West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 11, 1957

118 N.L.R.B. 1595 (N.L.R.B. 1957)

WEST VIRGINIA PULP " AND PAPER COMPANY 1595
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Sailors ' Union of the Pacific is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that the Respondents have engaged in and
are engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), 8
(a) (3), 8 (b ) ( 1) (A), and 8 (b) (2) of the Act have not been sustained.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
NLRB 1040 . Respondents contend in their briefs that the General Counsel 's "theory
only slightly resembled the allegations made in the complaint ," and "the facts, as they
developed at the hearing , do not at all sustain the allegations of the complaint." If by
this argument , Respondents contend that such variance Is fatal , it is rejected . The "aim
of pleadings should be to give reasonable notice of the pleader 's case to his opponent.
N. L. R. B. v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co., 109 F. 2d 552 ( C. A. 6). The test is
whether the variance does or does not mislead the adverse party. Murnane v. LeMesnager,
207 Cal. 485. Here, there is not a fatal variance , but rather a failure of proof. All
authorities cited by the General Counsel have been carefully considered and it is not
believed the holdings in those cases require a finding contrary to the conclusions reached
herein. However, the Trial Examiner finds no occasion for lengthening this Report by
citing, distinguishing, or discussing them, because it is believed that the controlling
reasons for this decision have been sufficiently discussed . Moreover , some of the General
Counsel's contentions are based , in part, on an interpretation of the facts which are not
shared by the trier of these facts. •
West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company and United Papermakers
and Paperworkers,' AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No. 2-RC-8730.
October 11, 1957
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before John J. Carmody,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are
free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed 2
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member .panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Jenkins].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees
of the Employer.'
1 The name of the Petitioner appears as amended at the hearing.
2 Local 12915 of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, herein referred to
collectively as the Intervenor , and individually as Local 12915 and District 50, intervened
on the basis of their contractual interest in the employees Involved herein.
8 The parties stipulated that the Petitioner and District 50, United Mine Workers, are
labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. The Petitioner refused to stipulate
that Local 12915 is a labor organization or an entity within the meaning of the Act at
the present time as it is defunct. For the reasons stated In paragraph 3, we find that
Local 12915 is not defunct. As it participated in negotiating and executing collective-
bargaining contracts with the Employer , and has administered these contracts, we find
Local 12915 is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
118 NLRB No. 215.
1596 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the repre-
sentation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the follow-
ing reasons :
The Employer is engaged in the manufacture of pulp paper and
paper products at its Mechanicville, New York, mill, the operation
involved in this proceeding. As a result of a Board certification
on September 20, 1944,4 for approximately the past 12 years the
Employer's production, maintenance, and shipping employees at its
Mechanicville mill have been represented by the Intervenor. The
most recent contract between them was executed on November 24,
1956, to be effective until September 27, 1958. This contract names
as parties thereto the Employer, and United Mine Workers of
America, District 50, and its Local 12915, and was signed on behalf
of the Intervenor by officials of the United Mine Workers of America,
District 50, and by the negotiating committee of Local 12915. The
Intervenor urges this contract as a bar to the petition filed March
Q6, 1957. The Petitioner contends that the contract cannot bar the
petition because, as a result of the disaffiliation of Local 12915 from
District 50, a schism has occurred in the ranks of Local 12915 render-
ing it defunct, nonexistent and incapable of administering the con-
tract, The Employer is neutral.
We find no merit in the Petitioner's contention. The record shows
that at a regular meeting on January 9, 1957, Local 12915 was noti-
fied that District 50 was asking for a per capita tax increase. A
discussion of this proposed increase of per capita ensued and then
a motion to disaffiliate was passed unanimously by the 173 members
present at this meeting. However, later in the meeting, the member-
ship agreed to delay the action on the disaffiliation and District 50
agreed to delay the action on the increase in per capita tax, although
both of these actions were to be discussed at the next meeting.
At the next regular meeting of the Local held on February 13, 1957,
at which approximately 90 members attended, a motion was passed
not to increase the per capita tax payment to District 50. No action
was taken on the January 9, 1957, motion to disaffiliate.
