atmosphere of trust” and “to eliminate a
chilling effect on the expression of views . . . especially
when sensitive or confidential matters are being dis-
cussed”—is indeed their real purpose, and they would
reasonably interpret the rules as a legitimate means of
serving that purpose, not as a prohibition of Section 7
activity. See Flagstaff Medical Center, supra.7
The Board can hardly disagree with the reasons that
prompted the Respondent to adopt its no-recording rules.
As noted above, precisely the same reasons have
prompted the Board to apply a similar restriction against

7 My colleagues distinguish Flagstaff Medical Center on the basis
that the Respondent’s business justification for the rules at issue here is
“not nearly as pervasive or compelling as the patient privacy interest in
Flagstaff.” However, saying as much does not explain why the Re-
spondent’s employees would reasonably interpret as prohibiting Sec-
tion 7 activity rules that clearly explain their express purpose of en-
couraging freedom of expression.
recordings and verbatim transcriptions in cases involving
collective-bargaining negotiations and grievance meet-
ings. The Board has held it is unlawful for any party to
insist to impasse on recordings or verbatim transcripts of
collective bargaining or grievance meetings, specifically
because the use of recordings or transcripts would cause
“adverse effects on the bargaining process.” Pennsylva-
nia Telephone Guild (Bell Telephone), 277 NLRB at
501–502; see also Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 NLRB at 773
fn. 9.8
As I have said previously, it is not reasonable to “find
a party in violation of the Act regardless of what it does.”
Arc Bridges, 362 NLRB No. 56, slip op. at 6–7 (2015)
(Member Miscimarra, dissenting). The rationale under-
lying Pennsylvania Telephone Guild and Bartlett-Collins
suggests the Respondent might have engaged in unlawful
interference with protected concerted activity if it re-
quired recordings or transcripts of all conversations,
phone calls or company meetings. Yet, even though Re-
spondent’s no-recording rules have the salutary purpose
of encouraging free expression, my colleagues find that
the Respondent, by prohibiting recordings, likewise en-
gages in unlawful interference with protected concerted
activity.
That employees would not reasonably read the rules to
prohibit Section 7 activity is all the more apparent when
one considers the limited scope of protected activity po-
tentially covered by the rules. Whether a particular act of
recording is protected by Section 7 turns on the specific
facts of each case, and making visual and/or audio re-
cordings is often a solitary activity, not a concerted one.9

8 Board precedent also holds that recordings of conversations that
are part of negotiations and made without notice to a party to the con-
versation are excluded from evidence in Board proceedings. Carpenter
Sprinkler Corp., 238 NLRB 974, 975 (1978), enfd. in relevant part 605
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979). In adopting this rule, the Board relied on the
very same reason the Respondent relies on here, stating that it was
“convinced that a rule permitting the introduction into evidence of
surreptitiously prepared tape recordings of negotiations would inhibit
severely the willingness of parties to express themselves freely and
would seriously impair the smooth functioning of the collective-
bargaining process.” Id. (emphasis added).
9 By “solitary” recording activity, I mean an individual’s recording
activity that is unconnected to group action. Such a recording, under
well-established principles, would not involve “concerted” activity,
which means making the recording—or prohibiting it—would not
implicate the Act’s requirements. It is true that, in some circumstances,
the action of a single individual employee may constitute “concerted
activity,” but the individual action is “concerted” only if it is linked to
group action in some way. For example, when an individual employee
asserts a right grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement, his or her
conduct is deemed concerted on the basis that it is an extension of the
concerted action that produced the agreement. See NLRB v. City Dis-
posal Systems Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). No right grounded in a col-
lective-bargaining agreement could be asserted through the making of a
recording here; the Respondent’s employees are not represented by a
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 9
And within the subset of recordings made by two or
more employees (or by one employee as a part of or in
furtherance of some group action), only those made for
the purpose of mutual aid or protection—as opposed, for
example, to the purpose of posting the recording on so-
cial media to entertain one’s Facebook “friends”—would
come within the protection of the Act.10
Most of the cases my colleagues cite in support of their
decision not only do not support it, they implicitly con-
tradict it.11 And in Flagstaff Medical Center, supra, 357

union. In addition, an employee engages in concerted activity when he
or she brings “truly group complaints to the attention of management.”
Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB 882, 887 (1986) (Meyers II), affd. sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487
U.S. 1205 (1988). In the instant case, it is possible that an employee
may wish to bring group complaints to management’s attention by
recording his or her coworkers’ statements and then giving the record-
ing to a manager. Even if such an unlikely case arises, however, the
Respondent’s rules would accommodate this scenario by permitting the
recordings if the parties to each recorded conversation gave their con-
sent. Finally, an employee also engages in concerted activity when he
or she seeks “to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action,”
Meyers II, supra, but such activity necessarily involves at least two
individuals, a speaker and a listener, id. (citing Root-Carlin, Inc., 92
NLRB 1313, 1314 (1951); Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964)). The making of a recording does not neces-
sarily involve this type of “concerted” activity, nor does the record
include any evidence that such activity occurred in the instant case.
10 Note that the Respondent’s employees are at liberty to record any-
thing said in the workplace by writing it down. Only electronic record-
ings are prohibited. See Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d
317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Section 7 of the Act protects organizational
rights—including the right to oppose the union’s campaign—rather
than particular means by which employees may seek to communi-
cate.”).
11 In White Oak Manor, 353 NLRB 795 (2009), reaffirmed and in-
corporated by reference at 355 NLRB No. 211 (2010), the Board found
that an employee who engaged in protected concerted activity “by
seeking to initiate or induce group action among the [r]espondent’s
employees in an effort to compel the [r]espondent to fairly enforce its
dress code” did not lose the Act’s protection by photographing a
coworker and showing the photo to other employees. 353 NLRB at
795 fn. 2. In so finding, the Board relied in part on the respondent’s
failure “to establish that it disseminated, prior to [the employee’s] dis-
charge, a rule prohibiting employees from taking photographs of other
employees without their permission.” Id. (emphasis added). Far from
supporting the majority’s decision, White Oak Manor implies that a no-
photographing rule would have been lawful.
So does Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63 (2011), where
the employer discharged employee Smith for tape recording an inter-
view Smith believed could result in his discipline. Similar to White
Oak Manor, the Board found that Smith did not lose the Act’s protec-
tion by tape recording the meeting “where the [r]espondent had no rule
barring such recording and where it was not unlawful [under state
law].” Id., slip op. at 1 (emphasis added). The Board did find the
employer violated the Act by “promulgating and maintaining a rule
prohibiting employees from making secret audio recordings of conver-
sations,” but only on the basis that the rule was promulgated “in re-
sponse to protected activity.” Id. (emphasis added).
Again, in Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 303 NLRB 1007 (1991), in
which the Board adopted the decision of the administrative law judge,
NLRB No. 65, the Board adopted the decision of the
administrative law judge, who stated that “the specific
right to take photos in the workplace would not reasona-
bly seem to come to mind as an inherent component of
the more generalized fundamental rights of employees
set forth in Section 7 of the Act.” Id., slip op at 25–26.
For the reasons I have set forth, I believe the majority’s
decision fails to withstand scrutiny. Employees would
reasonably interpret the Respondent’s rules to protect
Section 7 activity, not to prohibit it.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 24, 2015
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection

the judge found the employer violated the Act when it refused to rehire
former employee Blazer in part because Blazer had carried a tape re-
corder on the jobsite, where the employer failed to show that such
activity “violated any of [its] valid policies.” Id. at 1013 (emphasis
added).
Finally, in Opryland Hotel, 323 NLRB 723 (1997), the Board re-
quired the employer to offer employee Garramone reinstatement and
pay him backpay despite its discovery, through after-acquired evidence,
that he had secretly tape-recorded conversations with supervisors. Id.
at 723 fn. 3, 732. In so ordering, the Board reasoned that the employer
had failed to establish that making the tape recordings “would have
resulted in a lawful discharge,” which it could have done by showing it
had a “rule, prohibition, or practice against employees using or pos-
sessing tape recorders at work.” Id. at 723 fn. 3 (emphasis added).
Again, the clear implication is that such a rule or prohibition would
have been lawful. (Even absent a rule prohibiting tape recording,
Chairman Gould would have denied Garramone backpay from the time
the employer became aware of the tape recording. In his view, “it is
not consistent with the policies of the Act or public policy generally to
reward . . . parties who engage in such conduct.” Id.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules in our General Infor-
mation Guide that prohibit the recording of conversa-
tions, phone calls, images, or company meetings with
any recording device without prior management approv-
al.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL revise or rescind the recording rules on pages
25 and 57 and the references to recording as a “major
infraction” on page 53 of the General Information Guide
and WE WILL advise employees in writing that we have
done so and that the unlawful rules will no longer be
enforced.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Gen-
eral Information Guide that (1) advise that the unlawful
recording rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide the
language of a lawful policy; or WE WILL publish and dis-
tribute to all current employees a revised General Infor-
mation Guide that (1) does not contain the unlawful
rules, or (2) provides the language of a lawful policy.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/01–CA–096965 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Rick Concepcion, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
Kathleen M. McKenna, Esq. (Proskauer Rose LLP), of New
York, New York, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon a
charge filed by United Food and Commercial Workers, Local
919 (UFCW), and based on charges and amended charges filed
by the Workers Organizing Committee of Chicago (WOCC), a
complaint was issued against Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Re-
spondent or Employer)1 on July 25, 2013.2
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a rule prohibiting the record-
ing of conversations with a recording device.
The Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of
the complaint, and on August 13, a hearing was held before me
in Hartford, Connecticut. On the entire record, including my
observation of the demeanor of the sole witness, Marc
Ehrnstein, and after considering the briefs filed by counsel for
the Acting General Counsel, Respondent, and WOCC, I make
the following3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
The Respondent, a corporation having its offices and places
of business in Cheshire, Connecticut, and in Chicago, Illinois,
has been engaged in the retail sale and distribution of food.
During the past year, the Respondent derived gross revenues in
excess of $500,000, and also sold and shipped from its facilities
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located
outside the States of Connecticut and Illinois. The Respondent
admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The
Respondent also admits, and I find that the UFCW and the
WOCC are labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
1. The Employer’s organizational hierarchy
Operationally, the Employer is divided into 12 regions in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, within which
it operates 351 stores and employs 76,000 workers. The offic-
ers at the highest level of the Respondent include two chief
executive officers, executive vice presidents, and 13 global vice
presidents for various functional areas. Regional managers are
responsible for the various food departments.
Each of the 12 regions are autonomous in certain respects.
Each region is run by a regional president, regional vice presi-
dent, regional managers for each department, and leadership
personnel. At the store level, management includes the store
team leader and the associate team leader, both of whom are
responsible for the operation of the store, department team
leaders who are responsible for their department, and the em-
ployees, who are called team members.
Mark Ehrnstein, the global vice president for team member
services (human resources), stated that the Respondent is essen-

1 The R. Br. states that its correct name is Whole Foods Market
Group, Inc.
2 All dates hereafter are in 2013. A charge was filed by UFCW in
Case 01–CA–096965 on January 23. Charges were filed by WOCC in
Cases 13–CA–103533 and 13–CA–103615 on April 23, and were
amended on June 21.
3 Hereafter, the counsel for the Acting General Counsel shall be re-
ferred to as the General Counsel.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 11
tially decentralized, with each region’s management personnel
being responsible for that region’s stores.
2. The rule
The rule at issue is set forth in the Respondent’s general in-
formation guide (GIG), a comprehensive handbook which con-
tains the Employer’s mission, and information concerning em-
ployment and human resources policy.4 The GIG is dissemi-
nated to all of the Respondent’s employees who are required to
follow the rules contained therein, including the rule at issue,
which applies to all of the Employer’s employees in every re-
gion of the United States.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s rule prohibiting
the recording of conversations by employees violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. The rule, set forth on page 57 of the GIG,
states as follows:
Team Member Recordings
It is a violation of Whole Foods Market policy to rec-
ord conversations with a tape recorder or other recording
device (including a cell phone or any electronic device)
unless prior approval is received from your store or facility
leadership. The purpose of this policy is to eliminate a
chilling effect to the expression of views that may exist
when one person is concerned that his or her conversation
with another is being secretly recorded. This concern can
inhibit spontaneous and honest dialogue especially when
sensitive or confidential matters are being discussed.
Violation of this policy will result in corrective action
up to and including discharge.
3. The scope and application of the rule
Ehrnstein defined the parameters of the rule. The rule itself
is silent as to these matters. Ehrnstein stated that the rule ap-
plies when an employee is on worktime, defined as when he is
being paid for work. It applies to all areas of the store includ-
ing the parking lot and the area in front of the store.
The rule does not apply when the employee is not at work, or
is on nonworktime such as his breaktime. It should be noted
that certain rules set forth in the GIG specifically permit em-
ployees to engage in certain activities while on their breaktime.
For example, employees may make personal phone calls and
also sleep on their breaktime but may not engage in either ac-
tivity while on worktime. The rule at issue is silent concerning
the employee’s ability to record conversations on breaktime,
but they are permitted to do so, according to Ehrnstein.
The rule applies equally to all levels of management and to
all employees, prohibiting the recording by an employee of any
conversation with another employee or with management per-
sonnel. The rule also prohibits the recording of any conversa-
tion by management with other management personnel or em-
ployees.
Ehrnstein testified that regardless of the activity that the em-
ployee is engaged in, whether protected concerted activity or

4 The allegedly offensive rule set forth in complaint par. 8(i) and on
p. 25 of the GIG differs from the rule stipulated to be the rule at issue
here and which was litigated and briefed. That rule, set forth on p. 57
of the GIG, is set forth herein. It is that rule upon which this decision is
based.
not, if the employee is on worktime he is precluded from re-
cording a conversation without prior management approval. He
stated further that an employee’s recording of picketing in front
of the store would be a violation of the rule.
The rule applies to all devices which may record conversa-
tions including a tape recorder, cell phone, any electronic de-
vice, and tablet. The purpose of the rule is to prevent the re-
cording of a voice.
4. The reasons for the rule
Ehrnstein, who drafted the GIG, met with the executive di-
rector of team member services and trained him regarding the
meaning of the GIG and its application. The executive director
and his team then explained it to the employees in their region.
The rule, which prohibits the recording of conversations with
a recording device, is currently in effect and has been in effect
since at least 2001. As set forth in the rule, “the purpose of this
policy is to eliminate a chilling effect to the expression of views
that may exist when one person is concerned that his or her
conversation with another is being secretly recorded. This
concern can inhibit spontaneous and honest dialogue especially
when sensitive or confidential matters are being discussed.”
Ehrnstein testified that an essential part of the Respondent’s
“core values” and “culture” is that employees have a voice and
are free to “speak up and speak out” on many issues, work re-
lated or not. The Employer has an open-door policy which
encourages employee input into their work lives, and the work-
ers “feel very comfortable” in voicing their opinions.
That policy is set forth in the GIG, immediately before the
rule at issue, where it is stated:
In order to encourage open communication, free ex-
change of ideas, spontaneous and honest dialogue and an
atmosphere of trust, Whole Foods Market has adopted the
following policy concerning the audio and/or video re-
cording of company meetings.
Please note that while many Whole Foods Market lo-
cations may have security or surveillance cameras operat-
ing in areas where company meetings or conversations are
taking place, their purposes are to protect our customers
and Team Members and to discourage theft and robbery.
Meetings are held with the workers at which they have an
opportunity to express their views and opinions on various
topics.
For example, a “town hall” meeting is held at least once per
year in which regional management leadership including the
regional president and vice president visit each store and meet
with store employees without store management being present.
At such meetings, an “open forum” is held where work issues
are discussed. At those meetings, regional leadership “gets the
pulse of the store” and learns what is going on in the store,
including issues the employees may have with the store man-
agement and its leadership. Ehrnstein stated that at certain
town hall meetings he attended, employees spoke critically of
store management. For example, employees complained that
team leaders or managers did not follow the Employer’s poli-
cies, a deli manager used products that did not meet the Em-
ployer’s strict quality standards, and managers were not submit-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
ting job reviews on time.
Ehrnstein explained that such a meeting promotes an “out
front open dialogue” with the workers, and the absence of store
management encourages a free exchange with the employees.
He stated that store management’s presence at such meetings
could “chill” the conversation.
Ehrnstein stated that the recording of such a meeting would
“absolutely chill the dynamic” of the meeting. He believed that
workers would be reluctant to voice their opinions about store
management, would feel “inhibited” in doing so if they knew
that their comments were being recorded, and would fear that
store management would hear their remarks. Store manage-
ment is advised of the general nature of the comments of the
workers “in the aggregate,” but the identities of the employees
who spoke are not given.
Another type of meeting is the “store meeting” at which the
store’s employees and store leadership convene periodically.
At such meetings, employees speak about various issues, and
“keep [the Employer] on track,” ensuring that the Respondent
does “what we say we’re going to do.” Matters discussed in-
clude real estate strategies, price competitiveness, competition
with new stores including pricing and produce strategy, and
sales and comparable sales information.
“Team meetings” are also held in which the employees of
the various departments, such as meat and grocery, discuss
areas of mutual interest with team leadership. After a new
worker had been employed for 30 to 90 days, that person’s
team votes, at a team meeting, whether he should be included in
the team. At the meeting, during which the nominee is absent,
the team members frankly discuss that person’s qualifications
to join the team.
Ehrnstein stated that such a meeting is designed to “promote
team harmony” in that the success of the team is the primary
factor. That success is measured, in part, on the ability of the
team to be more productive than the amount budgeted for their
work, for which it receives additional income. Accordingly,
the team is involved in the evaluation of the nominee for the
purpose of ensuring that the candidate is someone who will
work efficiently and productively, and contribute to its success.
If the nominee is declined membership, he could be moved to
another team. Ehrnstein testified that it is important that criti-
cisms voiced at the meeting not be identified as coming from a
particular employee since team harmony would be disrupted.
Rather, comments made at the meeting are conveyed to the
nominee “in the aggregate” without identifying the commenta-
tor.
The Respondent’s Team Member Emergency Fund enables
employees to contribute to a fund which supports a fellow em-
ployee who has a financial need, suffered a death in the family,
or has an illness or personal crisis. An employee’s request for
financial assistance is considered by a team member awareness
group which reviews the request, discusses the matter, and
decides whether to award the funds requested. Ehrnstein stated
that the matters discussed at the awareness group meeting in-
volve personal details of the employee making the request.
Ehrnstein stated that as to each of these meetings, feedback
and “open dialogue is critical to the process.”
Analysis and Discussion
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s rule prohibiting
the recording of conversations with a recording device violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In determining whether a rule or policy violates the Act, it is
necessary to balance the employer's right to implement rules of
conduct in order to maintain discipline with the right of em-
ployees to engage in Section 7 activity. Relco Locomotives,
358 NLRB No. 32, slip op. at 15 (2012).
The Board’s standard in evaluating work rules is set forth in
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646
(2004):
The Board has held that an employer violates section
8(a)(1) when it maintains a work rule that reasonably tends
to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In de-
termining whether a challenged rule is unlawful the Board
must, however, give the rule a reasonable reading. It must
refrain from reading particular phrases in isolation and it
must not presume improper interference with employee
rights. Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry into
whether the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful
begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly restricts
activities protected by Section 7. If it does, we will find
the rule unlawful.
If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected
by Section 7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of
one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the
rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section
7 rights.
A threshold question, therefore, is whether the rule explicitly
restricts activities protected by Section 7. The General Counsel
argues that the rule is facially overbroad. I do not agree. Mak-
ing recordings in the workplace is not a protected right, but is
subject to an employer’s unquestioned right to make lawful
rules regulating employee conduct in its workplace.
I have found no cases, and none have been cited, in which
the Board has found that making recordings of conversations in
the workplace is a protected right. In two cases in which re-
cordings were made, the Board carefully limited its holdings
concerning employees who made recordings, stating that the
employers involved had no rule prohibiting the making of such
recordings. Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63, slip
op. at 1 (2011); Opryland Hotel, 323 NLRB 723, 723 fn. 3
(1997).
Even if recording a conversation is a protected right, the Re-
spondent is entitled to make a valid rule, such as the one in
question here, to regulate its workplace, and in doing so, pro-
hibit such activity. Komatsu America Corp., 342 NLRB 649,
650 (2004); Akal Security, Inc., 354 NLRB 122, 124 (2009).
The rule does not prohibit employees from engaging in pro-
tected, concerted activities, or speaking about them. It does not
expressly mention any Section 7 activity. The only activity the
rule forbids is recording conversations or activities with a re-
cording device. Thus, an employee is free to speak to other
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 13
employees and engage in protected, concerted activities in
those conversations. “The rule . . . in no way precludes em-
ployees from conferring . . . with respect to matters directly
pertaining to the employees’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment.” Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB at 826.
There has been no showing that the rule was promulgated in
response to union activity or that it has been applied to restrict
the exercise of Section 7 rights. “In addition, the Respondent
has not by other actions led employees to believe that the rule
prohibits Section 7 activity. Thus there is no evidence that the
Respondent has enforced the rule against employees for engag-
ing in such activity, that the Respondent promulgated the rule
in response to union or protected activity, or even that the Re-
spondent exhibited antiunion animus. See Lafayette Park, 326
NLRB 826, relying in part on the absence of such evidence to
find that a rule of conduct did not violate Section 8(a)(1).”
Tradesmen International, 338 NLRB 460, 461 (2002). Accord-
ingly, the only basis on which to find the rule unlawful is if
employees would reasonably construe its language to prohibit
Section 7 activity.
The General Counsel alleges that the rule could reasonably
be interpreted by employees to prevent them from recording
statements or conversations that involve activities permitted by
Section 7 of the Act. He further argues that the rule is invalid
because it prohibits recording of instances where employees are
actually engaged in protected, concerted activities such as pick-
eting outside the store. The General Counsel and WWOC also
argue that the rule would “reasonably be interpreted by em-
ployees as precluding them from using social media to com-
municate and share information regarding working conditions
through pictures and videos obtained at the workplace, such as
employees working without proper safety equipment or in haz-
ardous conditions.”
I do not agree. “Section 7 of the Act protects organizational
rights . . . rather than particular means by which employees
may seek to communicate.” Guardian Industries Corp. v.
NLRB , 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995), cited in Register
Guard, 351 NLRB 1110, 1115 (2007).
The General Counsel argues that the rule broadly prohibits
recordings in the workplace, but does not state, as Ehrnstein
testified, that employees are permitted to make recordings dur-
ing nonworktime. According to the General Counsel, employ-
ees may thus presume that they are not permitted to make re-
cordings during nonworktime. I disagree. This is not a case
involving solicitation of employees which may lawfully take
place during the employee’s nonworktime. This case involves
the validity of the Respondent’s rule, the question being wheth-
er employees would reasonably construe the rule to prohibit
Section 7 activity.
The General Counsel asserts that the rule prevents the em-
ployee from recording conversations related to protected activi-
ties including allegedly unlawful statements made by supervi-
sor, and “recording evidence to be presented in administrative
or judicial forums in employment related matters.” I agree, but
the employee may present his contemporaneous, verbatim,
written record of his conversation with the other party, and his
own testimony concerning employment-related matters. Only
electronic recordings of conversations is prohibited.
The General Counsel also argues that the rule is contradicted
by the Respondent’s maintenance of surveillance cameras in
the same areas as its meetings. I do not believe that the pres-
ence of such cameras renders the rule unlawful. The GIG care-
fully advises employees that the presence of such cameras is for
the purpose of protecting customers and employees and to dis-
courage theft and robbery and therefore reassures them of its
legitimate business practice in maintaining those cameras.
The plain language of the rule leads to the conclusion that it
“cannot reasonably be read as encompassing Section 7 activity
and that employees would not reasonably fear that the Re-
spondent would use this rule to punish them for engaging in
protected activity.” Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB
287, 289 (1999). There is no basis for a finding that a reasona-
ble employee would interpret this rule as prohibiting Section 7
activity. As the Board stated in Lutheran Heritage, above, “we
will not conclude that a reasonable employee would read the
rule to apply to [Section 7 activity], simply because the rule
could be interpreted that way.” (Emphasis in original.)
The rule itself clearly explains its purpose—“to eliminate a
chilling effect to the expression of views that may exist when
one person is concerned that his or her conversation with an-
other is being secretly recorded, and that recordation may in-
hibit spontaneous and honest dialogue especially when sensi-
tive or confidential matters are being discussed.” That explana-
tion is a clear, logical, and legitimate description of the reason
for the rule.
The prohibition of recording conversations is embedded in a
context, above, that clearly states the rule’s lawful purpose.
Target Corp., 359 NLRB No. 103, slip op. at 3 fn. 8 (2013).
Thus, based on that embedded explanation, a reasonable em-
ployee would infer that the Respondent’s purpose in maintain-
ing the rule is, as set forth in the GIG, “to encourage open
communication, free exchange of ideas, spontaneous and hon-
est dialogue and an atmosphere of trust.”
Similar to the rules at issue in Lafayette Park and its proge-
ny, the Respondent’s rule addresses legitimate business con-
cerns. The rule is reasonably addressed to protecting the Re-
spondent’s legitimate business interests. As expressly made
clear within the rule and the paragraph immediately preceding
it, the purpose of the rule is to promote the open discussion of
matters of store business, and to encourage employees to pre-
sent their honest and frank opinions concerning company mat-
ters.
Thus, Ehrnstein credibly presented valid reasons for the rule
and cited examples of company meetings where candor and
forthrightness in employee opinions was essential. Thus, at the
town meetings, regional management leadership has an im-
portant interest in hearing from employees any difficulty they
had with store management. Employee comments would cer-
tainly be inhibited if employees believed that their remarks
were recorded and possibly replayed for store management. It
is clear that the use of recording devices would impede free and
open discussion among the members of the Employer’s work
force. Similar evidence was received concerning the im-
portance of frankness and honesty at store meetings where con-
fidential sales information was being discussed and where can-
didates for inclusion in teams was voted upon. In addition,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
matters pondered at team member emergency fund meetings
involve highly private matters relating to employees’ personal
circumstances.
At each of the above meetings, it would be expected that
employees would be restrained in their comments if they knew
that they were being recorded.
In Flagstaff Medical Center, 357 NLRB No. 65 (2011), the
Board found no violation in the employer’s prohibition of the
use of electronic equipment during worktime for recording
images of patients and/or hospital equipment, property, or facil-
ities. The Board held that the privacy interests of hospital pa-
tients are “weighty,” and the employer had a significant interest
in preventing the wrongful disclosure of individually identifia-
ble health information, including by unauthorized photography.
The Board held that employees would reasonably interpret the
rule as a legitimate means of protecting the privacy of patients
and their hospital surroundings, not as a prohibition of protect-
ed activity.
I find and conclude that the rule does not reasonably tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, or that
an employee would reasonably construe the language to prohib-
it Section 7 activity. I accordingly find and conclude that the
Respondent has not violated the Act by maintaining its rule
prohibiting the recording of conversations with a recording
device.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Whole Foods Market, Inc., is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 919, and
Workers Organizing Committee of Chicago are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not violated the Act as alleged in the
complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 30, 2013

5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.