Webcor Packaging

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 18, 1995

319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (N.L.R.B. 1995)

1203
319 NLRB No. 142
WEBCOR PACKAGING
1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
2 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credi-
bility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an
administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings. We agree with the Gen-
eral Counsel that it would have been preferable for the judge to ex-
plicitly discredit the employee testimony regarding the statements al-
legedly made by Plant Manager Rikard, or to explicitly credit
Rikard’s denial. Nevertheless, the judge did not err in holding that,
because either version was just as believable, the General Counsel
failed to carry his burden of proving the allegation that the state-
ments violated Sec. 8(a)(1). See Bethel Home, Inc., 275 NLRB 154,
157 (1985).
3 The following exchange took place between Sibilsky and counsel
for the Respondent:
Q. There was previous testimony that I think the Plant council
or the steering committee . . . got involved with an issue cut-
ting checks . . . for employees when they go on vacation. Do
you have any direct information on that subject.
A. The vacation pay issue was addressed at the plant council.
Q. Okay.
A. And it came to me as a question.
There were a couple of issues that were raised. One, employees
were asking why we had to deduct federal taxes, state taxes,
Continued
Webcor Packaging, Inc. and Local 332, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.
Cases 7–CA–31809, 7–CA–31896, and 7–RC–
19513
December 18, 1995
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS BROWNING
AND TRUESDALE
On October 28, 1993, Administrative Law Judge
Stephen J. Gross issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief to the General Counsel’s
answering brief. The General Counsel filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has
decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions as further discussed below and to adopt
the recommended Order.
Background
The judge found that the Plant Council established
at the Respondent’s facility was a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by
dominating and interfering with the formation and ad-
ministration of the Plant Council and by contributing
financial and other support to the Plant Council. We
agree with the judge’s findings, for the reasons set
forth by him, and for the reasons set forth below.
Discussion
1. We agree with the judge’s finding that the Plant
Council satisfies the criterion set forth in Section 2(5)
of the Act that a statutory labor organization is one
that exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of deal-
ing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work. The Board has explained that
‘‘dealing with’’ contemplates ‘‘a bilateral mechanism
involving proposals from the employee committee con-
cerning the subjects listed in Sec. 2(5), coupled with
real or apparent consideration of those proposals by
management.’’ Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990,
995 fn. 21 (1992), enfd. 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
The bilateral mechanism thus ordinarily entails a pat-
tern or practice in which a group of employees, over
time, makes proposals to management, and manage-
ment responds to these proposals by acceptance or re-
jection by word or deed. E. I. du Pont & Co., 311
NLRB 893, 894 (1993). The record evidence estab-
lishes that this is precisely how the Respondent de-
signed the Plant Council to operate.
Robert Sibilsky, the Respondent’s vice president for
operations who ordered the establishment of the Plant
Council, testified that the Plant Council was designed
to offer recommendations to management about pro-
posed changes in working conditions and that manage-
ment would consider whether to accept or reject those
recommendations. Sibilsky testified:
What you’re looking for out of those bodies and
specifically out of the Plant Council, is a consen-
sus building type of recommendation that would
come—that would be a recommendation from that
entire committee to Management about a pro-
posed change . . . and if there was a rec-
ommendation to be made, it was to be considered
by Management.
Sibilsky testified, for example, that by written memo-
randum dated November 15, 1991, the Plant Council
requested reconsideration of the Respondent’s policy
for issuing employee vacation paychecks. Sibilsky stat-
ed that Respondent’s management considered the pro-
posal, but rejected it and decided to retain its proce-
dures.3 In addition, Mathew Newcomb, an employee
1204 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from their vacation check. They didn’t want that to take place.
Could we change what we did? And not do that?
The second question was, the employees normally received their
vacation pay check on their anniversary date. They wanted to
change that to when they took their vacation, could they get
their vacation check. I responded in writing to the plant council
. . . that we could not change the methodology of how we dis-
tributed the vacation checks. And so we stayed with the pro-
gram. It was not changed. [Emphasis added.]
4 Newcomb testified:
Q. And tell us, as much as you remember, about what’s been
discussed in the Plant Council meetings.
A. . . . And safety shoes, we [the Plant Council] come up
with a policy for safety shoes. The company agreed to give forty
five dollars for everybody buying a pair of OSHA approved
safety shoes. . . . [Emphasis added.]
5 We note that on advice of counsel the Respondent temporarily
restricted during the pendency of the instant proceeding the Plant
Council procedure of recommending proposals to management.
6 The judge additionally found, and we agree, that the Plant Coun-
cil acted in a representational capacity because its employee-mem-
bers were elected by the Respondent’s work force. Compare NLRB
v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 294–295 (6th Cir. 1982) (con-
tinuous rotation of employee committee members rather than an
electoral process militates against finding labor organization status).
We note further that the Plant Council canvassed employees for their
opinion regarding policy changes the Plant Council was considering.
For example, the Plant Council circulated to all employees a copy
of its proposed attendance program, asking employees to read the
proposal and respond back to the Plant Council, and attaching a
comment form. The Plant Council’s minutes additionally reflect its
efforts in ‘‘trying to get the feeling of what the employees actually
wanted on vacation checks.’’
In light of our finding that the Plant Council acted in a representa-
tional capacity, it is unnecessary to the disposition of this case to
determine whether an employee group could be found to constitute
a labor organization absent a finding that it acted as a representative
of other employees. See Electromation, supra, 309 NLRB at 994 fn.
20.
7 We thus find that the record evidence contradicts the Respond-
ent’s contention in its exceptions that the Plant Council was merely
a unilateral employee communication device and brainstorming
group. Compare E. I. du Pont & Co., supra at 894 (committee that
exists for the purpose of sharing information with the employer, or
engaging in brainstorming without making specific proposals, is not
a statutory labor organization).
8 We have carefully considered the Respondent’s exceptions stat-
ing that the Plant Council created its own bylaws, and that the Em-
ployee Involvement Steering Committee had some involvement in
the election process for Plant Council representatives. These facts are
insufficient to outweigh the record evidence that the function, struc-
member of the Plant Council, testified that the Plant
Council proposed to management a policy that the Re-
spondent would pay for employee safety shoes, and
that the Respondent’s management considered and ap-
proved the proposal.4
Indeed, Sibilsky was specifically asked by counsel
for the General Counsel whether the Plant Council had
the authority to make a final determination, without
management approval, as to whether any policy rec-
ommendation was to be effectuated. Sibilsky replied:
[O]f substantive nature, no . . . the area that they
. . . cannot make decisions on are those that deal
with—with the handbook—those issues related to
wages, hours, that sort of thing. They don’t have
the authority to make that decision.
Sibilsky emphasized that management would treat rec-
ommendations on such issues from the Plant Council
‘‘very seriously,’’ and that management would ‘‘have
to take it under advisement.’’5
We accordingly conclude that the record evidence
establishes that the Plant Council existed for the pur-
pose, at least in part, of following a pattern or practice
of making proposals to management which would be
considered and accepted or rejected, and that such a
pattern in fact occurred.6 We therefore agree with the
judge that the element of ‘‘dealing with’’ is present in
this case.7
2. We further agree with the judge that the Respond-
ent unlawfully dominated the formation and adminis-
tration of the Plant Council. A labor organization that
is the creation of management, whose structure and
function are essentially determined by management,
and whose continued existence depends on the fiat of
management, is one whose formation or administration
has been dominated under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
Electromation, supra, 309 NLRB at 995. Each of these
elements is present in this case.
The record evidence establishes that the Plant Coun-
cil was the creation of management. By memorandum
dated February 11, 1991, Vice President Sibilsky di-
rected Olin Rikard, Respondent’s director of manufac-
turing, to establish the Plant Council and to have it in
place by March 15, 1991. Two days later, a memoran-
dum from Mark Blackburn, Respondent’s plant super-
intendent, was posted to all employees directing the es-
tablishment of the Plant Council, describing the goals
for the Plant Council, and detailing the election proc-
ess.
The record evidence further establishes that the
structure and function of the Plant Council were essen-
tially determined by the Respondent. Sibilsky directed
in his memorandum of February 11, 1991, that ‘‘[t]he
Plant Council will consist of five hourly employees
who will be elected by the hourly work force,’’ and
that ‘‘the Plant Council will function as a policy devel-
opment body . . . involved with the development of
plant policies, the employee handbooks, the creation of
a grievance procedure that will involve council mem-
ber representation, and with the process of hourly com-
pensation and benefits.’’ The Respondent further deter-
mined the number of management officials who would
serve on the Plant Council, and selected those individ-
uals. Thus, the Respondent determined the function of
the Plant Council, defined the subject matter to be ad-
dressed by the Plant Council, and announced the num-
ber of employee and management representatives that
would serve on the Plant Council.8
1205WEBCOR PACKAGING
ture, and composition of the Plant Council was determined by the
Respondent.
9 As the judge noted, the General Counsel has not alleged that the
Respondent’s establishment of the Employee Involvement Steering
Committee was unlawful.
10 877 F.2d at 1295.
11 Id.
12 Compare NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co., supra, 691 F.2d at 294
(Sixth Circuit held that employee committee that was part of a com-
pany plan to determine employee attitudes regarding working condi-
tions and other problems for the company’s self-enlightenment, rath-
er than a method by which to pursue a course of dealings, was not
a ‘‘labor organization’’; and emphasized the distinction between
communication of ideas and a course of dealings).
13 Chairman Gould agrees with his colleagues that the Plant Coun-
cil was a labor organization dominated by the Respondent in viola-
tion of Sec. 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. He notes that the control ex-
ercised by the Respondent over the Plant Council is such that the
Continued
The record evidence further unequivocally estab-
lishes that the existence of the Plant Council depended
entirely on the authorization and approval of the Re-
spondent. Although the Respondent contends in its ex-
ceptions that the Respondent’s employees had ex-
pressed an interest in a plant council in 1989, it is un-
disputed that the Plant Council was not in fact initiated
by the employees but by Sibilsky’s management direc-
tive. Sibilsky testified that he decided in late January
1991 to implement the Plant Council because of prob-
lems he perceived in the operation of the Employee In-
volvement Steering Committee, which had been estab-
lished to focus on issues of quality, waste reduction,
housekeeping, safety, and productivity but was then
being asked by employees to involve itself with ‘‘pol-
icy’’ issues.9 It was Sibilsky, moreover, who ordered
the establishment of the Plant Council to be halted fol-
lowing the February 22, 1991 election based on his
judgment that there was insufficient support for the
Plant Council. And it was the Respondent that reestab-
lished the Plant Council by directing in late April or
early May 1991 that a second election for Plant Coun-
cil be conducted. Based on these facts, there can be no
dispute that the Respondent has the authority to estab-
lish and disband the Plant Council entirely at its own
discretion.
We accordingly agree with the judge’s conclusion
that the impetus behind the formation of the Plant
Council emanated from the Respondent, and that the
Plant Council has no effective existence independent
of the Respondent’s active involvement and approval.
A finding of unlawful domination is accordingly war-
ranted. Electromation, supra, 309 NLRB at 996.
We recognize that this case arises in the Sixth Cir-
cuit. As the Respondent notes, the Sixth Circuit has,
on occasion, declined to enforce decisions of the Board
finding that employer-sponsored committees violated
Section 8(a)(2). See NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,
supra; Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th
Cir. 1989). We believe, however, that the Sixth Circuit
precedent on which the Respondent relies is distin-
guishable.
In Airstream, the Sixth Circuit found that the em-
ployer’s ‘‘President’s Advisory Council’’ (PAC) was
not a statutory labor organization because it did not
deal with wages or rates of pay, did not involve itself
in or purport to accomplish the settling of grievances,
and did not attempt to resolve labor disputes with indi-
vidual employees.10 In contrast, the Plant Council here
was specifically assigned by the Respondent to de-
velop policies concerning wages and benefits, work
rules and hours of operation, and to create a grievance
procedure involving Plant Council member representa-
tion. There can thus be no dispute that the Plant Coun-
cil was charged with responsibility for those topics list-
ed in Section 2(5) of the Act.
Further, in Airstream, the Sixth Circuit found that
the PAC meetings were no different from prior ‘‘rap
sessions’’ at which employees were invited to ask
questions and make suggestions.’’11 The Plant Council,
in contrast, was not a forum for suggestions but was
a formalized procedure designed to make specific rec-
ommendations to management about changes in wages,
hours, and other conditions of work, and the Respond-
ent pledged itself to consider whether to accept or re-
ject each recommendation. The Plant Council was thus
not merely a means of communication between man-
agement and employees in which ad hoc proposals
were made and in which management might glean
some ideas and even adopt them, as the Sixth Circuit
viewed the employee committee in Airstream. Rather,
the Plant Council was directed to engage in a pattern
and practice of making recommendations for manage-
ment consideration.12
Nor is this a case in which the employee committee
discussed with management issues of production prob-
lems and plant efficiency. See NLRB v. Associated Ma-
chines, 219 F.2d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1955). The record
evidence clearly establishes that the Plant Council was
not designed to address such issues. Rather, the Re-
spondent had created its Employee Involvement Steer-
ing Committee, which is not alleged to be unlawful, to
address issues of productivity, quality, and safety.
Sibilsky testified, however, that employees neverthe-
less were addressing issues of wages, benefits, and
work rules to the latter committee. Sibilsky decided to
create the Plant Council specifically to deal with issues
of wages and other topics listed in Section 2(5) of the
Act.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for all these reasons, we agree with the
judge that the Plant Council was a labor organization
dominated by the Respondent in violation of Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.13
1206 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
freedom of choice and independence of action open to employees is
too strictly confined within parameters of the Respondent’s making
for the Plant Council to be a genuine expression of democracy in
the workplace. Keeler Brass Co., 317 NLRB 1110 (1995) (Chairman
Gould’s concurrence). Further, the Plant Council was created for the
purpose of engaging in a pattern or practice of dealing with the Re-
spondent on employment conditions.
14 The Respondent declared in its campaign literature:
If the Union WINS the election:
- All wages are subject to change.
- All benefits are subject to change.
- Policies, rules, etc. are subject to change.
There is NO guarantee that those items will be as good as they
are now.
If the Union LOSES the election:
- As we stated prior to this Union organizing drive,
We, the owners of Webcor:
GUARANTEE:
-The employee handbook will not be changed unless it is
changed through the Employee Involvement/Plant Council proc-
ess. [Emphasis added.]
15 The Respondent’s campaign literature stated:
The choice you will make on [election] day is a simple one.
EITHER . . .
You will choose to hire Teamsters #332 as the sole and exclu-
sive agent.
OR . . .
You will choose to continue a relationship with Webcor based
on Employee Involvement.
REMEDY
The Unfair Labor Practice Proceeding
We agree with the judge’s recommended remedy re-
quiring the Respondent to disestablish the Plant Coun-
cil. Disestablishment is the usual Board remedy when-
ever unlawful domination of a labor organization is
found. E.g., Keeler Brass Co., 317 NLRB 1110, 1114
(1995); Electromation, supra, 309 NLRB at 995 fn. 24
and 998.
In two decisions issued more than 50 years ago, the
Supreme Court upheld the Board’s authority to order
disestablishment of ‘‘a company union so organized
that it is incapable of functioning as a bargaining rep-
resentative of employees.’’ NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 270 (1938). See also
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding Co., 308 U.S.
241 (1939). In Pennsylvania Greyhound, the Court em-
phasized that the Act ‘‘secure[s] to employees the ben-
efits of self-organization and collective bargaining
through representatives of the employees’ own choos-
ing.’’ Pennsylvania Greyhound, supra at 267. Likewise
in Newport News, the Court reasoned that once a labor
organization has been unlawfully dominated by an em-
ployer, ‘‘disestablishment . . . may be the only effec-
tive way of wiping the slate clean and affording the
employees an opportunity to start afresh in organizing
for the adjustment of their relations with the em-
ployer.’’ Newport News, supra at 250.
The Representation Proceeding
We further agree with the judge’s recommended
remedy setting aside the results of the representation
election held on April 18, 1991, and directing that a
second election be conducted.
It is undisputed that the Respondent emphasized the
role of the Plant Council throughout the Union’s orga-
nizational campaign in urging its employees to vote
against the Union. Indeed, the Respondent guaranteed
its employees during the organizational campaign that
if the Union lost the election no changes in the policies
set forth in its employee handbook would be made ex-
cept through the Plant Council process.14 The Re-
spondent’s campaign literature additionally pronounced
that Webcor had in fact ‘‘implemented [the] Plant
Council.’’ The Respondent further portrayed the elec-
tion as a stark choice between retaining the Plant
Council and employee involvement processes or select-
ing the Union as its representative.15 Sibilsky further
underscored the prominent role of the Plant Council
during meetings the Respondent conducted with its
employees during the organizational campaign in
which he explained to employees ‘‘what was in place,
where it was going, what it could do for them, what
it couldn’t do for them.’’ The record evidence accord-
ingly demonstrates that the Respondent emphasized the
Plant Council process in the context of urging employ-
ees to vote against the Union throughout the critical
period between the filing of the representation petition
on February 19, 1991, and the election itself on April
18, 1991.
The Respondent nevertheless asserts that the Plant
Council was not in fact implemented during the critical
period and did not effect any changes in working con-
ditions during the critical period. The Respondent ac-
cordingly contends that the Plant Council had only a
de minimis impact on the representation election and
does not warrant the conduct of a second election.
The Respondent’s argument disregards the record
evidence. As noted above, the Respondent specifically
advised employees during the critical period that the
Plant Council was in place. The Respondent does not
dispute or even address the conspicuous role it as-
cribed to the Plant Council during the critical period
in its campaign against the Union. And the Respondent
concedes, as it must, that it conducted an election for
the Plant Council during the critical period on Feb-
ruary 22, 1991.
The Respondent further guaranteed its employees
during the critical period that the policies in the em-
ployee handbook would not be changed except through
the Plant Council process if the Union lost the elec-
tion. The Respondent’s campaign literature concomi-
tantly reminded employees that the handbook included
policies of significance such as double time for Sunday
work and utilizing holiday and vacation hours to com-
pute overtime. The Employer’s announcement of the
1207WEBCOR PACKAGING
1 The Charging Party, Local 332, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL–CIO (Local 332 or the Union), filed its charge in Case 7–CA–
31809 on April 25, 1991, and its charge in Case 7–CA–31896 on
May 17, 1991. On June 7, 1991, the Regional Director for Region
7 issued an order consolidating cases and a notice of consolidated
hearing. The Regional Director simultaneously ordered that the
Union’s objections to the election held in Case 7–RC–19513, which
to a considerable extent parallel the alleged unfair labor practices,
be consolidated for hearing with the unfair labor practice allegations.
I held the hearing in Flint, Michigan, on October 29 and 30, 1992.
Thereafter the General Counsel and Webcor filed briefs. Webcor ad-
mits that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Sec. 2(2) and (6) of the Act and further admits that Local 332
is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
Plant Council as a guarantor against change in policies
of great import to employees contradicts the Respond-
ent’s contention that its actions, even if considered to
be misconduct, were de minimis with respect to affect-
ing the results of the election. The record evidence
compels the conclusion that the role of the Plant Coun-
cil was stressed by the Respondent throughout the crit-
ical period as a reason to vote against the Union. This
case thus falls squarely within the Board’s general pol-
icy of setting aside an election when an unfair labor
practice occurs during the critical period. See, e.g.,
Leather Center, 312 NLRB 521, 530 (1993).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Webcor Packaging, Inc.,
Burton, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from publica-
tion.]
Tinamarie Papas, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Brian Michael Smith and Lawrence J. De Brincat, Esqs., of
Troy, Michigan, for the Respondent.
Rodney Eaton, of Flint, Michigan, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEPHEN J. GROSS, Administrative Law Judge. The Gen-
eral Counsel alleges that a Webcor supervisor threatened one
employee because of the union activities of Webcor’s work
force, coercively interrogated another employee, and gave the
impression that Webcor was spying on the employees’ union
activities, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act). But the General Counsel’s
major allegation is that Webcor dominated and interfered
with the formation and administration of a labor organiza-
tion, and contributed financial and other support to it, thereby
violating Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.1
I turn first to the alleged violation of Section 8(a)(2).
Webcor’s ‘‘Plant Council’’
Webcor manufactures corrugated boxes. It operates only
one facility, a plant in Burton, Michigan. Webcor’s employ-
ees are not represented by a union.
Robert Sibilsky arrived at Webcor, as vice president for
operations, in September 1990. (Sibilsky is an owner of
Webcor, apparently acquiring his ownership interest about
the same time he became vice president of the company.)
Sibilsky had been the manager of another corrugated box
manufacturing company, Consolidated Packaging, prior to
coming to Webcor. According to Sibilsky’s credible testi-
mony, what Sibilsky calls ‘‘employee involvement’’ at Con-
solidated Packaging led to exceedingly high quality in that
plant’s output—levels of quality that were, in fact, higher
than at Webcor. Sibilsky accordingly was an apostle of em-
ployee involvement when he began his management of
Webcor.
By ‘‘employee involvement’’ Sibilsky means a way of op-
erating a plant: (1) that calls on employees, as well as man-
agement, to think up better ways of operating, primarily in
respect to matters that affect productivity, quality, safety,
plant cleanliness, and reduction in waste; (2) in which man-
agement proceeds in a manner that evidences a respect for
what employees have to say about how things should be
done in the plant; and (3) under which small numbers of em-
ployees and supervisors meet as committees in order to
thrash out the best ways to improve operations and deal with
problems as they crop up.
Sibilsky credibly testified that, as he sees things, unless
managers of manufacturing operations do utilize employee
involvement programs, competitive levels of quality and low
cost cannot be achieved. In Sibilsky’s words—
What surfaced in the mid-80’s was something that we
really knew a long time ago . . . but we didn’t utilize
it—the way we were going to achieve . . . quality and
low cost was by involving all the people in our oper-
ation in thinking. Not checking their brains at the door,
but thinking about and participating in how we are
going to get better at what we do. Because if we don’t
get better . . . we’re not going to get any business. We
will not be there. It is that simple.
Sibilsky found no employee involvement in the problem-
solving process when he arrived at Webcor; what was in
place, as Sibilsky testified, was a ‘‘top-down type of arrange-
ment. . . . The solutions were always top down. [The em-
ployees] weren’t asked for their input on solutions to . . .
quality problems, productivity problems, or the rest of it.’’
(Sibilsky defined ‘‘top-down management’’ this way: where
the managers of a plant, rather than asking the employees
how a problem can be solved, ‘‘take it upon themselves to
analyze the problem, and determine what the issues are, and
then force the solution down the pipe.’’)
Sibilsky, as vice president of operations and an owner of
Webcor, is senior to all other members of Webcor’s manage-
ment. The next most senior official at Webcor is Director of
Manufacturing Olin Rikard. In Rikard’s words, Sibilsky
quickly ‘‘made it very clear that we [Webcor] were going to
have employee involvement.’’
On November 1, 1990, Sibilsky became specific about
what he wanted in the way of an employee involvement
1208 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
structure: he ordered Rikard to establish an ‘‘Employee In-
volvement Steering Committee.’’ That committee would have
five members—three employees and two members of man-
agement. (The employee-members would be chosen by lot
from among those who volunteered to serve on the commit-
tee.) The committee was expected to focus on issues of qual-
ity, waste reduction, housekeeping, safety, and productivity.
Those were the areas, thought Sibilsky, about which the em-
ployees could be expected to have expertise and where, as
Sibilsky testified, ‘‘the bang for the buck’’ is. The Employee
Involvement Steering Committee was not to involve itself in
what Sibilsky calls ‘‘policy’’ issues; that is, matters such as
wages, work rules, hours of employment, and the like.
The Employee Involvement Steering Committee was es-
tablished in mid-December 1990, held its first meeting on
January 3, 1991, and held meetings weekly thereafter. (Here-
after all dates to which this decision refers occurred in 1991
unless otherwise noted.) Webcor’s employees promptly
began to submit matters for consideration by the committee.
(The General Counsel does not allege that Webcor violated
the Act in any respect by establishing the Employee Involve-
ment Steering Committee.) But by mid-January it became
clear that things were not going as Sibilsky had hoped. The
problem was that many of the matters employees were ask-
ing the Employee Involvement Steering Committee to handle
did not directly deal with productivity or quality or the like.
Rather, they concerned policy issues. For example, sugges-
tions coming into the Employee Involvement Steering Com-
mittee had to do with changes in the way overtime was dis-
tributed among employees, whether employees should be on
or off the clock during lunchbreaks, when employees should
receive their vacation pay, and whether and to what extent
the Company should reimburse employees for the cost of
tools and safety boots.
Sibilsky, and a labor consultant from whom Sibilsky
sought advice, had recognized that the Employee Involve-
ment Steering Committee would inevitably receive some sug-
gestions having to do with policy issues. But Sibilsky and
the labor consultant agreed that the Employee Involvement
Steering Committee should not deal with such matters. A
separate entity would be set up to handle them. Sibilsky’s
expectation had been that the establishment of this other en-
tity would be delayed until the Employee Involvement Steer-
ing Committee had been in operation for a while.
But when suggestions dealing with policy issues began ar-
riving on the doorsteps of the Employee Involvement Steer-
ing Committee, some arrangement had to be made to deal
with them by an entity other than the Employee Involvement
Steering Committee. The problem was that that committee
‘‘was getting grid-locked on what [it] could and couldn’t
do’’ (in Sibilsky’s words).
A complicating factor is that it was at this point—mid-Jan-
uary—that several employees asked Local 332 to run an or-
ganizing effort at Webcor. Until then, there had been no
union activity at Webcor since an unsuccessful unionization
campaign late 1989 by the Allied Industrial Workers. (Iron-
ically, the employees’ interest in union representation appears
to have been aroused by changes in procedures at Webcor
that Sibilsky had, without seeking employee input, forced
‘‘down the pipe’’—to use Sibilsky’s phrase.)
The result of all this was that in late January and early
February Local 332 got ready to begin an organizing cam-
paign at Webcor and, simultaneously, Sibilsky, after ponder-
ing what to do about providing for employee involvement in
policy matters, moved toward the creation of a ‘‘Plant Coun-
cil’’ that would deal only with such matters.
On February 11 Sibilsky ordered Rikard to establish a
Plant Council in a memorandum that specified that the Plant
Council would have ‘‘five hourly employee’’ members ‘‘who
will be elected by the hourly work force’’ and enumerated
the matters with which the Plant Council would ‘‘be in-
volved.’’
By February 11 Sibilsky had begun hearing rumors about
union activity in the plant. Thus the first question to consider
is whether Sibilsky decided to establish the Plant Council, or
decided to establish it so soon, because of the union activi-
ties of the employees.
My conclusion is that the employees’ union activities af-
fected neither the decision to establish a Plant Council nor
the date on which the idea of a Plant Council was put before
the employees. Considerable evidence adduced by Webcor
shows that management’s action regarding a Plant Council
was driven by Sibilsky’s views about the importance of em-
ployee involvement, by advice from a labor consultant con-
cerning employee involvement (which advice was not based
on information about union activity), and by the nature of the
matters that the employees were asking the Employee In-
volvement Steering Committee to consider.
I note that the General Counsel contends that Local 332
handbilled at the plant on February 7—4 days before
Sibilsky’s order to Rikard to establish a Plant Council. But
I find that the evidence fails to show that there was any
handbilling that early. (A business agent of the Union testi-
fied that he distributed handbills on February 7 and then
again on February 16. But he had earlier testified that the
Union did not do any handbilling until after the filing of the
election petition, and that occurred on February 19. Further,
no one but the business agent testified that there was any
overt union activity prior to the filing of the election peti-
tion.) In any event, my finding about the reasons for the es-
tablishment of the Plant Council would not change even if
there had been handbilling on February 7.
On February 13, 2 days after Sibilsky ordered Rikard to
establish a Plant Council, management announced to employ-
ees that there would be a meeting on February 15 to discuss
the ‘‘Webcor Plant Council’’ and also announced that the
five employee-members of the Plant Council would be cho-
sen by an election among the employees to be held a week
later.
The Employee Involvement Steering Committee had been
asked to design the procedures for choosing the employee
membership on the Plant Council. The committee decided
that the employee-members of the Plant Council should be
chosen by election from among all the production and main-
tenance employees. Each employee was to vote for five of
the listed names.
The election was held as scheduled, on February 22.
Twenty-eight employees cast ballots. But 18 of the 28 ballots
were blank. Of the 5 employees receiving the most votes (on
the 10 ballots that were not blank) 4 refused to serve on the
Plant Council. An employee called as a witness by the Gen-
eral Counsel testified that, as far as he was concerned, the
proposed establishment of a Plant Council was merely man-
agement’s way of responding to Local 332’s organizing ef-
1209WEBCOR PACKAGING
2 The bargaining unit: All full-time and regular part-time produc-
tion and maintenance employees and truckdrivers employed by
Webcor at its facility at 1220 Center Road, Burton, Michigan; but
excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
fort. The employees’ response to the election for membership
on the Plant Council suggests, of course, that that feeling
was widespread.
Sibilsky recognized that the election for plant council
membership showed ‘‘that there wasn’t any support’’ for the
Plant Council. He accordingly ordered that everything con-
cerning a Plant Council temporarily come to a halt.
Nonetheless, in a ‘‘Dear Employee’’ letter distributed on
March 20, management contended that one reason Webcor’s
employees ought to vote against representation by the Union
was management’s commitment to ‘‘employee involvement’’
and, in listing management’s accomplishments, the letter re-
ferred to ‘‘implemented Plant Council.’’
The representation election was held on April 18. Fourteen
employees voted in favor of representation by Local 332; 21
employees voted against representation by the Union.2
About 2 weeks later—in late April or early May—manage-
ment again conducted an election to choose the employee-
members of the Plant Council. As was the case in the earlier,
abortive, election, management provided the ballots and the
polling place, and the election was conducted during working
hours, with the employees on the clock. On this occasion
employees were asked to volunteer to serve on the Plant
Council. The ballots named only the volunteers. The election
was a success in that the employees cast complete ballots,
five employee-members were chosen from among those who
volunteered, and those five employees agreed to serve.
The Plant Council began meeting in May and has contin-
ued to meet regularly since then.
Here are the details of what the plant council is and how
it operates.
The Membership of the Plant Council; the
Decisional Process
The Plant Council has eight members: five employees (as
already discussed) and three members of management. The
management members are the two most senior officials at the
plant (the director of manufacturing and the plant manager),
and a lower-ranking Webcor official. If an employee-member
of the Plant Council is promoted into management, that indi-
vidual leaves the council and the employee who received the
next highest vote at the previous election for plant council
members replaces the departing individual.
Employees choose only the employee-members of the
Plant Council; they do not select the management members.
It is not altogether clear whether there has been any decision
concerning the term of an employee-member on the Plant
Council. But Sibilsky apparently planned that each em-
ployee-member of the Plant Council would remain on the
council for a maximum of about a year.
An employee-member of the Plant Council called as a wit-
ness by the General Counsel agreed that each member has
an ‘‘equal say . . . in terms of the ability to bring topics up
and discuss topics.’’ The chairmanship of the Plant Council
rotates, so that a different member chairs each meeting. As
a result, sometimes an employee-member of the Plant Coun-
cil chairs the meeting, sometimes a management-member
does.
In theory the members of the Plant Council can vote on
an issue, with a simple majority determining the outcome. In
practice the members strive to reach a consensus and, as of
the hearing, have always succeeded. (The employee-members
of the Plant Council appear to be quite satisfied with the
decisional process within the Plant Council. That holds true
for an employee-member of the Plant Council who had ac-
tively supported Local 332 during the 1991 election cam-
paign.)
Employees who are not members of the Plant Council
bring matters to the Plant Council’s attention by placing a
written suggestion in a box designated for that purpose. Man-
agement puts matters before the Plant Council by having one
of the management-members raise it at a plant council meet-
ing. The Plant Council routinely invites to plant council
meetings those employees who have made suggestions so
that the employees can orally present their proposals.
The Kinds of Matters the Plant Council is
Authorized to Deal with
I mentioned earlier that action on a Plant Council was set
in motion by a February 11 memorandum from Sibilsky to
Rikard. In that memorandum Sibilsky spelled out the matters
that he wanted the Plant Council to concern itself with:
The Plant Council will be involved with the develop-
ment of plant policies, the employee handbooks, the
creation of a grievance procedure that will involve
Council member representation, and with the process of
hourly compensation and benefits.
The Plant Council will function as a policy develop-
ment body.
All matters of plant policy, procedure, and com-
pensation will be jointly reviewed prior to implementa-
tion by the Plant Council and Management.
By way of example, Sibilsky testified, the Plant Council
could consider work rules, wages, and benefits, what the
plant’s hours should be, and what kinds of discipline should
be meted out for specified infractions.
The Effect of a Plant Council Decision
As touched on earlier, four individuals own Webcor and
are considered Webcor’s senior management. Decisions of
the Plant Council ordinarily are not implemented unless ap-
proved by the owners. As Sibilsky put it, no plant council
decision of a ‘‘substantive nature’’ is put into effect without
such approval. The only decisions of the Plant Council that
are implemented without the owners’ approval, testified
Sibilsky, are decisions on ‘‘lesser issues’’—decisions ‘‘that
are logical to make at the level of the plant.’’
The Activities of the Plant Council
Matters that have come before the Plant Council include:
Tools. The issue the Plant Council dealt with was when
Webcor should purchase tools for an employee (for use in
the employee’s work in the plant) and when should the em-
ployee be responsible for the purchase of tools. Rikard and
one of the employee-members of the Plant Council drafted
1210 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 As discussed earlier, in respect to a limited number of ‘‘lesser’’
matters the Plant Council’s decisions result directly in changes in
conditions of work. As to these matters it is unclear whether there
is any ‘‘dealing’’ with employers. The criterion would appear to be
whether the management-members of the council have the power to
reject proposals put forward by the employee-members. E. I. du
Pont, supra. On the one hand, it is the Plant Council’s practice to
operate by consensus—which suggests that the management-mem-
bers do have such veto power. Id. On the other hand, the Plant
Council’s rules provide for voting, in which case a simple majority
determines the outcome. Since the management-members are out-
numbered by the employee-members, in the case of a vote manage-
ment could not reject a proposal supported by the employee-mem-
bers.
4 But see id. at 994 fn. 20.
a policy statement on the subject, the Plant Council adopted
it, and the policy was implemented.
Overtime equalization. Webcor’s employees had been
complaining about favoritism in the way overtime work was
handed out. The members of the Plant Council decided that
when there was overtime work to do, management would be
required to first turn to the employee (in the relevant job
classification) with the lowest number of overtime hours; the
employee with the highest number of overtime hours would
be asked last. Seniority was to be ignored for that purpose.
This overtime equalization policy has been implemented.
Safety boots. Webcor had been paying for one pair of safe-
ty shoes per year for some of its employees. The employee-
members of the Plant Council proposed that, due to the na-
ture of the work involved, some of those employees needed
two pair of safety shoes per year and that Webcor should pay
for both pair. The management-members of the Plant Council
agreed, and Webcor now does pay for two pair of safety
shoes per year for such employees.
Attendance policy. In April 1992 management proposed a
revision to the plant’s attendance rules. All the plant’s em-
ployees were asked to consider the revision and to ‘‘respond
back to the Plant Council.’’ Within the Plant Council, the
employee-members opposed implementation of the new at-
tendance rules. The new rules were not implemented. But the
members of the Plant Council did reach agreement about
some changes in attendance policy, and Webcor did imple-
ment those changes.
The implication of the record as a whole is that none of
these actions would have been implemented unless Webcor’s
owners approved of the Plant Council’s decision. But the
record is not entirely clear in that respect.
Temporary Restrictions on Plant Council Activities
Webcor’s labor counsel advised the Company that the
Plant Council should not act on matters directly affecting
employee pay and benefits until the conclusion of this pro-
ceeding. The result of this advice has been that the Plant
Council has considered, but not acted on, the following mat-
ters: (1) changes in incentives for perfect attendance; (2)
whether each employee ought to get a paid day off when a
grandparent dies; and (3) the timing of the issuance of
checks covering paid vacation time.
Sibilsky testified that, as a result of counsel’s advice con-
cerning the need to await the outcome of this proceeding,
matters that might affect expenditures have been considered
by the Plant Council, but they have not come out in the form
of recommendations. That, however, overstates the restric-
tions on the Plant Council, given the new policies governing
tools and safety shoes that have been implemented as a result
of plant council action.
When does the Plant Council Meet;
Management Support
The Plant Council meets in the plant during working
hours. The members of the Plant Council decided they would
meet twice a month. The plant manager schedules the meet-
ing dates, subject to change at the request of any member of
the council.
Management supplies any needed materials and equipment.
All members of the Plant Council are paid for the time they
spend on plant council matters.
Does Webcor’s Plant Council Violate Section 8(a)(2)
The question for consideration in this proceeding is not
whether Webcor’s Plant Council benefits Webcor’s employ-
ees or harms them; or whether the Plant Council, and entities
like it at other companies, would be good for America or
bad. Rather, this case is about whether, in the words of Sec-
tions 2(5) and 8(a)(2) and in light of Electromation, Inc., 309
NLRB 990 (1992), and its progeny, the Plant Council is a
‘‘labor organization,’’ and whether, if it is, Webcor
‘‘dominate[d] or interfere[d] with the formation or adminis-
tration’’ of the Plant Council ‘‘or contribute[d] financial or
other support to it.’’
Is the Plant Council a ‘‘labor organization?’’ Section 2(5)
defines ‘‘labor organization’’ as follows:
The term ‘‘labor organization’’ means any organiza-
tion of any kind, or any agency or employee representa-
tion committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work.
It is clear, of course, that Webcor’s Plant Council is an
‘‘organization’’ within the meaning of Section 2(5), and is
one in which ‘‘employees participate.’’ See generally
Electromation, supra. It is also clear that the Plant Council’s
purpose is to consider, and to take positions on, ‘‘grievances
. . . wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.’’ Further, it is inescapable that the Plant Council
‘‘deals with’’ an employer concerning such matters. That is
because, in respect to most matters the Plant Council follows
a ‘‘pattern or practice’’ in which it, ‘‘over time, makes pro-
posals to management’’ (with ‘‘management’’ in this case
being Webcor’s owners) and ‘‘management responds to these
proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed.’’ E. I.
du Pont & Co., 311 NLRB 893 (1993).3
What remains to determine is whether the employee-mem-
bers of the Plant Council ‘‘acted in a representational capac-
ity within the meaning of Section 2(5).’’ Electromation,
supra;4 see General Foods Corp., 231 NLRB 1232, 1234
(1977).
Unlike Electromation (at fn. 7), the employee-members of
Webcor’s Plant Council were not instructed ‘‘to go amongst
1211WEBCOR PACKAGING
5 See also Ryder Distribution Resources, 311 NLRB 814 (1993),
in which the employee-members of the committee at issue were di-
rected to poll the other employees concerning the various proposals
discussed in committee meetings.
6 For other considerations regarding employee suggestion box pro-
cedures, see E. I. du Pont at fn. 11 and accompanying text.
7 Compare, for example, the ‘‘Communications Committee’’ in
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 NLRB 230, 244 (1985), in which ‘‘the
employees on the committee were not selected by their fellow em-
ployees’’ but instead participated ‘‘on a rotation basis.’’
8 See, e.g., Peninsula General Hospital Medical Center, 312
NLRB 582 (1993).
9 Id.
the other employees and find out what kind of ideas they
had.’’5 (Employees generally were invited to suggest matters
for consideration by the Plant Council; however, I do not
consider that to mean that the employee-members of the
council acted in a representative capacity.)6 Rather, I got the
impression that the employee-members of the Plant Council
voiced their own thoughts about how to deal with whatever
issue was on the table, without concerning themselves about
whether those thoughts necessarily mirrored the points of
view of the plant’s employees generally. And the testimony
of employee plant council member Mathew Newcomb indi-
cates that representation was not what the members of the
Plant Council—either employee-members or management-
members—had in mind: According to Newcomb, ‘‘we [the
Plant Council members] are hoping to settle the problems
and make the hourly employees and management see the
same thing at the same level.’’
But for all that, the employee-members of the Plant Coun-
cil surely ‘‘represent’’ Webcor’s employees generally. The
point is that the employee-members of the Plant Council are
selected by election in which the voters are the plant’s em-
ployees. Virtually by definition, the employee-members of
the Plant Council are thereby the representatives of the em-
ployees. That is, given their election to the Plant Council by
the employees, the employee-members of the Plant Council
are ‘‘representatives’’ of the employees in that they ‘‘stand
for . . . a class’’ (in the words of Webster’s Third Inter-
national Dictionary)—the class being Webcor’s production
and maintenance employees.7
I conclude, therefore, that Webcor’s Plant Council is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
Domination and interference by Webcor. All this brings us
to the question of whether Webcor ‘‘dominate[d] or
interfere[d] with the formation or administration’’ of the
Plant Council and whether Webcor ‘‘contribute[d] financial
or other support to it.’’
