Wen Y.,1 Complainant,v.James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Army & Air Force Exchange Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 29, 20180120171855 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 29, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Wen Y.,1 Complainant, v. James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Army & Air Force Exchange Service), Agency. Appeal No. 0120171855 Hearing No. 480-2014-00836X Agency No. AAFES14013 DECISION On April 27, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s May 23, 2017, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order finding no discrimination. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Food Service Foreman (Popeye’s restaurant) at Edwards Air Force Base in California. On December 20, 2013, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of age (57) when she was subjected to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment in the following incidents: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120171855 2 1. Management failed to provide her with equivalent training, scheduling, support, guidance, communication, feedback, or counseling provided to other workers and supervisors; 2. Her immediate supervisor issued her written counseling documents without further discussion, explanation, or guidance; 3. Her immediate supervisor falsified her training records; and 4. On August 22, 2013, management terminated her during her probationary period. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. Over Complainant’s objection, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s January 7, 2015, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March 13, 2017. In issuing the decision, the AJ found no discrimination regarding claims (1) - (3) because Complainant failed to present any corroborating evidence to support her allegations. With regard to claim (4), the AJ found that Complainant was terminated because of management’s negative perception regarding her performance and customer service skills, which rendered her undesirable as a permanent employee. Although Complainant attempted to offer evidence of pretext, the AJ determined that such evidence was insufficient to rebut the Agency’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determined that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weight the evidence, but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the nonmoving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988) A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. 0120171855 3 In this case, we find that even if the evidence and arguments submitted by Complainant on appeal are considered, we still find a decision without a hearing is appropriate. Although Complainant references inconsistencies in statements by various witnesses, he has not specifically identified or shown any inconsistencies, let alone material inconsistencies. On appeal, Complainant alleges that the Agency failed to adequately train her and scheduled her for less hours than her colleagues. She also alleges that the Agency’s witnesses contradicted themselves regarding material facts and provided statements that was inconsistent with their own proffered reasons, thereby raising credibility issues. In response, the Agency argues that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she failed to show that similarly situated people were treated more favorably than her. The Agency also contends that even if a prima facie case exists, Complainant failed to proffer sufficient evidence to demonstrate pretext. The adjudication of a complaint of discrimination alleging disparate treatment under the ADEA follows the McDonnell Douglas three-step evidentiary analysis. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, Complainant must establish a prima facie case. Second, the burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Third, once the Agency has articulated its reason, Complainant must show that the Agency's reason was pretextual, that is, it was not the true reason for its action. Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of age discrimination, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Regarding Complainant’s allegation in claim (1), the Agency explained that it provided Complainant with a combination of in-class, online, and on-the-job training throughout her probationary period. The Agency also noted that Complainant was scheduled for at least 20 hours of work a week, except for a few occasions, and had similar schedules as other foremen. For claim (2), the Agency denied that Complainant’s supervisor handed Complainant pre-written counseling statements without further discussion, explanation, or guidance. The Agency explained that the purpose of managerial counseling was to put Complainant on notice of the deficiencies in her work performance. The Agency noted that it gave her ample opportunities to respond to each counseling, as evidenced by her handwritten comments on each counseling statement. Regarding claim (3), the Agency categorically rejected Complainant’s allegation that her supervisor falsified her training record. In rejecting Complainant’s allegation, the Agency noted that she failed to offer any evidence to corroborate her allegation. For claim (4), the Agency explained that management decided to remove Complainant because she failed to demonstrate improvement despite additional training. Management averred that Complainant’s deficient work performance made her undesirable as a permanent employee. 0120171855 4 Upon careful review of the AJ's decision and the evidence of record, as well as the parties' arguments on appeal, we conclude that Complainant has failed to demonstrate pretext with regard to the Agency’s actions. Regarding claim (1), we agree with the Agency that Complainant has not shown she was provided with either inadequate or inequitable training. We note that Complainant received the standard five-week training program for all employees. She also received additional mentoring from her immediate supervisor and a colleague. As for Complainant’s assertion that management should have sent her offsite for a five-week restaurant training program, we note that neither Popeye’s operating manual nor franchisee agreement require the Agency to send every employee to a five-week offsite training course. Complainant has not shown that she was treated less favorably than other similarly-situated employees with regard to training. Regarding Complainant’s contention that she received less favorably treatment than younger employees with regard to scheduling, we find no persuasive evidence supporting that assertion. The record reflects that Complainant received at least 20 hours a week for 16 out of her 20 weeks of employment with the Agency. While some workers received more training than Complainant, they were not similarly situated since they worked the day shift. Also, unlike the comparative employees cited by Complainant, she was a supervisor. We agree with the Agency that it had no obligation to schedule Complainant for shifts outside of her assigned shift solely for the purpose of ensuring she received the same number of hours of training as the day shift employees. There is no indication that age was a factor in training decisions. Regarding claims (2) and (3), we agree with the AJ’s finding of no discrimination. Although Complainant asserts on appeal that she was given pre-written counseling statements without further discussion, explanation, or guidance, the record reflects that her immediate supervisor provided detailed guidance in writing and orally. Complainant was also given the opportunity to respond to each counseling statement. Furthermore, we find no evidence to support Complainant’s allegation of falsification of her training record. Finally, regarding claim (4), we find that Complainant failed to demonstrate pretext in the Agency’s decision to remove her from federal service. Although Complainant subjectively believes that her work performance was adequate, the record contains negative assessments from both customers and management officials. Therefore, we agree with the Agency that Complainant failed to demonstrate proficiency in learning her duties as a foreman and providing satisfactory customer service. Complainant has not shown that similarly situated persons were treated differently. Consequently, Complainant failed to rebut the Agency’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her removal. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the Agency’s decision finding no discrimination. 0120171855 5 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 0120171855 6 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 29, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation