West Point Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 17, 1956

115 N.L.R.B. 448 (N.L.R.B. 1956)

448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
West Point Manufacturing Company (Lanett Mill) and Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO.' Case No. 10-CA-,0284.
February 17, 1956
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 31, 1955, Trial Examiner Stephen S. Bean issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding in which he dis-
missed some allegations of the complaint and sustained others. To the
extent here pertinent,2 he found that the Respondent had engaged in
certain unfair labor practices and recommended that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy
of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respond-
ent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby. affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Report, the exceptions and the brief, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, with the corrections and additions noted
.below.'
'The AFL and CIO having merged, we are showing the affiliation of the Union accord-
ingly
3 As no exceptions were filed to the findings dismissing certain portions of the com-
plaint, such findings are hereby adopted pro forma.
3In section III, A, fifth paragraph, of the Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner
states that Haynes made certain comments with respect to union organizational efforts
at a "special meeting of all supervisors." The record shows that, according to the testi-
mony of Holly, Haynes made comments along the line referred to by the Trial Examiner
at a special meeting of "secondhands " The Respondent's brief asserts that such meeting
was confined to the secondhands and/or other supervisors in the spinning department.
This assertion may well represent the fact, inasmuch as there is testimony by other super-
visors that they had,no knowledge of the meeting referred to by Holly The record also
shows, however, that regular weekly meetings of overseers were conducted , that Plant
Manager Williams advised' overseers either individually or at one or more such weekly
meetings of the Union's organizational efforts , and that overseers, in turn, transmitted
to lesser supervisors (such as secondhands) the information and instructions imparted
to them by Williams. While we correct the Intermediate Report in the respect above
noted, we sustain the Trial Examiner's implicit finding that the Respondent wasaware
of the Union's organizational efforts and of its employees' interest in'the same in Feb-
.ruary, and that the Respondent's higher management officials so advised its lesser super-
visors and gave the latter certain instructions as to how to cope with the situation.
In section III, B, 1, second paragraph, of the Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner
'inadvertently attributed to employee Russell Lawhon, the testimony given by employee
George Stahlmgs as to interrogation by Secondhand Horace Knight. As Stahlings' testi-
mony on this point is undisputed, we find that Knight asked Stahlings within 3 or 4
weeks after he had joined the Union if he had signed an application card. ,
Employee Russell Lawhon's testimony was that about 3 weeks after he had' joined the
Union, Supervisor Roland Thompson asked him, in the presence of Supervisor Bill Smith,
whether he (Lawhon) "had been' out to . . . the Union meeting," and that when Law-
lion admitted he had been there, Thompson further asked him whether "there was a very
big crowd out there " Although Thompson denied acts of interrogation in categorical
terms, the Trial Examiner, in discussing Thompson's denial in connection with the testi-
mony of other employees attributing interrogation to Thompson, did not find this4denial
115 NLRB No. 80.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 449,
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c).
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, West Point Manufacturing
Company (Lanett Mill), its. officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its employees,
by discriminatorily discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its
employees or by otherwise discriminating in regard to their tenure or
conditions of employment because of their membership in, or activ-
ities on behalf of, any such labor organization.
(b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union member-
ship, sympathies, or activities, asking or inducing employees to re-
voke their union-memberships and to request the return of their union
authorizations, threatening employees with reprisal because of their
union membership, sympathies, or activities, promising employees
benefits on condition of their withdrawal of union membership or
discontinuance of union activities, and threatening employees with the
closing of its plant because of their concerted activities.
(c) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other- mutual aid or protection,
or in the exercise of their equal right to refrain from any or all such
credible We therefore credit Lawhon's testimony and find that Thompson Interrogated
Lawhon with reference to his attendance at a union meeting.
Although we adopt the Trial Examiner's substantive determination, as to Elizabeth
Danford, we note that the Trial Examiner refers to the fact that Danford's personnel file
contains notations such as "rated-Excellent " Examination of the files discloses that
such a notation with reference to Danford's capabilities as a worker was made'in 1945,
and that more recent "excellent" notations had reference to her physical condition. We
make no finding, therefore, that Danford was rated as an "Excellent" worker as of, or
near, the date of her discharge. We note further, however, that Danford's separation form
describes her performance as "average" in all the factors used by the Company in rating
its employees, including her "get-along ability" with supervisors and fellow employees,
her production, and her "interest in job " Such form also states that the Company
"would consider" her for reemployment. We also note that such written reprimands as
do appear in her file coincide, in time, with the beginning of union organizational activity
in the plant We do not consider the foregoing as affecting the validity of the Trial Ex-
aminer's conclusion as to the discriminatory nature of Danford's discharge.
Likewise, in view of certain written reprimand records appearing in the personnel file
of Benjamin Stone, we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's statement that Stone held the
position of loom fixer "with no recorded indication of dissatisfaction until the time he was
separated." We are 'nevertheless persuaded', as was the Trial Examiner, that Stone's
,discharge was discriminatory: We note, in this connection, that the only reprimand re-
corded as to "Stone's "reading of newspapers" Is dated March 7, two days after Stone
joined the Union, and was interrogated about his activity by Supervisor Thompson.
390609-68-vol. 115-30
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
- 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Elizabeth Danford, Benjamin F. Stone, Elvin Smith,
John F. Cole, James T. Simms, James C. Reed, Herman Crowder,
and Genelle Tankersley immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions and make each of them
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of Re-
spondent's discrimination against them in the manner set forth in
the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents upon
request, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social-
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due
and the rights of employment under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Langdale, Alabama, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix." a Copies of such notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be main-
tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
The Board further orders that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as it relates to Joe W. Lynn, Johnny M. Reeves, Jimmie H. White,
and Gladys H. Smith.
MEMBER BEAN took no part in the consideration of the above De-
cision and Order.
+ In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 451
WE WILL NOT discourage the membership of any of our em-
ployees in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization , by discriminating in any manner in re-
gard to the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment of any of them.
WE WILL offer to Elizabeth Danford, Benjamin F. Stone, Elvin
Smith, John F. Cole, James T. Simms, James C. Reed, Herman
Crowder, and Genelle Tankersley immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions without
prejudice to their- seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make each of them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result
of our discrimination against such employees.
WE WILL NOT engage or attempt to engage in interrogating our
employees concerning their union membership, sympathies, or
activities, asking or inducing them to revoke their union member-
ships, threatening them with reprisal because of their union mem-
bership, sympathies, or activities or with the closing of our plant
because of their concerted activities, or in promising them benefits
on condition of their withdrawal of union membership or dis-
continuance of union activities , or in any other manner interfere
with or coerce them in the exercise of their right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations , to join or assist Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection , and to refrain from any or all of such activities,
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to the following -named employees immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions without prejudice to any of the rights and privileges
they formerly enjoyed and make them whole for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination against them :
Elizabeth Danford James T. Simms
Benjamin F . Stone James C. Reed
Elvin Smith Herman Crowder
John F. Cole Genelle G. Tankersley
All our employees are free to become or remain members of Textile
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any. other labor organiza-
tion , or to refrain from so doing except to the extent that this right
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY
(LANETr MILL),
Employer.
Dated- --------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and an amended charge duly filed by Textile Workers Union of
America, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called respectively the General Counsel and Board, through
the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued a complaint
dated June 8, 1955, against West Point Manufacturing Company (Lanett Mill),
herein called Respondent, alleging that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
.61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act.
Copies of the charges and the complaint were duly served upon Respondent and
the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance that
on certain stated dates in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act Respond-
ent discharged 12 named persons 1 because of their membership in and activities on
.behalf of the Union and because of their engagement in concerted activities. The/
complaint further alleged that in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, Respond-
ent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the-rights
'guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by: (a) Interrogating its employees as to their
membership in, sympathies for, and activities on behalf of the Union; (b). asking
-and inducing its employees to revoke their memberships in the Union and by asking
and inducing them to make written requests directed to the Union for the return of
written authorizations which they had previously filed for the Union; (c) threatening
its employees with economic reprisals because of their membership in, sympathies
for,,and activities on behalf of the Union; (d) promising economic benefits to its em-
ployees on the condition that they withdraw from membership in the Union and dis-
continue their activities in its behalf; and (e) threatening employees that it would
close its plant because of their concerted activities.
Respondent duly filed an answer in which it admitted certain of the allegations
but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held at La Grange, Georgia, on August 1,
2, 3, and 4, 1955, before the duly designated. Trial Examiner, at.which the testimony
of 74 witnesses was taken and 40 exhibits, varying in length from 1 to 44 longhand,
typed, or printed pages of material, were received. The General Counsel and Re-
spondent were represented by counsel" whose skill built a tight record. The assist-
ant to its southern director appeared for the Union but did not participate in the in-
terrogation of witnesses. Full opportunity was afforded all parties to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses , to introduce evidence, and to argue and file
briefs. Due to delay in receipt of the transcript of evidence, briefs were not received
from the General Counsel and Respondent until October 3.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint insofar as it alleged that Respondent had discriminated against
Joe W. Lynn, Jimmie H. White, and Gladys H. Smith, none of whom testified at the
hearing. , The General Counsel made, and I granted , a motion for the dismissal of
I Elizabeth Danford John F. Cole James T Simms
Benjamin F. Stone Johnny M. Reeves James C. Reed
Joe W. Lynn Jimmie H. White Herman Crowder
Elvin Smith Gladys H. Smith Genelle Tankersley
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 453
the allegations insofar as they referred to Lynn. I denied the motion to dismiss as
to White and Smith, reserving the right of Respondent to renew it at the conclusion
of the hearing. The motion was then renewed. It is now granted since it does not
appear to me that on the record taken as a whole there is sufficient substantial evi-
dence to warrant the conclusion that White and. Smith were discriminated against as
alleged.2
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF RESPONDENT
West Point Manufacturing Company is ' and has been at all times material a corpora-
tion duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama with its prin-
cipal office and place of business at Langdale , Alabama, where in the usual and regu-
lar course of its business of manufacturing textiles it annually sells and ships products
of value in excess of $500,000 directly to its customers located outside the State.
It is admitted and I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted and I find that Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The campaigns for and against the Union
Following an invitation extended late in February 1955 by employee Phillip Kelly,
who was to become what Overseer J. W. Haymes characterized as "the ramroad [sic]
of the Union," J. L. Smith, an organizer for the Union, came to Langdale where he
remained about a week talking to employees individually and at a meeting at Kelly's
home on March 1 attended by approximately 25 of them on the subject of organizing
a union at Respondent's Lanett Mill where some 2,500 workers were employed. A
second meeting , addressed by Ken Cramer , an assistant director of the Union, was
held on March 5 at the Triple K. Hall. This meeting resulted in the formation of an
"organizing committee" consisting of 46 employees of which group Kelly was elected
chairman on March 8.
A letter which had been drawn up at the March 5 meeting, but which bears the date
March 11 and which was signed by the 46 employees, was forwarded to Respondent's
president. This communication asserted a right to bargain collectively, pledged that
the committee would conduct an organizing campaign on a high plane, and expressed
the hope that Respondent would cooperate in avoiding discrimination , coercion, or
intimidation in order that employees might be free democratically to decide for or
against unionization without fear , confusion , and ill feeling.
Previous to the date of this letter, Respondent had posted, the day of the night the
first of its signatories was discharged on March 10 , a notice that employees engaging
in solicitation for memberships or any other purpose while they or the employee
solicited should be at work within the plant, would be subject to disciplinary action
and/or discharge.
Respondent's officials quite obviously were aware of the organizational effort some-
time before the date appearing on the committee's letter. It is unlikely that the no-
t At the hearing, discussion concerning the introduction into evidence of White's and
Smith's personnel files took place It was agreed that a period of 10 days, until August
14, be reserved within which counsel could determine whether or not they might be offered.
Nothing having been heard from counsel, these records are not in evidence The only
admitted evidence concerning White is that in company with a number of. employees he
signed a letter to Respondent's president (to be considered infra) indicating he was a
member of the Union's organizing committee and that Foreman Harold Peek does not
recall talking with White about the Union. The evidence directly related to Smith is that
Phillip Kelly, employee and union leader, thought her name was mentioned by Mill Man-
ager Frank Williams, did not remember agreeing or disagreeing that she was discharged
for inability to run her job, remembered saying that she was the only one that had been
fired In No 1 spinning department, and considered her a fair worker on a job upon which
she had no more difficulty than other weavers at times, and that Overseer J. W. Haymes
knew she was one of several helping Kelly organize the employees and a signer of the
letter to Respondent's president indicating that she was a member of the organizing
committee.
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
solicitation notice would have been posted had not Respondent learned before March
10 that union memberships were being solicited in the plant. The Union had sent
out, to both supervisors and employees, a pamphlet entitled "Peace to Better Living"
before the time in February when Kelly wrote to its Charlotte office requesting more
information. Employee Benjamin F. Stone became active in the Union around March
5 and distributed 50 or 60 union membership applications in the plant. Immediately
thereafter, in response to an inquiry by Roland Thompson, a secondhand, Stone
stated he had procured signatures on applications and was going to get more. Em-
ployee James T. Simms started giving out applications on March 5 and had distributed
about 20 before the no-solicitation notice was posted. Employee Elizabeth Danford
procured 15 or 16 signatures and gave out about 30 or 40 application cards in the
plant before March 10. Employee Elvin H. Smith was also active procuring signa-
tures in the plant before the notice was posted.
From the testimony of several management representatives including Secondhand
Lavell Holly, Secondhand Ranson L. Gaylor, Overseer J. Olin Bolt, Lubrication
Engineer G. R. Wheeler, Thirdhand Homer Walls,3 Overseer Harold Peek, and Over-
seer J. W. Haymes, it appears that in February, Haymes stated at a special meeting
of all supervisors, at which Plant Manager Frank Williams was present, that a group
of men was coming in trying to organize a union, that supervisors had seen men pass-
ing out union pamphlets long before the no-solicitation notice was posted, that there
was general talk in the plant before the organizing committee's letter was received
that employees were engaging in union activities, and that about February 15 there
were received by most of the supervisors "key" letters 4 containing information about
the Union and whom to contact in the event the recipient was interested in joining it.
Respondent's Executive Vice-President Joe L. Jennings wrote quite a lengthy
letter to Respondent's employees; signed printed copies of which it is apparently
agreed were distributed to them with their paychecks on March 10. This letter
told the employees that: the statement made to them in 1946 that "we believe that
the unionization of our plants would be against [their] interest, [Respondent'st
interest, and the interests of [the] Community" still held true; Respondent does not
want the Union in the Company, never has and never will; the Union had virtually
destroyed the textile industry in New England where whole communities were wrecked
and many mills had become vacant and cities had become industrial graveyards
with hundreds of unemployed people; while union mills all over the country have
been folding up, the Union and mills whose employees it represents have steadily
agreed upon increases in workloads and cuts in wages; Respondent has not increased
its workloads to the extent that union mills have; the Union has now come to Re-
spondent's employees to see if it can get them to let it put in the same sort of dis-
ruption as it has created elsewhere; and if employees do not want to risk the same
results that hundreds of unemployed cotton mill employees in New England have
been subjected to as a result of the Union's activity, they will express the sentiment
that there is no place for the Union in Respondent's plant or elsewhere in its vicinity.
In the recent case of Lux Clock Manufacturing Company, Inc., 113 NLRB 1194,
the Board dealt with a case involving a speech to employees bearing a similarity,
particularly in its allusions to the New England textile industry, to what Jennings
wrote. In Lux Clock, the company president said, in that part of his speech which
related to New England, that the textile industry has moved out of that area and
had been afflicted with the blight of unionism. In the instant case, Respondent's
vice president went considerably further in writing that the particular union which
was seeking to organize the plant had virtually destroyed the industry in New England
and, by going on to state that whole communities were wrecked, by stressing un-
employment, and by concluding that it was the Union's purpose to get the employees -
to allow it to create the same sort of disruption at Respondent's plant. In Lux
Clock, the Board majority seems not to have discussed the statement that the in-
dustry had moved out of the area due to what might be called a blight but confined
itself to the statement that factories had been afflicted with a blight and felt that in
view of other statements about a long-range view, the growth of the company and
the obligation to bargain with the union, there was no violation of Section 8 (a)
(1). The minority was of the opinion that the statements that in New England
the textile industry had moved out because of the blight of unionism and that not
much could be done with any factory afflicted with such a blight, when taken in
a It was agreed by Respondent that overseers, seeondhands, and thirdhands are super-
visors within the meaning of the Act.
4 This apparently was the same communication as that referred to by Kelly as the
pamphlet entitled "Peace to Better Living" which led him to communicate with the Union
in February.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY ' 455
conjunction with a later statement that the blight of unionism would hit the em-
ployees exactly the same as the New England mills were hit, together constituted a
threat of reprisal in violation of Section 8 (a) (1).
The instant case is distinguishable from N . L. R. B. v . Enid Co-operative Cream-
ery Assn ., 169 F . 2d 986 (C. A. 10), cited by the majority in Lux wherein the court
held "an employer . surely may tell an employee that . . . it would not be
beneficial for him to join a union if he makes it plain that such an employee has
a free choice without fear of reprisal ." [ Emphasis supplied .] For here Jennings
did not make that fact clear . It is distinguishable from Lux Clock where the com-
plaint did not "not even allege that the Respondent engaged in any conduct other
than Lux 's speech-that indicated as little as an anti-union bent ," and it was found
that there was "absolutely no evidence of any other employer conduct pertaining
to the employee 's union activity ." Here, the complaint alleges some 48 acts of
interference and coercion , engaged in by numerous individuals (exclusive of those
derivative from the allegations of discrimination), extending over a period of 2
months and , as will be seen , the record is replete with evidence supportive of many
of such allegations . The majority said in Lux Clock, "We believe that the divid-
ing line between an employer 's exercise of its freedom of speech right and those
words and conduct intended to frustrate the will of employees should be deter-
mined by viewing the entirety of an employer's statements and actions ." This can
mean no other than that here (unlike in Lux Clock where "the employer's conduct
and statements were confined in time and subject to a single incident ,") the effect
of Jennings ' letter in the instant case should be determined by viewing the en-
tirety of Respondent 's statements and actions uttered and taken during 2 months
in time. Looked at in this light , I have no doubt that Jennings ' letter was not an
expression of Respondent 's views protected by Section 8 (c) and that it impinged
upon the employees ' right to do as they pleased without fear of retaliation or ex-
pectation of special benefit.
The General Counsel did not choose specifically to allege that the letter was
violative of the Act. The point was litigated only to the extent that the communi-
cation was admitted in evidence without objection on the part of Respondent. I
do not conceive that I am either requested or required to make a pro hac vice find-
ing. To do so would add nothing to the order which I shall ultimately recommend.
The letter is a part of the case, however , and assumes importance in sizing up the
connotations of Respondent 's entire course of conduct.
On March 23 , after nine employees admittedly had been separated from Respond-
ent's employ between March 10 and 19 , Kelly asked Overseer Haymes if he would
recognize that Respondent had unjustly discharged a number of employees since
the start of the campaign . Haymes replied that he had not fired anybody, to which
Kelly replied he knew that to be so but knew also that Haymes had influence with
the people who had discharged them . At Haymes ' request , Kelly then talked to
Plant Manager Frank Williams to whom he addressed the same inquiry as he had
made of Haymes . Williams requested that Kelly return for an answer the follow-
ing day. On the 24th , Williams stated he could not rehire or reinstate all the people
who had been separated but that if they would file applications for (new) employ-
ment he would give them the same consideration as though nothing had happened.
Kelly testified that Williams then said , "If the people and you on the committee
will cease union activities , I can promise there willl be no further discrimination
against the employees at the plant ." Williams did not testify at the hearing. Haymes,
however, testified that he was present at a conversation between Williams and Kelly,
that at no point did Williams say that if Kelly did something there would be no
further discrimination , and that the word "discrimination" was not used but Kelly
did complain about a secondhand trainee. There is nothing in Kelly's testimony
to indicate whether Haymes was present with him and Williams on either the 23d
or the 24th . He did testify that Haymes was alone in his office ( Haymes is over-
seer of the spinning department ) where he talked to him on the 23d and that he
then went to the main office whence Williams invited him into his own office where
the two talked together . Kelly further testified that on the 24th he first talked
to Williams by telephone and then went , on Williams ' request, to the latter's office
where the second conversation between himself and Williams took place.
Haymes did not refer to the statement asserted by Kelly to have been made by
Williams on the 24th that strain due to union activity was causing bad work or the
agreement , attributed to him , with Kelly's expression of belief to the effect that
if the employees were allowed to vote their convictions without fear of discrimina-
tion they would feel at ease and their work would improve. Whatever may have been
the situation on the 23d, it does not seem that Haymes would have had any particular
reason to be present with Kelly in Williams' office on the 24th where Kelly went in
456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
response to Williams' suggestion during a telephone conversation between the two.
Under these circumstances I am not convinced that Haymes' testimony refutes the
fact that Williams and Kelly discussed the subject of discrimination on March 24.
However, there is another feature of this particular aspect of the case that does satisfy
me that Kelly's testimony (which I note was generally undenied and find was given
in accordance with Kelly's honest conception of the facts) that Williams promised
no further discrimination should not be taken to mean that Williams admitted that
employees had been discharged in violation of the Act. After Williams told Kelly
on the 24th that he could not hire and reinstate all the people who had been dis-
charged, Kelly told the organizing committee that Williams would not agree that
employees had been unfairly discharged and then, the same day, wrote Williams that
"in view of the fact that you will not recognize that you have unjustly discharged a
number of employees" the committee had determined to proceed with the organiz-
ing campaign because it felt the Union would avert further similar charges.
And so, upon no little reflection,5 I come to the belief that a fair reconstruction
,of what Williams probably said on the 24th was to the effect that assuming , without
admitting, that employees had been discriminatorily discharged in the past, Kelly
could rest assured that there would be no similar discrimination in the future if
employees would discontinue their efforts to organize. Because there is no allega-
tion in the complaint that Williams engaged in conduct of the character, I make no
finding as to whether he, as certain lesser members of management and supervisors
.are alleged to have done, violated the Act by promising employees benefits on the
condition that they withdraw from membership in the Union and discontinue their
activities in its behalf. What he did say to Kelly, however, is of more than passing
significance with respect to the general attitude of Respondent toward its employees'
union activities in the framework of its overall conduct.
About March 31, Walter Croft, a secondhand in No. 3 weave room, posted the
front page of a newspaper called the Valley Daily Times-News on the company
bulletin board in smokehouse No. 3. Two other copies were posted in 2 other
conspicuous locations where they remained from 1 to 4 weeks.6 The entire front
page of the newspaper was filled with a pictorial article entitled "The Uniontown
Story," apparently authored by Rev. Bob Nelson.?
The illustrations consisted of seven scenes under which there were captions
describing them as representing: a spinning room, where members of the CIO once
worked, from which the equipment had been sold as secondhand machinery after
closing due to labor trouble since which time the former employees are hungry and
without work; a picker room which management had told employees because of
labor trouble it would never try to operate again; a card room from which machinery
had been sold and where CIO members, who are now living on State charity, once
worked; a deserted home, with practically all the windows broken, representing a
typical scene in the mill village at Uniontown from which occupants had moved to
try to find work; a largely empty card room in a mill which former employees had
begged management to reopen, promising they would never join a union again;
and, an aerial view of the California Cotton Mill at Uniontown, which has gone
out of business because of labor troubles caused by the CIO and which is typical of
many other empty cotton mills that have been forced to liquidate for similar reasons.
On March 31 this same homily ran in the Sylacauga News and was also published
as an advertisement from the Valley Daily Times-News in the Sylacauga Advance.
It does not appear who placed the advertisement or paid for the cuts. The Valley
Daily Times-News is published in West Point, Georgia. It, the Advance, and the
News, which are published in Sylacauga, Alabama, all circulate in Langdale and
Lanett.
G This feature of the case, as well as that relating to Jennings' letter, I realize has been
labored It is no less or mole vital to a final resolution of the main issues as to whether
or not Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act than scores of other
obscure details, which, when taken in perspective and in relation to one another, should,
as the sun gradually pierces the morning joist, finally emerge through the divergent and
oft conflicting testimony of so great a cloud of witnesses to reveal a more plainly perceived
pattern of polity To so elaborately verbally ruminate all the manifold minutiae would
result in a report of inordinate length. The fact that this I shall refrain from doing
should not import, however, that I have accorded any material aspect of the case merely
desultory thought
U Loom Fixer Hartman, called by Respondent, testified the article remained posted for
about a month and that he saw lots of employees standing around reading it.
7 It is of more than passing interest that Kelly, the employee leader of the union forces,
is, himself, an ordained minister of the Gospel.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 457
Abbreviated, the story went as follows: The writer does not want the good people
of Lanett to be hurt and sees they are in danger; as a pastor and former cotton mill
employee he went to Uniontown to see if he could straighten out church members
where the CIO had caused trouble and so much suffering; the same thing that has
happened in Uniontown, where the CIO caused the California Cotton Mill to close
down and the owners had to sell all the machinery, could happen in Lanett were the
CIO ever to be allowed in; the people who once worked in Uniontown are without
work except for little extra jobs they can pick up and they and their children are hun-
gry and unhappy and do not know what is going to become of them- it is one of the
saddest situations he has ever seen ; the people are on welfare but receive only a few
butterbeans, a little cheese and butter, and some cottonseed oil shortening once a
month; it is a heartbreaking sight to see these poor people line up once a month to get
their meagre rations; an officer of the local CIO said it had $6,000 in its treasury but
the parent union will not let the local spend a dime of it and has done nothing to help
feed former members of the local except for a little help given to a favored few;
an officer of the company said the mill was losing money and the owners decided
to shut down and sell out after the CIO's last demand for 3 weeks' paid vacation
and company payment of all insurance costs; after that and unemployment benefits
had expired and the employees began getting hungry, about 95 percent of them told
the mill officials they would go back to work and have nothing more to do with
unions, but it was then too late; if the good people of Lanett could see the sad and ter-
rible conditions in Uniontown they would do all in their power to prevent the CIO
from ever coming to their town; 6 months ago nearly every mill family in Union-
town owned an automobile but now not more than 4 still have their cars and have
had to give up so much of their household furnishing and equipment; many chil-
dren are not in school because their parents cannot buy clothing; the people are
unhappy and the town is dead; some merchants have had to go out.of business;
church members are broke and suffering; and things were bad enough in Alabama
City in 1934 when a strike caused the Dwight Mill to close down for 90 days and
in Manchester in 1937 when a strike caused the Callaway Mill to shut down, but
never has he seen in all his life anything so sad and pitiful as it now is in Uniontown,
it is simply awful. In conclusion, the apparent author admonishes that lest one thinks
or is being told that if the CIO should come to Lanett there would be no strike, they
should not be fooled, for he has never seen a union take over in a mill without a
strike following and he begs the good people of Lanett not to take the risk of
letting the CIO come in for he believes with all his heart there will come a time of
regret, and he adjures them not to let the CIO in.
The campaign continued for several weeks after the middle of March but ap-
parently has been in no more than a quiescent state, at least since the filing -of com-
plaint on June 5, 1955, the last complained-of act of Respondent having been alleged
to have taken place in April. During the period of active campaigning, 2 meet-
ings were held each day, union literature was openly distributed at the gate of the
plant, and' the signatures of approximately 700 employees to membership applica-
tions were procured. The Union's running attack bogged down when Respondent
began to discharge a number of employees and by early April, when many mem-
bers had quit the team under circumstances to be later revealed, it was being thrown
for many a loss.
B. The alleged interference, restraint, and coercion
1. The allegation that Respondent unlawfully interrogated its employees
Employee Benjamin F. Stone's testimony that on the day he signed a union mem-
bership card Secondhand Roland Thompson stopped him as he was going on his job
and asked if he had attended the union meeting and if he had signed a card, and
that a few days later while he was working Thompson and Secondhand J. W. Smith
asked him if he were still in the Union and if the Union had promised him a raise,
was undenied by Smith and but obliquely refuted by Thompson who at one junc-
ture testified that he had never asked anybody if "they" were in the Union. Employee
John F. Cole's testimony that on March 12 Secondhand Walter Croft asked him what
he believed about the Union was undenied. Employee Genelle Tankersley testified
that about 2 weeks before she was discharged on March 25, Secondhand (now super-
visor) Robert Gunn asked her what she thought of the Union and on the Wednes-
day before her discharge asked her if she was on the union committee. Gunn testi-
fied he remembers two talks with Tankersley about the Union, that he asked her
what she thought about its activity but does not recall what was said in the other con-
versation. Employee Mauva Lee Morrison's testimony that Overseer Haymes asked
458 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
her if she had signed a card was undenied. Employee Margaret Harper testified
that Secondhand Horace Gamble asked her if she had signed up for the Union
and who signed her up (Gamble was not a witness) and her testimony that Over-
seer Haymes asked her if her daddy knew she had signed a union card was undenied.
Employee Raymond E. Tankersley's definite testimony that Secondhand Thompson
asked him around March 7 what he thought about the Union and around March
15 why he wanted to get in the Union, was not specifically denied and is credited
,because it carries more weight than Thompson's mere generalization that he asked
nobody if "they" were in the Union.
Employee Russell Lawhorn testified that Secondhand Horace Knight asked about
3 or 4 weeks after he had joined the Union if he had signed an application card
(Knight was not a witness); employee Frank Smith testified that after he had been
checking pick clock seals in the presence of Secondhand Thompson the two met
Secondhand Croft and Thirdhand Walls who asked him if he had been at the union
meeting at Kelly's house. This testimony was denied by neither Croft, who admitted
he talked to many employees about the Union, nor by Thompson. Walls testified
that he does not believe he asked Smith a question like that, although he might have
asked him how the Union was getting along, how many members it had, or what
Smith thought of it, but he does not know exactly what was said to Smith because
with all the looms running maybe he did not understand everything that was said. I
credit Smith's testimony concerning these incidents. Smith also testified that Croft,
or Walls, or both of them told him they had a person at every union meeting who
reported what happened. Croft, who admitted he talked to many employees about
the Union, testified he made no such statement. Walls testified he did not say it, and
did not hear it said. It is doubtful if the matter of surveillance is strictly "in" the
case ' under the pleadings, although it was litigated; in any event, should it be felt
important, I credit Croft and Walls' testimony, denying Smith's assertion, that neither
admitted espionage.
Employee James T. Whitaker testified that 2 days after he started to wear a union
button, Thompson asked him why he got into the Union and what good he thought
the Union would be. Thompson's testimony that although he had talked to em-
ployees about the Union, he did not ask them if they were members, scarcely con-
stitutes a denial of the testimony of Whitaker, that while wearing the union button
Thompson asked him why he was a member. Employee James A. Kittrell's testimony
that Supervisor Gunn asked several times how the Union was coming along finds
support in the testimony of Gunn himself who stated he talked to something like 10
or 15 employees about the Union, asking them what they thought about it and how
they were getting along. Employee Truman Gravitt's testimony that about 4 days
after he,signed a union card Secondhand J. W. Smith asked him if anyone had re-
quested him to sign him up was repeated by Smith. Employee Jesse F. Reese's testi-
mony that Assistant Overseer Vester Dobson asked him if he had the employees all
signed was undenied (Dobson was not a witness). Employee Dorothy Harris' testi-
mony that Supervisor Gunn asked her after the Union started organizing in March if
she had any part in it stands unrefuted.8
As thus recounted, Respondent's supervisors clearly made repeated inquiries of
employees as to their membership in, sympathies for, and activities in behalf of the
Union. Most of the testimony concerning these interrogations was undenied, much
of it admitted by the supervisors themselves. Respondent's position with respect
to this aspect of the case is summed up in the first part of Overseer Haymes' February
statement to his supervisors "that the law was now they could talk to the employees
about the Union if they wished...." The last part of the statement went on, ".. .
if they did not threaten the employees or did not threaten to close the plant." The
fallacy underlying Respondent's position (apart from the fact that there is no evidence
that any instructions to supervisors were communicated to employees) is that it
begs the question by assuming that under all the circumstances, this interrogation did
not (as the law clearly says it must not in order to be protected; see Blue Flash Ex-
press, Inc., 109 NLRB 591, infra) reasonably tend to restrain or interfere with the
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. Although in the interests
of orderly exposition the subject of interrogation is treated first in sequence of the
progressive paragraphing of the allegations as they are set forth in the complaint, it
8 There is other testimony such as Secondhand Luther Ray's that he asked Cole what
the "CIO" on his button meant and Kelly's that Overseer Haymes asked him if he were
through with the 'Union, which bears upon the general allegation that inquiries violative
of Section 8 (a) (1) were made but which, being cumulative, it would be superfluous to
discuss in detail for the purpose of arriving at a final conclusion.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING-COMPANY 459
will be seen as we proceed that many of the interrogations were accompanied with
threats of reprisal and promises of benefits.
In Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591, where it was found that the employer
made inquiries for the legitimate purpose of verifying the representation claim of a
union , the Board held in a split decision that interrogation was not unlawful per se
but that "The test is whether , under all the circumstances , the interrogation reasonably
tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the Act" and stated that "the rule which we adopt will require the Trial Ex-
aminers and the Board to carefully weigh and evaluate the evidence in each case, but
that is what the statute requires us to do. The only alternatives , both of which we
reject , are either to find all interrogation per se unlawful , or to find that interrogation
under all circumstances is permissible under the statute ." It seems clear that an ap-
plication of these stated principles necessarily entails the weighing and evaluation of
all the circumstances of, and all the evidence in, a case and the arrival at a conclusion
respecting interrogation based on an overall perspective of the entire factual situation
and the reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom . Since the decision in
Blue Flash, the Board has not hesitated to find acts of interrogation of the nature of
those involved in the instant case to be violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act
where they occurred in the context of other unfair labor practices.9
As has been shown in section III , A, above, Respondent expressed adamant opposi-
tion to unionization , barred solicitation of union memberships while at work in the
plant, while at the same time it allowed the posting there of antiunion propaganda
urging employees to oppose the Union lest they become subject to the same sort of
results as had overtaken employees by reason of the Union virtually having destroyed
the textile industry in New England , wrecked whole communities , and folded up mills
all over the country . When viewed against this backdrop and the unfair labor prac-
tices which will be found upon consideration of succeeding allegations of the com-
plaint to have been engaged in by Respondent , I am convinced that Respondent inter-
rogated its employees as to their membership in, sympathies for, and activities in
behalf of the Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and I so find.
2. The allegation that Respondent unlawfully induced its employees to revoke their
memberships in the Union
At the same time in April that Haymes asked Morrison if she signed a union card,
he told her it would be best for her to write a letter and ask for its return. When
Morrison said she did not know where to write Haymes told her that James C.
Reardon would fix it or write it for her . Reardon ( not to be-confused with M. M.
Reardon, another loom fixer ) is a loom fixer who worked for Respondent in its No.
1 spinning room . A few minutes later Reardon came by and Morrison told him she
wanted the card back . At Reardon 's request she went to his house where he brought
out a prepared letter addressed to the Union stating she wanted her card back. The
letter which was then signed , but not posted, by Morrison was mailed on April 11.
While the union campaign was in progress Secondhand Gamble asked Harper
if she had signed up for the Union and who signed her up and told her Haymes wanted
to talk to her the next morning . Harper saw Haymes as requested and after re-
sponding to Haymes ' question about her father's knowledge of her union membership,
Haymes asked her to sign a letter to get out of the Union, stating that a man would
get in contact with her the next day. Harper told Haymes she would not be at
home then but that night while she was at work Reardon called her up the spinning
alley and requested her to come to his house the following day. Meeting Reardon
there, he handed Harper a prepared letter , addressed to the Union , which stated
she did not wish to become a member and requested the return of the card. She
signed but did not herself post the letter which was mailed on April 11,
On an occasion when Thompson had told employee M. M. Reardon what the
effect the comine in of the Union probably would be (a subject to be discussed in
this subsection III, B , 2), Thompson said that he wanted to see about all the boys
getting together , going to the office, and turning out the Union . About 45 minutes
later Thompson was in the presence of Croft and they asked Reardon if he was
ready to go to the office and give the Union up . Reardon said he would think it
over . He took the hint and when he later found Overseer Whitman in the personnel
office he asked Whitman about getting out . Whitman told him he would have to
get out of the Union like he got in but if he needed any help to come back. There-
after Reardon went to see Smith , the union organizer mentioned in the early part
of this report , who gave him a card, other than the one he had signed , which Reardon
9 See , e g, Geo. Byers Sons, Inc, 111 NLRB 304-; Hammond Brick Company, 111 NLRB
1; Graber Manufacturing Company, Inc., 111 NLRB 167.
460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
signed and upon which he also wrote Smith 's name . He then went to Whitman's own
office and told Whitman he had the card . Whitman did not look at it but asked
Reardon if he did not know what to do with it. Thereupon Reardon apparently de-
stroyed the card. Thompson 's version of this affair is somewhat confusing . Insofar
as Reardon is concerned , Thompson 's testimony could be taken to read that Reardon
looked like he was distressed and despondent , had told other people he wanted to
get out of the Union , and on being referred to him told him he wanted to sign a paper
to get out ; and that Thompson said he knew nothing about a paper but the thing
for Reardon to do was to see Whitman . I am satisfied that Reardon 's account is,
more accurate than Thompson 's and that his approach to Whitman was due to Croft's
and Thompson 's importunities and certain -promises which are to be related in
their proper turn.
Following certain statements to him by Secondhands Dobson and Holly, either
discussed above or to be discussed in the succeeding subsection , and after he had
talked the situation over with his wife and with Kelly, employee Jesse F. Reese
asked Haymes to help him get his card back. Haymes told Reese he was surprised
he ever "fooled" with the Union and referred him back to Kelly, but that afternoon
Supervisor Vess Hamel told Reese that John Seymour wanted to see him . Seymour
is an employee in Respondent 's twisting department and is president of what is.
known, perhaps euphemistically , as the "Citizens ' Committee." 10 Haymes testified
that Seymour told him the committee had been "reactivated" and he wanted to do all
he could to keep the Union out . Overseer Whitman testified there had been an
article in the Valley Daily News-Times that Seymour was president of the com-
mittee. Reese went to Seymour who told him to see "Bubbles" Johnson , a Lanett
lawyer. Johnson dictated , and Reese signed, a letter of resignation from the Union
which requested the return of his authorization card.
About March 15, Thompson asked Raymond Tankersley why he wanted to get
in the Union and why he did not go out and talk to Whitman about getting out.,
Tankersley 's reply to the second question was that he had signed the letter to Re-
spondent 's president and did not think it would do him any good to see Whitman.
Then Thompson made a certain promise of work to Tankersley that will be de-
tailed in the second following subsection of this report . Following this conversa-
tion, Tankersley encountered five secondhands , Croft , Walls,ii Thompson , Davis,
and Gunn , in the smokehouse . They all tried to get him to go out and see Whit-
man about getting out of the Union . Davis said if he were Tankersley he would
throw away the union button . As Tankersley was leaving work the same day both
Davis and Gunn again asked him if he was going to see Whitman. Tankersley's wife
was discharged on March 28 . This discharge , it will be recalled , was one of sev-
eral alleged in the complaint to have been in violation of the Act. The following
day Tankersley decided he had better get out of the Union and went to see Whit-
man who told him he would have to get out the way he got in but that if he needed
any help he knew where Tankersley could get some. He then went to the union
hall where he was told he could not get his own card back but he procured a blank
application , signed his own, and wrote Smith 's, name on it and took it to Whitman 2
days after he had first talked with him. Whitman was talking to his secretary in
the office and when Tankersley showed him the card he laughed and told him to tear
it up . This Tankersley did.
Thompson 's testimony relative to these various incidents described by Tankersley
is the same as, and no more clear than , that relating to the overtures made to Reardon
that he should resign . Croft made the blanket statement that he never asked anyone
to take himself out of the Union . No reference was made to Tankersley , however,
in Croft 's testimony nor was it made in the testimony of Walls or Gunn , although
the latter stated 4 or 5 employees asked him how to get out of the Union and he told
them they would have to see Whitman . No secondhand named Davis was a witness;
the only person of that name who testified was Frank Davis, a loom fixer, who was
not interrogated about Tankersley . Whitman, who testified that a-number of em-
ployees came to him stating they thought if they did not get out of the Union they
would be discriminated against and that a total of approximately 10 or 12 letters of
resignation from the Union were prepared for employees in his office , was not interro-
gated concerning Tankersley. Upon consideration of the various ramifications of
the incidents here in question , I am satisfied that Tankersley 's account was substan-
tially accurate.
Employee Lucille Meggs was approached by Secondhand Horace Knight, about 10
days after she had signed for the Union, with the questions whether there was not
^u The only " citizens" referred to in the record are both employed by Respondent.
n Walls, as has already appeared , was a thirdhand
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 461
something she wanted to talk about and was she sure she did not want to talk to him
about something . Meggs then went to Haymes and told him she had decided that she
had done the wrong thing and wanted the card back. Haymes informed her he could
not get it back but he could see one of the citizens of Lanett (the Citizens' Commit-
tee), mentioning Seymour and Reardon, and they would procure it. That night Meggs
went to the home of Reardon where there was a previously prepared letter, addressed
to the Union, saying that she had changed her mind and requesting the return of her
card; Meggs signed, but did not post, the letter. It was mailed on April 9. Knight
did not testify. Haymes who testified that 6 or 7 letters of resignation from the
Union were written in his office, and that a good many employees were advised to
check with the Citizens' Committee, mentioned no employee by name.12
The courts have repeatedly held that it is "objectionable conduct" for an employer
to have "interested itself in any way in the matter of revocation of authority previ-
ously given by any of its employes to the Union to represent them." Coca-Cola
Bottling Company of St. Louis v. N. L. R. B., 195 F. 2d 955, 957 (C. A. 8); The Red
Rock Company and The Red Rock Cola Company, 84 NLRB 521, 524, enfd. as mod.
on other grounds 187 F. 2d 76 (C. A. 5), cert. denied 341 U. S. 950; United Biscuit
Company of America, Union Biscuit Division, 101 NLRB 1552, 1558-1568, enfd.
208 F. 2d 52, 55 (C. A. 8), cert. denied 347 U. S. 934; Poultry Enterprises, Inc., 102
NLRB 211, 224, enfd. 207 F. 2d 522, 525 (C. A. 5); N. L. R. B. v. Charles R. Krimm
Lumber Co., et al., 203 F. 2d 194, 195-196 (C. A. 2).
This case can not be fragmentized by sealing off its various facets, one from the
other. When Respondent's conduct is viewed in its entirety there inescapably emerges
a picture of a large scale solicitation of employees to abandon the Union with threats
of reprisals if they did not and promises of benefits if they did. Many of these
threats have been related. More will be. There is convincing evidence that em-
ployees not directly solicited to resign felt impelled to do so in the face of what they
considered (and not erroneously) coercive and discriminatory conduct. A few ex-
amples of these threats, promises, and resultant fears will suffice: (1) Croft's state-
ment to Cole that he was cutting his own throat by following the wrong crowd; (2)
Thompson's statement to Reardon that if the Union came in the mill would probably
shut down; (3) Holly's statement td Reese that if the Union got in the Company was
going to shut the mill down; (4) Thompson's statement to Whitaker that if he would
withdraw he would see he had a job as long as Thompson remained a secondhand;
-(5) Kittrell's having signed a letter of withdrawal because he was scared of losing
his job; and (6) Griffin's decision to get under cover when Tankersley was fired.13
On the basis of the facts which I have found, and my conclusions concerning their
significance, I am convinced that the General Counsel has sustained his burden of
proving that Respondent interfered with and coerced its employees by asking and
inducing them to make written requests directed to the Union for the return of their
-authorizations to the Union and that this conduct was violative of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
3. The allegations that Respondent unlawfully threatened reprisals and
to close its plant and promised benefits
These three allegations are so interrelated as to be susceptible of joint consideration.
It appears, without contradiction, that on April 10 Dobson told Kelly he had
been a good hand, that he had previously given instructions to start training him to
"There is additional cumulative testimony such as that of employees Bobbie L. Owens,
George Stallings, Lonnie Robinson, James H. Jones, Robert Watson, James T. Whitaker,
Ollis Turner, James A. Kittrell, and Leon Griffin, to the effect that they were importuned,
induced, or assisted by management in requesting the'Union to return their previously
signed authorizations, which would merely prolong this report and which it is unneces-
sary to discuss in detail or make specific findings upon for the purpose of arriving at a
- final conclusion.
'3I have touched upon the need of treating such issues as interrogation and the pro-
curement of,withdrawals in the light of concomitant threats and promises and related
,incidents. . The method of writing this report according to the sequence of allegations ob-
viously requires occasional anticipative reference to findings ^especting•allegations yet to
be considered This makes for a certain awkwardness of expression, but on balance, I
believe the advantage inherent in the chronological method more than compensates for the
confusion a completely commingled recitation of but loosely connected facts might create.
I only point out here that there are forthcoming further findings of threats and promises
which will support the conclusion that Respondent's conduct respecting the letters of with-
drawal took place in a context of interference, restraint, coercion, and discrimination.
462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
become a 'secondhand, and that he would-have had good prospects for the future
were it not for Kelly's union activity. Haymes agreed with Kelly that he told Kelly
he thought it best for him to get out of town and testified that his reason for saying
this was the disturbance he caused particularly between 2 boys, I of whom became
upset due to Kelly's union activities. Stone testified that about March 7-which
was before the no-solicitation notice was posted-Thompson came along when he
was talking to Slim (L. S.) Finley. As Finley walked away, Thompson asked what
the men were talking about. Stone told him they had been talking about the Union.
Thompson then said, "If you don't stop that kind of thing you are going to lose your
job." Although Thompson was not asked about this incident, there are two notations
in Stone's personnel file signed by Thompson that Stone had been seen reading a
newspaper and off his job talking to Finley, that he volunteered the information that
he was talking about the Union and that he was a member of the CIO, and that
Thompson warned Finley if he failed to keep the looms running or read another
newspaper on the job he would be fired.
It is clear that there was mention made of the Union during this conversation.
A witness' testimony under oath and subject to cross-examination is frequently more
impressive than a statement appearing in an exhibit. It is improbable, in view of
Haymes' instructions to supervisors that they could talk to employees about the
Union but not threaten them, that Thompson would have written a record admitting
that he had told Stone that if he did not stop talking about the Union he would lose
his job. I am inclined to believe that Thompson did not make in his notations a full
disclosure of all that was said by him when Stone either told him he was talking
about, or was a member of, the Union. I am somewhat perplexed by the meaning
of the phrase "that kind of thing" as used by Stone; whether it implies merely talking
on the job or talking about the Union on the job. But in view of the abundance of
evidence that Respondent had iio rule proscribing talking while at work, it is, I
believe, a fair inference that the phrase in its context implies union talk. It is
,somewhat strange that, in a case tried so well as this, Thompson would not have
been interrogated on the subject if he had not, or were to testify that he had not,
made a statement substantially in accord with Stone's account. This is one of a
multitude of close questions of credibility with which the case abounds. A reading
of the record and its comparison with this report will disclose a number of instances
where claims of conduct made by employees have not been adverted to. The reason
for this is that I have not been satisfied such claims have been proven and con-
sequently, since they do not support the complaint, discussion would be useless. In
this instance, in view of what has been said above and a number of other statements
of similar import which it is clear to me that Thompson made to employees, I resolve
the question of credibility in favor of the General Counsel.
On March 12, Croft had a long talk with Cole concerning the latter's connection
with the Union, saying among other things that he was following the wrong crowd-
mentioning names-and cutting his own throat. Cole stated he thought unions were
good for the people. Croft said that when Cole finished his course in business
administration-which Cole was taking mornings before going to work at 3 p. m.-
and went out looking for a job, management would find out Cole's opinions for the
people and would not want anyone with those opinions. Croft also said if there
were an election and the Union should win, the Company could close down and
move its machinery elsewhere. Croft, who posted one of the copies of "The
Uniontown Story," testified that he had talked to many employees about the Union,
that he did not tell Cole that he was cutting his own throat about the Union, that he
never repeated to anyone the mill would close, and that it was beyond his capacity
to know that even 1 week ahead. I have previously found, largely on the basis of
Croft's denial, that he probably did not tell employees that the Company had a
representative who attended and reported back what happened at union meetings.
By no means do I feel all his testimony was in distortion of the truth.
It will be noted that Croft did not deny the relatively trivial accusations that he
told Cole he was following the wrong crowd and would not be wanted by manage-
ment if he entertained prounion beliefs. But when it came to the crucial subject of
closing the mill down he at least indirectly denied Cole's assertion. I say "indirectly"
because the latter's testimony was that Croft said the mill could close whereas Croft
testified he never repeated to anyone that the mill would close. Croft made no
reference in his testimony to Cole's further assertion that he said the Company
could move its machinery elsewhere if the Union should win the election. I was
impressed with Cole's attitude of candor as he appeared before me. I cannot believe
that out of whole cloth he named the names of the members of "the wrong crowd"
which he said were mentioned by Croft. Assistant Overseer Carl W. Huckabee,
Croft's superior, testified that he talked to Cole a good bit and that in his opinion
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 463
he was fair to him and he'was a good boy. He also attested to Cole's honesty by
paying him the left-handed tribute of saying that plenty of looms were improperly
aproned and it was "unusual" for a man who was responsible to admit it as did
Cole. Croft, as a loyal member of Respondent's supervisory staff, of course found
himself in a difficult position when called upon to admit or deny conduct going to
the fundamentals of the case. He was saved from the necessity of testifying con-
cerning accusations of making statements of more or less innocuous character.
But when he was required to defend his Company from real peril, I fear his sense
of loyalty and dependence dimmed his inclination clearly to distinguish fact from
fiction. I am satisfied that Cole's testimony concerning this incident is not afflicted
with a similar myopia.
Employee Herman Crowder testified concerning an incident involving his third-
hand whose name he first stated was "Pellington" or "Fennington" and whom he
subsequently called Pennington. Employees Herron and Reed testified that there
was a thirdhand named Dock Pembleton-which person is expressly named in the
complaint. It is obvious to me that the thirdhand mentioned by Crowder is Pemble-
ton. About 2 weeks before March 26, when Crowder was wearing a union button,
Pembleton told him the button meant communism and that no Communist should
be allowed to work in the mill with decent people. The following day Pembleton
told Crowder he was going to have to run him off if he did not stay on the job and
that it was "not the damn button" he was wearing that was causing him to be that
way. Employee Elvin H. Smith testified that Secondhand Thompson told him
(Smith) that he did not want to see something happen like happened in Lagrange
where they had seen women and kids go hungry in 1933 on account of the union.
(Thompson's version was that he told Smith, "I have seen enough union activity that
I don't want any part of it. . . . What would happen if you all did organize that
plant? They would shut it down if they didn't run it like you wanted when i was a
kid up there. They shut that one down.") Employee Garland Sherrer testified he
heard this conversation but did not remember exactly how it went but Thompson did'
tell Smith if the mill were to go union, they would shut it down.
Around the first week of March, Thompson said to Sherrer, in the presence of em-
ployee Thadeus Kellum, that if the mill went union it would shut down. When
Sherrer expressed doubt about the mill closing if the stockholders continued to make
money, Thompson asserted that if a person in Birmingham, whom he named, said for
the mill to shut down, it would shut down.. (In referring to Sherrer's testimony
Thompson stated that he told him he was surprised that he was working for the
Union but he knows no Birmingham stockholder, he had no authority to tell anyone
that the Company would close, and he did not tell Sherrer that the Company would.)
A few weeks after he signed a union card Thompson told M. M. Reardon, during
the course of the conversation related earlier, about getting the boys together and
seeing about turning out the Union and that if the Union should come in, the Com-
pany would probably close down or he would lose his job or probably lose his house
and his children would go hungry. After Reardon began to wear his union button,
he observed that Thompson was watching him at work more closely than previously.
At the end of the conversation Thompson told him that if he would get out of the
Union, he would no longer make it hard for him. Thompson, who, as had already
been pointed out, made a general assertion that he had neither said the mill would
close if the Union came in nor promised anybody a permanent job if he should with-
draw from the Union, and attempted to explain away several other conversations
with employees , including Hugh Reardon , was not interrogated concerning M. M.
Reardon's testimony.
Employee Jesse F . Reese testified that about March 8, Secondhand Lavelle Holly
called him to his porch and talked to him about the Union, that the next week Holly
told him that if the Union come in the Company was going to shut the mill down,
and that the following day Holly told him that he knew he (Reese ) was in the Union.
Holly testified that he did not call Reese to his porch, that Reese came over, and
that Reese did not say anything to him on that occasion . Holly made no reference
to Reese's testimony concerning two subsequent conversations with him and Holly's
assertion he knew of Reese's allegiance to the Union , although he did deny that he
had a conversation with him in which he told him if the Union were brought into
the mill the Company would shut down . This but partial denial of Reese 's testimony
fails to convince me that Reese 's testimony should be disbelieved . Holly, of course,
knew that if Reese 's severest accusation that he threatened closing went unchallenged,
the effect might be most damaging.
About the third week of March, the first day employee T. L. Herron wore a union
button , Secondhand Pembleton told him he thought he was a better man than that
and asked him to pull off the badge . Pembleton talked with Reese nearly every day
464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for about 3 weeks. On one occasion he talked about wars going on overseas and
folks back home joining unions and on another occasion told Reese he had a chance
to fire him. The coercive implication of these statements under the circumstances
of this case is quite apparent.
About 2 days after Whitaker started to wear a union button, Thompson came up
to him while he was cutting out a warp and, during the previously alluded-to conver-
sation in which he asked Whitaker why he got into the Union, stated that if Whitaker
would sign a paper getting out of the Union he would see that he had a job as long
as Thompson remained a secondhand. When Whitaker manifested a degree of
skepticism, Thompson replied that he would hold up his right hand and swear that
as long as he was a secondhand Whitaker would have a job in Lanett Mill and that
he would quit himself before he fired him. Thompson's version of this incident was
that he told Whitaker and another employee they need have no fear of being "run
off," that they could keep their jobs so long as they ran them right, and that any
supervisor would be foolish to "run -them off." Thompson's testimony, even if it
were fully to be believed, does not meet the factual issue posed by whatever con-
flict there may be between his and Whitaker's testimony. The latter was talking
about a promise of permanent retention; the former about an assurance against fu-
ture discharge. I am satisfied that Thompson's statement-whatever its precise
words-was meant and understood to imply that if Whitaker should not quit the
Union he could apprehend being fired, but if he should get out he could anticipate
continued employment.
During the course of the previously related conversation when Croft and Walls
made inquiries of employee Willie H. Baker relative to his interest in the Union,
Croft told Baker that he was a good hand, had a good record, and he wanted Baker
to stay on. Croft then accompanied Baker to the office where he was shown his
own record and those of Crowder and employee Clarence Stanford which Croft said
he wanted to compare with Baker's. In the context of the unlawful inquiries made
of Baker and the subsequent suggestion that the advent of the Union might cause
the mill to shut down and result in Baker's losing his home, Croft's statement that
he wanted Baker to stay on constituted a readily discernible threat of reprisal if he
should adhere to the Union and promise of benefit if he should abjure it. (Croft
did not deny he had told Baker he wanted him to stay with the Company. His
denial that he told employees that if the Union came in the mill would or probably
would shut down, has already been discussed at considerable length. Rediscussion
of it here should not be necessary.14
As shown in the above findings, Respondent's supervisory personnel on many
occasions threatened employees with reprisals for union activity and promised them
benefits if they refrained from such activity. There can be no doubt that Respondent
thus engaged in the kind of interference, restraint, and coercion proscribed by
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Therefore I find that, as alleged, Respondent: (1)
Threatened its employees with economic reprisal because of their membership in,
sympathies for, and activities in behalf of the Union; (2) promised economic benefits
to its employees on the condition that they withdraw from membership in the Union
and discontinue their activities in its behalf; and (3) threatened its employees it
would close its plant because of their concerted activities.
C. The alleged•discrimination
The basic question raised by the discharges of 9 employees remaining out of the
12 whom it was alleged to have been discriminated against must be answered by
14 There is additional testimony such as employee Bobbie L. Owens' that Dobson told
-him the first day he wore a union button that he did not think he was that kind of a boy
and asked him whether he had ever heard of the loafer system-thus possibly implying
that workloads would be increased due to the Union ; employee Russell Lawhon's testimony
that his supervisor, Bill Smith-referring to the fact that Lawbon belonged to the
Union-asked him what he would do when he joined a big armed club and went around
burning up people's houses ; and employee George M. Reed's testimony that Pembleton
told him that he did not believe that people trying to organize the mill had much respect
for their buddies killed overseas, which' bear upon the allegations of threats and promises
violative-of Section 8 (a) (1). To make findings respecting all such testimony would, I
feel, be supererogatory. Regardless of whether or not such testimony should be found
in accord with the truth and whether or not a conclusion of unlawful interference,
restraint, and coercion should be premised on the facts found, the ultimate result would
be the same as .that reached upon consideration of the. testimony specifically discussed in
this report
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 465
determining the motive for such action. The General Counsel contends that
Respondent 's true reason was the union membership , sympathy, interest, assistance,
or other concerted activities of the persons who were discharged . Respondent
ascribes entirely different reasons.
It is well settled , of course , that union membership and activity do not immunize
an employee against discharge but it is equally well established as the Fifth Circuit
has said in N. L. R. B. v. W. C. Nabors Company, 196 F . 2d 272 , 275, that an
employee's unionism
sometimes discloses the real motive actuating an antiunion employer in dis-
charging such an employee notwithstanding other asserted reasons.
In the language of Chief Judge Hutcheson (N. L. R. B. v. Kibler-Camp Phosphate
Enterprise , 216 F . 2d 113 , 115 (C. A. 5) ),
It is, and always has been clear . . . that a discharge ostensibly for cause must,
in order to be protected as such , be in reality for cause and that a trumped up
or synthetic discharge for cause may not be used by the employer as a shield
and buckler to protect him against discharge , the real , the dominant motive of,
the moving cause for , which is anti-union discrimination.15
The Fourth Circuit has said in N. L. R. B. v. English Mica Company , 195 F. 2d
986, 987:
Whether , in view of all the circumstances , the discharges were in good faith for
the reasons given or whether these were mere pretexts for discharge on the real
ground of union membership and activity was a question to be decided by the
Board upon the conflicting evidence and the conflicting inferences to be drawn
therefrom . . . . As we said in Hartsell Mills Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 111 F. 2d
291, 293:
It must be i emembered , in this connection , that the question involved is
a pure question of fact ; that, in passing upon it, the Board may give con-
sideration to circumstantial evidence as well as to that which is direct; that
direct evidence of a purpose to violate the statute is rarely obtainable. .. 16
It is in obedience to these principles that I must apply the law to the facts and the
reasonable inferences to which they give rise and determine upon the basis of all the
circumstances of the case , and the rational implications derived from them, what was
the real and dominant motive which actuated this antiunion employer in discharging
these nine employees . The evidence is often in diametrical conflict . Few findings
may readily be made on uncontradicted testimony . The grain must be winnowed
from the tares and weighed in the light of the various witnesses ' power and oppor-
tunity accurately to observe the extent of their self -interest and their appearance and
attitude while testifying. In many instances , but far from in all, I shall refer-as I
have in treating the allegations of coercion-to statements of witnesses at variance
with those of others upon whom I shall rely in making findings and undertake at least
to sketch my reasons for according such reliance I do not credit some testimony
from either side. This and other evidence that seems to lack reliability or probative-
ness or substantiality I shall not dwell upon. This is not a "mass discharge" case to
which an easy escape and facile formula of disposition may be applied . I must in
effect decide nine individual cases. They will be taken up chronologically. While
doing so I shall endeavor always to be restrained by the knowledge that a more recep-
tive ear is naturally lent to an accusation than to a denial and that the truth is a sensi-
tive companion , difficult to catch up with and likely to flee if suspicion appears.
. Elizabeth Danford, who is 30 years old, was first hired as an inexperienced worker
by Respondent on March 22, 1943, at the age of 18 and put to work for 2 months as
a spooler learner. She became a general helper within 3 months and worked steadily
with the exception of 6 weeks from June 8, 1943, to March 1, 1944, when she quit.
A son was born to her on September 9, 1944. She returned to work in June 1945 as
a battery hand and apparently continued in the constant employ of Respondent in that
capacity until she was discharged on March 10, 1955. Her employment records con-
tain such notations as "attitude 0. K ," "rating-excellent," and "rated excellent."
Danford attended a meeting of the Union at a hall on March 5 and thereafter all
but one of the meetings held at employees ' homes. She circulated about 30 or 40
union application cards, I of which she had signed , among employees at the plant and
procured some 15 signatures . She was the first signatory to "the letter to the Presi-
See also N L I? B v Brady Aviation Corporation, 224 F 2d 23 ( C. A. 5).
n See alao N. L B B v Moss Planing M ill Co , 206 F 2d _557 (C A 4)
390609-56-vol. 115-31
466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dent." On,March 7, Danford told her foreman, Harold L. Peek, that she was 100
percent for the Union.
About 12:30 a. in. on March 10 Secondhand Luther Ray told all the battery hands
including Danford that they should not carry filling from one box to another. About
10- to 30 minutes later, Luther returned and said he had seen her carrying filling since
he had told her not to. Danford replied that if she was carrying filling she was not
conscious of it and that she had been doing so for 9 years and could not break such
a habit in 5 minutes . Ray testified that Danford said she had the habit and had
always 'carried filling and always would. Danford was sent to the office and dis-
charged forthwith.17 There is little doubt that the practice of carrying filling by
hand is likely to cause a mixing of fillings which is one of many causes of the produc-
tion of seconds and that the better practice is to transfer filling directly from marked
boxes to the batteries.
Overseer Whitman testified that he discharged Danford because Ray complained
she had been reprimanded frequently for the same offense of "carrying filling [which]
is [against ] a standard rule in Lanett's weave room" and he "saw fit to discharge her
for violation of company rules." In view of this statement of one of the mill's very
top executives it becomes appropriate to turn to the evidence to see if there was a
standard rule respecting the carrying of filling and, if so, whether the real and domi-
nant motive behind Danford's discharge was the rules' claimed violation or whether
the purported infraction was trumped up into a synthetic cause.
Danford's testimony that she had carried filling for 9 years and that Ray had
helped her carry it many times not only from loom to loom but from one alley
to another was undenied. Equally unrefuted was a mass of evidence coming from
both sides that carrying filling was a frequent and usual occurrence. For examples,
attention is drawn to the testimony: of Genelle Tankersley that she and all battery
hands carried filling; of Raymond Tankersley that it is a common practice for bat-
tery hands to carry filling and it is still being done; of Herron that filling is carried
from one loom to another when it runs out and is still being carried, he himself has
toted it to help a battery hand get caught up and nobody ever told him about a rule
against it ; of Reed that carrying filling is a practice in the mill; of Whitaker that there
is nothing strange about carrying filling; of Kittrell that most battery hands carry
filling; of Baker that he has seen employees carrying filling every night; of Gravitt
that he has seen employees carrying filling and see it recently and that he saw his
battery hand carry it the day before he testified at the hearing and employees have
always carried it; of Osborne that he has often seen employees carrying filling and
saw it done as late as the night before he_ testified at the hearing; of Harper that he
has seen battery hands carrying filling and it is done very day; and of Hamby that
the night Danford was discharged Ray-newly promoted to secondhand-came by
and said not to carry filling from one box to another, but he has seen employees
carrying filling, and all battery hands tote it, that since he received the instructions
from Ray he has carried filling but has tried to break the longstanding habit, that
he does not know how long there had been a rule, and that he reckons the battery
hands did not pay any attention to it.
In view of the testimony of these 12 witnesses, I am unable to credit the testimony
of Secondhand Ray that a rule against carrying filling by hand had been in effect
ever since he had worked for Respondent. Certainly, assuming the existence of such
a rule, there has been no apparent attempt to enforce it throughout the years until
about the time of the commencement of the union activities in which Danford took
so prominent a part. It goes without saying that an employer may discharge an
employee for any reason, good, bad, or indifferent, or for no reason whatsoever with-
out violating the Act, providing his reason is not one proscribed by the Act. If it were
a fact that Respondent imposed upon this excellently rated young woman the harsh
penalty of discharge for doing the same thing as had habitually been done by all
other battery hands it would be utterly improper for the Board to penalize Respondent
because it discharged her for a bad reason. Rather, what must be determined is
whether under all the circumstances the reason Respondent assigns for its action
was the genuine reason or a cloak put on to cover a starker reason . Considering all
of the manifold factors and overall perspective of, the case, I cannot escape arriving
17 There is testimony that about February 23 and March 1 Danford had been warned
about mixing filling in the batteries by carrying it by hand Danford testified that she
had not been reprimanded but sometime before March 10 there was some mixed filling in
the batteries she tended which was looked at by Ray and Peek, that Peek asked, her why
she mixed it and she replied she did not know, it just got mixed, and Peek rejoined that
if it weie a common practice with Lei he would turn her across his checkered apron
N
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 467
at the conclusion that Respondent seized upon an otherwise tolerated work method
on the part of Danford as a pretext for ridding itself of an active union adherent.18
Benjamin F . Stone, who is 35 years old, was first hired by Respondent in 1939 or
1940 and left his employment as a general helper on October 31, 1941 , to enter self-
employment . He returned to work for the Company on October 8, 1943, as a
weaver. Apparently the period of work , if any, for himself was of short duration as
he was occupied throughout most of the 2-year period he was away from the Com-
pany working for other concerns as a weaver , a painter, and an explosive loader. He
was separated for military service on January 3, 1944. This service was completed
in the late winter or early spring of 1946 and Stone was cleared for employment by
Respondent , again as a weaver on April 12, 1946, and reemployed on April 22. With
the exception of 11/2 months in 1947 when he took a fling at , and lent his hand to,
the diversified fields of insurance and interior decorating , Stone continued to work
regularly for Respondent from April 22, 1946, until he was discharged on March
l1,-1955. Although there is some indication that his work as weaver was not
entirely satisfactory on three occasions in 1947, 1949, and 1950 , he was given, some-
time subsequent to October 23, 1950, what was probably a promotion to the posi-
tion of loom fixer which he held with no recorded indication of dissatisfaction until
the time he was separated . The only performance rating appearing in Stone's em-
ployee work record prior to March 11, 1955, and that in 1947, is that he was
marked "average" in all respects by an overseer on a form providing for the circling
of estimates of production , quality, "get-along" ability , interest in job , knack of
helping, leadership , willingness , and use of spare time ; the printed ratings being
"poor," "below average," "average ," "above average ," and "excellent " During the
period of his employment Stone's hourly wage grew from 19 cents to $1.53.
Stone first became active in the Union at the March 5 meeting when he signed a
membership card . Thereafter he handed out 50 or 60 applications to employees in
the plant. He volunteered as a member of the organizing committee and signed
its letter to Respondent 's president , as has , already been noted. Thompson asked
him the day he signed the union card if he had been at the meeting and if he had
signed. Stone replied that he had attended the meeting , had signed for membership,
and added that he had procured signatures of other employees and was going to
get some more . Later, before March 11, the previously mentioned inquires by
Thompson as to what Stone and Finley were talking about and by Thompson and
Smith as to what the Union had promised him took place. On March 11 , Stone,
whom Whitman the following day told Cole was on the committee list and a mem-
ber of the wrong crowd , went to work at 3 p. in. He saw that there was one flag
up on a loom ( indicating the loom needed the attention of a fixer ). When he got
to the loom he found that the flag was down but there was a note on it that the
bristles were out of the shuttle. He took one shuttle to the workroom, rebristled
it, returned to the loom, put the shuttle in, and started the loom up. He then went
down the alley to see if anything was loose on the looms that needed tightening.
Stone testified that while doing this he noticed a newspaper on a box which the
filling boy had just piled up. Seeing that the paper was about to bunch off the
loom, Stone picked it up and was about to stick it down inside the filling box so
that it would not drop off into the left -off when Thompson walked up to him and
said he was going to have to pay him off for reading the paper , an act which Stone
denied he engaged in.
Stone was not allowed to finish his shift but was sent or taken to the office where
Thompson told Whitman and Huckabee that Stone had been reading a paper.
Stone again denied it and said he did not think he was being treated right. The
subject of Stone having talked with Finley on March 7 was brought up and when
Stone asked to see the paper which he had seen Thompson write up at that time,
he was told that it had been destroyed . At the conclusion of the conversation Whit-
man looked up and said that as far as the Company was concerned it was through
18 In making this finding , I do not rely upon the fact that Danford was the leadoff signer
of the organizing committee 's letter. Although she signed this communication before her
discharge , it was not proved that Respondent had received it before the night of March
10 or the early morning hours of March 1 1 and hardly satisfactorily shown that it was in
Respondent 's possession by the time Danford talked with Whitman during the daytime of
March 11, when the latter refused to rescind Ray 's action in sending her home the pre-
vious night , although Danford told him she was not sure that she was carrying filling at
the time of her discharge and asked him why it took him 9 years to lay her off when she
had been carrying filling ever since she cause to work and did not suppose that there was
.i'battery' liand in the mill who had not mixed filling at one time or the other.
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS,BOARD
with him then and forever Subsequently, Stone appealed to Mill Manager Wil-
liams who told him to come back after he had heard Whitman's side of the story.
Whitman called another meeting after that at which Stone was discharged, ap-
parently the day following Stone's interview with Williams, and went further into
the situation. Thereafter Stone again saw Williams who told him that he and
Whitman had decided Stone was dissatisfied with the job.
Whitman testified that it is not against the rules to read a newspaper,19 but he
discharged Stone because he thought he was neglecting his job by reading a news-
paper because the thing occurred right after a shift change when loom fixers' ac-
tivities should be devoted to their jobs. He also testified that he was in the room
at the time Stone's job was running but did not observe that there were flags on the
job, although supervisors told him that they were flying.
The testimony as to whether there were flags on the looms at the time Stone was
sent off the job and as to whether he was reading a newspaper at the time is con-
flicting. It needs scrutiny. Huckabee testified that several days-maybe a couple
of weeks-before March 11 he had seen Stone reading a paper twice just after the
shift started up but did not think much about it then, but when he later saw him
doing the same thing a third time he told Thompson it looked bad for a loom fixer
to sit around reading a newspaper and that Stone could not have inspected the
fillers which he is supposed to do at the start of a shift. Thompson testified that
after Huckabee talked to him he told Stone of the conversation and asked him
if he did not know his job came first to which Stone replied he did know it, that
on March 11 somewhere around 3:15 or 3:20 he saw Stone reading a paper, that
there were three flags up, that he walked up to him saying "Frank, you don't be-
lieve snakes will bite," and that he then got the attention of Whitman who was a
little piece away and told him he wanted to let Stone go. Herron testified he was
standing right at the end of his job when Stone was discharged, that he did not see
Stone reading a newspaper but did see him pick it up unfolded when it was about
to fall off the box, and that Stone started to fold it up but had not completely done
so until Thompson came up.
On the other hand there is the testimony of Mary Jane Rogers (who asserted that
she had had arguments with Stone, that at one time he had told her he could run
her off her job by tearing her looms down, that she did not like him at the time he said
it but did not particularly dislike him at the time of the hearing) that Stone had been
reading a newspaper or had it open in his hands for 3 or 4 minutes, she would say,
before Thompson came up. Rogers also testified that at the time she had three
flags up but was not disturbed by the fact that Stone paid no attention to them. Also
to be weighed is the testimony of Sarah Huckabee, aunt of Assistant Overseer
Huckabee and wife of a nonunion loom fixer also working in the plant (who as-
serted that she did not like the Union and most certainly did not appreciate Stone's
request that she join it and that she told him if she had a place of business and some-
body should tell her how to run it she would close it and Respondent could do the
same thing), that she saw Thompson walk up and there was Stone reading a news-
paper but she did not know whether Stone had been reading it for a long time or
just a split second before she saw him.20
Witness after witness repeated the fact that reading newspapers in the plant is a
frequent occurrence. In view of Respondent's final position that it was not for read-
ing a paper that Stone was discharged but for reading to such an extent that he was
neglecting his work, it is not necessary to expatiate upon the subject of reading alone.
Respondent could not plausibly have taken the position that reading papers was for-
bidden in the face of the fact of the postings of "The Uniontown Story" in the plant
during the height of the union activity. Although the record-quite naturally-does
not show how many of Respondent's 2,500 employees looked at these newspapers
during this period of excitement and agitation in the 3 places where they were posted,
there is evidence that they were widely read and it would be hard to believe differ-
ently. It scarcely could be expected that there were not a large number of employees
who took some time away from their work to read the article in this emotional epoch
and that in the aggregate hundreds of man hours, which otherwise would have been
19 It was brought out during the Respondent's cross-examination of employee Frank
Smith that after Stone was fired, Smith was ieading a paper when his job was caught up
and Thompson told him not to read on the job and that he did not want to have to dis-
charge him on account of reading a newspaper
z' 13uckabee, who has worked at the mill since 1909, knows of no one except Stone who
has been fired in connection with reading a newspaper.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 469
devoted to production, were lost.21 No one other than Rogers testified that Stone
read or looked at the newspaper-if he did read or look at it-for more than an ex-
ceedingly short time on March 11 . Witnesses ' estimates of the length of time are
prone to be notoriously unreliable. There is no one who has tried many motor vehi-
cle accident cases who has not heard witnesses estimate the time he had a car under
observation before a collision in terms of minutes although it is certain that under
the physical conditions of speed and distance the time could not have extended over
more than a period of seconds. In this instance I am unable to place reliance upon
the 3-4 minute estimate arrived at "just by the expression" by this determined and
obviously biased lady. Neither am I impressed with the argument to the effect that
although it was permissible for Stone to read at such times as looms did not require
his attention , his reading at the particular time at the beginning of a shift when it is
necessary to inspect the looms constituted a neglect of his job. Thompson and
Rogers testified that Thompson found Stone reading sometime about 3:15 or 3:30.22
This testimony is in accord with Stone's that before he picked up the paper he had
made the usual start-of-shift inspection, had taken a part from a loom, carried it to
the shop, repaired it, and replaced it on the loom. During this period he also, accord-
ing to Rogers herself, had turned the pick clock for her. The "critical time of the
day, which was right after shift change" referred to by Whitman, had passed if
Stone had been reading a paper at this time he would have been doing nothing other
than Assistant Overseer Huckabee testified he liked to see a loom fixer do because
he could feel his job had been done 23 and what Thompson testified was a usual thing
when a man's job is up. The very form of Respondent's first employee work record
respecting Stone shows that it was contemplated that employees would have spare
time and Stone was rated on the factor of how he used it. It is singular that among
all the looms assigned to Stone for attention it should just so happen that the only ones
which are claimed to have been flagged were those tended by the prejudiced Mrs.
Rogers whom Stone had just completed assisting, and that on Rogers' looms, and on
hers onP three faults should have been discovered in so short a time. However
that may be, if any failure instantaneously to fix the flagged looms could have re-
sulted in so severe a production loss as Respondent would have one believe it would,
it is difficult to understand why, instead of ordering Stone immediately to repair
them, Whitman should have told Thompson "to carry him to the office" leaving the
looms unrepaired and still running. Certainly loss of production such as it is claimed
that Stone (as well as Simms and Reed) occasioned was of no great moment to
Croft when he spent 2 hours attempting to pry Cole away from the Union, while
the latter was protesting that his job was getting behind.
It is an anguishing experience for any employee of long standing to be forever dis-
charged by his employer if he feels in his own heart that his discharge was unlawful.
It also is a distressing thing to an employer to be required to reinstate an employee
whom he sincerely believes was discharged for lawful reasons. While considerations
of sympathy or hardship must not play any part in determining whether or not an
employee has been discharged in violation of law, they point up the fact that it is of
just as grave importance in deciding such an issue not peremptorily to cast aside an
employee's claim as it is not capriciously to shrug off an employer's defense. Em-
ployee and employer stand equally before us. Both claim and defense must be fully
and conscientiously studied and weighed. This I have attempted to do to the best of
my ability. Justice to both parties demands no less. Considering all the evidence as
a whole, together with Respondent's hostility toward the Union, its awareness of
Stone's union activities, the dubiety of his being discharged for allegedly engaging
in conduct recognized as showing that an employee has attended to his work, and the
lack of resolute proof that he was neglectful of his job, I cannot escape arriving at
the conclusion that Respondent seized upon a bit of normally accepted conduct which
11A careful reading of this "story" (General Counsel's Exhibits Nos 13 and 13-A),
together with the material describing the illustrations, by the average reader, would, I
believe, consume about 5 minute,; Doubtless the time required by people of slight educa-
tional advantages would be considerably greater
s7 As indicative of the unieliabihty of Rogers' testimony sic testified at one place that
Stone staited reading about 3 0% :in(] at another place „nat Thompson dlsco%eled him
reading about 3 30 There is no hint or claim that Stone read on more than one occasion
on March 11 If these pacts of Rogers' testimony were to be believed, it would have to
be found she underestimated the time lie read by about 23 or 24 minutes.
211-luckabee's testimony that Stone could not have completed his inspection 5 nnnutes
after 3 seems reasonable but it has no seal hearing bete since the fact is that the news-
paper incident took place at least 10 minutes and perhaps as long as 25 minutes after 3 05.
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it wanted to believe Stone engaged in as a pretext to rid itself of a union adherent in
one of its attempts to polarize the union movement . That this attempt was not with-
out success is evidenced by the flight from the Union after Stone and other prounion
employees were gone.
Elvin H. Smith, who is 40 years old, was first hired on January 27, 1941, and
worked for Respondent over 14 years until he was discharged on March 14, 1955.
Respondent says he was fired for violating an established uniformly enforced rule
against smoking more than two times a shift. The General Counsel claims he was
discharged because of his union activities.
Smith signed a union card on March 5. Union meetings were held twice a week
and he attended all of them. Before the no-solicitation notice was posted he pro-
cured other employees' signatures. He signed the letter to Respondent's president
showing that he was on the organizing committee. It will be recalled that Thomp-
son told Smith that women and children had gone hungry in Lagrange on account of
the Union.
Previous to 1947, smoking had been forbidden in the slashing department where
Smith worked. That year the employees were informed that they would be allowed
to smoke in the restroom. The practice of smoking there continued until February
10, 1955. It is quite apparent that employees sometimes went to that room before
February and thereafter to another location, which will be described hereinafter,
and smoked more than twice each shift. There is considerable testimony however
to the effect that many of the employees understood that the practice was to be
limited to twice each shift. It appears that no employee had ever been penalized
before March 14, 1955, for smoking more than twice a shift in the department
where Smith worked.
A smoking stand or booth(s) was installed in the slashing department on Febru-
ary 10, 1955. There is evidence the secondhands were instructed that there
would be no more smoking in the restroom but that henceforth employees might
smoke in the booth. Smith testified that Secondhand Gaylor told him both before
and after February 10 that he could smoke twice a shift, that he smoked a cigarette
around 5 p. in , 1 about 7 p. in., and 1 about 9 p. in. on the night he was discharged,
and that he had on 1 occasion smoked 3 cigarettes with Gaylor himself. Gaylor tes-
tified that he informed all employees working under him, including Smith, that two
smokes per shift would be allowed in the stand, but no longer in the restroom
where a No-Smoking sign was put up, and that if any of them were caught smoking
,more than twice he would have to discharge him. He did not deny Smith's testimony
about having smoked 3 cigarettes with him at 1 time.
Other evidence as to whether there was a widely promulgated rule and, if so, how
assiduously it was enforced, coming from rank-and-file employees called by the
General Counsel who were in a position to know something about the subject, was
that: of Cole that there was no rule against smoking so long as the employee's
job was caught up; of Crowder that the employees smoked when they felt their
jobs were in such shape as to allow it and that when his secondhand went away from
his job he would go and get a puff off a cigarette; of Sherrer that he has smoked
as often as 4 or 5 times a day and does not recall anyone (in supervision) telling
how many cigarettes but some employees had said (the Company) did not want them
to smoke but 2 a shift; of Reese that he never heard of any rule limiting smokers
to 2 cigarettes a night and had himself smoked, and seen others smoke, more than
2 a shift; of Raymond Tankersley that he knows of no rule regarding limitation to
2 cigarettes a shift; of Herron that he never heard any rule about smoking only 2
cigarettes a shift and that he smokes more than twice a night but not a whole cig-
arette each occasion because he does not have time; of Pitts that he has not seen
anybody going into the smoking stand over twice and does not know how many
times those that did go in smoked once they were there; of Reed that he never
heard of any company rule against smoking and has smoked, and seen other em-
ployees smoke, more than twice a shift; of Whitaker that he knows of no rule against
smoking while on the job and that he smokes more than 2 cigarettes on a shift;
of Kittrell and Baker that they know of no rule against smoking in the plant; and
of Gravitt, Osborne, and Griffin that they have seen other employees smoking on
the job in the plant and that there is nothing uncommon about it.
Evidence from rank-and-file employees called by Respondent was that: of Eulas
Bailey that he was told when he went to work there would be just 2 smokes a shift,
he was told by Secondhand Chester Estes when the smoking booth was put in that the
rule would be as usual, that he only goes to the stand twice but may smoke more than
1 cigarette each time, and that the rule did not say how many cigarettes but how often
an employee went to the stand; of Claude Barnette that the rule before the stand
was installed was 2 smokes per shift, that when it was put up Estes told him that the
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 471
rule regarding smoking would be the same as always, that before the stand was
erected he probably smoked 3 times a shift but was' never reprimanded for, or
caught doing, it, and that since the stand was put up he has not smoked more than
2 cigarettes per 8-hour shift; of George Howell that when smoking was first permitted
in the restroom employees were not told how many times they could smoke there,
that about 8 or 10 years ago there was a notice put up that smoking was being
abused and that "he" said employees were permitted 2 smokes a shift, and that
when the booth was erected Gaylor told him not to smoke in the restroom but to
use the stand and take 2 smokes a shift; of Morton Bridges that Gaylor mentioned
smoking from time to time, that when the smoke booth was installed Estes told
him the same-rule would apply there, and that he had smoked more than twice a shift
in the restroom and had not been reprimanded for it or seen doing it by a supervisor
so far as he was aware of but had not taken any chance by smoking more than
twice in the stand; of Burt Spanks that Gaylor told him not to smoke anymore in the
restroom but to go to the booth, that if he were caught once smoking more than
2 cigarettes a shift he would be sent out for a week, and that he imagines that if
he were caught 2 or 3 times he would be fired; of Marvin Howell that Gaylor told
him when employees were first allowed in the restroom they could smoke 2 cigarettes
a shift but did not tell him what would happen if they should smoke more than
twice and that he never heard any complaint about excessive smoking; of Jessie
Harper that he smokes 4 or 5 times a night in the smoking booth and guesses others
do the same if their work is caught up and that there is nothing wrong about doing
it; and of Dorothy Harris that she knows of no rule about smoking other than that
it is allowed in the smoking booth and forbidden in the restroom.
Digesting this summary, 15 employee witnesses called by the General Counsel,
several of them coming in involuntarily, testified to the general effect that either
they had never been told anything about smoking or that such instructions as they
received were not enforced, and 5 out of 8 employee witnesses called by Respondent
testified that they had been told not to smoke more than twice a shift and, of the
remaining 3, 1 testified that the penalty for violating the instructions was a week's
suspension, another that he was told of no penalty, and the third that he smokes 4
or 5 times a night, conduct which is not wrong if one's work is caught up.
The weight of the testimony is adverse to Respondent's claim of the uniform en-
forcement of a rule by discharge or temporary layoff. Indeed, Gaylor testified that
Smith was the only man he had seen smoke more than twice since the booths were
put up but he had reprimanded two or maybe half a dozen for smoking before that
time Gaylor's claim that he had told Smith and others that anyone caught smoking
the third time would be discharged finds little support in the testimony of the em-
ployees-so many of whom stated that they were never advised what the penalty for
excessive smoking might be. Respondent relies upon an excerpt from the testimony
of Barnette to establish the fact that Gaylor stated the penalty would be dis-
charge. The persuasiveness of the quoted testimony is allayed by Barnette's other
testimony; i. e. "Q. Up to the present time he has said nothing to you about the
smoking rule, is that correct? A. That's right." In any event, Barnette was testi-
fying, whether correctly or otherwise, about what Gaylor said to him, not to Smith
or the other employees.
Without necessarily discrediting any of the testimony of the some 23 employee
witnesses who testified on the subject, it seems quite clear to me that the actual
situation was that some of them had been instructed not to smoke more than twice
a shift, more had not been informed of any rule respecting the number of times
they might indulge, and most of them had not been told anything about the im-
position of any specific penalty.
Before March 1955 there had been four occasions, going back as far as June 27,
1946, when Smith had been reprimanded. Gaylor told him, after he had engaged
in the second of two fights with other employees, that "any further trouble from him
in any way" would result in his being discharged. Yet he was not discharged when
thereafter on November 25, 1950, he came to work when he had been drinking
nor on March 5, 1954, when he left his job without permission and was caught
climbing the plant fence. But he was discharged when he engaged in an act, which
to say the least, was no more serious misconduct than fighting (to, which one would
suppose, the chastening tune of a broken nose), reeling to work, or slipping away
from it. Respondent states in its brief that Smith had been warned about the con-
dition of his job and his frequent absences from the job on many occasions. The
record does not support this contention. With the exception of the incident having
to do with drinking there is no evidence that he had been warned or censured during
nearly 5 years from November 25, 1950, until he was criticized for failing to leave
drop wires for work on frames on March 9 and 10, within 4 or 5 days after he
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
joined the Union and started attending its meetings. Gaylor testified that through-
out a period of 10 years Smith never refused to do what he asked him' to do, that
he kept his job up, and that he was always willing to do what the supervisor asked
him to do.
Whatever may have been Smith's shortcomings as an-employee during his younger
days of intractability, they were invariably tolerated, and threats that he would
be discharged if he should cause any further trouble were not carried out when he
did again engage in misbehavior of a serious character. Respondent would seem to
have it that quite suddenly in March 1955, this employee, whose willing services
it had enjoyed and whose spells,of belligerence and perversity it had endured for
14 years, became unbearable. Not until he showed himself active in the Union
and became known as a member of its organizing committee, a regular attendant
at its meetings, and a canvasser for members at the mill, did Respondent again begin
to laden Smith's personnel file with complaints and find his deportment intolerable.
It is of course fundamental that an employer has the right to manager its own
business and that the discharge of an employee incidental to that right is unim-
peachable. But where, as here, it is apparent that a discharge allegedly pursuant
to the right to run one's own affairs was in fact, as I find it was, a discharge in con-
sequence of an employee's union affiliation and activities, Section 8 (a) (1) and
(3) of the Act is violated.
John F. Cole came to work for Respondent at the age of 19 on June 30, 1950. He
is by far the best educated person among the several alleged to have been dis-
criminatorily discharged, having been graduated from high school and having con-
tinued his studies by attending courses in an endeavor to procure a degree in busi-
ness administration during his spare time from Respondent's employment. After
working for 6 months, Cole entered military service and upon his separation re-
turned to work for the Company on November 9, 1953, as a general helper and
continued until he was discharged on March 15, 1955.
Respondent insists that Cole was discharged because he refused to- follow in-
structions and caused damage to a roll of cloth. The General Counsel claims that
as it is clear that Cole was interrogated regarding his union activities and threatened
with economic reprisals if he persisted in them, the reasons Respondent advance for
the discharge are pretextuous and that as a matter of fact he was discharged in viola-
tion of the Act.
Cole joined the Union about March 9, attended all but one of its meetings, signed
the committee letter to the company president, and procured signatures to applica-
tion forms. Croft's statements about Cole following the wrong crowd, cutting 'his
own throat, and the Company's moving need be retold here.
On March 12, Cole was reprimanded for the second time for failing to change
filling and style tags. About 3 days later, the day Cole first wore a union button,
Croft and Huckabee showed him a roll of cloth spotted with oil which they said
had been called to their attention by a note from Secondhand Luther Ray.24 The
previous night Cole had changed an apron on one of the looms. Either Croft or
Huckabee said the damage had been caused by a short apron 25 Cole was forthwith
taken to the office and given a time slip. Huckabee told him he could return the
following day as possibly Whitman might consider putting him back to work. Cole
did see Whitman who, after looking over a notice Huckabee prepared which stated
that Cole had made one mistake after the other and had admitted that on account
of his outside studies he did not get ample sleep, announced that he saw no reason to
reverse Huckabee's decision to separate him.
Huckabee testified that there was nothing unusual about having short aprons,
that he imagined plenty could be found on looms right at the time he was testifying,
and that Cole did fair work but because of his short experience at the trade he was
no expert. Croft testified that (before he had put on a union button) Cole had
made two pick gear mistakes which, in one sense of the word, are more serious
than putting on a short apron and that normally a person would be discharged for
a pick gear mistake but not for installing an improper apron unless he did it de-
liberately. As against Respondent's contention that its reason for this discharge
was accumulative, it is persuasively significant that Cole was merely reprimanded
St Although a witness. Ray did not testify about the incident
-Cole admitted the mistake of not changing the filling and pick geais With respect
to the accusation that he put on an unsuitable apron he is reported to have said to Croft
and Whitman that he figured it was long'enough This subject was explored with relent-
less detail in the interrogation of Roy Oliver, Gwin E Feiner, Frank S. Davis, and Third-
hand Homer Walls with but meager results, about all of import having been-discovered
being that looms are dressed in shoit aprons every once in awhile and no one othei than
Cole is known to have ever been supposedly flied foi such abbreviated draping
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 473
for derelictions ordinarily calling' for discharge before management was aware of
his committee membership , but fired for his actual or assumed part in creating a
frequently occurring condition which does not call for discharge after his union
allegiance became known and was persisted in despite Croft's attempt at dissuasion.
I am convinced that this discharge of yet another known member of the union
organizing committee was but one more pick of the warp and woof of the winding
sheet woven for the Union.26
Johnny M. Reeves worked for the Company from August 23, 1939, until March
17, 1941, when he entered the military service; from January 28, 1946, until March
29, 1951, and from August 5, 1953, until he was laid off on March 16, 1955.
Respondent says he was laid off on account of a reduction in force ; the General
Counsel claims that he was discharged for his union activities.
Reeves joined the Union (signed a card) about March 5 and attended all the
meetings which were held in the morning . The lubrication group of employees in
which he worked is a separate department under the supervision of the lubrication
engineer . Originally he had done lubrication work in the spinning room on a
temporary basis while the regular oiler was out on sick leave . There was an opening
in the weave room and Reeves was assigned there when the regular oiler whose
place he had been taking in spinning returned to work. He was dissatisfied in the
weave room and when an opening became available , he was transferred back to
spinning.
In November 1954 there was a change in cleaning schedules , necessitating a
readjustment of the work force among the oilers. Reeves was offered a choice of
a second shift job as a spinner or a first job as a weaver . He preferred to give up
the first shift job, the shift on which he was working, rather than go to the weave
room . New equipment had been ordered for the spinning room during the winter
of 1954-55 and by the middle of February half of the frames in the spinning room
had been equipped with new rolls. These were antifriction rolls which required
less frequent cleaning -than those they replaced . The cycle for spindle cleaning was
8 month"s. instead of 4 months, so that a change in cleaning schedules was necessary.
This change in equipment started several months before the union campaign.
On February 14, 1956, the Respondent's assistant manager issued the following
instructions:
Since we have purchased antifriction top rolls for the 64 frames in No. 3
Spinning Room and delivery has begun on these to the extent that at the
present time you have equipped approximately i/2 of these frames with middle
and back Clean Draft rolls, I would suggest that you get with Ed Penley and
have him rework your oiling jobs. With the installation of the antifriction
rolls on these frames and the fact that you have been able to change the fre-
quency of oiling the antifriction spindles from a 4-months to an 8-months cycle,
it would indicate that we should be able to eliminate at least one Spinning
Room oiler.
After the jobs and schedules were studied it was found that the crew of 8 in the
spinning room could be reduced to 7. The lubrication engineer reviewed the records
of the spinning room crew, having in mind terminating any employee in the group
who might be doing unsatisfactory work. However, he could not make a selection
on that basis because they were all functioning well. He then checked length of
service and found that Reeves was the junior in the spinning room in length of
continuous employment. The schedule and the fact that he had less length of
service than the other oilers in spinning was explained to Reeves. There was no
other vacancy available as an oiler. All the other oilers were also advised about
the new schedules and the reason for the reduction in force. There remain only
seven oilers in the spinning room and there have been no hires since Reeves was
terminated.
Since then there has been only one person hired as oiler, and that was in the
weaving department. Lubrication Mechanic Slagle testified that he was present at
the conversation between Reeves and Wheeler, the lubrication engineer, in which
Reeves was offered a job in weaving in November 1954, and Reeves replied that he
"didn't want the weave room under no condition."
`m Among other members of the organizing committee, less persevering than Cole, who
remain in Respondent's employ are Reese, Owens, Whitaker, Kittrell, and Griffin who to
outward appearance resigned from the Union under the circumstances of company sug-
gestion, urging, assistance, or pressure with which we are now familiar It will be re-
called that "rani-road" Kelly left the Company after he was told it would be advisable
for him to get out of town
474 DECISIONS OF- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Unlike the previously discussed employees, whom I have found were unlawfully
discharged, Reeves neither was a member of the organizing committee, wore a
union button at work, nor solicited memberships. There is no evidence that any
.supervisors discussed union matters with him. That an abnormally large number
of employees for a given period-and union members at that-were discharged dur-
ing the height of the union campaign and that Respondent engaged in numerous
acts of interference, restraint, coercion, and discrimination at about the time it
discharged Reeves.is not sufficient, in the absence of further evidence, to warrant
the conclusion that the allegation of unlawful discrimination against Reeves has
been sustained.
James T. Simms went to work for Respondent on July 9, 1951, as a general helper
in the cloth room. He signed a union card about March 5, attended all the union
meetings, procured the signatures to cards of about 20 employees before the no-
solicitation notice was posted, but did not procure signatures nor solicit memberships
after it was posted, and started wearing a union button about 4 days before Respond-
ent discharged him on March 19, 1955, for the asserted reason of being off the job,
talking, and hindering other help Simms' personnel folder contains only one "warn-
ing" record between July 9, 1951, and March 11, 1955. That is a notation that he
was told to stop talking to the inspector too much because it was slowing down pro-
duction. But the folder does contain four notations of objections raised to his con-
duct- on March 11, 14, 17, and 19, 1955 The March 11 entry notes that a press
operator told a supervisor that Simms was bothering him about the Union. The
subsequent entries are to the effect that inspectors reported that Simms talked to them
and they were worried and nervous; that Simms was found talking to an inspector
and told he would have to stop hindering the help and if it happened again he would
be discharged; that Simms was seen talking to the calendar man, by the overseer,
who told the secondhand that Simms had not stopped hindering the help; and that
on March 19 after he was seen talking to the calendar man 27 at 9 a. m. and 10:30
a. m. he was discharged, at which time Simms protested that the main reason
for his discharge was because he wanted a union, and that he had never been repri-
manded about anything else as long as he had been working.
I credit Simms' testimony that all he said to the calendar operator at the time
Secondhand W. T. Dailey discharged him was, "Boy, these women sure are running
the cloth off." (I make the same reflection concerning Dailey's estimate that the
conversation lasted "I would say couple minutes, or two or three minutes, something
like that" as I already have with respect to Rogers' estimate of the length of time
Stone was asserted to have read a newspaper Regardless of this, even if Simms had
talked to Cantrell for 5 minutes he could not have interfered materially with his work
if Dailey's testimony, that a roll runs 5 minutes before being doffed, is to be be
believed:)
Insofar as Respondent has hinted that Simms was also discharged for violating
Respondent's rule against solicitation, I refer to my finding of fact based on his own
testimony that he engaged in no solicitation after the posting of the notice. Beulah
White's testimony is more susceptible of meaning that Simms propositioned her some
time before the barring of solicitation during the workweek ending Friday, March
11, than it is if he did so after the ban was imposed during an 8-day week peculiarly
beginning on a Friday and running through a Sunday. There is no indication in the
March 11 "warning" notice that Simms talked to inspectors about the Union.
Respondent's attempt to draw a distinction between talking with other employees
and interfering with their work is not impressive. The real distinction Respondent
makes, I believe, is that between talking to employees about the Union and merely
talking to them. Supervision was told what Simms was talking about and knew what
he was doing in behalf of the Union before solicitation was ordered stopped. Neither
Dailey nor Overseer Morgan (so far as appears from the latter's reports), who was
ill at the time of the hearing, knew what he was talking about after that time. It
requires but little insight to infer that Respondent apprehended he might be continu-
ing to recruit union members and that this explains the sudden appearance of the
many warning reports after March 11 in Simms' otherwise virtually unblemished
record. The interference with the work of a great number of employees due to read-
ing the antiunion message in "The Uniontown Story" could not have been other than
a hundredfold, even a thousandfold, greater in the aggregate than that occasioned
by whatever brief remarks Simms had made to a few of them The former conduct.
Respondent found unobjectionable; indeed it facilitated it at a time that it says there
had come about so marked a decrease in production and increase in seconds over the
preceding months, such a low ebb of production and so great a flow of complaints
r Cantrell, who was not a witness.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY- 475
regarding quality, that it was necessary to take steps to increase efficiency, to start a
program to improve quality and production, and to start a drive to correct employees'
inefficiency and neglect and their leaving their jobs by congregating in discussion or
otherwise. .
By a majority of 17 to 1, White alone dissenting, 17 supervisors and rank-and-file
employees, including Secondhand Dailey, testified that Respondent had no objection
to, or rule against, employees talking to one another.
• According to White herself she had conversations with other employees and would
talk to Simms several times a day. she does not know whether they talked for sec-
onds or minutes and only one of these conversations had to do with the Union.
Scarcely can it be said that the following testimony of White furnishes convincing
proof that Simms engaged, while at work, in disruptive or time-consuming solicita-
tion of his matrilineal coworker on this one occasion:
Q. When he talked to you about the Union, he didn't show you any card. Is
that right?
A. No, but he did tell me, he says "Aunt Beulah, I have got a pocketful of
them." That is exactly what he said. Didn't you, Jimmy?
On all the evidence, as well as upon the circumstances directly attending Respond-
ent's treatment of Simms, I am of the belief that his discharge, ostensibly for cause,
was not in reality for cause but rather a trumped up or synthetic discharge for cause.
I find that the real and dominant motive of, and the cause for, Simms' discharge was
Respondent's antiunion discrimination.
James C. Reed went to work for Respondent the day after his 16th birthday on
June 5, 1946, and remained in the Company's employ for nearly 9 years with but
brief'interruptions, the longest of which was when he was in military service in 1951
and 1952, until he was discharged ostensibly for "violation Co. rules" and "solicita-
tion in mill CIO union memberships in violation of Company policy" on March
25, 1955.
Reed signed a membership card about March 7, attended union meetings, passed
out union circulars, and wore a union button in the plant. Reference has been made
to Huckabee's expression of disapproval of the fact that Reed wore the button.
Reed testified that while he and employees Henry Crowder (not to be confused
with Herman Crowder) and Hamby were eating their suppers at about 1:20 a. m.,
at Crowder's request he gave him a card and that while Crowder was signing it on
the wall, he stood in the hall between the cloth room and the weave shed and asked
Hamby, who had not started back to his place of work, to wait a minute so they
could go back together into the weave room. When the card was signed, Reed
took it and the three men went inside to work. Thereafter Night Supervisor Harold
Peek, whom Reed had not seen during the episode, came up and said he had been
in the doffing room and had seen Crowder sign the card, stated that was not the
wise thing to have done, and told Reed and Hamby, who was also wearing a union
button, that they were fired. Reed went outside to his car and was waiting for
Hamby when Peek came up and asked him to hand over Crowder's card.
Peek's version of the incident is that on the night of March 26 he saw Reed,
Crowder, Hamby, 'and employees A. C. Pepper and R. C. Colby eating lunch in the
hallway between the weave and cloth rooms. He then went to the yard, entered the
cloth room, and stopped at the door to the hall where the men were still eating to
see what he could hear. The conversation was largely about the CIO and 'he could
hear most of it. After Pepper and Colby left, Hamby started to open the door and
leave when Reed asked him to wait a minute until he got a card signed before going
back to work. Crowder signed the card, gave it back to Reed, and the three went
to the weave room. Then Peek in company with Secondhand Ray talked to Reed
in the smoking room where Reed said he was aware of the antisolicitation rule and
knew he had violated it. Ray then told Reed and Hamby to "go out" and return
later to see Whitman 28
It is important to recall that the antisolicitation rule proscribed solicitation in the
plant by any employee while he is at work of any other employee while he is at
work. Let us figure out, whether Reed, while he was at work, solicitated Crowder,
while he was at work.
Peek testified that he knew of no definite time in which to eat; a lunch wagon
comes to each department and normally stops there about 15 minutes while employees
gather around it, get what they want, eat it, and then go about their business.
0 Peek further testified that Whitman decided Hamby had not done any soliciting and
exonerated him
i
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As appears from Reed 's testimony the three men were no more than finishing their
supper when Crowder signed the card . Even assuming that Hamby had headed
back to work or, arguendo , going further, that he was performing work at a time
when an actual solicitation for membership took place (and the evidence goes no
further than that Crowder asked for a card-which is certainly not a "solicitation"
on Reed 's part ), the fact remains that the interchange took place between Reed and
Crowder at a time when they were not at work , regardless of what Hamby may
have been doing. Therefore it is difficult to follow Respondent 's emphasis on Peek's
testimony , that after Hamby had started back to work Reed asked him to wait a
minute until Crowder signed the card or to attach any relevancy thereto. As the rule
proscribes solicitation while either precator or precatee is at work and it is clear
that if anything that may accurately be called a solicitation was made it took place
at a time when neither Reed nor Crowder were at work , it must be that the rule was
not infracted.
Although Peek's signed warning record and Reed's separation notice, both dated
March 26, 1955 , refer only to the incident with Crowder and Respondent's evidence
is indicative of an assertion of the fact that the ground for Reed 's discharge was his
conduct on that date , Respondent in its brief seems to argue that two additional
supposed derelictions contributed to itsodecision to fire him and refers to the evidence
of employees Harper and Huddleston . The former testified that maybe a couple
of times when Reed was tying on a warp on his job he would ask him if he were ready
to sign a card, that it would just take him a minute, and that he reported it to Peek.
It appears likely that the inquiry or inquiries Harper reported to Peek took place
more than 10 days before Reed 's discharge because an "employee warning record,"
dated March 15 and signed by Peek, reports that Harper told him Reed had been to
him at his job and in the smoking booth and asked him to sign a union membership
card . In view of Harper's statement , far remote from the fact , that the antisolicita-
tion notice had been up 3 weeks before Reed talked to him ( it was posted only 2-or
possibly 3 working days before Peek reported Harper told him he had sometime
earlier been approached by Reed ), I can place little reliance on Harper's testimony
that Reed solicited him subsequent to its posting . In any event , no "warning" about
this was given to Reed and no disciplinary action was taken. Harper further testified
that there were a couple of times he knows of that Reed asked him if he were ready
to sign 'and the last time was the night Reed got discharged . There is no claim that
at any time before he was discharged did Harper tell anyone that Reed had impor-
tuned him that very night. Obviously then , any present asserveration that any
solicitation of Harper on March 26 played a part in the decision of Respondent to
get him discharged that day is illaqueative . Similarly, although Huddleston testi-
fied Reed asked him about joining the Union, about a week before he was dis-
charged, since he also testified that he neither reported the incident to his supervisor
nor told anybody about it, any solicitation of Huddleston by Reed could not have
been a ground for the latter 's discharge.
The reason advanced by Respondent for the abrupt discharge of this man with
whom, so far as his personnel file discloses , it never had found occasion to be dissat-
isfied during the 10 years of his employment until the height of union activities in
which he was a participant, does not stand up under scrutiny. The cause must be
found elsewhere. I find that the reason was Respondent's opposition to the union
activities of this employee whom it feared was an unregenerate union advocate and
suspected would continue to seek support for the Union so long as he remained in its
employment.
Because of this conclusion , it happily becomes unnecessary to consider the possibly
exceedingly close question of whether or not Respondent discriminatorily misapplied
a no-solicitation rule which has been so arduously argued by both counsel.
Herman Crowder , who was born August 5, 1911 , first went to work for Respondent
at its Langdale plant in 1924 at the age of 12 or 13. He does not remember, and the
record does not disclose , how long he remained there this first time but it does appear
that he worked in Valway Mill from 1928 to 1933. As it also appears that Crowder
finished the 9th grade it is a reasonable assumption that sometime between 1924 and
1928 he attended school for 2 or more years, it being improbable that he had gone to
school more than 6 or 7 years before 1924. Hence it is doubtful if his .first employ-
ment as a young boy at Shawmut Mill was of long duration . There is no evidence
concerning where Crowder may have worked between 1933 and 1937, but it is estab-
lished that he started working a second time for Respondent at Langdale Mill in 1937
and continued as a weaver in Respondent 's employ there and in its Shawmut and
Lanett Mills until he was discharged on March 26 , 1955, 31 years after he first started
working for Respondent and 18 years after his second entry into the employment of
the Company.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 477
Crowder signed a union card on March 5, attended all the meetings on his shift,
and began to wear a union button about 2 weeks before his discharge. It will be
recalled that at about this time Thirdhand Dock Pembleton told Crowder that the
union button meant communism, that no Communist should be allowed to work in
the mill with decent people, that be was going to have to run him off if he did not
stay on the job, and that it was not the union button that was causing him to be that
way.
The General Counsel's interpretation of the evidence relating to, and his argument
concerning, Crowder runs as follows: It strains the imagination to arrive at the con-
clusion that this employee, after more than a quarter of a century of service, should
be terminated for inefficiency as claimed by Respondent. Respondent presented rec-
ords to support its contention that he was discharged for low production and high
seconds, but these records reveal that there were numerous other employees with
lower production and higher seconds than Crowder and that, during the last week he
was employed, 7 out of 21 weavers had higher seconds than Crowder. It is thus
conclusively demonstrated that the reason asserted for Crowder's discharge has no
validity, and it is clear that he was discharged for his union affiliation and activities
and for no other reason.
Respondent's appraisal of the testimony and argument in support of its position
that Crowder was discharged as a result of his own negligence and improper per-
formance is that: On one occasion Secondhand J. W. Smith found 9 out of his 36
looms producing seconds, which was more than Smith had ever seen a weaver have
on his looms; Crowder admitted a prior 3-day layoff in the fall of 1954 for producing
seconds and warnings for carelessness and leaving his job; he was warned on March
11 about second quality cloth off his job and told quality must improve or he would
be replaced; whether the seconds found on March 26 were caused by Crowder's own
acts or by fault in the looms, it was his responsibility to shut them down and flag the
fixer; although the secondhand pointed out 9 defects Crowder refused to recognize
them as such; half the flaws were due to the looms and half to Crowder's failure to
do his job properly; Crowder's excuse was that he had a backache due to an injury
2 weeks earlier; Respondent's medical examiner, Dr. Austin, reported, following an
examination 3 days after Crowder's discharge, a diagnosis of no apparent disability
and recommended referral to the patient's family physician, Dr. Norman, for exami-
nation, treatment, and further study thereafter; Dr. Norman reported the opinion that
it was inconceivable that a traumatic injury could give rise to such symptoms without
more positive physical findings; Denny, a fixer on 10 of Crowder's looms, testified
there were 2 or 3 days, around the-time the union was organizing, during which
Crowder stayed in the smoke booth most of the time; and Hartman, the other loom
fixer, testified Crowder claimed the secondhand "had it in for him," that he had not
stayed on the job, and consequently was having trouble with it.
There is no question but that Crowder was especially active in behalf of the Union
and that Respondent was aware of his interest. The fact is apparent not from Pemble-
ton's observations alone. Employee Denny and Secondhand Smith, upon whom
Respondent particularly rely to establish its defense of a discharge for cause, testified
as follows concerning the notoriety of Crowder's activities:
Q. [To Denny] It was pretty well known that Mr. Crowder was active in the
Union is that correct?
A. Who could miss it?
Q. [To Smith] When did you learn that Mr. Crowder was interested in the
Textile Workers Union?
A. . . I went on an assumption basis that he was because he was signing
them up left and right. . When I saw his button as a committee man, then I
definitely knew he was on the committee.
Q. When did you see his button with relation to the day of his discharge?
A . . . . About three weeks I guess.
Q . . . there is considerable testimony that buttons were not worn in the
plant until March 16th, that would be a period of only 10 days.
A. I will go along with you. . . .
Crowder testified credibly that although Smith showed him 8 or 10 of what Smith
claimed were things wrong he never saw any of the material come back as seconds,
he did not find a single thing wrong, and, as he thinks he had been a weaver long
enough to know what a defect in cloth is, he would not call anything that Smith
showed him a defect. He further testified that he was having some trouble with his
looms with a resultant production of seconds in cloth other than that shown him by
478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Smith, which was caused by the difficulty he had in getting Loomfixer Brad Hard to
fix the looms.
It is quite apparent that during his 2 penultimate workweeks Crowder turned out
more than an average amount of seconds , yet during this period there were 2 other
weavers the first such week and 3 others the second such week , out of a total of 19 each
week , whose percentage of production of seconds was greater than his. During the
second of these weeks his seconds were but six-tenths of 1 percent greater than 2
additional fellow weavers. The records would seem to show that the General Counsel
understated by 3 the number of weavers having higher seconds than Crowder during
his last week of employment when Respondent apparently would have it that he
produced an intolerably high number of seconds, as they disclose that the number
was 10 of them rather than 7 out of 20 who did so. If we were to go back for a
period of 10 weeks before the third last week of Crowder's employment to the first
week of January 1955 , we would find that during each week there was an average
number of over 6 weavers whose percentage of seconds exceeded Crowder's . During
2 weeks only in this period a notation of "good" was made opposite the names of
certain weavers . Two employees were awarded this citation twice and seven others,
including Crowder, received it once. Twelve did not receive it at all.
Crowder , who recognizes that he was not pleased with the amount of seconds
coming from his looms for a period around the middle of March, attributed the fact
to the handicapping effect of a back injury as well as to his loomfixer's lack of coopera-
tion.29 Respondent belittles the physical condition as a factor in the case mainly by
pointing to the reports of two physicians that they could find nothing to account for
Crowder 's complaints . Apart from the facts that the medical reports are not "evi-
dence" in the usually accepted sense of the word , that the physicians were not witnesses
subject to cross-examination , and that doctors can sometimes be wrong, it is clear that
when Crowder was sent to Respondent 's clinic by his secondhand on March 10, he
gave a history of having been struck by a shuttle , was found to have signs of contusion
over the right upper lumbar region , and advised to return for heat treatment the
next day if he had pain. He continued to have back soreness and took medication
but did not return to the clinic because nothing had been done for him the first day.
It was not until 19 days later that he was examined by the Company's medical direc-
tor who obtained a history that Crowder continued to have pain in the lower back and
that although he had worked each shift he had been unable to do as much work as
usual because of this condition. X-rays of the back revealed an old localized arthritic
condition which the medical director stated was above the area of complaint. He
reported that examination of the back did not reveal any real evidence of hematoma
and that no definite muscle spasm was present . Seventeen days after Crowder's
examination by the medical director, Dr. Norman wrote a report that Crowder com-
plained to him on March 31 that he had had a low back pain of 2 or 3 weeks duration,
that physical examination on March 31 revealed no marks, discoloration, or deform-
ities, that other signs were negative , and that in his opinion a traumatic injury could
not give rise to Crowder 's symptoms without more physical findings.
Crowder or his looms produced more than the average number of seconds during
the period immediately after his March 10 accident . There is no way of telling how
much of this occurred right after he sustained his injury, on March 10, 11, and 12.
This situation continued into the week ending March 19 but, as we have seen , became
greatly improved during the following week. Such a course is entirely consistent
with Crowder's claim that for a period after his injury of March 10 he was so handi-
capped by its effects that he had not been able to do as well as-usual. It is also indica-
tive of a gradual and not prolonged recovery. It is not in the least surprising then,
that 3 weeks or more after his injury the doctors should not find "any real evidence of
hematoma," nor "definite muscle spasm," nor "marks, discolorations, or deformities."
Denny's testimony that for 2 days Crowder spent most of the time iri the smoke
booth around the time when the Union was organizing cannot be believed. In the
first place, it is scarcely conceivable that Crowder could have done so without having
been discovered by supervisors who also frequented the booth or that he would not
have been penalized, at least reprimanded, for absenting himself from work. In the
second place, Crowder could not possibly have been away from his work for 2 days
of a 5- or 6-day week without the amount of his production having suffered. Yet an
inspection of percent production columns of the weavers' records shown in the mar-
29 It appears that weavers were charged for seconds, that this was considered inequitable,
and that it was one of the reasons employees joined the Union hoping it would correct
the situation.
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY ' 479
gin 30 reveals that during the 5 weeks from that ending February 26 until the week
he was discharged , Crowder 's average production was fairly up to the norm and in
excess of that of his fellow workers . Of course , if it could be correctly imagined
that Crowder did no work for most of the time for 2 days in 1 week without super-
visors knowing it, Respondent cannot now claim that this conduct formed a part of
the asserted "improper performance of his job " which it alleges was the reason for
his discharge.
Assuming the accuracy of his secondhand's description of the state of Crowder's
job on a single occasion , "one swallow maketh not a summer, nor one ill-wind a
winter." Crowder was probably not the best weaver in Respondent's employ; nor
was he the worst. As has been seen , the company records themselves indicate that
the performance of other employees , during this particular time when Respondent
says special corrective steps were being taken to get the percentage of production up
to a normal operating standard and the quality of fabrics back to accepted standards,
was inferior to Crowder's. Yet while he alone was fired it does not appear that others
with poorer or no better records were even wrist-slapped for their similarly equally
nefarious shortcomings.
An "employee work record" form on which Overseer Whitman appraised Crowder's
performance provides spaces for rating five selected factors on a scale ranging from
"poor" to "excellent." Crowder 's work was evaluated as "below average" in 2 and
"average" in the other 3 factors . In this form Whitman expressed a willingness to
consider reemploying Crowder . I believe that an overall and undistorted estimate
of Crowder's worth is not far removed from that spelled out in Respondent's own
records and that he is a good average weaver. I am unable , however, to agree with
Respondent's argument that this man, who has aged beyond his years in its drab and
toilsome service, at any time became such an inefficient and intentionally negligent
a weaver that he could no longer be tolerated in its employ.
In my opinion the reason ascribed by Respondent for its action was feignedly ad-
vanced. I am convinced that Crowder was discharged because of his union affiliation
and activities.
Genelle Tankersley, to the subject of whose discharge we have at long last
arrived, first worked for Respondent at its Langdale Mill 31 and then came to
work in the Lanett Mill on March 24, 1942. There is confusing evidence that
she was out of work some time before she returned on May 14, 1950, and that she
was given a 90-day leave on February 2, 1954, because there was no work avail-
able. She was first a warphand but had become a weaver a fairly long time before
her discharge on March 28, 1955.
Tankersley signed a union card on March 5, 1955, and attended the organizational
meetings . She is the wife of employee Raymond Tankersley, about whose coercion
at the hands of Davis, Thompson, and others and about whose resignation from the
Union, a day or two after his wife had been discharged, findings have been made.32
It will be recalled that in reply to Secondhand Gunn's inquiry, Tankersley told
him she thought the Union was a good thing and that later on the Wednesday be-
fore she was discharged Gunn asked her if she were on the committee and she
replied that she was not.
The General Counsel argues that Respondent's claim that Tankersley was dis-
charged for "excessive second quality cloth produced on job as compared to other
shifts on same job based on six-week average" is pretextuous and that Respondent
was primarily motivated in discharging her because of her union affiliation and
activities. He lays emphasis upon a comparison which he says shows that Tankers-
ley had a greater production percentagewise than Foster, another employee who
worked on the same group of machines at another time, that Tankersley replaced
-'Week ending 2-26 Ci owder 92 21 , Hawkins 88 31 ; Chappell 88 42
Week ending 3-5 Crowder 92 68, Yai biongh 90 23 ; Heath 90 92
Week ending 3-12. Ciowdei 92 96, I1a«kms 88 78; Shadix 9013
Week ending 3-19, Crowder 93 55, Hawkins 89 78; Shadix 89.69.
Week ending 3-26 Ciowdei 92 65 . Hawkins 89 49 ; heath 90 10
The date she first entered Respondent's employment is not disclosed The statement
that she woiked at Langdale fioni February 2, 1952, to March 24, 1942, is obiiously ill
error If the earlier (late should be Febiu,tiv 2, 1942, Tankeisley would have been 25 at
the time, if it should be 1932 sbe would h,is e been but 15
There is a note in Tankersley's "sepaiation notice" that she thinks she was dischaiged
because of the Union since her husband was on the committee Raymond T.uikei iey's
nephew. Billie Tankersley, signed the committee letter and the name "W D Tankersley"
appears as i siguei on the copy tlieieof iihich is all exhibit in the case Raymond testi-
fied that lie signed the "committee papers."
480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this employee because of the latter's low production, and that after Tankersley was
discharged this same lower producing employee, Foster, replaced her.
Respondent's view of the evidence and its assertion relative to the reason for
Tankersley having been discharged is that: a secondhand made written reports that
he had told her that her seconds were too high and that he wanted her to show im-
provement; she said she was doing the best she could; the production records from
February 19 to March 16 show that her production record was below that of 2
weavers on the 2 other shifts on the same loom and continued to get worse; al-
though Tankersley and another employee testified that poplin is more difficult to
run than other types of fabric, her record was worse than before most of the poplin
had been taken off; the production of seconds' records of weavers show that the
efficiency of weavers varies from day to day; compared to a room average of 4.15
percent over a 14-week period, Tankersley's average was 7.7 percent, Foster's was
5.3 percent, and Chappell's was 6.1 percent; there was evidence that her poor work
was caused at least in part by her neglect of her job, witnesses having testified
Tankersley was not found on the job as much as other weavers, wouldn't watch her
loom like the others, and stood around and talked quite a bit; there was more re-
pairing of pickouts on her looms during the last 2 weeks she was there than before;
Respondent's supervisors had no knowledge of her union activities; and she was
separated because of a poor record which became progressively worse, not in viola-
tion of the Act.
In order to determine the facts and the actual reasons for Tankersley's discharge,
it seems necessary to explore the evidence somewhat more thoroughly than have
the parties in their briefs.
Loomfixer Ollis Turner testified that Tankersley wove on the job for which he
was fixer for about 2 months and that 6 weeks after, he would say, she went to work
on it, Gunn told him Tankersley was going to make a good weaver. Warpman
Tollie J. Osborne testified that Tankersley wove poplin on looms on which he tied
the works for about 5 or 6 weeks before her discharge, that poplin was hard to
weave, that previously Foster had worked on this same job and did not run as much
production as Tankersley did and had been taken off the job and put on work as a
battery hand, that after Tankersley was placed on the job the production figures
increased, and that Tankersley remained constantly on the job and told him that
for 2 or 3 nights she didn't have time to eat her lunch. Loomfixer Leon Griffin 33
testified that at a time when she had come on his job, Gunn walked up to him once
or twice and said Tankersley was doing good, that poplin is mighty difficult to weave
and apt to produce more seconds than other material. In a somewhat different
tenor, employee Lena Dollar testified that: She would not think Tankersley's work
was good, as a lot of time she was talking to the ones who were for the Union; part
of her (Dollar's) job is to clean up the seconds; she would not have to spend a
good bit of time on Tankersley's job because of seconds and did not necessarily find
more misdraws and doubles on Tankersley's job than on those of the other weavers;
and she would think that Tankersley's production was less, and her seconds were
more, than Foster's.
Gunn (while not denying Turner's and Griffin's testimony and admitting that
he remembered two conversations with Tankersley about the Union, asking her
what she thought of its activities and saying he had other employees with records
right along with hers) testified he recommended her discharge because of too many
seconds and too little production. Gunn further testified that he took Foster off
the looms because she was having high seconds and low production and put Tank-
ersley on them and that after Tankersley was fired he put Foster back on the job;
that some weeks others may have had second records just as bad as Tankersley's;
and that poplin might be a little more difficult to work on than other material.
This business of selecting excerpts from mathematical computations and then insist-
ing they prove or disprove an employee's ability can be overdone. Respondent con-
'-fidently presses upon me statistics indicating that Tankersley was a poorer worker
than 2 employees who worked on the same looms, but on different shifts, but disre-
gards the figures disclosing that during the weeks Foster worked on the same shift,
looms, and material as did Tankersley, her weekly production percentage was 82,
80, 75, 79, and 78 while Tankersley's was 82, 81, 84, 87, and 92, and that during the
last 2 weeks Tankersley worked, when practically no more of the poplin, which
Overseer Whitman testified should cause no more seconds than any other fabric,
^3Aiiffin also testified that after Tankersley and a number of employees had been fired
he told «'hitman lie was ready to quit fooling with the Union On direct examination he
said his decision was brought on and on ciose-examination he said it was not brought on,
because Tankersley had been fired
WEST POINT MANUFACTURING COMPANY 481
was being woven , her percentage of production was 92 which exceeded by 4 per-
cent Foster 's best record during all but 2 weeks from January 1 through April 2.
Likewise , the General Counsel has relied upon the fact that during many weeks
, Tankersley 's production record was considerably better than that of several other
weavers working on her shift , while ignoring the fact that during other weeks she
was among the lowest on the totem pole.
The point to bear in mind is not whether Tankersley was the worst or among the
worst weavers in her room but whether in fact she was discharged for inefficiency as
Respondent claims. It is not incumbent upon Respondent to show that she was in-
ferior to all others to establish its claim. Rather the burden is on the General Coun-
sel at all times to show that Tankersley was discharged because of her support of the
union . There is no merit in Respondent 's contention that it was unaware of this sup-
port . As I have found she told Gunn that she believed in it. It is apparent from the
testimony of Supervisor Peek , Secondhand Thompson , and others that department
heads and supervisors were informed by Whitman of the names of the signers of
the organizing committee 's letter and that some of the names were illegible. It was
natural, and Gunn does not deny it ( he merely testified he did not recall what was said
during his second conversation with her ), that when the name of two Tankersleys ap-
peared on the letter he should ask Mrs. Tankersley if she was a member of the com-
mittee in which the family name was doubly involved.
Having this knowledge of Tankersley 's approval of the Union , and her kin 's spon-
soring of the organizing effort , a suspicion arises that she was selected for discharge,
rather than someone of the other no more demonstrably efficient weavers who were
opposed to the Union , because of the fact that she favored it. However , even though
Tankersley might have been among the best weavers and the only union member on
her shift , the mere fact that she was singled out for discharge while poorer weavers
were retained would not necessarily establish the General Counsel's contention. If
one were to segregate the evidence solely relating to Tankersley from that applying
to the case as a whole the issue would no more than hang in the balance . Then there
would be suspicion alone, solving nothing. That the truth may not take cover when
suspicion lurks, Tankersley 's demission must be considered in the context of the case
as a whole and in the light of the entire pattern of Respondent 's conduct.
A Board majority stated in Delta Finishing Company (Division of J. P. Stevens &
Co., Inc.Plant No. 3), 111 NLRB 659 (a case cited , and quoted from, by Re-
spondent ), in partially reversing this Trial Examiner who did not take into considera-
tion conduct in a previous case arising more than 6 months earlier between the same
parties which the Board had not found to have been unfair labor practices at the time
he issued his Intermediate Report:
Nor do we agree with the Trial Examiner that Street 's remarks were isolated.
For, not only do they reflect the Respondent 's conceded policy to discourage
membership in the Union , but also demonstrate a continuation of Respondent's
pattern of coercive conduct in which Thomas and another supervisor (Baker)
engaged and which was litigated in Case No. 11-CA-588... .
The Board pointed out that it has, with judicial approval, consistently evaluated a Re-
spondent's acts in the light of his prior conduct and cited cases including Brady Avia-
tion Corporation, 110 NLRB 25, affd. 224 F. 2d 23 (C. A. 5).
The remarks and conduct which I have found were coercive were virtually con-
current with Tankersley 's discharge . They together form a pattern being woven
on the same loom. Evaluating , in the light of its other unfair labor practices, Re-
spondent 's discharge of this now 39-year -old woman who had spent most of her
mature life in its employment and had apparently been regarded as a satisfactory
worker until she became recognized as a deterrent to the success of a policy of dis-
couraging union membership , a design of discrimination becomes distinct.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondent as set forth in section 1 , above, have a close,
intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce , it will be recommended that it cease and desist there-
390609--56-vol 115 32 1
482 DECISIONS OF 'NATIONAL LABOR' RELATIONS 'BOARD
from and take certain `affirmative measures designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act..
By interrogating employees concerning their membership in, sympathies for,' and
activities on behalf of the Union, by asking and inducing employees to revoke their
memberships in the Union and to make written requests directed to the Union for
the return of authorizations to the Union, by threatening employees with reprisal
because of their membership in, sympathies for, and activities on behalf of the
Union, by promising benefits to employees on condition that they withdraw mem-
bership from the Union and discontinue their activities in its behalf, and by threat-
ing employees that it would close its plant because of their concerted activity, Re-
spondent has evinced an effort to thwart the self-organization of its employees and
deprive them of their rights under the Act. Having thus found, I will recommend
that Respondent cease and desist from engaging in such conduct.
' Having found that Respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure
of employment of Elizabeth Danford, Benjamin F. Stone, Elvin Smith, John F. Cole,
James T. Simms, James C. Reed, Herman Crowder, and Genelle Tankersley, I will
recommend that Respondent offer each of them reinstatement to their former or
substantially smiliar positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges. I will further recommend that Respondent make each of them
whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination, by payment to
each of them of a sum of money equal to that which he or she normally would
have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination to the date of offer of re-
instatement, less his or her net earnings during such period. The back pay shall
be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Respondent shall make available to the Board, pay-
roll and other records necessary to the determination of the amounts due.
In view of the nature and extent of the unfair labor practices committed, I am
persuaded that Respondent's conduct indicates a purpose to defeat the self-organiza-
tion of its employees and that a danger exists that in the future Respondent, unless
restrained, will engage in other unfair labor practices. Accordingly, in order to
make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, I will rec-
ommend that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the
rights guaranteed in said section. N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312
U. S. 426.
As the evidence does not establish that Respondent unlawfully discriminated
against Joe W. Lynn, Johnny M. Reeves, Jimmie H. White, and Gladys H. Smith, I
shall recommend dismissal of the allegations concerning them.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
2. Respondent, by interrogating employees concerning their membership in,
sympathies for, and activities on behalf of the Union, by asking and inducing em-
ployees to revoke their memberships in the Union and to make written requests
for the return of authorizations to the Union, by threatening employees with re-
prisal because of their membership in, sympathies for, and activities in behalf of
the Union, by promising benefits to employees on condition that they withdraw
membership from the Union and discontinue activities in its behalf, and by threaten-
ing employees that it would close its plant because of their concerted activity, in-
terfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
3. Respondent by discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment
of Elizabeth Danford, Benjamin F. Stone, Elvin Smith, John F. Cole, James T.
Simms, James C. Reed, Herman Crowder, and Genelle Tankersley, thereby discour-
aging membership in -a labor organization, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
4. The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of Joe W. Lynn, Johnny M . Reeves, Jimmie H . White, and Gladys H. Smith.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]