On February 21,1957, the Employer was notified by District 50 that
the, Local 12915 had been placed under temporary administratorship.
Although on February 22, the Local officers were so informed by the
Employer, the next day they were officially advised by the president
of the United Mine Workers of the appointment of a temporary ad-
ministrator for Local 12915 and of their removal from office. The
Local officers then called a special meeting to be held February 28,
1957. Notices of the special meeting were posted in the mill, stating
4 Case No . 2-R-4954.
WEST VIRGINIA PULP AND PAPER COMPANY 1597
the subject to be discussed was disaffiliation from District #50,
U. M. W. A. In order to permit members from the three shifts to
attend this meeting, 2 sessions were held, one at which 336 members
attended and the other at which 92 members attended. A motion to
make effective immediately the motion to disaffiliate adopted January
9, 1957,, was passed unanimously. At this meeting, the former officers
of Local 12915 were appointed as an organizing committee to seek
affiliation with the Petitioner, to hold all records, monies and proper-
ties of old Local 12915; and to request recognition as the bargaining
representative of the employees pending selection of another bar-
gaining agent.
On February 26,1957, the temporary administrator advised the Em-
ployer that it should refrain from dealing with the former officers
of the Local and that he had appointed a new representative to post
notices in the plant for Local 12915. On that day, the new represent-
ative posted a notice advising that no special meeting of Local 12915
would be held and that the regular meeting would be held on March 13,
1957.
On March 7, 1957, the administrator notified the Employer of the
appointment of the new union committee to perform the functions of
said committee as defined in the contract. On that date, a job-award
meeting was held between the Employer and the committee. On March
13, 1957, the regular meeting of Local 12915 was held at which the
business of the Local was conducted in the usual manner and in
accordance with the bylaws. On March 22, 1957, another job-award
meeting was held and on March 28, 1957, the regular monthly griev-
ance meeting was conducted. This was the last meeting between the
Employer prior to the date of the hearing, April 4, 1957.
In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that, despite the disaffection
of the great part of Local 12915's membership, District 50, has not
relinquished its right under the contract, as a signatory thereto. It
has appointed a temporary administrator for the affairs of Local
12915, has called a membership meeting and has conducted meetings
with the Employer in administering the present agreement.
We conclude that the action taken by District 50, to administer the
affairs of its Local and to administer the contract precludes our setting
aside the contract as a bar on the ground that Local 12915 is defunct.'
As the Intervenor remains able and willing to administer the contract
and as the Employer is willing to meet with the Intervenor pursuant
to the contract, there is no warrant for setting aside the contract on the
grounds of schism.' Accordingly, as the existing contract will not
expire until September 27, 1958, we find that it is a bar to the present
5 Youngstown Steel Door, 116 NLRB 986, 987; Dick Brothers, Inc., 107 NLRB 1054,
1058.
Youngstown Steel Door, supra; Cyctone Sates, Inc., 115 NLRB 431, 433.
1598 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
petition. Wjre shall therefore dismiss the petition without prejudice to
a timely refiling °
[The Board dismissed the petition.]
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting :
The majority decision denies to employees who have repudiated
a noncomplying union 8 the right to employ the peaceful procedures
afforded by the Act for the designation of a complying union as
their representative. It forces them to accept representation by a
noncomplying union for at least another year. I recognize that the
majority decision follows Board precedent under which its "contract
bar" and "schism"' rules are considered applicable equally whether
the union which is party to a contract has or has not complied with
Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act.9 Although the precedent
had 10 years' standing, I believe that the results are contrary to law
and the public policy expressed in the Act. I believe that the Board,
in according noncomplying unions the benefit of the same "contract
bar" and "schism" rules accorded complying unions (or unions whose
compliance with Section 9 (g) has temporarily lapsed), has miscon-
strued Section 9 (f) and (h). Even if its legal construction of these
subsections is proper, I believe that the Board should, as a matter of
public policy, deny unions refusing to comply with the filing and
affidavit requirements of the Act the benefit of its processes and
should deny them the privilege of invoking its discretionary rules
thereby postponing a determination of the question whether the
employees wish to be represented by a complying union. Because
these are my beliefs, I am impelled to dissent.
Section 9 (f) and (h) provide that "No investigation shall be
made by the Board of any question affecting commerce concerning
the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under
subsection (c)" of Section 9, unless that labor organization has com-
plied with the requirements contained in those subsections. (Emphasis
supplied.) Section 9 (g) specifies that no labor organization shall be
"eligible for certification" unless it has complied therewith. Before
the 1951 amendments, Section 9 (f) and (h) provided that "no peti-
tion under Section 9 (e) (1)" was to "be entertained" unless the
petitioning labor organization was in compliance with those subsec-
tions. Such particularity in the selection of language designating
a In view of our determination herein , we find it unnecessary to pass upon the unit
contentions of the parties.
8 As used in this dissent the term "noncomplying union " does not relate to those
unions whose noncompliance at any given moment is merely a matter of pure happen-
stance. See footnote 23, infra.
0In special concurrences in A. C . Lawrence Leather Company, 108 NLRB 546, foot-
note 4 ; Copeland Refrigeration Corporation , 111 NLRB 533, footnote 4; Whirlpool Corpo-
ration, 111 NLRB 547, footnote 3, Board Member Rodgers did urge the Board not to
extend its contract-bar rules to unions whose compliance with Section . 9 (li) was based
on false affidavits rather than to decide that a "schism" warranted an election.
WEST VIRGINIA PULP AND PAPER COMPANY 1599
various aspects of representation proceedings clearly establishes a
congressional intent to prohibit more than the mere exclusion of a
noncomplying union from the ballot in an election sought by a peti-
tion filed by a complying union."
It seems clear to me that "investigation" of the question within the
meaning of Section 9 (f) and (h) includes, as the Board said it did
in Rite-Form Corset Company : tl
... every step in a proceeding initiated under Section (c)-
the preliminary administrative review of the facts, the hearing,
the Board decision and direction, the election itself, and the pro-
ceedings on Challenges and Objections- ... .
The mere recital of Board practices in the administration of its con-
tract-bar rules shows that their application to noncomplying unions
involves an "investigation" within the meaning of Section 9 (f) and
(h).12 It seems equally clear to me that the investigation relates to
a "question concerning representation" "raised by" the noncomplying
union's assertion that its contract should bar an immediate determina-
tion of the independent question raised by the petition." I would find
a question "raised by" a noncomplying union involved even if I re-
garded the application of the Board's contract-bar rules to be an
integral part of the "investigation" of the question raised by the peti-
IDA similar particularity exists in the provision in Section 9 (f) and ( h) that "no
complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under sub-
section ( b) of section 10," unless the labor organization has complied therewith. In
N. L. R. B. v. Dent & Russell, Ltd., 344 U . S. 375, the Supreme Court interpreted these
phrases literally . The Court said ( at 384-385) :
Finally, respondent makes the argument that its position is supported by the legis-
lative history of § 9 (h ). But in the face of the specific words of the statute, the
legislative history does not persuade us. It contains no discussion of the necessity of
filing § 9 ( h) affidavits before filing the charge . The purpose of § 9 (h ) was to stop
the use of the Labor Board by union leaders unwilling to be limited in government
by the processes of reason . . . . The legislative comments are to be read in that
light. Indeed , those comments are so lacking in definitiveness on the point here In
issue that both parties suggest that § 9 (h) itself best shows the purpose of Congress.
We hold that the sought -for congressional intent is found in the language of
the Act. . . .
U 75 NLRB 174, 195. Judicial support for such an interpretation is to be found, among
many other cases , in Inland Empire District Council, Lumber and Sawmill Workers
Union v. Millis , 325 U. S. 697 , 706; N. L. R . B. v. Duval Jewelry Go., et al., 243 F. 2d
427 (C. A. 5) ; Fay v. Douds, 172 F. 2d 720, 723-724 (C. A. 2).
1a When a representation petition is filed by a complying union , the Board , in its ad-
ministrative investigation , seeks in every case to ascertain, inter alia, whether there is in
effect a contract covering the bargaining unit which would, under the Board's rules, con-
stitute a bar to an election . If the investigation discloses that a noncomplying union has
a contract which, under Board doctrine , is such a bar , the Board , without proceeding to
a hearing , dismisses the petition . Where the investigation discloses that a contract
exists between the noncomplying union and the employer but there is doubt as to whether
such contract would be deemed by the Board to constitute a bar, the Board conducts a
hearing on the question and permits the noncomplying union to participate. But where
the administrative investigation discloses beyond doubt that the noncomplying union does
not have a contract which , under Board decisions , would constitute a bar, the Board
excludes such union from all participation in the proceeding.
13 For an analysis of the distinction between contractual recognition of a representative
and the existence of a question concerning representation raised by a petition requesting
.certification see General Box Company , 82 NLRB 678.
1600 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion, for the reasons ably stated by Judge Learned Hand in Fay v.
Douds,172 F. 2d 720 (C. A. 2) . Judge Hand said (at 723) :
It can be most forcefully argued that the "question of representa-
tion" is not to be divided into two parts : the preliminary "in-
vestigation" to decide whether there shall be an election, and the
election itself. If so, as soon as a union files a petition under § 9
(c) (1) (A) (i) ... asking to be designated the exclusive bar-
gaining agent, a single and continuing "question of representa-
tion" is "raised": i. e., whether it shall be "certified" as such
representative, to the indivisible answer to which all that follows
is a part. The Board must "investigate" to see whether the peti-
tion is well enough founded to proceed further ; if it so concludes, it
must cite into the "investigation" all interested parties; and their
objections [including the assertion of a contract as a bar] at the
ensuing hearings are "questions of representation" "raised" within
the meaning of § 9 (f). Certainly that is a most persuasive
interpretation. Moreover, it fits well upon the purpose of § 9 (f).
Congress did not provide that the Board should investigate any con-
tractual claim to represent employees in an appropriate unit raised
by a noncomplying union nor that the Board should defer determina-
tion of a question concerning representation raised by a. complying
union for the duration of a contract of a noncomplying union. It
specified that the Board shall make "no investigation . . . of any
question . . . concerning . . . representation of employees, raised by
a labor organization under subsection (c)"of Section 9, unless the labor
organization had complied with subsections 9 (f) and (h). To estab-
lish the validity of a contract as a bar necessitates an "investigation"
but that is what the section specifically prohibits the Board from
doing. I believe that the Board has no authority to read its contract-
bar rules as exceptions to be implied in 9 (f) and (h), contrary to the
express language of those subsections." In so doing, the Board has
1* See the language of the Supreme Court in N. L. R. B. v. Dent cE Russell, Ltd., quoted
footnote 3, supra.
The legislative history contains no mention of the Board 's contract-bar rules which
considers their possible application to the contracts of noncomplying unions. There
is no discussion of the possibility that the Board might employ its contract -bar rules to
preserve the bargaining status of noncomplying unions, thereby deterring the need for com-
pliance with the Act and immunizing such unions from raids by complying unions or
from effective pressure toward compliance from their membership through threat of
affiliation with complying unions. Such pressures were, however , recognized as means
opened by the statutory scheme for persuading labor organizations to "take the neces-
sary steps to avail themselves of the benefits and peaceful procedures offered by the
law." See the Report of the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, Sen.
Rept. 986 , 80th Cong., 2d sess. , pt. 1, pp. 10-11; pt. 3, p. 45; Millis and Brown, From
the Wagner Act to Taft Hartley (1950), pp. 644-645.
It was widely assumed that Congress had, in Section 103, protected the contractual re-
lationships of noncomplying unions until the end of the contract or 1 year after the
effective date of the amendments , whichever occurred first. E. g., see Fitzgerald et ai, v.
Douds, 167 F. 2d 714, 717 (C. A. 2) (dictum) ; see also the contentions of District 50,
UMW, in Bush Woolen Mills, Inc., 76 NLRB 618, 619-620.
WEST VIRGINIA PULP AND PAPER COMPANY 1601:
not only added an exception not contained in the statute but one which
does not effectuate the policies of the Act, either as construed by the
courts or by the Board.
Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) seek to achieve congressional objec-
tives-financial and operational responsibility by unions to their-
membership and freedom from Communist and other subversive in--
fluence in union leadership-by procedural measures which deny non--
complying unions access to the Board' s facilities for the peaceful
investigation of questions concerning representation or for reme--
dying unfair labor practices. The method adopted "was to stop
the use of the Labor Board" 15 by noncomplying unions, and "to en-
courage compliance with the filing requirements of the Act by creating-
a system of benefits and detriments." 18
Board decisions involving the effect to be given noncompliance are
replete with similar statements of the public policy embodied in
Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) : "denying utilization of the Board's.
processes . . . to aid the bargaining position" of a noncomplying
union ; 17 "completely to debar noncomplying unions from access to the
Board's processes in representation cases"; 18 "denying the imprimatur-
of Government" to noncomplying labor organizations; 19 "withholding
the processes of the Act from noncomplying unions"; 20 refusing to,
permit a noncomplying union to "be the beneficiary of any Board
investigation"; 21 and variations on the theme that the purpose was.:
to encourage compliance.
For-10 years the Board has applied its contract-bar rules equally to,
the benefit of the union which is party to the contract, whether or not
the union has complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h). There is.
no published decision which attempts to reconcile the consequences
from granting noncomplying unions the benefit of such rules with the,
public policy embodied in those subsections. I cannot do so.
By extending the benefits of these procedural rules to noncomply-
ing unions , the Board permits noncomplying unions to utilize the-
Board's facilities and processes to preserve their bargaining positions,,
puts its imprimatur on the contracts and the noncomplying union as,
is N. L. R. B. v. Dant tf Russell, Ltd., 344 U. S. 375, 385.
19 New Jersey Carpet Mills , 92 NLRB 604 , 610, cited in United Mine Workers or
America v . Arkansas Oak Flooring Company, 351 U. S. 62, 72. See also American Com-
munications Assn. V. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 , 389-390.
17 Marshall and Bruce Company, 75 NLRB 90, 96.
is Myrtle Desk Company, 75 NLRB 226, 227.
1e Herman Loewenstein, Inc., 75 NLRB 377, 383, quoted with approval by Board Mem-.
ber Murdock in dissenting in Calcasieu Paper Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1186 , at 1190, and,
in rejecting a decision rationalized by use of the language quoted above and cited in footnote,
13, as well as by the majority of the Board in Darling and Company , 116 NLRB 274, 277'
(Board Member Rodgers dissenting).
21 Board Member Murdock dissenting in Calcasieu, cited supra, footnote 12.
21 Darling and Company, 116 NLRB 274, 277, quoting Herman Loewenstein, Inc.,
supra, footnote 19.
450553-58-vol. 118-102
1602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a party to the contract, and, consequently, withholds the processes of
the Act from complying unions. This denies employees the privilege
of designating, by the peaceful procedures afforded by the Act to
complying unions only, a complying union as their representative.
Such a result clearly fails to effectuate the purposes of the Act. I
cannot better state my conviction than it was stated by Judge Learned
Hand, again in Fay v. Douds, supra, when he wrote (at 724) :
The privilege of becoming an "exclusive bargaining" agent is
altogether distinct from the common-law right of workmen to
combine; it is a creature of Congress to whose grant Congress was
therefore free to attach such conditions as it saw fit. It has seen
fit to deny the privilege to unions which will not disclose their
affairs, as § 9 (f) prescribes. The plaintiff's argument must
therefore be that this condition applies only to prevent such a
union from becoming an exclusive bargaining agent, but does not
prevent it from objecting to an election or, if one is called, from
defeating any rival. The result would be that a "non-complying"
union which was already the agent, could succeed in maintaining
.its position as such. We cannot conceive why Congress should
have intended to allow recalcitrant unions to maintain the status
quo. Those considerations which made it desirable to require
publicity to unions seeking new authority, must surely make
equally desirable publicity in the cases of unions that are to
continue an existing authority. [Emphasis supplied.]
