Wayne Fueling Systems LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 11, 2020

15669109 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/669,109 08/04/2017 Daniel C. Harrell 255903/47376-042C02US 6650
123896 7590 05/11/2020
Mintz Levin/Wayne Fueling Systems LLC
One Financial Center
Boston, MA 02111
EXAMINER
MAI, THIEN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2887
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocketingbos@mintz.com
ipfileroombos@mintz.com
mintzdocketing@cpaglobal.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANIEL C. HARRELL
Appeal 2019-003420
Application 15/669,109
Technology Center 2800
Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, MONTÉ T. SQUIRE, and
DEBRA L. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 In our Decision, we refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) of Application
15/669,109 filed Aug. 4, 2017; the Non-Final Office Action dated May 18,
2018 (“Non-Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed Jan. 7, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”);
the Examiner’s Answer dated Mar. 8, 2019 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief
filed Mar. 26, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Wayne
Fueling Systems LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 15/669,109

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention is drawn to fuel dispensers for dispensing fuel to
customers. Spec. ¶ 2. The Specification suggests that safety, reliability, and
efficiency for fueling facilities may be improved by intelligent control of
fuel dispensers by providing enhanced management at one or more fuel
dispensers. Spec. ¶ 6. The enhanced management may provide
point-of-sale functions, fuel dispenser coordination, fuel dispenser
diagnostics, data security, and sales capability for remote merchants. Spec.
¶ 6.
FIG. 5 of the ’109 Application is reproduced below:

FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating a detailed implementation of a
fuel dispenser system. Spec. ¶ 21. Store controller 410, POS equipment
420, and fuel dispenser 430 are coupled together via communication
network 440. In this implementation, communication network 440 includes
hub 442 for distributing the communication between the components. Spec.
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¶ 87. POS equipment 420 generates customer activated terminal (CAT) and
pump commands that are transmitted to fuel dispenser 430 through hub 442
via link 444. Spec. ¶ 87. Store controller 410 is linked with hub 442 via
communication link 446. Spec. ¶ 87. System 400 also includes diagnostic
and asset management system 480 coupled to hub 442 via communication
link 446. Spec. ¶ 87.
Fuel dispenser 430 includes in-dispenser POS (point-of-sale) module
431 that allows the fuel dispenser to conduct fueling session in a stand-alone
mode if POS equipment 420 or POS link 444 should become inoperable.
Spec. ¶ 86. POS module 431 may provide POS functionalities, which may
include cash register, dispenser control, transaction card processing, and/or
bar code scanning. Spec. ¶ 86. Fuel dispenser 430 also includes dispenser
computer 436, which controls fuel flow aspects of fuel dispenser 430. Spec.
¶ 89. Dispenser manager 431 interoperates with dispenser computer 436 to
deliver commands and receive transaction data and status. Spec. ¶ 89.
Control, status, real-time disagnostic, error codes, and data may also be
exchanged over communication link 437. Spec. ¶ 89. Dispenser computer
436 may also drive sale progress displays on sales/volume displays of
dispenser 430. Dispenser manager 432 collects and maintains status of fuel
dispenser 430 and reports status information to store controller 410 and/or
POS equipment 420. Spec. ¶ 89.
POS module (in fuel dispenser 430) provides a fault-tolerant
architecture, assuring dispenser functionality in the event that POS
equipment 420, hub 442, or link 444 crashes, goes off-line, or otherwise
becomes unavailable. Spec. ¶ 90. POS module 431 (in fuel dispenser 430)
is operable to perform the relevant POS functionalities (e.g.,
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store/forwarding, transaction logging, and URL and payment card
processing) for operating fuel dispenser 430 in autonomous mode for at least
some operationally-significant period of time. Spec. ¶ 90.
Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal
Brief, illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A fuel dispenser comprising:
a dispenser manager configured for internal mounting
within the fuel dispenser and operable, during a fueling session,
to create fueling session data, the dispenser manager
comprising a communications interface;
a user interface device capable of detecting user
instructions, the user interface device being operable to
exchange information regarding the detected user instructions
with the dispenser manager during a fueling session;
a point-of-sale module resident on the dispenser
manager, the point-of-sale module being operable full time in a
stand-alone mode to, in response to the detected user
instructions, independently determine that payment for a fuel-
dispensing request is authorized, and the point-of-sale module
being operable full time in the stand-alone mode without
communication with a point-of-sale device, and wherein the
point-of-sale device is external to the fuel dispenser;
a display operatively coupled to the dispenser manager
through the communications interface, wherein the dispenser
manager is operable to output at least a portion of the fueling
session data to create a visual representation on the display; and
a fuel controller operatively coupled to the dispenser
manager through the communications interface and operable to
manage one or more fuel transfer components, the dispenser
manager being operable to exchange fueling commands and
status data with the fuel controller during the fueling session.
Appeal Br. (Claims Appendix A).
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REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims:
Name Reference Date
Coppola et al.
(“Coppola”)
US 6,360,138 B1 Mar. 19, 2002
Dickson et al.
(“Dickson”)
US 2004/0182921 A1 Sept. 23, 2004
Giacaman US 2004/0260425 A1 Dec. 23, 2004
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a): (1) claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 11–13, 19, 20, and 23 over Coppola in view of
Dickson; and (2) claims 3–7, 14–18, and 22 over Coppola and Dickson, and
in view of Giacaman. Non-Final Act. 2–9.
OPINION
Rejection over Coppola in view of Dickson
Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 11–13, 19, 20, and 23 as a group.3
Appeal Br. 7–11. We select claim 1 as representative of the group.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claims 2, 8, 9, 11–13, 19, 20, and 23 stand or
fall with claim 1.
With regard to claim 1, the Examiner finds that Coppola discloses
almost all of the claim limitations. Non-Final Act. 2–3. The Examiner finds
that Coppola is silent regarding “the point-of-sale module being operable
full time in a stand-alone mode without communication with a point-of-sale

3 Appellant argues independent claim 12 and its dependent claims 13, 19,
20, and 23 are patentable over Coppola in view of Dickson “[f]or reasons
similar to those discussed above regarding claim 1.” Appeal Br. 11.
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device, and wherein the point-of-sale device is external to the fuel
dispenser” and “independently determine[s] that payment for a fuel-
dispensing request is authorized.” Id. at 3. The Examiner finds that Dickson
discloses off-line authorization of transaction payments via a smart card,
with payment authorization obtainable locally, based on information stored
within the smart card. Id. at 3–4. The Examiner finds that a POS software
module portion resident in the dispenser of Dickson allows the card reader to
verify the PIN entered by the customer against that stored in the card, then
pass authorization information to the controller, which sends an
authorization signal to dispensing hardware to start the fuel dispensing
process. Id. at 4. The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to incorporate
Dickson’s disclosure to eliminate the need to contact the POS externally in
cases of a connectivity issue, for faster processing of the sale, or to minimize
intrusion hacking threats. Id.
Appellant argues that the combination of Coppola and Dickson fails to
teach or suggest “the point-of-sale module being operable full time in the
stand-alone mode to, in response to the detected user instructions,
independently determine that payment for a fuel-dispensing request is
authorized.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant’s argument focuses on the term
“operable full time on a stand-alone mode.” See id. at 8–10. Appellant
contends that requiring Coppola to operate full time in a mode in which only
smart cards are used for fuel payment eliminates functionality of Coppola’s
fuel dispenser making it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose and
impermissibly changing its principle of operation. Id. at 10. Appellant
argues that Coppola’s “self-service functionality would necessarily be
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eliminated” because the fuel dispenser would “have to operate full time in a
mode in which the fuel dispenser does not communicate with the POS 12
that is external to the fuel dispenser 14.” Id. at 9. Moreover, according to
Appellant, Coppola’s full service mode, in which a site attendant provides
input to POS commands locally stored at the site forecourt controller that the
POS uses to release use of the fuel dispenser, “would necessarily be
eliminated” under the Examiner’s proposed modification. Id. at 10.
Appellant contends that one of ordinary skill would not have modified
Coppola in a way that eliminates use of the site forecourt controller. Id.
And, if one incorporated the smart card functionality of Dickson into
Coppola as an additional mode of functionality, Appellant contends the
claimed invention would not result because the modified dispenser with
three modes of functionality would not be operable full time in the newly
added third mode. Id. Thus, the outcome of this case turns on interpretation
of “operable full time in a stand-alone mode.”
During prosecution, we give the language of the proposed claims “the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account
whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be
afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“The words used in a claim must be read in light of the specification, as it
would have been interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the invention.”). “Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the
claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent
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with the specification and prosecution history.” TriVascular, Inc. v.
Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Any explanation,
elaboration, or qualification presented by the inventor during patent
examination is relevant, for the role of claim construction is to ‘capture the
scope of the actual invention’ that is disclosed, described, and patented.”
Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(quoting Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d
1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). However, any special definitions for claim
terms must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.
In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Appellant provides no special definition for the terms “full time” or
“stand-alone.” See generally Spec. Therefore, we apply the broadest
reasonable interpretation to these terms.
The Examiner determines that “full time” includes “the entire time or
each transactional time the self-service mode or the full-service or even the
third mode is in.” Ans. 6. Appellant counters that “operable full time in a
stand-alone mode” is not the same as “operable part time in a stand-alone
mode, i.e., only when a smart card is being used for payment.” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant does not otherwise proffer constructions of the terms. See
generally Appeal Br., Reply Br.
The Specification includes the term “full time” only twice:
In certain modes of operation, the management module may
also be active while the fuel dispenser is communicating with a
facility controller. Types of services that the management
module may provide include POS, . . . . POS function [] may,
for example, be provided at a fuel dispenser on a full time, or
close to full time, basis.
. . .
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Although FIG. 9 illustrates one implementation of a process for
operating a POS module, other processes for operating a POS
module may include fewer, additional, and/or a different
arrangement of operations. For example, a POS module may
operate on a full time basis. This could provide for a scaled-
back version of the facility controller . . . , since most POS
functionalities could be handled by the fuel dispenser. As
another example, the POS module may be commanded to
operate while the external POS equipment is to be taken offline,
for repair or replacement.”
Spec. ¶¶ 67, 98 (emphases added). The Specification describes
“stand-alone” as follows:
[F]uel dispenser 430 includes an in-dispenser module 431 that
allows the fuel dispenser to conduct fueling sessions in a stand-
alone mode if POS equipment 420 or POS link 444 should
become inoperable. For example, POS module 431 may
provide POS functionalities, which may include cash register,
dispenser control, transaction card processing, and/or bar code
scanning.
. . .
[O]nce it is determined that the link with the external POS
equipment is unavailable [], the POS module begins to operate
in a stand-alone condition [] until it is determined that the link
with the external POS equipment has been re-established [].
After the link is re-established, the POS module returns to the
passive condition.
Spec. ¶¶ 86, 90 (emphases added).
Taking into consideration the Specification and FIG. 9, the broadest
reasonable meaning of the phrase “the point-of-sale module being operable
full time in the stand-alone mode” as understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art is “the POS module is capable of operating with all necessary
functions during the entire time that a link with an external POS device is
not available.” “Full time” is not so broad as to apply to any individual
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transaction time. See Ans. 6. Nor is it so narrow as to be limited to
requiring the fuel dispenser to only and always operate with no
communication with an external point-of-sale device. See Appeal Br. A
(Claims App’x).
Applying the construction of “operable full time in a stand-alone
mode” discussed above, we determine that Coppola in view of Dickson
discloses the invention of claim 1. Appellant does not show that the
Examiner reversibly errs in finding claim 1 obvious over the combined
references.
Having determined that claim 1 would have been obvious over
Coppola in view of Dickson, we likewise determine that claims 2, 8, 9,
11–13, 19, 20, and 23 would have been obvious over the combined
references. See 37 C.F.R.§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). The heading in the Non-Final
Action regarding this rejection does not refer to claims 10 or 21. See
Non-Final Act. 2. However, the Examiner discusses claim 10 (which
depends from claim 1) and refers to claim 21 (which depends from claim 12)
in the same section of the Non-Final Action. See id. at 6, 7. Therefore, we
view the omission of claims 10 and 21 from the heading of the rejection as
inadvertent clerical error, and hold these claims obvious over Coppola and
Dickson, as well.
Rejection over Coppola and Dickson in view of Giacaman
The Examiner rejects claims 3–7, 14–18, and 22 over Coppola and
Dickson in view of Giacaman. Non-Final Act. 7–9. With respect to claims
3–7 and 14–18, the Examiner finds that Coppola is silent as to an internal
database in the fuel dispenser. Id. at 7, 9. However, the Examiner finds that
Giacaman teaches that fuel dispensers were known to autonomously
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dispense fuel without authorization from the main controller, and Giacaman
discloses logging or recording of transaction details with a dispensing
system comprising a dispenser with a central process unit, program memory
and data memory, and storing information concerning the fueling operation
in a mode independent of the main controller. Id. at 8. The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention to incorporate the teachings of Giacaman with
Coppola and Dickson to enable logging and recordings of transactions to
facilitate financial and tax accounting. Id. at 9.
Appellant argues that Giacaman fails to remedy the deficiencies in the
combination of Coppola and Dickson. Appeal Br. 12. Because we find no
deficiencies in the combination of references, Appellant fails to show
reversible error in the rejection of claims 3–7, 14–18, and 22.
Appellant makes the additional argument for patentability of claim 22
that the Examiner does not address claim 22’s requirement that “the
point-of-sale module [is] configured to process the payment using the stored
price data and the received amount of fuel.” Appeal Br. 12–13.
The Examiner finds that Giacaman teaches price information, pump
id, and any other information used to calculate receipt information for
printing. Non-Final Act. 9. The Examiner finds that Coppola and Dickson
teach that the PIN and card are read and payment is authorized prior to fuel
being dispensed, suggesting that the price and amount of fuel are received
after validating the card or payment for processing/calculating the total
amount. Id. The Examiner finds that, contrary to Appellant’s argument,
after the fuel dispenser’s POS module in the combined teachings authorizes
the payment, whether it is a smart card or other payment methods, the
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transaction amount caused by the customer or attendant pumping fuel is
calculated and recorded using the price and fuel type stored in the pump
controller. Ans. 7.
In the Reply Brief, for the first time Appellant argues that the rejection
of claim 1 requires modifying Coppola in view of Dickson to have smart
card functionality such that a fuel dispenser allegedly includes a
“point-of-sale module being operable full time in a stand-alone mode to, in
response to the detected user instructions, independently determine that
payment for a fuel-dispensing request is authorized.” Reply Br. 7 (citing
Ans. 3–6 and Non-Final Act. 3–5). Appellant restates the Examiner’s
reasoning from the Non-Final Action and Answer, and then contends that
Dickson discloses that the smart card processes payment by using its on-
board processing to determine if sufficient funds are stored thereon for the
transaction, but the rejection of claim 22 requires moving the transaction
processing from the smart cart to the fuel dispenser’s pump controller and
microprocessor. Id. Appellant argues that one of ordinary skill in the art
would not have made such a modification. Id.
All arguments not specifically and timely raised in the principal
Appeal Brief are considered waived absent a showing of good cause. In re
Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that an argument not
first raised in the brief to the Board is waived on appeal); Ex parte
Nakashima, 93 USPQ2d 1834 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (explaining that
arguments and evidence not timely presented in the principal Brief will not
be considered when filed in a Reply Brief, absent a showing of good cause
explaining why the argument could not have been presented in the Principal
Brief); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1477 (BPAI 2010) (informative)
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(“Properly interpreted, the Rules do not require the Board to take up a
belated argument that has not been addressed by the Examiner, absent a
showing of good cause.”). Appellant fails to show good cause for not
raising its additional argument sooner, especially given the recitation to the
Non-Final Action.
Nonetheless, the rejection of claim 22 is based on the collective
teaching of Coppola, Dickson, and Giacaman. The Examiner adequately
explains how the skilled artisan would use the teachings of the references to
arrive at the fuel dispenser claimed in claim 22. See Non-Final Act. 7–9;
Ans. 7. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible error by the
Examiner.
We sustain the rejection of claims 3–7, 14–18, and 22 over Coppola
and Dickson in view of Giacaman.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23 is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 8–13,
19–21, 23
103(a) Coppola, Dickson 1, 2, 8–13,
19–21, 23

3–7, 14–18,
22
103(a) Coppola, Dickson,
Giacaman
3–7, 14–18,
22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
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AFFIRMED