WGN of Colorado, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 26, 1972

199 N.L.R.B. 1053 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

WGN OF COLORADO 1053
WGN of Colorado, Inc. and Local Union No. 1823,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO. Case 27-CA-3207
October 26, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS KENNEDY AND
PENELLO
On April 11, 1972, Administrative Law Judge 1
E. Don Wilson issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent
filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as here-
in modified, and to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found and con-
cluded that the Respondent did not violate Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by locking out its employees
at a time Respondent reasonably anticipated a strike
and by thereafter continuing business operations with
the use of its employees not covered by the expired
contract and supervisors from the parent Chicago sta-
tion. We agree with his conclusions that the lockout
and subsequent continuation of operations with em-
ployees not covered by the expired contract and su-
pervisors from the parent Chicago station in the
circumstances here did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act. We so find for those same reasons fully
set, forth in our recent decision in Ottawa Silica Com-
pany.2 Thus, absent antiunion motivation, which is
not shown here, an employer does not violate Section
8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act by hiring temporary replace-
ments to continue operations during an otherwise
lawful lockout.
of the lockout, which is dealt with extensively by the Administrative Law
Judge, is not, in our view , controlling or even materially relevent to the issue
of the legality of the lockout . Members Kennedy and Penello would also find
it unnecessary to resolve this issue in order to determine the legality of the
use of temporary replacements, since , as they have previously indicated, they
would in any event overrule Inland Trucking Co. and Wesley Meilahn, Co-
Partners, d/bla Oshkosh Ready-Mix Co, 179 NLRB 350. On this latter issue,
however, Chairman Miller continues to be of the view that N. L.R B. v Brown
Food Stores, 380 U.S . 278, requires an examination of the several factors
referred to in the Court 's opinion in that case in order to determine whether
the use of replacements in any given case is violative of the Act He would,
therefore , concur in the analysis with respect to the use of replacements,
including affirming his finding that the defensive nature of the lockout here
is one of the several relevant factors weighing in favor of the use of replace-
ments in the particular circumstances of this case.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
E. DON WILSON, Trial Examiner : Pursuant to due no-
tice , a hearing in this case was held before me on November
30, 1971, at Denver , Colorado. A complaint and notice of
hearing was issued by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, herein the Board, on July 26, 1971,
upon a charge filed on March 29 , 1971, by Local Union No.
1823 , International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, herein the Union , against WGN of Colorado,
Inc., herein Respondent . The complaint alleged that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, herem the Act, by various acts herein-
after discussed.
The parties fully participated in the hearing . General
Counsel and Respondent filed briefs on January 17, 1972,
and they have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENTS BUSINESS
Respondent is a Delaware corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of WGN Broadcasting Company of Chi-
cago, Illinois. Its principal office is at Denver, Colorado,
where at all material times it has been engaged in the opera-
tion of television broadcasting stations. Annually, in the
course and conduct of its operations, it has an income in
excess of $100,000 and income in excess of $30,000 from
national advertisers . It is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that the complaint herein
be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
"The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972
2 197 NLRB No. 53. The issue as to the "offensive" or "defensive" nature
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
At all material times, the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The issues include whether a lockout by Respondent
of its unit employees, in the circumstances of this case, on
199 NLRB No. 169
1054 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or about March 6, 1971,1 and its continuance of the work
normally performed by such employees through the use of
nonunit employees and members of its own management
personnel and those from a parent television station, consti-
tuted violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The
lockout and use of such replacements lasted about 5 days.
B. Background
Respondent operates under a license from the Federal
Communications Commission which provides, among other
things:
The licensee shall, during the term of this license, ren-
der such broadcasting service as will serve public inter-
est, convenience, or necessity to the full extent of the
privileges herein conferred [Emphasis supplied.]
The Union has been the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of technicians employed by Respondent and its
predecessors in an appropriate unit for almost 20 years,
during which time ownership changed from time to time,
Respondent becoming owner in 1966. Respondent's parent
corporation, WGN Continental Broadcasting Company,
has owned and operated television and radio stations in
Chicago, Illinois, for a long period of time. Respondent and
its parent have recognized unions for many years, and as of
early 1971, no complaint alleging an unfair labor practice
had at any time been issued against Respondent or its par-
ent. As of that time, neither had ever had a strike.
When Respondent took over in 1966, it assumed an
existing contract with the Union and thereafter negotiated
and entered into two 2-year contracts with the Union, the
second covering the period from March 1, 1969, through
February 28, 1971. It provided for automatic renewal. In
December 1970 Respondent advised the Union of its desire
to amend and modify the expiring contract. The Union
later, but still in December, notified Respondent it wished
to terminate the contract as of March 1, and to renew it with
changes to be outlined in the future.
C. Bargaining the Lockout with Replacements,
and the Lockout's Termination.
The parties first met on February 10, exchanging pro-
posals. Respondent requested a delay in the next meeting
until after February 21, to permit the conclusion of an arbi-
tration scheduled for February 19. The Union protested any
such delay, stating that based on past experience, about 10
meetings were required to work out an agreement.
Dennis L. Thuis, the Union's business manager , testi-
fied that at this meeting he told Respondent "that the time
was late, that the contract did expire as of March 1, and that
the employees did not want to work without a contract
beyond March 1." He further testified that an employee
member of the Union's negotiating'committee, Cam Sheff-
ner, told Respondent's representatives he had taken a straw
vote of the employees covered by the soon to expire contract
and "they did not want to work without a contract." Thuis
further testified that prior to this meeting he had never indi-
cated to anyone an intention to have a strike if an agreement
was not reached by March 1. In fact, on January 25, Thuis
notified the Industrial Commission of Colorado that
Respondent's employees covered by the contract intended
to strike on or after March 1 because of a dispute over wages
and working conditions? The contradiction is obvious.
Thuis attempted to explain that the Notice of Intent to
Strike was not such a notice, "As far as the Union is con-
cerned, it is not actually an intent to strike, it is a legal
requirement of the state laws of Colorado." Thuis further
testified that "the company always gets a copy." I find that
on or about January 26 or before the first meeting Respon-
dent knew that the Union had notified the State of its intent
to strike Respondent on or after March 1. Thuis never noti-
fied Respondent that the Union's notice of intent was a
mere formality. At the last negotiation meeting in February,
February 26, the Union did not request that the contract be
extended. A further meeting was set up for March 4. Indeed
at no time did the Union ask for an extension of the con-
tract.
Instead of Thuis' and Sheffner's statements at the Feb-
ruary 10 meeting being as testified by Thuis, i.e., that the
employees did not "want" to work after March 1 without a
contract, I find they were much stronger. I find Sheffner, in
substance, stated at least that his poll revealed 80 percent
of the men were either reluctant to or they would not work
without a contract. Robert P. Irving credibly testified Sheff-
ner said there had been a strike vote and 80 percent of the
men had voted in favor of striking on March 1. Irving was
the manager of personnel and industrial relations for
Respondent's parent corporation and its subsidiaries. He
dealt with seven unions, with one since the early 1930's.
Irving further credibly testified that at the February 10 ne-
gotiation meeting Thuis stated, "if an agreement is not
reached by March 1, the men are walking off the job." This
was a statement of intent by Thuis rather than a mere state-
ment of desire. Thuis, at Irving's request, repeated the same
statement and Irving wrote it ddivn. Two days later, Irving
wrote various officials a memorandum in which he quoted
Thuis' exact words, as above. In the same memo he reported
Sheffner's statement that 80 percent of the men had voted
to strike as of March 1. He further noted that in all his years
of negotiations this had been the first time he had been
given "an ultimatum at the first bargaining session." Such
almost contemporaneous writing lends much corroboration
to Irving's otherwise credited testimony. Thuis later testified
that Sheffner indicated that as a result of a straw vote among
the employees he learned 80 percent of them would not
work beyond March 1 without a contract. Thuis also testi-
fied that he couldn't be absolutely sure as to Sheffner's exact
words.
Michael L. Cannon, a member of the employees' nego-
tiation team, testified that Thuis, at this first meeting, said,
"the men didn't want to work after the contract had termi-
nated." He testified Thuis repeated his statement exactly as
he had before. He quoted Thuis as saying the men did not
want to work without a contract.
Donald E. Raydon, Respondent's chief engineer and
vice president, credibly testified that at the February 10
meeting Thuis stated the men had decided that if they didn't
have a signed contract by March 1 they were walking off the
1 Hereinafter all dates refer to 1971 unless otherwise stated. 2 Resp. Exh. 1.
WGN OF COLORADO 1055
job. At that time, Respondent had the Union's letter stating
it wished to terminate the contract, and a notice of the
Union's intent to strike, received from the State. Raydon
made notes at the meeting of what was said . They are in
evidence .3 Item numbered 4 corroborates further Irving's
and Raydon's credited testimony. It was made contempora-
neously with Thuis' statement about the men not working
after March 1. It reads, "Union states no contract-no work
policy. Will not work as of 3/1 without new contract." I
have not the slightest doubt that at this first meeting Thuis
made it clear that the men would not work after March 1.
Without a contract-they would strike.
There were six more negotiation meetings in February,
the last being on February 26. The parties were then apart
on the duration of a new contract and the issue of whether
there would be a union or open shop. After the first meeting,
the Union never said it would not strike.4 At the February
26 meeting, after morning discussions and a union caucus,
a Federal mediator appeared at 2 p.m. at the request of the
Union and there were further discussions and the meeting
ended with no further meeting set up, the parties to be at
the convenience of the mediator. Raydon credibly testified
that at the end of that meeting, Respondent was firmly
convinced the Union planned to strike on March 1. There
had never been a withdrawal of the February 10 union
threats to do so. On February 26 Respondent, knowing that
the contract would expire on. February 28, Sunday night,
had the administrative supervisor of radio-television trans-
mission from Chicago come to Denver in anticipation of a
probable strike. He was to operate the transmitter if there
were a strike. Other station employees and members of
management were designated to work.
The employees did not strike on March 1. The union
employees continued working and the mediator called a
meeting for March 4. There was a morning meeting. In the
afternoon, Respondent reiterated its final offer-3 year
contract and open shop. After caucuses, the Union was told
that if it did not accept Respondent's offer by 1 a.m. on
March 6, there would be a lockout. The Union at no time
suggested an extension of the contract or stated it would not
strike.
The reason Respondent stated there would be a lock-
out if its offer was not accepted was because the Colorado
State Basketball Tournament was to be played on the week-
end. This was a very "big feature" for Respondent which
had been televising it every year since 1966. It was "the
single most profitable feature" Respondent put on during
the year. Also, it was a broadcast Respondent had put in its
license renewal application to show the FCC that Respon-
dent was serving the public interest .5 The broadcast, unlike
the ordinary programs of Respondent, reached all over Col-
orado through other television stations and cable systems.
The poeple of the entire State could tune in and see their
sons, cousins, other relatives, friends, and their high schools
playing basketball. The broadcast attracted many interested
viewers. Respondent believed the broadcast had a high rate
of interest in the State and that the broadcast attracted "the
prestige public service type of advertisers, the Public Service
3 Resp . Exh. 9.
° Nor did it repeat that it would strike.
5 See Resp. Exh 6.
Company of Colorado, the Mountain Bell Telephone Com-
pany, First National Bank of Denver, Continental Oil Com-
pany. These people obviously felt that this was a great
interest program which would reach a wide audience, or
they wouldn't have put their advertising dollars into the
program." Such was the credited testimony of Donald E.
Raydon. It was the "high point of the youth sports activity
in Colorado. Newspaper wise, radio wise, television wise, it
attracts far more attention than anything else that's done for
high school youth, and it comes at a time of the year when
things are in the doldrums with the kids. Spring is starting
to get here and anything we can do to encourage them to
watch and participate or look forward to maybe next year
they would be there helps us just that much from the public
service viewpoint." The hall where the tournament was to
be played had a capacity of about 11,000, almost always
filled.
It is obvious to me and I find that not only was the
television broadcast of this 2-day event of great economic
importance to Respondent and the sponsors of the broad-
cast but also that the broadcast performed a real and great
public service and convenience to the people of Colorado.
Respondent's management , under these circumstances,
quite properly and reasonably believed it could not take a
chance on not being able to televise it. Bearing in mind the
Union's declared intention to strike at the first bargaining
meeting, never withdrawn, Respondent reasonably and ac-
tually believed that any strike would occur on the days the
tournament was to be telecast, March 12 and 13 .6 The Un-
ion had never asked for an extension of the old contract
during bargaining. As Irving credibly testified, Respondent
believed that in the absence of a lockout, the Union would
choose the days of the tournament for a strike. Respondent
was convinced that the Union would procrastinate and de-
lay any agreement until the tournament when it could call
a strike which would have not only most serious and adverse
impact upon Respondent and its sponsors but also most
seriously disservice the people of Colorado.
Reasonably anticipating such a strike, Respondent
knew that it would have to begin protective action by March
6. Those who would operate during the reasonably antic-
ipated strike were relatively inexperienced and needed time
and training properly to function. It was believed the strike
would take place on the Wednesday before the tournament.
Those who would operate would have to be in Denver earli-
er and check out equipment and utilize the first part of the
week for planning and checking out equipment. Saturday
was chosen as the day,to begin the lockout because on
Saturday and Sunday it was easier for inexperienced people
to learn the operation of the station since videotape and film
were run until 9 p.m. It was reasonably believed that by
Monday, Respondent would have people who were able to
run the station and then time could be devoted to making
plans for the tournament. Employees not covered by the
expired contract and supervisors from the parent Chicago
station and of Respondent were utilized. As the days of the
tournament came closer, more executive personnel were
brought in from Chicago. By March 10, the "color van" was
ready and brought to the Coliseum so that equipment could
be set up. Some such work was done but the van was
. 6 Thus exerting great economic pressure upon Respondent.
1056 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
brought back that night. They returned on March 11 and
continued to "set up." There was picketing. The Union and
Respondent met at 4:30 p.m. that day. Respondent said it
was not going to negotiate at that meeting but wanted to
talk about televising the tournament and it had heard some
of the men "wanted to do the tournament." Respondent
stated that if the men would "guarantee to do the tourna-
ment, we would lift the lockout." The union representative
said they would take it to the men for a vote. At 1:30 a.m.
on Friday, March 12, Raydon was called and was told the
men had voted in favor of returning to work. They guaran-
teed to do the tournament, if Respondent would lift the
lockout. Respondent did so. When the station opened on
March 12, the Union men ran the station and handled the
pickup of the tournament'
Between March 12 when the men returned to work and
May 13, when an agreement was reached, there were four
or five bargaining meetings between the parties. The Union
got its union shop and Respondent got a 2-1/2 year con-
tract, to keep the termination date more than 5 months
away from the basketball tournament.
Respondent considered the basketball tournament, fi-
nancially and as of interest to the people of the State, as its
"Number 1" broadcast.
I am convinced, based upon the entire record, that
Respondent has established it was entirely free from any
antiunion motivation in locking out the employees and op-
erating for a few days with nonunit employees and execu-
tives of Respondent or its parent station. Such is abundantly
clear to me from the fact that the lockout was lifted as soon
as the Union guaranteed its members would work the tour-
nament. Respondent's sole reasons for the lockout were its
own economic interests,8 the economic interest of its spon-
sors, the intense interest of the people of Colorado in seeing
the tournament even if they could not attend in person, and
Respondent's concern for its commitments to the FCC and
its vital interest in preserving its license. Respondent's prime
concern was in fulfilling its job of broadcasting the tourna-
ment, and it had valid reasons to believe the Union would
choose the dates of the tournament to strike. To have await-
ed such a strike, and had such occurred, the tournament
would not have been televised since Respondent would not
have had sufficient time for preparation. The lockout oc-
curred solely to protect economic interests of Respondent
and the sponsors and to guarantee the telecast of an event
clothed with intense public interest and convenience. The
record is devoid of any evidence that the Union ever with-
drew from its stated position that it would strike. That it did
not strike on March 1 does not mean Respondent was not
eminently reasonable in believing the Union would choose
the critical days of the tournament for using its economic
strength as threatened at the start of negotiations. There is
nothing in the record which would justify me in second-
guessing Respondent and substituting my judgment for its
7 That Respondent was not unreasonable in expecting a "quickie strike"
is confirmed at least by hindsight, in the fact that the Union called a strike
on April 3, with no advance notice , the station losing about 8 hours of
broadcast time . The strike lasted until April 26.,
9 Which might have been much more serious than those involved only in
the 2 days It might have adversely affected its whole image of reliability with
sponsors and the FCC.
considered business judgment as to what action the Union
would take on the days of the tournament. Again, I am
convinced that Respondent utilized the lockout only as a
defense to the threatened strike which, while not occurring
on March 1, seemed most likely, to Respondent, to occur on
or just prior to the critical days of the tournament. That
Respondent was so acting only in a defensive and nonoffen-
sive manner is amply confirmed by the fact that the lockout
was called off as soon as the Union guaranteed to work the
so important tournament .9
Respondent has more than met any burden of proof it
may have had by establishing that it reasonably and in good
faith anticipated and expected a strike at the critical time of
the tournament, and based upon such anticipation it locked
out the employees and used replacements as set forth above
only to preserve legitimate economic interests and serve the
public good. Certainly, Respondent cannot be required to
prove that it had Divine Knowledge that the Union actually
would have struck. It satisfied any reasonable requirement,
by establishing that it took what, to it, was necessary defen-
sive action to assure that the important tournament would
be televised.10 I find such was the only reason for the lock-
out. There is no probative or substantial evidence that Re-
spondent was in any way motivated by an intention or
desire to interfere with, restrain, or coerce the employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, either by the lockout or by the use of replacements
as set forth above. Respondent had to operate, and be cer-
tain it would operate, to protect the obvious economic inter-
ests and the public's interests and convenience.
I have already found, but here emphasize, that if the
tournament were to be broadcast, in the face of the expected
strike, Respondent, to guarantee such televising, had to put
its plans into operation not later than March 6. I have not
by any means ignored nor failed fully to consider that on
March 4, Respondent told the Union that in the absence of
an agreement on the part of the Union to Respondent's
contract proposals by signoff time on March 5, Respondent
would lock out the employees on March 6. It was late on
March 5 that the membership of the Union voted to reject
Respondent's proposals. The lockout occurred, as pre-
dicted, on March 6, with use of replacements as found
above. General Counsel contends that this record estab-
lishes that "the lockout was inherently prejudicial to Union
interests and devoid of significant economic justification
sufficient to overcome the adverse effect on unionism," cit-
ing Inland Trucking Co., 179 NLRB No. 56, enfd. 440 F.2d
562 (C.A. 7). I have carefully read and considered all of
what might be called the lead cases involving lockouts." I
conclude that this lockout and use of replacements as found
above was not unlawful in the light of existing legal prece-
dent. That the proposed lockout was announced simulta-
neously with Respondent's contract proposal and followed
immediately upon the Union's rejection of such proposal
inclines one to speculate that the announcement of the pro-
posed lockout on March 4, and its implementation on the
9 Agreement on contract terms was not even mentioned by Respondent
on that occasion. Indeed, Respondent refused then to negotiate . It only
sought a guarantee that the men would work.
Had it not been, it, the sponsors, and the public could not ever have had
it Televise it or forget it
11 1 find no need to cite them They are known to all interested parties.
WGN OF COLORADO 1057
heels of the Union's rejection, have a cause-and-effect rela-
tionship. I find that the entire record establishes the nonex-
istence of such relationship. "Timing" is always a factor
which may be considered in determining whether an unfair
labor practice exists. Here I find nothing but the fallacious
post hoc ergo propter hoc insofar as the Union's rejection of
Respondent's proposals and the subsequent lockout are
concerned. I am convinced, find, and conclude that this
record demonstrates fully that the employees were not
locked out because the Union would not agree to
Respondent's contract proposals and as a device by Re-
spondent to gain such agreement , but rather, as found
above, Respondent locked out the employees because it
actually and reasonably believed that the Union would call
its announced "strike" at or about the most advantageous
time to the Union, the days before and during the soon
upcoming basketball tournament, all to Respondent's and
sponsors' great economic loss and to the great disservice of
the people of Colorado and possibly to the real detriment
of Respondent's FCC license. Respondent has here demon-
strated that the lockout was not based upon antiumon con-
siderations but rather was based upon legitimate and
substantial business reasons. The lockout was intended to
and did serve a legitimate business end. Respondent had a
reasonable apprehension that the Union was soon to take
hostile action against its substantial economic interests and
those of its valued sponsors and to the great detriment of
the public weal. I have noted perhaps too often, but here
again emphasize, that the Union never withdrew its state-
ment that it intended to strike on or after March 1. This
lockout was legal because of overriding business purposes
and because of the vital interests and convenience of the
public. Respondent had a good-faith anticipation of almost
simultaneous "offensive action" by the Union. The lockout
was not designed to destroy the employees' rights or the
capacity of the Union to represent them. At the first nego-
tiation meeting in February, the Union unequivocally an-
nounced itself as the protagonist and never withdrew from
such position. This lockout was designed solely to further
legitimate business interests and the public's good. Respon-
dent has more than established by a preponderance of the
probative and substantial evidence that it had no antiunion
motivation in the lockout but rather it was motivated solely
by legitimate objectives. Certainly, as I have found, Respon-
dent was faced with unusual operational problems and haz-
ards and most probable and irreplaceable economic loss
should the expected and announced strike occur and had
most reasonable grounds for knowing that a strike had been
threatened and for believing it was imminent . Note that in
the Inland case, supra, prior to the lockout, the union ad-
vised each of the employers involved that it had no intention
of striking at the expiration of the current contracts and
would give a week's notice before a work stoppage. I have
found and concluded this lockout was purely defensive. The
court of appeals in Inland, supra, found the lockouts were
offensive. The court in footnote 7, referring to N.L.R.B. v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, noted that in the Inland case "the
record does not show that a strike was imminent." Here,
Respondent reasonably and realistically believed the con-
trary was true.
Concluding Findings
I conclude, based upon the entire record including my
close observation of the demeanor of all the witnesses, that
General Counsel has failed to establish or prove any part of
his case by a preponderance of the probative and substan-
tial evidence. _
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record, I make the following conclusions of
law:
1. At all material times Respondent has been an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
3. The record does not establish that Respondent has
engaged in the unfair labor practices, or any of them,
alleged in the complaint.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Board issue
the following:
ORDER 12
The complaint herein is dismissed in its entirety.
12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Section
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.