The Board's contract-bar rules are procedural rules which the
Board in its discretion may apply or waive.22 I believe that the
Board should so exercise its discretion as to implement the public
policy of encouraging compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h).23
Finding the contract of a noncomplying union a bar to the petition
,of a complying union fails both to encourage compliance and to dis-
courage noncompliance.
For these reasons, I believe the Board should not, as it does in this
case, extend the benefits of its contract-bar rules to a union which
has never complied with the filing and affidavit . requirements of
•Section9 (f), (g),and (h).
za see, e. g ., N. L. R. B. v. Grace Company, 184 F. 2d 126 , 129 (C. A. 8 ) ; N. L. R. B. v.
,Geraldine Novelty Co ., Inc., 173 F. 2d 14 (C. A. 2) ; N. L. R. B. v. Century Oxford
Manufacturing Corporation, 140 F. 2d 541, 542 (C. A. 2), cert. denied 323 U. S. 714.
za Recognizing the difficulties and delays which make compliance at any given moment,
,or continuous compliance , a matter of happenstance , I would distinguish among unions
which are party to a contract as to the nature of their noncompliance . Cf. N. L. R. B. v.
Dant & Russell, Ltd., 344 U. S. 375, at 383-384. If the union which is party to the
.contract was in compliance at the time the contract was executed or within the preceding
12 months had received from the Board a notice of compliance, I find sufficient reason in
the statutory scheme to agree that the question then would be one of balancing the
advantages of stability in collective bargaining against the desirability of affording
,employees full freedom of choice of representatives. See National Lead Company, T1-
,ta.n.ium Division, 118 NLRB 1240, and proviso to Section 8 (a) (3).
$ROWN-DUNKIN COMPANY 1603
The contracting union in this case was certified by the Board in
1944 at a time precedent to the Taft-Hartley Act. As stated above
it is congressional policy to deny certifications to unions which are
not in compliance with the filing provisions of the Act. If we sus-
tain the contract-bar issue in this case, we will have the incongruous
effect of invoking our contract-bar rule in favor of a noncomplying
union in an inappropriate unit.24 It would seem that we would by
doing so doubly vitiate the intent of Congress.
On the basis both of statutory construction and for reasons of
broad public policy, I would refuse to find the contract of District 50,
UMW, a bar. I would protect instead "the exercise by workers of
full ' freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing . . ." by directing an immedi-
ate election in the appropriate unit sought by the Petitioner.
24 The Petitioner and the 'Employer would exclude, although the contract does not,
"guards and supervisors as defined in the Act , as amended ." Because I believe that the
Board should effectuate any policy expressed in the statute in applying its discretionary
rules , I do not believe that the Board should "apply its contract-bar rules where such
application will result in sustaining the contract of a union in a unit which the statute
prohibits the Board from certifying as an appropriate unit for purposes of collective
bargaining." Columbia-Southern Chemical Corporation , 110 NLRB 1189, 1190. I deem
recognition of the basic intent of Congress to exclude guards and supervisors from units
of employees relevant to the determination of any case arising under Section 9 (c) (1).
I note the majority 's failure to specify the unit issues involved in this case and their
sub silentio adherence to the rule in American Dyewood Company, 99 NLRB 78, which
the Petitioner specifically asked the Board to reconsider.
Brown -Dunkin Company and Building Service Employees ' Inter-
national Union , Local No. 245, Petitioner. Case No. 16-RC-2107.
October 11, 1957
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND CERTIFICATION
OF REPRESENTATIVES
Pursuant to a Decision, Order, and Direction of Election 1 dated
July 10, 1957, an election by secret ballot was conducted on July 31,
1957, under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director
for the Sixteenth Region, among the employees in the unit found
appropriate in the above-mentioned Decision. Thereafter a tally
,of ballots was furnished the parties, showing that out of 38 voters
casting valid ballots, 21 voted for the Petitioner, 10 voted against
the Petitioner, and 7 cast challenged ballots.2 On August 7, 1957,
the Employer filed objections to the election.
In accordance with the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Re-
gional Director conducted an investigation of the Employer's ob-,
'Not reported in printed volumes of Board Decisions and Orders.
2 The challenged ballots are insufficient to affect the results of the election.
118 NLRB No. 218.