Webcor did all of that. The Plant Council was ‘‘the cre-
ation of management,’’ its ‘‘structure and function’’ were
‘‘determined by management,’’ and its ‘‘continued existence
depends on the fiat of management.’’ Electromation, supra.
Additionally the Plant Council’s meetings are conducted on
Webcor’s premises,8 Webcor pays the employees for the
time they spend on Plant Council matters,9 and Webcor con-
tributes whatever additional slight financial support the Plant
Council needs.
Webcor’s motivation in establishing the Plant Council.
The Plant Council was created because of Sibilsky’s belief
that Webcor would benefit by involving employees in the
decisional processes. Concomitantly, Webcor’s Plant Council
was not created because of any antiunion animus on the part
of Webcor’s management. But ‘‘Sec. 8(a)(2) does not require
a finding of antiunion animus or a specific motive to inter-
fere with Sec. 7 rights.’’ Electromation, 309 NLRB at 995
fn. 24.
Webcor points out, on brief, that the Webcor ‘‘employees
had expressed an interest in the formation of a Plant Council
in 1989’’—during the Allied Industrial Workers’ organiza-
tional campaign. But that is beside the point if only because
such expression of interest did not play a role in Sibilsky’s
decision to establish the Plant Council.
As for the indications in the record that Webcor’s employ-
ees are pleased to have a Plant Council, that too is irrelevant
to the question of whether Webcor violated Section 8(a)(2).
Electromation, supra at fn. 24.
Webcor’s Plant Council—Conclusion
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, I further
conclude that Webcor violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
Employee Mathew Newcomb testified that, soon after the
Union had filed its election petition, Plant Manager Rikard
told Newcomb that Rikard had heard that Newcomb was one
of the leaders of the unionization effort and asked Newcomb
why he supported the Union. At the time Newcomb had not
made public his position regarding the Union. The General
Counsel claims that Webcor, by coercively interrogating an
employee and giving an impression of surveillance of the
employees’ union activities, thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
Rikard, however, denied questioning Newcomb about New-
comb’s role in or support for the Union, and Rikard’s testi-
mony was equally as credible as Newcomb’s. The General
Counsel, that is to say, failed to carry his burden of proof.
I accordingly shall recommend that this allegation be dis-
missed.
Maintenance employee Ricky Middleton testified that, on
the day preceding the representation election, Rikard said to
Middleton, ‘‘I don’t know what we’re going to do with you
if the Union is voted in.’’ There had been widespread rumors
in the plant that Webcor was going to reduce the number of
employees in its maintenance department. If Rikard did utter
such a statement, then, it constituted a threat that unioniza-
tion might cost Middleton his job. But Rikard denied saying
anything to Middleton about the Teamsters and denied
threatening Middleton with job loss. Again, Rikard’s testi-
mony was equally as credible as Middleton’s, and I shall
therefore recommend that the allegation be dismissed.
REMEDY
As requested by the General Counsel, the following rec-
ommended Order requires Webcor to disestablish the Plant
Council. The General Counsel does not ask that I order
Webcor to undo actions taken as a result of plant council
recommendations. (As indicated earlier, plant council rec-
ommendations implemented by Webcor include, for example,
rules covering payment by Webcor, in certain circumstances,
of the costs of safety boots and tools.) And since it seems
to me that more would be lost than gained by ordering such
1212 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
an undoing, the recommended Order imposes no such re-
quirement.
There remains the question of whether the April 18, 1991
representation election should be set aside.
In that regard, one of the Union’s objections states that:
Since on or about February 19, 1991, the Employer
has been trying to bargain with the employees to avoid
having to go to an election with Teamsters Local 332.
While I have found that not to be the case, the objection
does put into issue the question of whether Webcor’s actions
regarding the Plant Council warrant setting aside the rep-
resentation election. And since ‘‘the Board’s general policy
is to set aside an election whenever an unfair labor practice
occurs during the critical period’’ (Video Tape Co., 288
NLRB 646 fn. 2 (1989)), the only remaining question is
whether any Webcor actions between February 19 (the day
on which the petition was filed) and April 18 regarding the
Plant Council violated the Act. That question arises because
the Plant Council did not begin acting until May 1991 and
its employee-members at that time had been selected by a
vote that occurred after the representation election.
I have found that on February 22 (i.e., subsequent to the
filing of the election petition), an election was held in the
Webcor plant to select the employee-members of the Plant
Council. It is true that, because of employee resistance,
Webcor set aside the results of that election. But the act of
holding the February 22 election would itself appear to con-
stitute interference with the formation of a labor organization
and thus be a violation of Section 8(a)(2). Moreover
Webcor’s management contended during the Union’s cam-
paign—as an argument against unionization—that the Plant
Council had been ‘‘implemented’’; that is, that the Plant
Council existed. (Presumably Webcor’s theory at the time
was that the Plant Council, while for the moment inactive,
would begin operating as soon as its membership was se-
lected.)
The recommended Order accordingly sets aside the rep-
resentation election held on April 18, 1991, and remands
Case 7–RC–19513 to the Regional Director for Region 7 for
the purpose of conducting a new election.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Webcor Packaging, Inc., Burton, Michi-
gan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Dominating, assisting, or otherwise supporting the
Plant Council.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Immediately disestablish the Plant Council.
(b) Post at its facility in Burton, Michigan, copies of the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’11 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7,
after being signed by the Respondent’s representative, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately on receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held in Case 7–
RC–19513 on April 18, 1993, be set aside and the case re-
manded to the Regional Director for Region 7 for the pur-
pose of conducting a new election.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT dominate, assist, or otherwise support the
Plant Council.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL immediately disestablish the Plant Council.
WEBCOR PACKAGING, INC.