Weiming Tang et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 11, 20202018005559 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/890,734 05/09/2013 Weiming Tang 47376-129F01US (264376) 2210 123896 7590 05/11/2020 Mintz Levin/Wayne Fueling Systems LLC One Financial Center Boston, MA 02111 EXAMINER CHOO, JOHANN Y ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocketingbos@mintz.com ipfileroombos@mintz.com mintzdocketing@cpaglobal.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte WEIMING TANG and JAMES MATTHEW BREWER ________________ Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, SHARON FENICK, and RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–28, which constitute all of the pending claims.1 Appeal Br. 7–66. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Board conducts a limited de novo review of the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Wayne Fueling Systems LLC. Appeal Brief filed October 31, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”), 1. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant describes the present invention as follows: fast and secure communication can be achieved (e.g., in a fueling environment payment system) with systems and methods that validate an authentication request based on one or more pre-validated cryptographic keys.” Abstract. STATEMENT OF THE REJECTIONS Claims 1–28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. Final Act. 5–6.2 Claims 1, 3, and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Chan (US 2007/0136800 A1; published June 14, 2007), Goto (US 2009/0092060 A1; published Apr. 9, 2009), and Shambroom (US 2001/0020274 A1; published Sept. 6, 2001). Final Act. 7–11. Claims 2, 14, 17, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Chan, Goto, Shambroom, and Dickelman (US 2009/0144194 A1; published June 4, 2009). Final Act. 11–12. Claims 4–13, 18–25, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Chan, Goto, Shambroom, and Kohan (US 2005/0256742 A1; published June 4, 2009). Final Act. 12–19. 2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s arguments in their entirety, we refer to the above-mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the following documents, for their respective details: the Final Action mailed June 14, 2017 (“Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed March 8, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed May 8, 2018 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 3 Claims 15 and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Chan, Goto, Shambroom, and Lyons (US 2012/0118947 A1; published May 17, 2012). Final Act. 19. Claims 4–11 and 18–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Final Act. 6–7. THE SECTION 101 REJECTION Background Independent claim 1 reads as follows with paragraph numbers added for ease of reference and with claim language emphasized to indicate the portions of the claim that recite an abstract idea: 1. A terminal, comprising: [(i)] a wireless transceiver configured to communicate wirelessly with a mobile device; [(ii)] a secure element configured to store one or more pre- validated cryptographic keys; and [(iii)] a processor coupled to the secure element and the wireless transceiver, the processor being programmed to [(a)] receive, via the wireless transceiver, an authentication request from the mobile device, the authentication request including a public key and a random number, [(b)] authenticate the mobile device by validating the public key received in the authentication request based on the one or more pre-validated cryptographic keys stored in the secure element, [(c)] after the validating, generate a session key based on the random number received in the authentication request, [(d)] transmit, via the wireless transceiver, when the mobile device is successfully authenticated, an Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 4 authentication response including the session key to the mobile device, and [(e)] receive secure information from the mobile device, the secure information being encrypted by the session key. Claims 1–28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter without significantly more. Final Act. 5–6. More specifically, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to abstract ideas and that the additional elements do not recite significantly more. Id. According to the Examiner, the additional elements, viewed individually and in combination amount to no more than mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on “generic computer structure[s] that serves to perform generic computer functions that are well- understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry.” Id. at 5. Principles of Law A. SECTION 101: Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 5 is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 6 Benson and Flook) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE: In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October 2019 Guidance Update”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the October 2019 Guidance Update). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 7 guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the following: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Analysis Appellant presents multiple arguments for why the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Appeal Br. 44–66. Generally, Appellant argues that the rejection lacks sufficient analysis to establish a proper rejection (id. at 44– 46), that claim 1 recites patent-eligible subject matter (id. at 46–57), and that Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 8 even if claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, the elements of claim 1 amount to significantly more than the abstract idea (id. at 57–63). See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51 (“[The 2019 Guidance] supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s ‘Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas’ (first issued in July 2015 and updated most recently in July 2018). STEP 2A, PRONG 1: Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54. Limitation (iii)(a) recites “receive . . . an authentication request . . . , the authentication request including a public key and a random number.” Receiving data or an authentication request that includes data constitutes a certain method of organizing human activity. More specifically, receiving a request for information constitutes a method of managing interactions between people. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes this certain method of organizing human activity as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Receiving such an authentication request also constitutes a mental process. More specifically, receiving such a request constitutes making a mental observation. The 2019 Guidance also recognizes mental processes, including observations, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, limitation (iii)(a) recites a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 9 Limitation (iii)(b) recites “authenticate the mobile device by validating the public key received in the authentication request based on the one or more pre-validated cryptographic keys stored.” Authenticating a cryptographic public key by comparing that received public key’s number to a stored key number constitutes a mental process, such as an evaluation or judgment that can be performed in the human mind. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes such mental processes as constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, limitation (iii)(b) recites a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Limitation (iii)(c) recites “after the validating, generate a session key based on the random number received in the authentication request.” Generating a cryptographic session key entails performing a mathematical concept, such as by determining a mathematical relationship or performing a mathematical calculation. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes mathematical relationships and calculations as constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Generating a cryptographic session key also constitutes a mental process, such as an evaluation or judgment that can be performed either in the human mind or with the aid of pencil and paper. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes such mental processes as constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The “mental processes” judicial exception also includes concepts that can be performed by a human with a pen and paper as well as those that can be performed entirely in the mind. See October 2019 Guidance Update at 9 (“A claim that encompasses a human performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen and paper recites a mental process”) (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 10 Accordingly, limitation (iii)(c) recites a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Limitation (iii)(d) recites “transmit . . . when the mobile device is successfully authenticated, an authentication response including the session key.” Transmitting information or data such as a cryptographic session key constitutes a certain method of organizing human activity. More specifically, transmitting data constitutes a method of managing interactions between people. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes this certain method of organizing human activity as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Transmitting data also constitutes a mental process. More specifically, transmitting data entails expressing an opinion. The 2019 Guidance also recognizes mental processes, including expressing opinions, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, limitation (iii)(d) recites a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Limitation (iii)(e) recites another data-receiving step—“receive secure information . . . , the secure information being encrypted by the session key.” For the reasons discussed in relation to limitation (iii)(a), the data- receiving step of limitation (iii)(e) also recites a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For these reasons, each of limitations (iii)(a) through (iii)(e) recites a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance. “Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.” RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 11 STEP 2A, PRONG 2: Under step 2A, prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether claim 1 recites additional elements that individually or in combination integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–55. The 2019 Guidance identifies considerations indicative of whether an additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, such as an additional element reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(a). Before addressing Appellant’s arguments, we first note that the additional elements of various of claim 1’s limitations do not add significantly more to the associated abstract ideas because the limitations, read in full so as to include the additional elements, merely are directed to insignificant extra-solution activity. For example, limitation (iii)(a) recites, in full, “receive, via the wireless transceiver, an authentication request from the mobile device, the authentication request including a public key and a random number.” This limitation merely constitutes insignificant extra- solution data gathering. Limitation (iii)(e) also recites a step of insignificant extra-solution data gathering: “receive secure information from the mobile device, the secure information being encrypted by the session key.” An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining information about credit card transactions, which is recited as part of a claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the gathered information by a series of steps in order to detect whether the transactions were fraudulent. MPEP § 2106.05(g). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 12 Limitation (iii)(d) recites, in full, “transmit, via the wireless transceiver, when the mobile device is successfully authenticated, an authentication response including the session key to the mobile device.” This limitation does not add any meaningful limitations to the abstract idea because it merely constitutes the insignificant post-solution activity of transmitting data. E.g., Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that printing or downloading generated menus constituted insignificant extra-solution activity). Turning to Appellant’s arguments, Appellant first contends that the Examiner’s reliance on Dealertrack is improper because claim 1 does not wholly preempt the concept of “authentication of devices and managing/ auditing transactions,” or other concepts. Appeal Br. 47–48 (citing Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F. 3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Appeal Br. 49 (wherein Appellant similarly argues that claim 1 does not preempt an abstract idea). This argument is unpersuasive. We recognize that the Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. However, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained: “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). Although “preemption may signal patent Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 13 ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Benson is improper. E.g. Appeal Br. 48 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 65). According to Appellant, [p]resent claim 1 is clearly not directed to converting signals from binary-coded decimal form into pure binary form, nor is it directed more generally to a mathematical procedure for converting one form of numerical representation to another. Claim 1 is not directed to a mathematical procedure at all. The concept in Benson is simply wholly irrelevant to claim 1. Appeal Br. 48–49. This argument is unpersuasive because cryptographic operations, such as “generat[ing] a session key based on the random number received in the authentication request,” as recited in limitation (iii)(c), specifically entail a mathematical procedure for converting numerical data representative of plaintext to another set of encrypted numerical data that represents a ciphertext. The fact that claim 1 also recites a “wireless transceiver configured to communicate with a mobile device,” a “secure element,” and a “processor” that is configured to perform the above-noted abstract ideas, as Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 49), merely indicates that generic computer components are employed to carry out the claimed abstract ideas more efficiently, and recitation of these additional elements is insufficient to demonstrate integration of the abstract ideas into a practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (determining that the claim limitations “data processing system,” “communications controller,” and “data storage unit” were generic computer components that amounted to mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer); October 2019 Guidance Update at 11–12 (recitation of Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 14 generic computer limitations for implementing the abstract idea “would not be sufficient to demonstrate integration of a judicial exception into a practical application”). Appellant also argues that “it would not be possible to successfully authenticate a mobile device as recited in claim 1 by using a purely mental process.” Appeal Br. 50. This argument is unpersuasive because it is not commensurate in scope with the language of claim 1. Nothing in claim 1 reasonably precludes the use of an authentication protocol that is capable of being performed either mentally or with the aid of pencil and paper. And again, the recited processor that is programmed to transmit the data for authentication, via the wireless transceiver, is not part of the underlying abstract idea. It constitutes an additional element that is used to carry out the abstract idea of data authentication more efficiently. Restated, Appellant is improperly conflating the recited abstract idea with the additional elements. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Cybersource is improper. Appeal Br. 51 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). According to Appellant, claim 1 is clearly not directed to a mere comparison of obtained intangible data. Claim 1 recites numerous features demonstrating this fact. For example, the processor being programmed to “generate a session key based on the random number received in the authentication request” is not a mere comparison of obtained intangible data but is, instead, creation of something (a session key). Id. This argument is unpersuasive. Appellant is essentially arguing that claim 1 does not only recite one abstract idea (authenticating a request) because claim 1 recites multiple abstract ideas (e.g., authenticating a request and generating a session key). But a claim need not be addressed to a single Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 15 abstract idea to be patent ineligible. As our reviewing court has held, combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Appellant additionally argues, [f]or another example, the processor being programmed to “transmit, via the wireless transceiver, when the mobile device is successfully authenticated, an authentication response including the session key to the mobile device: is not a mere comparison of obtained intangible data but is, instead, communication of information to a physical device (the mobile device) via another physical device (the wireless transceiver). Appeal Br. 51. This argument is unpersuasive. Appellant is essentially arguing that claim 1 recites additional elements beyond the abstract idea. But this argument does not address the relevant question of whether the additional elements add significantly more to the abstract idea so as to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Cybersource is improper because “present claim 1 is not the mere obtaining of information and then using it in some undefined manner.” Id. at 53. According to Appellant, the claimed “authentication request . . . is instead used in a manner specifically recited in claim 1.” Id. This argument is unpersuasive. Merely stating that the authentication request is used for a specific purpose does not constitute an argument for why the specific purpose entails Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 16 significantly more than an abstract idea. For example, the specific purpose could be, instead, to narrow a claimed abstract idea to a more specific abstract idea. See SAP Am. In. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract”). Furthermore, we understand the Examiner to be relying on cases such as Cybersource, FairWarning, and buySAFE for the broader proposition that “longstanding commercial practices and [] methods of organizing human activity,” generally, constitute patent ineligible subject matter. Advisory Action 2, mailed Sept. 5, 2017. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on FairWarning is unavailing because FairWarning’s claims merely implemented within a new environment, an old practice “that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centuries.” Appeal Br. 54–55 (quoting FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094–95 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). According to Appellant, “[c]laim 1 clearly does not recite a process that humans have performed for years to authenticate devices and manage/audit transactions, or for that matter used at all due to the claim distinguishing over the prior art as discussed herein.” Id. at 55. This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, using secret codes and passwords to authenticate communications and people are processes that humans have engaged in for decades, if not centuries. Second, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 17 450 U.S. at 188–89. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. Furthermore, like Cybersource we understand the Examiner to be relying on, FairWarning for the broader proposition that “longstanding commercial practices and [] methods of organizing human activity,” generally, constitute patent ineligible subject matter. Advisory Action 2, mailed Sept. 5, 2017. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on buySAFE is improper because that case deals with creating a contractual relationship and “the abstract idea of ‘authentication of devices and managing/auditing transactions’ as alleged by the Examiner, . . . does not correspond to the concept identified as an abstract idea in buySAFE.” Appeal Br. 55–56 (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. We presume that the Examiner does not rely on buySAFE for the proposition that the specific abstract ideas at issue there and here are analogous. Rather, we presume the Examiner is relying on buySAFE, like Cybersource and FairWarning, for the broader proposition that “longstanding commercial practices and [] methods of organizing human activity,” generally, constitute patent ineligible subject matter. Advisory Action 2, mailed Sept. 5, 2017. Furthermore, even if Appellant were correct that none of Dealertrack, Benson, Cybersource, FairWarning, and buySAFE can be relied upon to show patent ineligibility, arguing which cases are not relevant to the present claims is not the same as providing evidence and reasoning to demonstrate why claim 1 does integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 18 Appellant asserts that software-based inventions that improve the performance of the computer system itself is patent eligible even when the invention is otherwise directed toward abstract ideas. Appeal Br. 59 (citing Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant argues [c]laim 1 includes a technical improvement over prior art ways of the “authentication of devices and managing/auditing transactions” (the alleged abstract idea), at least because no one has previously authenticated devices of managed/audited transactions as in the claimed implementation, which includes, e.g., receiving via a wireless transceiver an authentication request from a mobile device where the authentication requires includes a public key and a random number. Appeal Br. 60. This argument is unpersuasive because Appellant essentially is arguing for patent eligibility on the basis of claim 1’s novelty and unobviousness. As explained above, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 at 188–89. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. Appellant also argues claim 1 is directed to a technical improvement: [c]laim 1 includes a technical improvement over prior art ways of the “authentication of devices and managing/auditing transactions” (the alleged abstract idea), at least because no one has previously authenticated devices of managed/audited transactions as in the claimed implementation, which includes, e.g., receiving via a wireless transceiver an authentication Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 19 request from a mobile device where the authentication requires includes a public key and a random number. Appeal Br. 60. Appellant further asserts, even [if] a generic authentication of devices and managing/ auditing transactions may [have been] well known (similar to how in BASCOM filtering content on the internet was a known concept), present claim 1 and the present application describe how the particular arrangement of elements of claim 1 is a technical improvement over prior art ways of authenticating devices and managing auditing transactions[:] “Completing the authentication process in a single exchange can advantageously decrease the amount of time required to complete a transaction, increasing user convenience.” Appeal Br. 60 (citing Spec. ¶ 65); see also id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 99–102 to support the proposition that Appellant’s Specification “discuss[es] ‘advantages and/or technical effects’ of the disclosed systems and methods.”). Appellant’s Specification further explains why the present authentication protocol potentially can be completed in a decreased time: “[D]igital certificates are pre-stored and pre-authenticated on the payment terminal and the mobile device, such that a reduced-size public key/identifier pair can be exchanged instead of a plurality of larger certificates, thus enabling rapid authentication and transaction execution.” “By way of further example, in some embodiments, secure mutual authentication between two devices can be completed with only one transfer from the first device (e.g., a payment terminal) to the second device (e.g., a mobile device) and one transfer from the second device to the first device, thus enabling rapid authentication and transaction execution.” Spec. ¶¶ 100–01; see also Appeal Br. 61 (citing Bascom for the proposition that generic technical components can be combined in a non-conventional Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 20 way so as to produce a technology-based solution to existing technical problems). Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because these arguments evidence that the present invention does not entail a technical solution to a technical problem, but rather an improvement to an abstract problem that has utility in non-computerized interactions between humans that pre-date the advent of the Internet, as well as utility in computer environments. More specifically, Appellant’s description of the improvement—“[c]ompleting the authentication process in a single exchange [to] advantageously decrease the amount of time required to complete a transaction, [and thereby] increasing user convenience” (Appeal Br. 60)—constitutes an improvement to a method of organizing human activity among companies, people, and their proxies, which methods entail commercial or legal interactions. This is so regardless of whether computers are involved. For example, a purchaser of gasoline from a gas station may wish to have the payment charged to purchaser’s charge account. To do so, the purchaser could tell the gas-station attendant the identity of her charge account and the associated account number. In response, the attendant could ask the purchaser for a driver’s license to confirm her identification and then call the charge account company to verify the legitimacy of the account and the available credit. The charge account company could also verify the identity of the gas-station attendant before authorizing the charge. However, this three-party authentication-and-validation protocol among the gas-station attendant, the purchaser, and the charge account company could take place more quickly and conveniently if the transaction were simplified such that the authentication-and-validation protocol takes Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 21 place between only two parties instead of three. For example, a gasoline company could establish a charge-account program such that the company issues charge cards with account numbers (or credentials or authentication certificates) to pre-registered and authorized customers and further authorizes the gas-station attendant to approve purchases below a certain monetary threshold without the need to seek further authorization from the gasoline company. In such a case, the purchaser would only need to authenticate her identity by showing the gas-station attendant her driver’s license or personal identification and the charge card. Various other hypothetical situations can be envisioned in which a principal (either a company or a person) authorizes an agent to contract or act on its behalf with third parties without the need for the principal’s prior approval. And such delegations of authority to an agent create tradeoffs of benefits and risks. For example, not requiring an agent obtain the principal’s authorization at the time of a transaction improves the speed and convenience of the transaction, while increasing the risk to some degree that the agent will act improperly or not carry out the principal’s wishes. Thus, the claims do not reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer or improvement in technology, but rather an improved method of arranging communications (which could be applied to communications between people, as well as computers) in order to improve authentication of transactions. “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 22 Appellant next cites DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com., L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) for support of claim 1’s patent eligibility. Appeal Br. 61–62. In particular, Appellant asserts, The [DDR Holdings] court held that the claims at issue did not generically recite “use the Internet” to perform a business practice[,] but instead “recite[d] a specific way to automate the creation of a composite web page by an ‘outsource provider’ that incorporates elements from multiple sources in order to solve a problem faced by websites on the Internet.” Appeal Br. 61 (citing DDR Holdings, at 1258–59). Appellant urges that “[l]ike the claims in DDR Holdings, present claim 1 does not generically recite ‘use a computer’ or ‘use the Internet’ to perform a business practice[,] but instead requires specific functionality using a specific approach.” Appeal Br. at 61. This argument is unpersuasive. First because Appellant attempts to support this argument by reciting the entirety of claim 1 verbatim. Id. at 61– 62. The mere restatement of the claim language does not constitute an argument on the merits, much less constitute evidence that supports an argument on the merits. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“[a] statement [that] merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”). Secondly, and as already noted, claim 1 is directed to an improvement to an abstract idea—not to an improvement to technology. As such, the specificity by which the abstract idea is claimed is immaterial to the question of patent eligibility. Apple v. Ameranth Inc., 842 F.3d at 1240 (“An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”); see also SAP Am. In., 898 F.3d 1161 at 1168 (“even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 23 ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.”). Lastly, Appellant argues that “[t]he USPTO’s 2015 Updated Guidance also demonstrates that claim 1 recites patent eligible subject matter by reciting significantly more than the alleged abstract idea of the claim.” Appeal Br. 62. More particularly, Appellant argues that Example 21, claim 2, of the 2015 Updated Guidance indicates that a claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter when, looking at the additional limitations as an ordered combination, the claim does not simply recite organizing and comparing data, but instead “addresses the Internet-centric challenge of alerting a subscriber with time sensitive information when the subscriber’s computer is offline.” Appeal Br. 62. Appellant then contends that “[c]laim 1 similarly recites an ordered combination of features.” Id. at 63. This argument is unpersuasive because Appellant again merely recites the entirety of claim 1 without presenting substantive arguments for why any of the additional elements, either alone or in their ordered combination, constitute significantly more than the noted abstract ideas. Id. For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us that claim 1 is directed to an improvement in the function of a computer or to any other technology or technical field. MPEP § 2106.05(a). Nor does Appellant persuasively demonstrate that claim 1 is directed to a particular machine or transformation, or that claim 1 adds any other meaningful limitations for the purposes of the analysis under Section 101. MPEP §§ 2106.05(b), (c), (e). Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us that claim 1 integrates the recited abstract ideas into a practical application within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 24 STEP 2B: Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether claim 1 adds any specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that, either alone or as an ordered combination, amount to more than “well- understood, routine, conventional” activity in the field. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(d). Appellant’s Specification, by describing computer-related components at a high level without details of structure or implementation, indicates that the recited additional elements—the wireless transceiver, the mobile device, the secure element, and the processor—are well understood, routine and conventional: The computer system 200 can include a processor 202 [that] controls the operation of the computer system 200, for example by executing an operating system (OS), device drivers, application programs, and so forth. The processor 202 can include any type of microprocessor or central processing unit (CPU), including programmable general-purpose or special- purpose microprocessors and/or any of a variety of proprietary or commercially–available single or multi-processor systems. The computer system 200 can also include a memory 204, [that] provides temporary or permanent storage for code to be executed by the processor 202 or for data that is processed by the processor 202. The memory 204 can include read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, one or more varieties of random access memory (RAM), and/or a combination of memory technologies. Spec. ¶¶ 27, 28. The computer system 200 can also include a secure element 216. The secure element 216 can be a tamper-resistant platform (e.g., a one-chip secure microcontroller) capable of securely hosting applications and their confidential and cryptographic data (e.g., key management) in accordance with the rules and security requirements set forth by a set of well- Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 25 identified trusted authorities. The secure element 216 can be capable of providing random number generation, generating device-specific public/private key pairs, and executing a security algorithm. Known examples of security algorithms include, but are not limited to: Hash, TDES, AES, RSA, etc. Exemplary secure elements 216 include Universal Integrated Circuit Cards (UICC), embedded secure elements, and micro secure digital (microSD) cards. The computer system 200 can also include a secure communication interface 218 through which the computer system 200 can conduct mutual authentication procedures and communicate with other computer systems. The secure communication interface 218 can be wireless (e.g., near-field communication (NFC), Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and the like) or wired (e.g., USB or Ethernet). In the case of NFC, for example, the computer system 200 can include a radio transceiver configured to communicate with a radio transceiver of another device using one or more standards such as ISO/IEC 14443, FeliCa, ISO/IEC 18092, and those defined by the NFC Forum. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification does not indicate that consideration of these conventional elements as an ordered combination adds any significance beyond the additional elements, as considered individually. Rather, Appellant’s Specification indicates that the invention is directed to an abstract idea that is made more efficient with generic computer components—“validat[ing] an authentication request based on one or more pre-validated cryptographic keys.” Spec. ¶ 6. For these reasons, we determine that claim 1 does not recite additional elements that, either individually or as an ordered combination, amount to significantly more than the judicial exception within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55; MPEP § 2106.05(d). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 26 Claim 15 Dependent claim 15 reads, as follows: “The terminal of claim 1, wherein the secure information comprises a service instruction to open a door of the terminal, and wherein the terminal is configured to open the door in response to the service instruction.” Appellant argues that “claim 15 does not merely recite ‘sending/ receiving/comparing/processing data’ [because] a physical structure, a door, is opened. A structural effect is thus achieved, namely the opening of the door of the terminal, so as to recite ‘significantly more’ than the alleged abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 64 (citing Final Act. 5–6). Appellant argues that even assuming . . . that computer devices and computing devices do generically include a door, it is not a generic function for a processor of the computer device or computing device to open the door or to open the door in response to receipt of secure information including a service instruction. To the extent that computer devices and computing devices have a door or are involved in opening a door thereof at all, such opening would be in a specific context for a specific reason so as to not be generic function. Id. Appellant also argues that Diehr holds that even when a claim recites an abstract idea (in that case a mathematical formula), “the claim is nevertheless directed to patent eligible subject matter when it, ‘considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing).’” Appeal Br. 65 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192). Appellant points out that “[i]n Diehr the ‘claims involve the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 27 different state or thing,’ cured rubber.” Appeal Br. 65 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 177–79). Appellant then argues, [e]ven assuming in arguendo that present claim 15 is directed to an abstract idea under Step 2A of the § 101 analysis, claim 15 is directed to patent eligible subject matter under Step 2B of the § 101 analysis because, similar to Diehr, it involves the transformation of an article to a different state. Namely, the door of the terminal is opened such that the terminal is in a different physical state due to the combination of recited elements similar to the rubber in Diehr being in a different physical state due to the combination of recited elements. Appeal Br. 65. This argument is unpersuasive. The claims of Diehr were directed a machine that improved the process for chemically transforming synthetic rubber from an uncured physical state to a cured state. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. Claim 15, in contrast, does not entail transforming the chemical state of mechanical door or a terminal. The claim entails a secure communication protocol for sending an electronic signal to an electronic latch. Secure communications are not created solely for the sake of themselves. Rather secure communications are created for the purpose of conveying some sort of data, information, or instructions in private. For example, the instructions might be to gain access to a computer system or initiate a software application within a computer system. If the patent eligibility of secure communications were based upon whether the communications were used to initiate some further action, clever claim drafters could obviate all patent-eligibility rejections for cryptographic protocols by additionally claiming the most rudimentary of post-solution activities to be carried out with the secure communications. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 28 Furthermore, Appellant’s Specification indicates that in response to receiving the signal, the terminal door’s electronic latch can be unlocked in any desired, typical manner: In some embodiments, the mobile device can be a service mobile device possessed by a user seeking to access the payment terminal, or a fuel dispenser or other system of which it is a part, for service purposes. In such cases, instead of transmitting payment or loyalty information upon completion of the mutual authentication process, the service mobile device can be configured to transmit an instruction to open or unlock a service door, perform a diagnostic test, or perform other service-related functions. If the service mobile device is authenticated by the payment terminal, the payment terminal can respond to the service request by controlling an actuator to open or unlock the service door, etc. Accordingly, service personnel can be authenticated to prevent unauthorized access or unauthorized field service or troubleshooting operations, thereby providing improved security as compared with a traditional mechanical key model. Spec. ¶ 98. As such, the additional language of claim 15 does not recite an improvement to the mechanical operation of an electronic latch. That is, claim 15 does not recite significantly more than an abstract idea. The claim merely is directed to insignificant post-solution activity. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d at 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that printing or downloading generated menus constituted insignificant extra-solution activity). Furthermore, using electrical signals to initiate solenoids and other electronic actuators, switches, and triggers was well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 29 Conclusion Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. We, likewise, sustain the 101 rejection of claims 2–14 and 16–28, which Appellant does not argue separately. Appeal Br. 65–66. THE SECTION 112(B) REJECTION The Rejection and Contentions Dependent claim 4 reads as follows: 4. The terminal of claim 1, wherein: the public key is specific to the mobile device and the public key is encrypted in the authentication request by a private key that is superior to the public key in a certificate hierarchy; the authentication request includes a unique identifier that specifies the chain of public keys in the certificate hierarchy which ultimately decrypts the public key; and the random number is encrypted by a private key corresponding to the public key. In the Final Office Action, the Examiner determines that claim 4’s limitation of “superior . . . key” is unclear. The Examiner explains, The term [superior key] is not a term of art and is not adequately described in the specifications or the drawings. The specification [is] directed to a hierarchy of certificates, and the designated drawing item 400 does not pertain to public/private key pairings. Therefore it is unclear as to what the term “superior . . . key” refers to or what applicant intends to claim with such limitations. Final Act. 7. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 30 In the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner acknowledges the Specification may provide some guidance regarding the term “superior . . . key”, further explaining, it is noted that while the specifications may provide one possible interpretation of the limitations, the claims themselves provide no such limiting factors, therefore, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the limitations may include a variety of possible interpretations that would each alter the scope of the claims and differ the processes being provided. Therefore the limitation is considered unclear and would cause the scope of the claim to become indefinite. . . . [T]he plain language of the claims further support the Office’s possible interpretations as the plain text of the claims [does] not call forth the various specifics as cited by appellant as such specifics are only in the specification[] of the application as merely one possible interpretation and are nowhere to be found in the actual claim language. Therefore it is certainly within reason that the limitation of calling a key ‘superior’ in a ‘hierarchy’ would include one key enveloping another in double encryption, being higher in a table, or being older, more valuable, etc. Therefore appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Ans. 10–11. Appellant argues the Examiner’s interpretation is inconsistent with the claim language, explaining, Claim 4 does not recite “a private key that is superior to the public key” without any further context (although even without further context the phrase is not necessarily indefinite). Instead, claim 4 specifies that the superiority is “in a certificate hierarchy” and that the unique identifier in the authentication request “specifies a chain of public keys in the certificate hierarchy.” The Examiner’s interpretation of “superior . . . key” as being “construed in a variety of ways including being more valuable, being older, being placed higher on a [sic] index, being in an outer layer of a file, etc.” is therefore inconsistent with the plain language of the claim. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 31 Appeal Br. 38. Next, Appellant argues that the Specification describes the claimed “superior . . . key,” contending, “the present specification describes certificates in the certificate hierarchy 400 as including keys such that a person skilled in the art would clearly understand that keys also have superiority/inferiority in a certificate hierarchy.” Appeal Br. 40. Analysis We understand the Examiner’s position to be that the metes and bounds of claim 4 are unclear because a “superior . . . key,” as recited in claim 4, could include a variety of interpretations including the following: “one key enveloping another in double encryption, being higher in a table, or being older, more valuable.” Ans. 11. We disagree with the Examiner’s determination that these alternative definitions fall within the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. We, instead, agree with Appellant that the metes and bounds of claim 4 are reasonably clear. See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that language in a claim is unclear if it is “ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention.”) Reading claim 4, it seems reasonably clear that the term “superior . . . key” refers to placement of a key in a key certificate hierarchy. As noted by the Appellant, the instant Specification describes the placement of public/private key pairs in a certificate hierarchy. Fig. 4 and Spec. ¶¶ 38–43. Moreover, even if the other potential definitions proffered by the Examiner were reasonable alternatives, this fact would not render the claim indefinite. The breadth of a claim is not to be equated with indefiniteness. See, e.g., In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971). Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 32 We, therefore, do not sustain the indefiniteness rejection of claim 4, or of claims 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 21, and 25, which recite similar limitations. Claims 5, 8–10, 19, 22–24 also were rejected as indefinite due to their dependency from one of claims 4 and 18. For the reasons set forth above, we, likewise, do not sustain the indefiniteness rejection of claims 5, 8–10, 19, and 22–24. THE SECTION 103 REJECTIONS Determinations and Contentions The Examiner finds the combination of Chan, Goto, and Shambroom teaches or suggests claim element (iii)(a), which recites “[a] processor being programmed to: receive, via the wireless transceiver, an authentication request from the mobile device, the authentication request including a public key and a random number.” In particular, the Examiner finds that Chan generally teaches limitation (iii)(a)’s requirement of a processor being programmed to “receive, via the wireless transceiver, an authentication request from the mobile device,” but does not teach “the authentication request including a public key and a random number.” Final Act. 8–9. The Examiner finds that Shambroom teaches “the authentication request including a public key.” Id. at 10. More specifically, the Examiner finds Shambroom’s transmission 206 from client 200 to network server 300 (FIG. 2) includes a public key and an identifier and that this transmission corresponds to the request for authentication, as recited in claim 1. The Examiner further finds that Goto cures the remainder of Chan’s deficiencies by teaching “a random number.” Id. at 9–10. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 33 Appellant argues the combination of Chan, Goto, and Shambroom fails to teach claim 1’s limitation (iii)(a). Appeal Br. 11–12. Specifically, Appellant argues Shrambroom fails to teach “the authentication request including a public key” because Shambroom transmits a public key in response to an authentication request—not as part of the authentication request, as required by claim 1. Id. Analysis The Examiner’s interpretation is inconsistent with Shambroom’s disclosure. Shambroom describes the authentication as follows: As shown in FIG. 2, client 200, which can include a web browser 205, initiates a request for authenticated secure access to the web server 305 of network server 300 as indicated by arrow 206. . . . Web server 305 of network server 300 responds to the request at 206 by transmitting information back to web browser 205 that will be used to authenticate the identity of network server 300 to client 200 and support generation of additional information which will be used to encrypt future transmissions between client 200 and network server 300. If, for example, an SSL transaction is employed in the system of FIG. 2, web server 305 sends web browser 205, as indicated by arrow 208, a certificate that includes network server 300’s public key and an identifier indicating a cryptographic algorithm supported by network server 300. Shambroom ¶¶ 58–59. We agree with the Appellant that paragraph 59 of Shambroom does not teach “authentication request including a public key.” As excerpted above, Shambroom discloses a web browser 205 sends an authentication request 206, and web server 305 responds to this request with response 208. Moreover, it is the web server’s response 208 that includes a public key— not the web browser 205. Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 34 The Examiner’s interpretation of response 208 corresponding to the request for authentication is unpersuasive. We, therefore, do not sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claim 1 over Chan, Goto, and Shambroom. We, likewise, do not sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 3, which depends from claim 1, or of independent claim 16, which recites similar limitations to claim 1. With respect to the remaining obviousness rejections of dependent claims 1, 2, 4–15, 17–28, the Examiner does not rely on the additionally cited references, Dickelman, Kohan, and Lyons, to cure the noted deficiencies of the rejection over Chan, Goto, and Shambroom. Final Act. 11–19. Accordingly, we, likewise, do not sustain the obviousness rejection of these claims for the reasons set forth above in relation to for claim 1 above. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–28 101 Eligibility 1–28 4–11, 18– 25 112(b) Indefiniteness 4–11, 18–25 1, 3, 16 103 Chan, Goto, Shambroom 1, 3, 16 2, 14, 17, 28 103 Chan, Goto, Shambroom, Dickelman 2, 14, 17, 28 4–13, 18– 25, 27 103 Chan, Goto, Shambroom, Kohan 4–13, 18–25, 27 15, 26 103 Chan, Goto, Shambroom, 15, 26 Appeal 2018-005559 Application 13/890,734 35 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Lyons Overall Outcome 1–28 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation