White Motor Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1955

111 N.L.R.B. 1272 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

1272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Cisco Constiuction Company, a partnership , is engaged in, and during all
times material herein was engaged in, commerce within the meaning of Section 2
( 6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondents named in the complaint herein are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that Respondents have engaged in, and are
engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
and (B ) of the Act have not been sustained.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTO-
MOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA , CIO . Case No . 10-CA-194. March 31, 1955
Decision and Order
On October 20, 1954, Trial Examiner James A. Corcoran issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding
that the Respondent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of
the Act and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Re-
sponded had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor prac-
tices, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in respect
to these allegations. Thereafter, exceptions were duly filed by the
Charging Union and the General Counsel, but not by the Respondent.
Briefs were filed by the Union and the General Counsel; and a reply
brief was filed by the Respondent, pursuant to special leave.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations.
Order
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, White Motor
Company, Atlanta, Georgia, and its officers, agents, representatives,
successors , and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in International Union, United Au-
tomobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
111 NLRB No. 204.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1273
CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discrimi-
natorily demoting any of its employees in work classification or rate
of pay, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of its employees or any term or condition
thereof.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Make whole Laurence Goodrich for any loss of pay suffered
by reason of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth
in the portion of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social-security payment records, timecards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at each plant and place of business in Atlanta, Georgia,
copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report and marked
"Appendix." 1 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by a
representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty
(60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges
that the Respondent engaged in any other unfair labor practices, be
and it hereby is dismissed.
MEMBER MURDOCK, concurring in part and dissenting in part :
I agree with my colleagues that Goodrich was discriminatorily
demoted on February 1, 1954, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and
(1) of the Act. I cannot, however, agree with them that the Respond-
ent's violations of the Act as alleged in the complaint ended there, and
that Goodrich's subsequent discharge was not also discriminatory.
i The notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner" in the caption thereof the words "A Decision and Order ." In the event
that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be sub-
stituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a De-
cree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
1274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Trial Examiner found, and the majority has accepted his con-
clusions, that, although Goodrich was demoted on February 1 for
soliciting union membership, his discharge on March 26 was not mo-
tivated by his union activities. The Trial Examiner's conclusions
with respect to the discharge appear to be based on the fact that there
was no evidence that from the date of his demotion to his discharge
that Goodrich "actively further participated in Union activity" and
that he was "apparently" not a shop union official or on the bargain-
ing committee. As further reason, the Trial Examiner states there
• as no evidence that the Respondent evinced a continuing union
animus directed toward Goodrich, as there was no evidence that Re-
spondent "in any way harassed, oversupervised, or made matters dif-
ficult for Goodrich, or had displayed any attitude of resentment that
indicated it was simply biding time for an overt act of some kind to
be used as a pretext." Thus the Trial Examiner seems to find that
the General Counsel has failed to prove discrimination, because he has
made no showing that the Respondent continued to have a union
animus against Goodrich after discriminatorily demoting him. This
sort of reasoning would seem to presuppose that the discriminatory
demotion of Goodrich had in some miraculous manner immediately
operated to purge the Respondent of its discriminatory animosity
toward Goodrich. It also overlooks the fact that the Respondent's
discriminatory demotion continued to be operative; Goodrich had not
been restored to his prior position. I cannot accept such reasoning.
I would find that Goodrich's discharge was motivated by his pre-
vious union activity. Goodrich had been employed by the Respond-
ent for more than 10 years. He had been promoted to his job about 8
years before, and had received no complaints about his work, but to
the contrary had been praised by his foremen on several occasions.
On February 1, 1954, he was discriminatorily demoted for having
solicited another employee for union membership, and the Trial Ex-
aminer so found. This demotion and the reasons therefor were
announced to the employees. Then when collective-bargaining meet-
ings were going on between the Respondent and the Union, without
warning of any sort and without any indication to Goodrich of any
deficiency in his work, the Respondent because of a trivial incident,
discharged the employee who less than 2 months before had been de-
moted for his union activity.
Under these circumstances, in my opinion, the General Counsel has
made a prima facie case of discrimination, and it devolves upon the
Respondent to meet it by assuming the burden of going forward to
show reasonably and convincingly, that the employee was discharged
for cause. This, I submit, it has failed to do. The Respondent would
have us believe that it fired this employee with 10 years of service,
satisfactory until the Respondent learned of his union activity,
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1275
because he attempted to correct a slipping belt by depositing upon it
a "pinch" of dust picked up in his forefingers. According to Hicks,
the service manager, ". . . it was the significance of the thing .. .
that was so absurd for a man of experience to do with certain valuable
precision machines nearby." Hicks, himself, admitted that putting
the dust on the belt did not damage the belt, and the record is devoid
of any evidence that the other machines were affected in any way by
this "pinch" of dust. To the contrary the record indicates that the
Respondent has not heretofore been concerned with the problem of
dust in the plant, e. g., the machinery nearby had no dustguards, the
operation of the drill press itself creates a metallic dust, and the doors
and windows of the plant are customarily left open when the weather
permits. To me the Respondent's alleged reason for the discharge is
a transparent pretext, and the reasonable inference from the evidence,
as credited by the Trial Examiner, is that Goodrich's union activity
was actually the motivating reason for the discharge.
I likewise cannot agree with other findings of no-violation by the
Trial Examiner.
On March 29 and 30, petitions were circulated to indicate that the
employees were satisfied with working conditions and did not want
the Union to represent them. Archer, Respondent's manager, had
been told on March 29 by a supervisor that a petition was being cir-
culated. On March 30 the petitions were given to Archer who had
the employees present them to Hicks.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent knew of, and con-
doned, the circulation of the petitions and the solicitation of employees
on working time to sign them. He, however, concluded that there was
no unfair labor practice, because there was no nonsolicitation rule in
existence. It is true that the Trial Examiner found that Goodrich
had not violated a no-solicitation rule because there was no such rule
when Goodrich spoke to White. However, when Hicks called the em-
ployees together on February 1 to tell them of Goodrich's demotion
for union solicitation such a rule was then announced. Hicks "told
the assembled workers that the Respondent was not going to tolerate
any whispering campaign, work stoppage, conversation at work time
or delays. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] It thus appears that when
the petitions were circulated on March 29 and 30, there was a no-solici-
tation rule in effect.
Although there is considerable testimony to the effect that Hicks'
promulgation of the no-solicitation rule, coupled as it was with the
announcement that Goodrich was being demoted because he had so-
licited for union membership, applied only to union solicitation, it is
unnecessary for me to reach that conclusion. For, in any event, when
signatures to the petition were solicited on March 29 and 30, there was
a no-solicitation rule in effect, and the Respondent's condonation of
1276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the circulation of the petitions constituted an unfair labor practice;
I would so find.
The Union's contract proposal contained a provision concerning
military service. This provision was identical with the Company's
policy which was applicable to all the Company's branches. Hicks
agreed to abide by the policy but refused to put it into a contract. I
would find that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act
by refusing to include its own policy on military service into the con-
tract albeit agreeing to abide by it. (See Heinz Company v.
N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 514; Gagnon Plating and Manufacturing Com-
pany, 97 NLRB 104.)
I am also disposed to find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the allegation of general bad
faith in bargaining. I do not think it would be worthwhile to go into
an extended discussion of that question in this opinion, however, par-
ticularly in view of the fact that, as I have pointed out in the pre-
ceding paragraph, there is already one clear violation of Section
8 (a) (5).
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and amended charges filed by the International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 00 (here-
inafter referred to as the Union), the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (hereinafter referred to as General Counsel and the Board, respectively),
on April 29, 1954, issued a complaint against White Motor Company (hereinafter
referred to as the Respondent),' alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the charges,
complaint, and notices of hearing thereon were served upon all the parties.
With respect to unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance that
although the Union was duly certified on November 23, 1953, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all production and maintenance employees at the Atlanta plant, the
Respondent from on or about December 29, 1953, and continuing to April 5, 1954,
and thereafter, has refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union;
has engaged in conduct in derogation of the duty to bargain collectively by granting
unilateral wage increases on or about January 10-11, 1954, refusing to discuss indi-
vidual grievances with the Union on February 10, 1954, refusing to make any counter-
proposals in relation to proposals in the agreements submitted by the Union, engag-
ing in a course of conduct during bargaining meetings in the period December 22,
1953, to March 30, 1954, which was calculated to avoid reaching any agreement,
and refusing to meet with the Union on and after March 30, 1954; that the Re-
spondent on February 1, 1954, demoted Laurence Goodrich with a reduction in rate
of pay and hours of payment and on March 29, 1954, discharged the said Goodrich,
in each instance because of his membership in and activity on behalf of the Union;
that the Respondent instigated an antiunion petition circulated in the shop by an
alleged foreman and another worker in violation of an alleged rule of Respondent,
and condoned the circulation and solicitation of employees in the plant in working
hours in connection with it, and commended the persons circulating it for their
activities.
1 Only the Atlanta branch plant is directly involved herein.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1277
In an answer, signed and sworn to under date of May 12, 1954, by E. F. Hicks,
service manager (Atlanta branch), the Respondent admitted certain allegations of
the complaint, but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices as alleged.2
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Atlanta, Georgia, on June 8-11, 1954,
inclusive, before James A. Corcoran, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the
Chief Trial Examiner. All parties were represented at the hearing and were afforded
full opportunity to be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. A motion
by General Counsel made at conclusion of the hearing, with concurrence of Re-
spondent, to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof with respect to matters
of form not affecting matters of substance, was granted. The parties waived
presentation of oral argument after conclusion of presenting of the evidence. An
opportunity was afforded for the filing of briefs, and/or proposed findings of fact
or conclusions of law, or both .3
A brief was filed by the Respondent, which has been read and considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is and at all times material herein has been an Ohio corporation
with its principal office and place of business at Cleveland, Ohio, with integral parts
of its operations , branch offices, or plants in almost all the States of the United
States, including the branch directly involved herein at Atlanta, Georgia. The
Respondent is engaged in the manufacturing , selling, and repairing of automotive
trucks, and at the Atlanta branch plant in servicing , repairing , and selling new and
used automotive trucks, and building bodies for such trucks. The complaint did
not set forth any figures of amount of inflow or outflow of goods in connection
with the manufacturing and selling process, and no testimony was presented thereon
at the hearing, as the Respondent conceded it was engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the law and so stipulated on the record. In view of absence from the
record of such information relative to the amount of interstate commerce of the
Respondent, and the subsequent revision by the Board of the standards affecting
Board jurisdiction, a written stipulation of the parties was filed with the Trial Exam-
iner on August 30, 1954, stating that the Respondent in the course and conduct of
its business operations in 1953 had a total outflow of goods into interstate com-
merce from the entire operations of the Respondent valued at more than $500,000,4
I find that the Respondent has been and is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization admitting to membership em-
ployees of the Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Laurence Goodrich
1. The demotion of February 1, 1954
Up to approximately February 1, 1954, Goodrich was employed as a "road tester"
at a rate of $1.77 per hour, with a guaranteed 55-hour a week basis of payment.
His classification was then changed to line mechanic with reduction to pay rate of
2 The answer inadvertently admitted the assigned reason for the discharging of Goodrich
of having placed sand, dust, or abrasive substance on a belt and pulley, was a pretext; at
the hearing, on application and motion of Respondent and with consent of General Counsel,
the answer was verbally amended to deny such allegations of paragraph numbered 15 of
the complaint.
S The time for filing of briefs was twice extended by the Chief Trial Examiner ; on joint
application of General Counsel and Respondent to July 19, 1954, and on further applica-
tion by the Respondent to August 13, 1954.
4 Upon application of the General Counsel, the Trial Examiner has received and con-
sidered the stipulation in regard to the Board jurisdiction of the Respondent as a multi-
state enterprise, and directs that it be admitted to and incorporated in the record herein
as Trial Examiner's Exhibit No. 1.
1278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
$1.57 per hour, without hour guarantee, and with payment only for actual hours
worked. Goodrich had been employed by Respondent for over 10 years, and had
been engaged about 8 years as such inspector-tester. In such position his duties
were to analyze customers' cars coming in for repairs to find nature of any trouble
and work required, sometimes writing up customer repair jobs (worksheet), testing
completed jobs, and to make minor corrections and adjustments, if necessary, to
get jobs completed and back to customers. He claimed he had been told by foremen
on several occasions that his work was satisfactory and excellently done and that
he had not received any complaint relative to it.
While in line to punch out his time clock card, just prior to the quitting time whis-
tle, Goodrich spoke to Paul White, a fellow employee, who was also on the line,5
relative to when he was coming in the Union. Goodrich states he asked White if
he ever decided on or considered joining the Union yet, to which White allegedly re-
plied that he had given it good consideration and he thought he would. Goodrich
admits he advised him he "better hurry up and get in while getting was good or
something like that." White testified that to the opening inquiry of Goodrich he
answered, "I do not know. There is plenty of time yet," and that after further talk,
Goodrich allegedly declared, "Now, Paul, if you don't get in to this Union by Mon-
day, it will be your damn ass." White assertedly answered that "I haven't got in but
there is plenty of time. This is a free country yet, don't push me." 6 White then
returned to work. White alleged that the questioning by Goodrich was in a whisper-
ing tone. It is agreed that a fellow worker, Jordan, was standing nearby. White
denies telling any of the episode at the time to either his foreman or Hicks, service
manager 7
Goodrich was summoned to a meeting in Hicks' office on February 1, 1954, White
and Jordan being there prior to his arrival. To the question of Hicks as to whether
he recalled talking to White, Goodrich gave an affirmative answer. Goodrich states
he was asked what the discussion was about, and then allegedly Hicks asked what
was the idea of discussing and talking Union in the shop during working hours,
declaring that at this time and condition of the shop "I should know better," and
stating his belief "he was afraid I was out of place in doing it," and had no right to
do so. The reply of Goodrich allegedly was to the effect that he did not think it
mattered as they were in line at the clock at quitting time, he didn't spend any time
on it, and the matter of the Union had been talked about for months among the
men. Hicks, according to Goodrich, stated he would have to make some changes,
he would have to "demote me, and told us all to come downstairs to a meeting of
the mechanics." In the above office conference, Goodrich alleges Hicks asked
White regarding the conversations, and that White stated they had comments and
were talking about joining the Union. He stated White told Hicks that Goodrich
made some threats to him without stating what they were at that time. Goodrich
testified he did not recall doing so, and told Hicks, although admitting
he also told him he did not recall making any statement or using the words as alleged,
or the "exact words that we discussed." The testimony of White supports Goodrich
in this aspect as he states Goodrich answered that he did "not remember saying
that to Paul." However, White, then declared to Hicks that Goodrich did say it,
and alleges he told Goodrich that he did say it, and "there was no use denying it."
The matter is confused also by Hicks in his testimony in which despite the above
testimony of Goodrich and White he declares that Goodrich admitted he did make
the statement in question. On the other hand, Hicks admitted he asked Jordan if
he heard Goodrich make the statement to White and Jordan said he had not.8
5 White was punching out, and having been asked to finish a job was also marking up a
new card preparatory to returning to work but this situation was apparently not known
to Goodrich
6 White also testified that Goodribh said it would be $2 50 but that if he waited for the
contract it would cost $5 He admitted never stating this before There is no other testi-
mony to such effect
Affidavit of Cork (foreman) asserts White told him of the alleged statement of Good-
rich regarding his joining or his "ass," and informed him that he had previously told
Hicks of it, but wanted also to tell Cork. Hicks in his testimony stated he did not remem-
ber where he got the information regarding the alleged conversation between Goodrich and
White, but maybe it was from White
8 Goodrich testified he did not know what was said in the questioning of Jordan and
White by Hicks, but then further declared, without recalling exact words, that Jordan
had said it was "like as said" that Goodrich approached White regarding the Union and
that he (White) thought he would join White testified he never heard Jordan say a
thing there Jordan did not testify and nothing was asserted as to his unavailability.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1279
In the following shop meeting, Hicks told the assembled workers that the Respond-
ent was not going to tolerate any whispering campaign, work stoppage, conversation
at work time, or delays, and that they were going to operate that shop and stop
it, and have peace and harmony in it, as long as he was in charge, even if it was
necessary to get other new men to operate it 9 He testified he did not recall men-
tioning the Union. He informed them that it had been reported to him that one
man, naming Goodrich, had made a threat to another To give him another chance,
he testified he was demoting him to mechanic for the threats he had made to this
other worker. Goodrich in his testimony alleged Hicks stated at such shop meeting
that his demotion was for promoting and discussing union activity, although for-
getting the exact words used. He alleged Hicks also stated there had been a lot of
talk going on in the shop and he was demoting him for union activity and, regard-
less of what anyone thought, he was still going to run the business. White in his
testimony regarding this meeting said Hicks emphasized that Goodrich had talked
to him during working hours, and that "this loafing on the job is going to be out one
way or another." He was giving Goodrich another working chance. He also stated
that Hicks in such meeting related to them what White alleged Goodrich offensively
and threateningly said to him. Hanvey, a worker present at such meeting, stated
Hicks referred to threats made about a man joining the Union, that Goodrich was
such person, and that a man in his position should not be guilty of this and would
be demoted. Couch, a worker present also, said Hicks stated he was going to
demote Goodrich for speaking to someone for not joining the Union, and that he
therefore did not think Goodrich capable of holding his job. Bagwell, another
worker, stated Hicks said Goodrich told the worker he would have to join the
Union by Monday or else. Echols, a worker and union committeeman, also present,
believed Hicks said some of the men made threats to other about joining the Union,
and that he would not stand for it, as it was a free shop and that Hicks stated he
wanted the men to work in peace and harmony. His version is that Hicks in telling
them regarding Goodrich, said he heard he told White if he did not join he might
do something with him. He further understood Hicks to say that there was to be no
more talk regarding the Union in working hours. Hicks testified further that the
demotion of Goodrich was for making threats and inefficiency, although admitting
he did not tell Goodrich of this latter claimed basis or of ever taking it up with him,
although he declared he had decided on the inefficiency several months before the
time of action. Goodrich, Echols, Couch, and Hanvey all denied any knowledge of
the asserted prior existing rule barring solicitation of any kind, talking generally in
working hours or in regard to the Union.
The testimony of Hicks enlarges the basis of his action here, relative to the con-
versations and Goodrich, to show it based on an alleged violation of a rule against
solicitation in working hours, claimed work inefficiencies of Goodrich, and the
threatening of the employment security of another employee. For reasons separately
discussed and stated in the following subdivision in this report, I find that Goodrich
did not violate any existing rule against solicitation in the plant during working
hours Likewise, I find that the question of work efficiency of Goodrich was not
presented by Hicks except apparently as an afterthought in his testimony regarding
the later discharge incident. It was not raised in the discussions or statements in
the office conference or the shop meeting and there is no credible evidence that it
was a matter which had been taken up previously with Goodrich in connection with
which he was given any admonitory warning. I find therefore that neither of the
foregoing asserted reasons were the basis of the action of Respondent in demoting
Goodrich on February 1, 1954.
Clearly Goodrich did actively solicit the union membership of White. The perti-
nent question appears to be did he in connection therewith make the statement to
White heretofore attributed to him by White which the Respondent accepted as hav-
ing been made and upon which the Respondent allegedly acted, and if Goodrich did
make it, was it of threatening or intimidatory nature. The Trial Examiner had ample
opportunity to observe Goodrich, not only in his testifying but in his practically
continuous presence during the days of hearing. I saw nothing to raise any ques-
tion of his sincerity. I believe he was honest in stating his testimony, not evasive,
even though accepting that one apparently not dull witted might be expected to
remember with more definiteness the content of his conversations on such an alleged
matter as the threat language, especially at the time of the meeting with Hicks and
White, which occurred apparently the day following the event. I believe his credi-
bility is also supported to the extent of the testimony of White relative to Goodrich
not having admitted using the offensive phrasing, and that of Hicks as to Jordan
9
The calling and holding of this meeting is not a specific allegation of the complaint.
1280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not having heard such alleged statement . Some reference was made by Goodrich
to White as to the advisability of an early decision regarding coming into the Union.
Such advice in itself does not constitute a threat. I credit the testimony of Goodrich
over that of White relative to the matter of the statement here in dispute and find
that the alleged vulgar offensive threatening statement was not made by Goodrich,
as alleged.10 After considering all the testimony and factors surrounding this inci-
dent, I find that the action of Respondent in reducing the work and pay status of
Goodrich was discriminatory and in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1), being
based on reprisal for his known legitimate union membership and activity, and being
an action tending to discourage membership in the Union.
2. Existence and application of the asserted rule against talking
It is clear from all the evidence that there never was any clearly promulgated writ-
ten or posted rule against solicitation in the shop. Although the answer of Re-
spondent and the testimony of Hicks gave an impression at first that there was a
distinct rule against all talking, his later testimony reduced it to an alleged under-
standing, which in turn seemed to dwindle to involve really only some form of ele-
mentary shop management discipline, to the effect that mechanics were not allowed
to just stop and go around talking and killing time. This apparently was the only
alleged rule before February 1, 1954,11 and aside from the assertions of Hicks at that
meeting (previously referred to) as to the intent of Respondent to enforce such a
management function, no change was made after such date. Certainly no convey-
ance to the employees of any formal rule with an established penalty for violation
was ever attempted. As to a general rule against solicitation on the company prem-
ises in working hours, as such rule is generally understood, I find that there was not
at any time herein such a rule in existence. Hence, Goodrich could not have violated
it in talking to White in late January 1954. Nearly all the workers who testified
stated they had no knowledge of the existence of the claimed rule or knew of any
worker ever being reprimanded for alleged violation of such a provision. Practically,
the acknowledged lack of any rule being in existence after February 1, 1954, is evi-
dent in the failure of the Respondent to even reprimand the workers circulating a
petition on working hours in March 1954, or those leaving their work place to attend
the meeting on March 30, 1954. Archer, the general manager of the Atlanta branch,
stated he did not know of any specific order ever issued regarding talking in the
plant and that he never directed Hicks to issue any order or direct the men to refrain
from any discussion of the Union on work premises. Likewise, he stated that no
specific order as to solicitation on plant premises was ever issued, and that certain
types of solicitation were permitted. To his knowledge, union handbills were given
out and circulated on the plant premises in working hours, without objection by
the Respondent.
3. Discharge
After his demotion and assignment as a line mechanic, the work of Goodrich as
such was apparently uneventful for about 2 months until March 26, 1954. On such
date, he had difficulty with a belt slipping on the drill press he was operating. He
was drilling holes in heavy angle or channel iron, and when the belt slipped the drill
would not go. Each time he applied electric pressure on the drill, the belt would
slip. This leather belt which was a flat belt ran from an overhead motor over a
pulley to drive an accessory shaft with a step cone pulley on it regulating the speeds
in operating the drill. When such belt from the motor slipped, it would stop revolv-
ing the accessory belt on the cone pulley, and the drill would not operate. As he
was having difficulty trying to handle the fixing or adjustment of the slipping belt,
Hanvey, an electrician working nearby, came over to help him.12 Goodrich applied
1o Assuming, arguendo, that it was made, my conclusion would be that the statement
itself is so ambiguous in meaning, subject to differing interpretations, and with nothing
presented to amplify or clear the real significant extent of it, that it cannot be held to be
threatening to the point of intimidating. White admitted he had heard the expression
used on several occasions indicating it could be a common vulgar colloquial expression.
In any event, the most favorable interpretation should be afforded the remark if made,
which I would do, and find it not a threat of intimidation affecting the employment secu-
rity of White
U Hicks could not remember if he even referred to it in the meetings of February 1,
1954, with Goodrich or that with the mechanics.
>a Although Goodrich stated he had been in automotive repair business for over 35 years,
it had been many years since he ran the drill press in this machine shop.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1281
to the belt what he thought was a belt dressing, a cake of gray bulk substance, which
a nearby mechanic immediately informed him was a grease, and told him where he
could find a proper belt dressing. Goodrich secured it and put it on the belt. Han-
vey states the first alleged dressing used was black in color, that both used were similar
in appearance and he believed were medium black in color. The belt still continued
to slip. Hanvey left at such time, and Goodrich states he "took off on my own," went
out of the shop, and from two separate places inside the plant picked up a "pinch" of
fine dirt (or dust) in his forefingers which he applied to the belt on his return, in a
belief he could thus secure sufficient traction to operate the belt and machine press.
He testified he frequently applied dirt or dust to a flat leather belt before to secure
traction. Although this was the only occasion he did it here, he saw no harm in the
practice, and thought that no harm resulted to the belt or pulley, from this applica-
tion of it by him. He believed the amount of dirt he put on was so small that it
could not have any more effect on the belt than from whirls of dust entering from
open doors and windows, which also could affect any uncovered machines. He states
that after he applied the dirt to the belt, a pulley on the electric motor came off.
He left the machine shop to perform work on a truck.
In his absence, Hanvey assisted worker Fletcher in getting the belt off the drill
press, shortened it by cutting and relacing, and put it back on the drill machine.
It ran off the pulley. Fletcher then recrowned the pulley and put it and the belt
back on. It apparently was not sufficient. The pulley was recrowned again and when
replaced the drill press operated satisfactorily.13 Goodrich drilled several holes
after it was so repaired.
The following morning (Saturday), Hicks came to where Goodrich was working,
asked him what was the idea of putting sand and dirt on the belts,14 and if he did not
know it was bad policy to do that and if he did not know better. Goodrich alleges
Hicks stated it looked like sabotage to him. Hicks informed him he would have
to lay him off,15 and that under the circumstances Goodrich had better find some-
thing else to do, but that he could work out the rest of the week. Goodrich testified
he said "all right" when so informed.
On Monday, March 29, 1954, Goodrich worked part of the day, and after his
return to the shop from a visit to a doctor of Respondent for a work injury, he
was told by the foreman that Hicks wanted to see him in his office. Hicks wanted
to know what he was doing at work, and when Goodrich replied he understood he
was working out his notice, Hicks advised him that he meant that Goodrich was
through and discharged as of March 27, 1954 (Saturday), and that he would pay
him up to a full week, in which Goodrich was to find a job. Hicks testified there
was no other reason than putting sand on the belt for his discharge. He stated he
had reservations in his own mind regarding a lack of efficiency of Goodrich based
on other incidents. It is clear though that Goodrich was not told of these at the time
of discharge, and in general Hicks was extremely hazy and indefinite in his allegations
regarding any specific occasions when he allegedly spoke to Goodrich regarding
inefficient work.16
Hicks and Goodrich are in direct disagreement as to whether the work procedure
Goodrich used was proper under the circumstances. Hanvey indicated he would not
use and has never used sand or dirt on these belts, although he has seen it done in
case of water driven power. If his machine belt would not stay on, he would take
it off, cut and shorten it. Goodrich maintained he had frequently resorted to the
practice of applying dirt and dust to a leather belt to secure traction. Hicks admits
the putting of sand on the belt did not necessarily damage what was repaired, and
that shortening of the belt would properly have been required in any event. Further,
that the use of all of the materials used would not result in stretching the belt. To
him, it was the significance of the thing, i. e., putting sand on the belt that was so
absurd for a man of experience to do with certain valuable precision machines
is This work entailed a repair cost of $6-$7
14 Hanvey stated that Goodrich placed the dressing on both belts, but he did not see him
put the sand on.
15 Goodrich alleged Hicks said his orders were he would have to "lay me off "
11 Hicks recalled only one instance in which Goodrich was claimed to have made a wrong
diagnosis of trouble with a new truck only in use for 4 months It appears from testi-
mony of Hicks however, that many other mechanics had also worked on this same job at
varying times and similarly failed to find the cause of or eliminate the rear end noise in
such truck The attempt of Hicks to attribute the $400 repair cost of such vehicle to
Goodrich alone, does not seem warranted. Apparently also, nothing regarding inefficiency
was said to such other workers The trouble as finally found by Hicks was of different
nature than all the others supposed and was eliminated at small cost.
1282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nearby.17 Whether Hicks was technically right or wrong in evaluating the matter
is not a matter for decision of this Board under the circumstances here. Nothing
has been presented as affecting this 2-month interval while Goodrich was in this
mechanic job to indicate that Goodrich actively further participated in union activity
or that the Respondent knew that he did, or that the Respondent in any way harassed,
oversupervised, or made matters difficult for Goodrich, or had displayed any atti-
tude of resentment that indicated it was simply biding time for an overt act of some
kind to be used as a pretext for concealing some other motive for acting against
him. Aside from the incidents at his demotion, no point of his activity in relation
to the Union or its cause has been demonstrated; he apparently was not a union-
shop official of any nature and was not engaged in the current bargaining conferences
Only by surmise, speculation, and suspicion and ignoring of the only admitted facts
of the instance, can the action of discharge herein be linked up to a discrimijiatory
basis under the Act. I find such basis lacking in fact, and that the General Counsel
has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the Respondent discrimina-
torily effected the discharge of Goodrich on March 27 or 29 for union membership
or activities. Any other basis is not our concern, as it has been so often stated in
numerous cases, that discharge aside from the above basic reason indicated, may be
for any or no reason.
B. The refusal to bargain
1. General
No issue is presented as to the composition of the bargaining unit herein or as to
the Union being the valid collective- bargaining representative of such employees.
The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that all production
and maintenance employees of the Respondent at the two establishments or places
of business conducted by it in Atlanta, Georgia, except office clerical employees,
salesmen, shipping and receiving clerks, professional and technical employees, guards,
watchmen, and supervisors as defined by the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining.
The complaint alleges, the Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Union
at all times material since November 13, 1953, has been and is the duly designated
collective-bargaining representative of the employees of the Respondent in the above
appropriate unit, for purposes of collective bargaining under the provisions of the Act.
Archer, as manager of the Atlanta Branch, is in complete charge of the conduct
of it, subject only to certain broad general policies of the White Company office in
Cleveland. He stated he delegated to Hicks, the service manager and as such in full
charge of all service problems in the Atlanta District (includes Georgia, Florida,
and part of Tennessee), complete authority to negotiate a complete contract
with the Union. This authority he indicated was limited to the extent that
Hicks was to handle the entire negotiation up to the point of general agree-
ment with the Union on contents of the proposed contract. Archer reserved
to himself however the right of review with Hicks of such finished product and to
change, alter, or suggest changes in the proposed contract, but stated his belief was
that in view of Hicks' knowledge of the business, experience, and the delegation of
authority given, any completed contract presented by Hicks would be entirely ac-
ceptable. It is not clear as to how much of this situation was presented to the Union
in the beginning of the negotiations herein. Hicks in the course of the meetings
held, accepted certain provisions of the contract submitted as being tentatively agreed
upon, his explanation being that these items when so accepted, were really agreed
upon, subject to a proviso that nothing else in the proposed contract subsequently
discussed and to be agreed upon, might or would be in conflict with the matter thus
so accepted. Hicks had been employed by the Respondent for 31 years and had
been in his present capacity for about 7 years His work required frequent trips
away from Atlanta, often on emergency or very short notice. He had never pre-
viously participated in contract negotiations with any bargaining agent. Ciampa,
who appeared for the Union in the meetings of March 17 and 30, 1954, is a re-
gional director of his organization and general supervisor of the union activities in
11 States, having his headquarters in Baltimore . Although not thoroughly familiar
with the activities of this particular plant operation , he stated that there were similar
types of operations in the territory under his jurisdiction.
17 Whether such machines were damaged in any way was not established
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1283
2. The negotiating meetings from December 22, 1953, to March 17, 1954 18
In this period the parties actually met in joint conference to discuss the submitted
proposed contract on seven occasions . December 22 and 29 , 1953, January 11,
February 1, 10, and 26 , and March 17, 1954. In such period it was found necessary
for divers reasons to postpone or change the meeting date several times.19
The meetings of December 22 and 29, as reported, began at 1 p. in and lasted till
5 p. m.; the January 11 meeting was from 10 a. in. to 1:30 p . m.; the February 1
meeting lasted from 1 to 4 p. m. ; that of February 10 lasted from 2 to 3 50 p. m.,
the February 26 meeting lasted from 2 to 2.40 p. in . ( being terminated by Crawford
on requested strike notice basis ), and the meeting of March 17 , as arranged by Wil-
liams , began at 2 30 p. in and concluded at 4:45 p in. Hicks testified that there was
never any agreement between the parties as to the time to be spent on negotiations
by the parties in the arranged meetings , or any definite time periods the meetings
were to cover . He admits that the Union made some requests as to the length and
frequency of them and mentioned some could have been longer than as held. How-
ever, the Respondent never agreed or arranged for any longer time to be devoted to
the meetings.
The proposed contract presented by the Union in the meeting of December 22,
1953, and the basis of discussion then and in two subsequent meetings , was objected
to by the Respondent as being too general and as not being fitted to the plant con-
ditions.20 The Respondent expressed opinion that the Union could present some-
thing better as a basis of discussion. The Union did offer a revised contract pro-
posal at the fourth meeting on February 1, 1954, dropping certain items ( of those
noted) which the Respondent stated had absolutely no application to their plant
or operations . Crawford stated it entailed a deletion of about five pages of printed
matter The need of a presentation of a revised form of contract for further dis-
cussion, would in itself indicate that fulsome consideration must have been afforded
many items in the conversations up to that time, and negatives in large measure the
1e The complaint allegation as to the alleged refusal of Respondent to bargain has been
separately considered for this period shown , as the allegations of it merit separate con-
sideration , due to certain extraneous factors later present , in relation to the meeting of
March 30. 1954 and the asserted request to bargain of April 5, 1954
19 Crawford allegedly shifted an appointed December 21 date to the 22nd , at the conclu-
sion of the January 11 meeting , a meeting was scheduled for January 21, and according to
the submitted meeting notes , Ciawfoid phoned on January 20 , cancelling it, suggesting
January 25, but Hicks was out of town on such date and the Union was so notified ; the
next resulting meeting of Febiuary 1 was arranged by Williams , U. S. conciliator , brought
into the picture by Crawford , at adjournment of the February 1 meeting , Februaiy 8 was
selected as the next meeting date , but reputedly on a phone call from Crawford received
on the scheduled date the February 8 meeting was shifted to February 10 , on February
17, due to the absence of Hicks, who was out of town , the next scheduled meeting of
February 18 was postponed Crawford at such time allegedly stated that the men were
getting tired of the meetings being postponed On February 23, Hicks allegedly suggested
a meeting for February 25. but such date was not conienient for Crawford , and the next
meeting was therefore scheduled for February 26 At this short meeting, following brief
discussion of some of the sections of contract in dispute ( largely from the outset ), Craw-
ford on the basis that the committee felt we "were just spinning our wheel ," advised the
Respondent that he had requested a strike notice, not as yet received , and was not there-
fete requesting another meeting The meeting of March 17 was arranged by Williams
From this sequence , it appears that each party contributed to delay in the holding of the
meetings
As background, originally , the opening meeting session was scheduled for December 18
but Crawford , who did not have his typed agreement ready quite on time, telephoned I-licks
lie would be late, and was advised no meeting would be held , if not present on time Craw-
ford went up to the plant allegedly 20 -30 minutes late and Hicks, on the ground that he
was busy , refused to begin a meeting at that time This episode however is not included
in the complaint.
su Although the Respondent had no female employees , detailed provisions were in the
insurance section relative to maternity benefits and leaves of absence for such purposes
References were also made to incentive and piece -work provisions . The Respondent em-
ployed no such methods of payment Medical and personnel department provisions were
fulsome too , but neither existed in the Respondent organization . Crawford admitted that
the first contract submitted was broad and generally included all items found in other
contracts and would be changed to fit the needs of Respondent as necessity dictated
344056-55-vol . 111-82
1284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
claim that from the outset the Respondent had refused to bargain .21 Without going
into detail as to the discussions at the meetings of December 22 and 29, 1953, and
January 11, 1954 (which are referred to more fully in the next succeeding section),
it does appear from the testimony of Garrett, Crawford, and Hicks that many ques-
tions were resolved to the point of conclusion of acceptability as tentatively agreed
upon, at least on which may be termed minor points, although it does not show that
they then considered them as such. The meetings of February 1 and 10, 1954, in
the abstract notes in evidence, similarly show the same result.
In the meetings a procedure was adopted and followed, which besides being time-
consuming, actually tended to prevent progress through limiting the time available
for discussion of certain basic issues on which there had been no mutual agreement
from the start of the negotiations . Each meeting started with a lengthy review of the
entire contract, pointing out what had been tentatively accepted and/or otherwise
marked for disagreement or further consideration. Crawford stated this method
was followed at his suggestion , as he did not think Hicks remembered too well what
action had been taken on a point previously without recourse to reading and checking
it over again. This practice probably proved most embarrassing and harmful in con-
nection with the meeting of March 17.
That meeting was arranged by Williams and he fixed a 2:30 p. m. starting time.
As has been seen, prior meetings usually concluded around 4 or 5 o'clock. In addi-
tion, for this meeting, the Union had brought in Ciampa from Baltimore to attempt
to reconcile all the basic underlying differences and secure an agreement 22 Unfortu-
nately though, it does not appear that anyone advised the Respondent of the intended
coming of Ciampa, or that any drastic change in the pace or conduct of the negotiat-
ing sessions was in prospect. This was an error. The Respondent had no opportunity
to arrange to participate in daily sessions or anything approaching continuous or
"round the clock" meetings, which would have been required for Ciampa to have
opportunity to function as planned in one extended visit. Then, practicially imme-
diately after this meeting started, and as Ciampa stated, in view of the difficulty of
establishing the status of the negotiations and the actions previously taken in the prior
meetings, and for the purpose, as stated by Crawford, to bring Ciampa up to date,
Ciampa instituted another review for the purpose of having a definite separate and
complete writing compiled to clearly indicate the areas of agreement and disagree-
ment of the parties. Which, commendable as it might be, again used up the whole
of the ordinary time of the negotiating session, particularly in view of the later than
usual starting time fixed. Practically at the close of such review Hicks found he had
to leave the meeting.23 Ciampa explained how he had come from Baltimore and
wanted to continue either that night or the next day. Hicks explained he would
be unable to meet as suggested as under prior arrangement he had to go out of town.
Ciampa states Hicks said to call him next week for another meeting, and Crawford
recalled it as Hicks suggesting a day in the following week as the date for a meeting.
Hicks testified he asked Ciampa if he wanted to make a date for another meeting,
and that Ciampa replied that as he was there to negotiate a contract, he would not
make any appointment for another meeting. However, Hicks also admitted he did
tell the union representatives to call sometime next week for another meeting. Craw-
ford alleges that as to the suggestion for a date in the following week, Ciampa stated
he was unable to give a definite reply without further consulting his own appoint-
ment schedule and he would, after checking, advise Crawford of what date would be
satisfactory. On the basis of such information received, Crawford did arrange the
following meeting of March 30.
From all of the above, I conclude that in the entire period shown from December
22, 1953, to March 17, 1954, there had been a continuing series of meetings of
the parties, with considerable area of agreement on provisions of the contract found,
and other areas deferred for further consideration, and no clear-cut enunciation by
the Respondent of any unwillingness or refusal to discuss further with the Union
21 A supplemental agreement covering the parts department, Crawford states, was sub-
mitted by the Union at the sixth or seventh meeting
22 Ciampa stated he told Hicks early in the meeting that he was there to objectively re-
solve the issues involved and was prepared to have the Union waive off any previously
taken position, if the Respondent could convince him the union demand was unreasonable
or untenable, and that he expected management to do likewise
23 The abstract minute notes indicate the conclusion was at 4: 45 p. in. Ciampa alleged
Hicks stated it was going overtime and he had another appointment. Hicks stated he had
remained to check through all the provisions of the agreement, and thought that would
be a good stopping place, at the normal time of ending such meetings and his usual time
to go home.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1285
any provision on which up to then no agreement had been reached , or any outright
refusal to continue bargaining with the Union. Each party had contributed to or
been responsible for some of the delays occasioned in or requiring the postponement
of the holding of scheduled meetings. Even in this last meeting of March 17 , Ciampa
testified that although the Respondent indicated certain sections would not apply
and did not offer to rewrite such sections to show what would be their satisfactory
concept of what the contents should be, that , nevertheless there was agreement be-
tween the parties then to rewrite certain sections and delete others, on which "some-
thing" was to be performed by the Union between the meetings . This is not the
picture of an impasse being reached ( even though no basis of agreement had been
found on many fundamental questions) or of the Respondent taking any adamant
position of refusal to further discuss, bargain on, or meet on further . The failure
of the Respondent to accept the union proposals on certain fundamental questions
or to find an early solution for these matters ( as wages and hours, checkoff , cost-of-
living allowance , insurance ) or to offer an acceptable counterproposition in others
(as an example , what some would deem a fantastic proposal by the Respondent
re the 3-week vacation matter but which nevertheless was a counterproposal by the
Respondent ) I find does not in itself operate to show a lack of good faith by the
Respondent in dealing with the Union in this bargaining , or estabilsh that it was
acting in bad faith in the matter or simply following a technique to avoid agreement
and only offering a "veneer of bargaining ." I further find sufficient in the abstract
of minutes of the meetings of February 1, 10, and 26 , 1954, and the testimony
presented , to establish that the Respondent did in good faith make some counter-
proposals ,24 and do find unwarranted the allegation of the complaint that Respondent
had failed in such regard . On the record as a whole, insofar as it affects the period
of December 22, 1953, to March 17, 1954, and considering fairly all the circum-
stances also, I find that the complaint allegation of refusal of the Respondent to
bargain , has not been sustained by any preponderance of credible evidence.
3. The 10 percent wage increase of January 11, 1954
While the collective -bargaining meetings were proceeding , the complaint alleges
the giving of a wage increase by Respondent was unilateral conduct in derogation
of its duty to bargain collectively with the Union on such matter . The Respondent
posted a notice on the plant bulletin board on January 14, 1954, stating that as
promised , a 10-cent per hour wage increase was being put into effect as of January
11, 1954.
Garrett , International representative , who represented the Union at the first two
meetings of December 22 and 29, 1953, respectively , stated the only conversation at
these meetings regarding wages was general in relation to an economic package, to
be discussed separately . On the other hand, he testified the Respondent did say
something about a wage increase , either granted or to be granted , and that the Union
had knowledge from the employees to the same effect of a wage increase either
going into effect or to be put into effect, before the men were actually paid under it.
Crawford , International representative , who took over the chief representation of
the Union at the subsequent meetings, testified that at the meeting of January 11,
1954, he pointed out that a general increase was being given, and he advised Hicks
that the mgn appreciated any increase received , but that he had advised the em-
ployees only to consider it as a down payment on the final wage to be determined
in the bargaining negotiations . At the same time, he pointed out to Hicks that he
thought his procedure in so doing was an unfair labor practice ; but that he would
not file charges at that time . 25 The Union in the contract submitted was asking for
increased rates of pay.26
Hicks in his testimony was fairly insistent that the wage increase and the amount
of it was discussed with the Union in a bargaining meeting before being put into
effect , although hazy as to at which meeting it occurred and with whom such dis-
cussion was had, or as to what was said . He recalled it as "just something men-
tioned." He stated the reason for putting the wage increase into effect was that it
24 Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the contract were so to some extent modified.
21 The testimony of Garrett , who was also present, is in substantial accord with that of
Crawford
21 In the subsequent meeting of February 10, 1954, Crawford stated he would like to
discuss rates and work classifications . He believed the Respondent was not interested in
discussing rates , indicating only what they were and that it was not going to pay more,
but did discuss classifications and the time required to reach a fixed maximum wage rate.
1286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had been promised to the men,27 and everything in relation to the long-proposed in-
crease had been cleared and approved by the Cleveland office. The whole situation
regarding this increase cannot be appraised without recital of the antecedent back-
ground. Hicks and Archer have testified fully regarding meetings with the em-
ployees in August and October 1953, and their testimony as to the content of such
discussion is well substantiated in the testimony of several workers who were present
at either or both of such meetings. In the August 1953 meeting the men wanted to
know about an increase and vacation periods. Hicks assured them he would try
and get an increase and mentioned the 10-cent per hour figure. Archer reportedly
took the question up with a home office official who thought it was a good idea and
indicated for him to go ahead on it. Nothing was done immediately. Then in the
October 1953 meeting of employees with Hicks and Archer, Hicks stated the men
were informed that they would get a wage increase, the definite amount not being
stated, but that it would be substantial and not be 4 or 6 cents. Both Hicks and
Archer assigned the coming representation election as a reason for further delay,
and Archer also states he indicated the increase was to be made a part of the bar-
gaining contract. The matter remained dormant until January when Archer states
Hicks advised him that the men who believed a promise had been made, were get-
ting perturbed and some were leaving. Archer had further discussion with the same
home office official to ascertain if in view of the current economic conditions, ap-
proval of an increase would be given and received, a few days in advance
of posting of the notice, a teletype affirmance that an increase would be allowed,
and in accordance with their regular procedure to forward to the Cleveland
office the individual notices regarding wage increase for each worker. When such
notices as sent were returned approved, the increase was put into effect and the
notice posted. Unfortunately, the teletype notice after receipt was immediately
destroyed. Any mention or discussion of the increase in the bargaining sessions
must have been on a date preceding the actual posting of the notice. I do not find
here any clear-cut unilateral action violation by the Respondent. The act of in-
crease itself was undoubtedly solely determined upon as an action by the Respondent.
However, the earlier circumstances, as recited herein, combined with some discussion
with the Union of the increase going to be given, which I am convinced and find was
a minimum of bargaining relating to it and did antedate the actual putting into effect
of it, together with the tacit acceptance of the act by the Union as "a down payment,"
followed by some further discussion of wages and rates by the parties in subsequent
meetings, in effect acted to remove the sting which would accompany an outright,
deliberate unilateral act by the Respondent on a matter not previously contemplated.
The course of conduct of the Respondent here does not show any attempt being made
to undermine the Union, scuttle the pending negotiations, or to court discouraging
membership in the Union. The statement of Crawford, thanking Respondent in
stating employees' appreciation of the increase and accepting it as a down payment
on whatever increase could be negotiated, did not sound as such an objection to the
action as should make the Respondent pause and not put it in effect, but rather as
an acquiescence in the proposed action. I, therefore, find no unfair labor practice
in the increase of January 11, 1954, and that Respondent did not violate Section
8 (a) (5) and ( 1) in putting such wage increase into effect.28
4. Refusing to discuss grievances with the Union at the meeting of February
10, 1954 29
Crawford testified that at 4.30 p. m. in the meeting of February 1, 1954, Hicks
stated that time had run out and he had to leave. Crawford then pointed out he
had things outside the contract he wished to bring up, mentioning prior discharges
27A union handbill distributed prior to the iepresentation election in November 1953,
stated "Promises don't pay bills So, the Company is now promising a 10 cent
increase . don't intend to do this unless they are made to We will be glad to take 10
cent as the down payment of what they will pay when the Union gets in . "
2s Richai dson Mfg Co , 109 NLRB 136, Yaquina Bay Mills, Inc, 109 NLRB 439; Betty
Bi oohs Ca , 99 NLRB 1237
29 The limitation in the complaint to this date appears erroneous The testimony of
Crawford is limited to discussion initiated in the February 1 meeting. However, the meet-
ing notes in evidence foi the meeting of February 10, show he also raised questions re-
gaiding dischaiges of employees Collins and Williamson, received an explanation, and
did not later pursue the matters fuither
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1287
of employees Brown, Sills,30 and Respondent actions relative to Goodrich and Echols.
He asked reinstatement of all these employees. Crawford alleged Hicks pounded
the table and told him it was "none of my damn business." 31 However, after Craw-
ford pointed out the Union was the certified agent, and it was therefore "our busi-
ness" and he wanted to discuss the matters, Hicks agreed and Crawford took up "one
by one." Hicks stated Brown was fired for drinking (on cross-examination he also
gave additional reasons, of which the Union was not notified previously), and the
Union could protest it further if they wished. Sills, according to Hicks, was dis-
charged for doing private work on company time, and when Crawford advised that
in other similar instances no discipline had resulted, Hicks retorted that Sills would
stay fired. As to Goodrich, Hicks pointed out he talked too much as in the Paul
White episode. In Echols' case "economic reasons" were assigned as the basis.32 It
does not appear that these matters as such were brought up in any of the subsequent
meetings. Despite what might have been an explosive or bombastic reaction of
Hicks (which I credit as having occurred) to the initial request of Crawford, the fact
is some discussion of each instance alleged was had between the parties, and basic
reasons assigned for the action of Respondent in each, and a firm position on each
taken by the Respondent. A succinct summary of what occurred is presented in the
testimony of Echols in reply to a question as to whether there had been any discus-
sion of changes in status of employees already effected by the Respondent, when he
answered, "there was discussion but no agreement." Any initial refusal of Hicks
to discuss was cured by the immediate discussion of the projected matters by him
and the giving of the assigned reasons for action therein of the Respondent. Further
discussion apparently would have been fruitless. Except in instance of Goodrich,
no further action was taken by the Union. I find that the charge of refusal to bar-
gain or engaging in conduct thereby in derogation of bargaining in alleged refusing
to discuss these grievances as alleged in the complaint, is not sustained.
5. Events relating to the meeting of March 30, 1954
a. The antiunion petition
The complaint alleges the Respondent instigated the circulation of a petition among
the employees, condoned the circulation of it and solicitation of employees to sign
it in working hours, and commended certain persons for their activities in so circu-
lating it. It alleges the Respondent acted through Foreman Freeman and employee
Stone. The petition was not offered as an exhibit. In essence it apparently stated
the signers were satisfied with current working conditions in the plant and did not
want any outside interference. The wording of it was allegedly the product of
Stone, and the typing of it performed at home at night by either Freeman or his
daughter.33 Two copies were prepared, Stone receiving one and Freeman taking the
other, and each procuring signatures of employees on their respective floors. It is
clear from the testimony of both Freeman and Stone that some of the signatures of
workers were procured in working hours on March 29 and 30, although many were
secured in lunch time and before starting work. Freeman specifically denied mak-
ing any threats in relation to getting signatures of workers, and also that he told
employee Couch sometime after securing his signature that his job was all right, or
that the boss had said it was. Freeman also disclaimed being instructed in any way
by any other person to start the petition or having any discussion of it with anyone
else (other than Stone) before circulating it. Stone was not questioned in such re-
gard. When Freeman and Stone each finished getting signatures, independently
without any alleged further consultation with each other, and at different times, they
turned the completed petitions over to Archer. Freeman stated that he never asked
Stone what he did with the completed petition, and that he did not know what he
30 The dates of these actions were not established as coming within the period in which
the Union was collective-bargaining agent, but their names did appear on the list of em-
ployees as of October 2, 1953
Ri Echols' testimony supports Crawford as to the bringing up of these matters and Hicks'
initial reaction , expressed , as he recalled it, as stating that as long as he was service man-
ager, he was going to run it to suit himself.
n Echols testified he requested the Union at the time to drop any question regarding
him
^ An affidavit given by Freeman to a Board field examiner indicated Freeman might
have typed it but his testimony was that his daughter did it I do not regard the detail
as important, and do not accept that the discrepancy, in view of his explanations, vitiated
his testimony otherwise
1288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
did with it, although he supposed he gave it to the "authorities." Stone stated no
one told him to give it to Archer. Freeman states he laid his copy on Archer's desk
in his absence, and when shortly thereafter, Archer returned to his office, Freeman
entered too. He states Archer just looked at it and told him to give it to Hicks.
When he gave it to Hicks, he alleges there was no conversation and Freeman left
Hicks reading it. Stone testified he laid the signed-up petition on Archer's desk,
stating he could have it, and pointed out it was dirty where signed. Allegedly,
Archer replied he would rather have it just like it was. He insists there was no other
conversation, but stated, he could not recall, if as alleged, Archer then commended
him saying that he "did a good job." Archer admits finding the Freeman copy on
his desk in the morning, alleges he handed it back to Freeman with the remark that
it was "not a matter for me to fool with," and told him if he wanted to he could
give it to Hicks. About iir2 hours later, Archer says Stone came in and handed him
the second petition. He states he likewise told him to find Hicks and give it to him
"if you want him to have it." As Hicks was coming along the hall, Archer called
out to him that Stone has "a paper he wants somebody to relieve him of," and Hicks
took it. Hicks in his testimony stated he first saw the petition on March 30, that
he was not aware of the preparation of it, did not instruct nor authorize the prepara-
tion of it, and did not know it was being circulated. He thinks Freeman gave him
both petitions at the same time, in the hall or office. He alleges that he looked at it,
put it in his pocket, and said nothing to Freeman. Archer also testified he did not
instruct or in any way instigate the preparation and circulation of the petition.
However, he did have what he termed hearsay knowledge of it before receiving the
completed copies, as a salesman (supervisor) in their outside shop phoned him
calling it to his attention on the afternoon of the previous day, reading to him the
contents of the paper being circulated there, and informing him a lot of the men
had signed it. Archer alleges he stated at such time that he did not know what it
was for, or the purpose of it or anything else, but he assumed it was all right and
so to forget it. Cork, the immediate supervisor of the shop in which Freeman
worked, stated he did not know of the petition prior to it being turned in, did not
instruct regarding the preparation of it, and did not know Freeman circulated it.34
It is clear from the testimony of all that no one was reprimanded or apparently even
spoken to in connection with the circulation of the petition.
Several workers testified as to alleged incidents in connection with the securing
of their signatures. Paul White testified that he did not ask Freeman any questions
regarding the petition when presented and Freeman did not say where he got it, which
later he amended to say that Freeman stated he "just picked it up over yonder" and
walked across the building with it. He denied that he ever said in a statement or
otherwise that Freeman had told him that Cork gave it to him to get signed. I
credit his testimony in this latter regard. Mitchell declared he asked Freeman where
the petition came from, and the reply was "In there" while pointing to the office
Couch alleges that he signed the petition for Freeman, absent any threats or pressure
after reading it carefully, but that about 4 p in. of the same day, Freeman advised
him that "I didn't have to worry about my job, it was OK, the boss said it was." 35
Freeman categorically denied this allegation, both in his testimony and in the affi-
davit given in the Board investigation, and asserted he did not talk again to any
man after the latter signed the petition. Under all the circumstances I accept and
credit his denial. Smith, who alleged a Freeman greeting in asking him to sign was
"You four-eyed s. o. b., are you going to sign this paper," allegedly replied by hitting
Freeman with a hammer. He also indicated Freeman had stated his aspirations for
Archer's job and that the number of signatures would be a factor in his securing it
He did not report the incident 36 Freeman was not directly questioned on this al-
leged incident but his affidavit in evidence clearly denies it. At the time and now, I
believed Smith was exaggerating and embellishing his story and do not give it any
particular weight.
As regards the complaint allegation that Freeman was a foreman, I find on the
weight of the evidence that such claim is not maintained. Archer, Hicks, Newton,
and Cork as management officials all assert he was not a supervisor, but a journey-
as Reddy, foreman of shop in which Stone worked , likewise disclaimed knowledge of the
circulation of the petition and alleged that he did not learn of it until he heard talk about
it by workers 1 week after such time.
35 He asserted one reason he signed the petition was that he had heard a rumor he was
going to be laid off, that he was "next." However, he denied talking to anyone before
signing the petition.
as The testimony of Freeman, that he did not ask Smith to sign the petition, refers to
a different Smith.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1289
man mechanic . The regularly maintained company personnel records of Freeman,
showing all hiring, termination , and rate changes , have no indication of other than
a mechanic classification . Freeman makes no assertion of being other than a me-
chanic; Stone who worked with him on the petition formulation and distribution,
says Freeman is a mechanic , wearing conventional overalls, punching a clock, and
not attired in business suit as other plant supervisors; White, who works with Free-
man, declares they have never been told he was a foreman , he knows of no difference
between himself and Freeman, and that Cork is in charge of the used truck depart-
ment. Mitchell who does work in same department stated he worked under Free-
man's supervision , indicating he tells which jobs to do and to move to and from,
and he asks Freeman regarding the next job, but admitting on many occasions Free-
man does the same work as Smith, Bryan, White, and himself. Couch, who works in
a different department , thought Freeman was a foreman , and Bagwell 's (not in same
department ) opinion of his foreman status is weakened as being based largely on
happenings several years old. Cork, in charge of used truck department, makes all
appraisals of work necessary on any used truck taken in, using Freeman to assist
him. He states that Freeman is clearly the best mechanic in his department and
of his dependence on him in many mechanical matters to the extent of considering
him as a head mechanic, but not a foreman. His affidavit given to a Board examiner
states that Freeman is his mechanical foreman who he holds responsible for mechan-
ical work. His explanation of such alleged declaration is that these statements arose
out of his difficulty in trying to explain to the examiner his extensive use of Freeman
on certain technical parts. After observing him as a witness and considering the
testimony of Cork and also his affidavit, in connection with the work description and
procedure in the used truck department as outlined by several of the employees who
testified relative to it (and which I do not believe necessary to set forth in detail), I
conclude that Respondent took every advantage of the unusual technical proficiency
of Freeman as an expert workman in carrying on that particular type of work almost
to the point of occasionally clothing him at times perhaps with at least some apparent
authority, but not sufficient to find that he is a supervisor under the terms of the Act.
Clearly the usual indicia of authority on matters of hiring, firing, work advancement,
in layoff, or discipline of employees, were not within the scope of his employment
in any powers exercised by him. Such limited direction of employees, as is alleged
by some that he exercised in this small employment unit, was only occasional. I
accept the statement of Cork that Freeman's responsibility for work was limited
clearly to that which he personally performed . I find that the contention of the
complaint as to Freeman being a foreman supervisor has not been established.37
In all the foregoing, I do not find any substantial evidence to directly support the
allegation of the complaint that the Respondent instigated the preparation and circu-
lation of the petition or any that will fairly support an inference that it did so. I find
that the efforts and activities of Freeman and Stone were independently undertaken,
and evidence is lacking to show any encouragement of them by the Respondent to
undertake the movement of canvassing the employees Sometimes self advantage
seeking or zealous individuals among employees need only some subtle hint expressed
by the management side to spark such an activity, and in some cases such remarks
may be purposefully dropped by officials in what may be expected to be willing and
cooperative ears and spirits. Even such is lacking here. I therefore find that the
charge of instigation of the petition by the Respondent falls from lack of evidentiary
support.
It becomes difficult, however, to accept the testimony of such unanimity of lack
of knowledge of all supervisory officials of the solicitation by Freeman and Stone of
the signatures of the workers, many secured during working hours over a 1 or 2
day period, in a small plant of less than 100 employees, and one which was ap-
parently well and completely supervised. And despite also the claimed lack of knowl-
edge of the existence of the paper and the circulation thereof, it is clear that Archer
did have definite knowledge of the existence , circulation of, and contents of the
document almost 24 hours before the completed papers were actually presented to
him. After observing Archer in his presence at the hearing and as a witness, I be-
lieve he was rather naive in his alleged lack of comprehension of the extent and
significance of the contents of the petition when it was read to him. One could
logically assume that such information , if not passed along to supervisory officials,
might at least be the subject of some inquiry by him in view of the asserted existing
rule or understanding of the Respondent regarding no talking in the shop. No ac-
tivity of any kind on the part of the Respondent resulted. The apparent compla-
cency with which Archer and Hicks received the completed petitions ( even if not
87 Legion Utensils Company, 109 NLRB 1327.
1290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
having started such activity on the way) seems to also indicate they knew something
of the purpose of the activity and the results being achieved. Their lack of any
action in view of their asserted rule in existence also seems significant In total, I
find they support the allegation of the complaint that the Respondent condoned the
circulation of the petition and the solicitation of the employees in working hours to
sign it, and demonstrated the intention of the Respondent to take whatever benefit
could accrue to the Respondent thereby. However, as I have previously found no
valid rule to be in existence forbidding solicitation in the shop in working hours, I
do not make any finding of an unfair labor practice herein based on such rule viola-
tion as a factor. In and of itself, such conduct of the Respondent in my opinion,
was only a minor irritation and not a serious factor in derogation of the bargaining
process, or overly important in the disruption of the bargaining that subsequently
occurred. In addition, I find no credible support in the record for the complaint
allegation that the Respondent commended for their activities the persons so engaged
in connection with the petition or any indication that they were favored subsequently
in any way. The negative aspect of failure of reprimand is not commendation
directly or indirectly
b Presence of workers in the meeting room
Another incident which must be considered in connection with the meeting pro-
ceedings of March 30, 1954, was the presence in the meeting room, prior to the
arrival of Hicks and the union representatives , of four shop employees . 38 The testi-
mony is to the effect that Paul White was advised in the shop by Guy O 'Kelley,
another worker , that "they" were having a meeting upstairs at 2 p. in. and "want
you boys up there." White told Bryan, another worker, the equivalent message.
White alleges he worked until "someone hollered" saying it is time to go up there.
He washed his hands and went upstairs . Bryan states "they" (otherwise unidentified)
came up and told us to go upstairs and we went . Freeman alleged he was not told
of the meeting , but coming back into the building he met three other employees and
when he asked where they were going , he was told " lip to the meeting ," and "naturally
I followed suit ." He states they did not say what kind of meeting and did not
mention the Union. O'Kelley did not attend the meeting , but testified he did talk
to White ( and admittedly several others ) telling him "they were having another
meeting ," his impression being they were voting on a strike , and after White inquired
"what do you want to do about it" O 'Kelley advised him "we should go up and
break it up ." He requested White to tell other mechanics , while he told the men
downstairs . White indicated he would get the men ready to go.39 O'Kelley denies
that either Hicks or Archer said anything to him regarding this matter prior to the
scheduled negotiating meeting 40
Bryan testified that Foreman Cork did not have anything to say regarding his
going up to the meeting Against this , he admitted telling General Counsel in a
phone talk , that he did tell Cork that they were all going upstairs and Cork "lust
motioned his hands up." 41 He denied saying that Cork told him to go up, and
a9 Freeman, White, Bryan, and Smith, all employees of the used truck department. The
incident as such is not specifically alleged in the complaint as an unfair labor practice,
but considerable testimony vias presented on it and perhaps it was presented, at least in
part, as bearing on the general allegation of Section 9 (d) of the complaint regarding the
Respondent engaging in a course of conduct calculated to avoid reaching any agreement
with the Union
"A statement given to a Board field examiner by O'Kelley in April 1954, alleged he
did not recall seeing White that day, but lie testified lie did not recall so saying, or
of reading it His not too plausible explanation was she "may have caught me off bal-
ance" He also alleged lie did not read all of the statement, as well as stating lie did
lead it The pei tinent statement in such affidavit is not to the effect he did not see White,
but would appeal to be that lie did not tell White that Hicks said for them to come up to
the meeting
40 O'Kelley states he spoke to Aichet in his office at a time identified by Archer as being
about 5 minutes subsequent to the time the above men were sent out from the meeting
place by Ricks Archer alleged O'Kelley told him his fears relative to being forced out
on strike, and that 35 men downstairs want to break up the meeting and asked the per-
mission of Archei to do so Archer states lie refused it, telling him they were "out of
step" and told him to tell the men to go back to work. Archer maintained no one in the
Company authorized the disturbance
41 Affidavit of Cork given to Board field examiner declares he was out of the shop (at
Swift & Co ) appraising a truck, and that lie did not know of his men going up to the
meeting until it was over He was not questioned in his examination regarding this phase.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1291
stated he did not know if his alleged arm motion meant for them to go up or not.
He did talk to Cork after the meeting, telling him he did not know what the meeting
was about. I do not place much credence in the implication that Cork participated
in approving their going up.
There is little conflict in the testimony regarding what happened when Hicks
came in to the meeting room. He spoke to the four men, asking what they were
doing there, if they had permission to come up, and ordered them to leave imme-
diately and go back to their jobs. Freeman allegedly asked "if that was what you
want us to do" and when the answer of Hicks was in the affirmative, they left for
their jobs.42 °
Hicks testified he was "very upset" when he entered the meeting room and found
the mechanics there. Not that he did not have knowledge of their expected presence.
When he had gone to the shop upon request of the Union's representative to tell
his foremen to summon the committeemen of the Union for the negotiating meeting,
somebody "out there" said he thought they were going to have quite a few men
at the meeting. As he had the petition with him, received about 30-60 minutes
prior thereto, he did not ask for any reason for the assertion and took no action.
When he returned to the presence of the union representatives, he told them of the
petition and gave it to them to read, and also told them he thought it was only
fair to advise them that he had heard a rumor that there will be a reception com-
mittee of quite a number of our men in the meeting upstairs, in that the workers
were planning to come up and tell us "as in the petition." Ciampa indicated he
would be glad to talk to the men.
Crawford pointed out that there was an excessive number of chairs (amount not
stated) in the meeting room as compared to the previous meetings. The only testi-
mony or explanation as to their being there, was a statement of Archer that it was
possible for another meeting being held in such room between negotiating meetings
to have required the chairs being added to the usual room complement.43
In all the foregoing, I do not find an iota of testimony to directly connect the
attendance of the men at the meeting to any sponsorship, inspiration, maneuvering,
suggestion, direction, or command of the Respondent, or circumstances on which
to found any fair inference that the Respondent must have "master minded" the
procedure. I can well accept O'Kelley as having the fears he expressed regarding
what he believed to be about to occur, and of having undertaken the steps he also
believed might be the proper procedure to offset it. 1 credit his testimony generally,
as not being destroyed or to any appreciable extent weakened by the affidavit
presented. He appeared to me to be a vigorous, assertive but not too well educated
type capable of starting such a movement without actually taking thereafter too
prominent a part in it, and also as one not understanding or realizing the full impli-
cations involved in it.44 On the record presented, I find that the Respondent cannot
be charged with inciting, instigating, or sponsoring this episode as charged, as con-
duct calculated or tending to help avoid reaching any agreement with the Union.
I do not regard the failure of Respondent, having some scant notice of the projected
move, to actually prevent the appearance of the men at the meeting, as sufficient to
sustain the charge.
c. Proceedings in the meeting and immediately subsequent
After the unwanted and uninvited employees had been sent back to work by Hicks,
it is agreed that the conferees sat down at the table and began preparations for the
meeting. As to what happened thereafter, there is not such clear agreement. The
session lasted only 15 to 20 minutes. It is clear from testimony of all that the
initiative in conversation was taken by Ciampa. He states that he remarked on the
extremely extraordinary circumstance presented under which to bargain, of his
amazement at it, declaring it to be not conducive to sound industrial relations. Craw-
ford testified to Ciampa remarking upon the extraordinary feature, which Ciampa
stated he never encountered before, but that he was not making any charges, and
that if Hicks had honest intentions he would sit down and try to get an agreement
42 Freeman testified that Hicks stated "if he needed us he would send for us " Reputedly
Freeman also told Hicks, answering his first inquiries, that they, "just came up to look
you fellows over "
43 I do not accept this feature as being of great weight, in view of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the placing of them in such room, and the lack of any directly connecting proof
showing they were put there specifically for this particular event.
44 He probably would not have needed much official encouraging or "needling" to start
such a movement, but evidence of any being offered or applied is absolutely lacking here.
1292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
satisfactory to both. Hicks states Ciampa asked if it was not an unusual situation
and asked Hicks if he did not know the workers were coming up, or if he didn't
have something to do with the coming up of the men. Crawford and Ciampa allege
Hicks inquired if they "were accusing him of doing this" and Hicks further alleges
Ciampa asked him if he were trying to incite a riot. Hicks also states he assured
them he did not have anything to do with it, and did not know of their coming
until approximately the same time he conveyed the knowledge of it to them. The
testimony of Crawford and Ciampa is that the reply of Ciampa to Hicks was that
he was not making any accusations as yet, but was withholding opinion until he saw
the company attitude. At about this stage of conversation, the Union allegedly re-
quested that they get down to active discussion (presumably of the contract) and
Ciampa took out his notes and placed them on the table and Hicks did likewise with
his. According to Crawford the Hicks inquiry in regard to accusing him was again
made and about the same reply given. Hicks states that Ciampa continued to talk
in the same vein about the men coming in, and that he told Ciampa he would like to
get into negotiation of the contract, and that when discussion continued further
along the same lines as previously stated, he informed Ciampa that "it didn't look
like he came to get into contract," to which assertedly there was no reply 45
Ciampa states he then told Hicks that he was objectively trying to resolve the
issues and that Hicks would have to choose his course of either honest and fair bar-
gaining, or the other way, which would be more difficult. Ciampa and Crawford
declare that Hicks then stated he did not have to take that kind of talk from any-
body, got up and started to leave the room. Hicks states he told Ciampa that he
"did not have time to argue about the things he was talking about," picked up his
things and went to the door, allegedly asking Ciampa if he wanted to make an ap-
pointment for another meeting, to which receiving no reply, he went to his office.
Crawford and Ciampa are agreed that the retort of Ciampa to Hicks' assertion and
act of leaving, was to tell him to come back and cut out his childish behaviour, which
request (or injunction) Hicks ignored and went to his office. Hicks asserts he re-
quested getting down to the business of discussion and bargaining on three occasions
during the foregoing, while Crawford testified on rebuttal he could not recall his
making such requests. In such rebuttal, however, Crawford states that at one point
in the discussions Ciampa said "let's compare areas in dispute" and that Hicks as-
sented to the proposal, but that this exchange was immediately followed by Hicks
raising the question of being accused and Ciampa stating his withholding of his
opinion. The union contention is that the advances to get down to discussion prac-
tically all emanated from their side. Newton, also present for the Respondent, testi-
fied that after the visiting employees had left the room, Hicks insisted on getting
down to negotiations, but that the parties never got to taking up points of the contract
as Ciampa insisted on talking of the visit of the men, so that although he declares
Hicks made several requests to negotiate, negotiations actually never started. He
believed Hicks said upon leaving the room, if he did "not want to negotiate, we
would wait till some other day." Echols, a union committeeman, also testified, he
was at this meeting. He stated Ciampa started off by recalling how the men voted,
and all of the statements Then Hicks allegedly said, "We don't agree about that,
we are here to settle this if you want to take up the main part of this contract, all
right, but if you do not, I haven't time to talk to you." Hicks then called the other
Respondent's representatives with him and they got up and walked out.
Following the abrupt termination of the meeting, it is agreed that Ciampa, accom-
panied by Echols, went to the office of Hicks in an attempt of Ciampa to get him
back to the meeting. Again, there is no agreement in recollection of parties as to
what was said. Ciampa says Hicks greeted him by extending his hand and after
Ciampa told him he sincerely hoped that Hicks was coming back to negotiate, Hicks
assured him that he had nothing against him personally, but "I am not coming back
into negotiations ." Echols states Ciampa asked Hicks to reconsider, that Hicks re-
sponded, "No I will not, you don't go at it in the way I think you ought-I will not
anymore." Hicks maintains that when Ciampa "asked me if I would go back into
negotiations ," that he then told Ciampa that he "didn't believe either was in condi-
tion [position] to try and negotiate at that time." Ciampa then left. Neither main-
tains that anything was said at that time regarding any future meeting date. A phone
call was made later in the same day by Ciampa to Hicks. Ciampa alleges Hicks said
he saw "no point of negotiating with you fellows at all," and when Ciampa asked if
45 Somewhere in this conversation there was also discussion as to whether such an inci-
dent of men invading a negotiation meeting occurred before, and Hicks said it had hap-
pened at Tampa, Florida. following which Crawford alleges Ciampa again asked that they
get down to business.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1293
he was refusing to do so, that allegedly Hicks answered no, and that he did not see
any point in negotiating . Ciampa states he asked for a meeting date as he was will-
ing to meet with him, and allegedly Hicks informed him that he was "bushed" and
had a lot to do, asking Ciampa to call him the week after next. Ciampa says he
asked if that was the earliest, and Hicks indicated he was not sure if he could get
together then, but to call him. Ciampa admits he did not call again. Hicks states
that Ciampa called and did ask regarding a meeting date. He informed him he was
going out of town and would have to look over his schedule, and suggested Ciampa
call him back in a day or two. He says Ciampa specifically asked him if he was
breaking off negotiations and that he assured him he was not. He did not receive
any subsequent call from Ciampa or any other union representative.
The picture presented is not a pretty one. The suspicion and resentment of the
Union indicated in the meeting proceedings would appear on first impression to be
well founded in the coincidence in projection and appearance of the petition, fol-
lowed by the attendance of the workers in the meeting place. From their stand-
point particularly at that time it is difficult to conceive of any lack of culpability
for such acts in the Respondent. If free from any personal guilt in regard to those
matters, Hicks naturally bristled up at the emphasis on the occurrences and the con-
tinued discussion and reference to them, and the exclusion of the matters for which
the meeting was scheduled. The assumption of Hicks that they believed he was
personally involved, was not unreasonable, and under the circumstances his resent-
ment at the thought and suggestion was a natural human reaction, and one not
easily dispelled in a person of his energetic character. To the extent he indulged it,
and commented on it, he threw further fuel on the fire of uncertainty and equal
resentment apparently entertained by the Union representatives. Any attempts of
Ciampa to be coldly logical in analysis of the bargaining situation, did not at such
time operate to improve it.46 I deem both parties equally at fault in failing to bring
the meeting discussion back to the prime purpose for which it was called. I believe all
these witnesses testified honestly although they were far apart in their recollection
of the actual events. I see nothing between them on which to select one wholly
over another as being more credible, and am not willing to accept one version to
the exclusion of all others. I do not accept as the respective testimony would indi-
cate that one side made all the advances to get down to bargaining or continue it,
and the other one was alone at fault in failing to do so. From the whole however,
several significant features convince me that there was no real refusal to bargain,
akin to closing the door definitely, enunciated by the Respondent. Crawford indi-
cates at one point in the animated discussion Ciampa proposed comparing areas in
dispute and Hicks readily assented. The fact that immediately after, before any pro-
posal was made, both got back into the same vein of previous discussion, does not
entirely destroy the incident as indicating the general intent and purpose of the Re-
spondent. Also, the assertion of Newton that upon Hicks leaving the room, allegedly
he stated "if not want to negotiate, we would wait to some other day." Then, the
testimony of Echols, union committeeman, of his understanding that just prior to
leaving, Hicks stated "we are here to settle this, if you want to take up the main
part of this contract, all right, but if you do not, I haven't time to talk to you." The
contention of Hicks that he stated to Ciampa at his office shortly after the breakup,
that neither was in condition to try and continue negotiations that day, a not
unreasonable assumption or position to take as regards the possibilities of any imme-
diate resumption at that time, even though the admissions of both Hicks and Ciampa
show that nothing was said then relative to a future meeting date. Further, the
statement of Ciampa as to his phone call to Hicks later in the same day, to the effect
that when he definitely asked Hicks if he was refusing to negotiate, the answer was
a clear-cut no. The additional fact that both Hicks and Ciampa differ as to what was
the understanding in such phone conversation regarding when a subsequent call from
the Union for arranging a meeting was to be made, is not nearly as significant, as
the fact that it clearly appears from the testimony of each, that Hicks did suggest some
time for a call relative to resuming the efforts to get together, combined with the
fact that no such call by a union representative was ever made. I find that the Gen-
eral Counsel has failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that in these general
instances covering the March 30, 1954, meeting, that the Respondent has failed or
refused to bargain or engaged in any course of conduct calculated to avoid reaching
any mutual agreement , in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
46 Neither did the request to come back, made to Hicks, accompanied by references to
his childish behaviour. (Especially when a purported remark of Ciampa made after the
conclusion of the March 17 meeting "when it came to etiquette, Mr. Hicks would make a
good mechanic," was requested by him to be conveyed to Hicks. One can be almost cer-
tain there was compliance with such a request )
1294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
d. The alleged union request to bargain made on April 5, 1954
The complaint makes allegation of the Union having requested the Respondent on
such date to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the designated bargaining unit, and of the refusal of the Respondent to accede
to it and so engage in collective bargaining with it as such representative. There is
nothing in the record to show any written communication by the Union to the Re-
spondent as of such date, or oral conversation between authorized representatives
in which such request was made. It is evidently based on a phone call of un-
known and unstated date to Hicks from Williams, the Federal conciliator. Craw-
ford states that after the collapse of the meeting of March 30, he asked Williams to
see what he could do. He alleges that a few days later Williams told him the Re-
spondent was not willing to meet with the Union or discuss matters further. He
allegedly also then told Williams he would be available at any time to resume the
discussions. Ciampa testified Williams told him he contacted the Respondent but
was unable to arrange any meeting. Hicks stated he received the phone call from
Williams, who allegedly asked regarding the last meeting, and then inquired if they
were going to have another meeting, or if they had an appointment for one. Hicks
testified further that he told him no, regarding the last inquiry, and related to him
that he had talked to Ciampa and was under the impression that Ciampa was to
call him regarding a time for resumption of the meetings. He specifically denied
that he indicated to Williams in any way that negotiations had broken off. He main-
tained nothing he said to Williams should have led him to any such belief. He fur-
ther stated that Williams did not in any way inform him that he was requesting a
meeting on behalf of the Union. Williams did not testify. I do not find sufficient
in these conflicting statements to warrant a finding that the Union on April 5, 1954,
requested a continuance of the bargaining meeting, or that the Respondent refused
to bargain on and after such date. On the whole herein, I credit the testimony of
Hicks as to the content of the conversation with Williams, which I regard as
uncontroverted 47
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce
V. THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of Laurence Goodrich by demoting him in work activity and
classification with consequent loss of earnings. I shall recommend that Respondent
make the said Laurence Goodrich whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered
from February 1, 1954, up to the date to which he was paid in connection with his
termination of services by discharge on March 29, 1954, by paying to him the dif-
ference between what he would have earned in such period in his position as road
tester and his actual earnings as a line mechanic in the same period.48
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, the commission by
the Respondent of similar and other unfair labor practices may reasonably be an-
ticipated. The remedy should be coextensive with the threat. It will therefore be
recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner
upon the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. White Motor Company is and at all times material herein has been engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
47 The statements of Crawford and Ciampa relative to what Williams is alleged to have
stated, are pure hearsay.
49 As the discharge of March 29, 1954, has been found herein to be not discriminatory,
but a separation as an employee from the service of the Respondent for cause , no recom-
mendation for reinstatement to his position of road tester is made.
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY 1295
2. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2
(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent, at the two estab-
lishments maintained and conducted for truck sales, body building, painting, and truck
repair in Atlanta, Georgia, excluding salesmen, shipping and receiving clerks, office
clerical, technical and professional employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors,
as defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
4. At all times since November 13, 1953, the Union has been and now is the ex-
clusive representative of all the employees in the above unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
5. The Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act by failure
or refusal to bargain with the Union on the dates or occasions as set forth in the
complaint, or by engaging in sundry acts and conduct, also alleged in Section 9 of
such complaint, in derogation of any duty to bargain collectively.
6. The Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) in the discharge
from employment of Laurence Goodrich on or about March 29, 1954.
7. The Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) by any action as alleged in
the complaint in connection with the circulation of a petition in the plant on or
about March 29 and 30, 1954.
8. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Laurence
Goodrich, through his demotion on February 1, 1954, to a lesser job classification
at a decreased rate of pay and loss of guarantee relative to hours of work, with
consequent loss of earnings, the Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. by so interfering with, restrain-
ing, and coercing an employee in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
10. E. E. Freeman, an employee of the Respondent, was not a supervisor within
the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Appendix
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, or
any other labor organization, by means of discriminatory demotion of any em-
ployee, or discriminating in any manner in regard to hire, or tenure of emloy-
ment of our employees, or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organi-
zations, to join or assist International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid and protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities,
except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized
in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Laurence Goodrich for any loss of pay he may have
suffered as a result of his discriminatory demotion, in the manner set forth
in the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.