Wanda K. Comstock, Complainant,v.F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 1, 2000
01983005x (E.E.O.C. Feb. 1, 2000)

01983005x

02-01-2000

Wanda K. Comstock, Complainant, v. F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Wanda K. Comstock, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01983005

v. ) Agency Nos. AR000980134

) AR000980135

F. Whitten Peters, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Air Force, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the

bases of race (White), sex (Female), reprisal (prior EEO activity),

and physical and mental disability (carpal tunnel syndrome and

stress/anxiety), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted

in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established,

by preponderant evidence, that the agency discriminated against her on

the bases of race, sex, reprisal, and disability when she was allegedly

harassed and issued a warning by her first-line supervisor.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a telephone operator, at the agency's Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Complainant alleged that her supervisor ridiculed and yelled at her

on a continuous basis with the latest incident occurring on February

18, 1997. Believing she was a victim of disability, racial, and sex

discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling on February 25, 1997.

Subsequently, she filed a complaint on May 13, 1997. Then, on May 7,

1997, complainant alleged that her first-level supervisor issued her

a notice of consideration of possible disciplinary action based on an

incident on April 28, 1997.<2> Complainant filed a complaint on June

27, 1997 regarding this incident because she felt that her supervisor's

actions were based on reprisal for her prior EEO complaint.

These allegations were consolidated into one investigation. At the

conclusion of the investigation, complainant requested that the agency

issue a final agency decision. The FAD did not make a determination

regarding whether complainant established prima facie cases of racial,

sex, disability, and reprisal discrimination.<3> Therefore, the

FAD first focused on the agency's articulated reason for its actions.

The agency argued that its actions were appropriate due to complainant's

history on insubordination demonstrated against her supervisor. Further,

the agency stated that complainant's inability to accept criticism from

management led to a misunderstanding with her supervisors which resulted

in her complaints. The FAD agreed with the investigator's finding

that management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions. The focus of the FAD shifted to complainant's burden to

show pretext. Complainant alleged that her supervisor �picked on� female

employees and favored Black employees in order to avoid discrimination

complaints. The FAD found that complainant's allegations regarding her

supervisor's conduct were not supported by the evidence in the record

and in particular, she failed to disprove that her misconduct was the

catalyst for the warning issued by the supervisor. Accordingly, the

FAD found no discrimination based on sex, race, reprisal, or disability

because complainant failed to provide substantive evidence demonstrating

that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus.

This appeal followed. Complainant fails to raise any new contentions

on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disability Discrimination

Although the agency did not address complainant's prima facie case of

disability discrimination, the Commission finds it appropriate to address

this issue herein.

Complainant must first establish a prima facie case of disparate

treatment disability discrimination by showing that: (1) she is an

individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g);<4>

(2) she is a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(m); and (3) she was subjected to an adverse personnel

action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of disability

discrimination. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d

292 (5th Cir. 1981).

We turn now to an examination of complainant's disability claim.

Initially, we must reach a threshold determination as to whether

complainant falls within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973. One bringing a claim of disability discrimination must first

establish that he is a member of the class of persons protected by the

Rehabilitation Act, i.e., a qualified individual with a disability.

An individual with a disability is one who: (1) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;

(2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having

such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). The Commission has defined

"substantially limits" as "[u]nable to perform a major life activity

that the average person in the general population can perform" or

"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration

under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity

as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the

average person in the general population can perform that same major

life activity." 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(i) and (ii). Major life activities

include such functions as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. EEOC

Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

Upon review of the record, we find that complainant demonstrated that she

has a physical (carpal tunnel syndrome) and mental (anxiety disorder)

impairment.<5> However, whether complainant has impairments and those

impairments affect and substantially limit a major life activity

present separate questions. Based upon the record, the Commission

finds that complainant's impairments do not rise to the level of a

disability that substantially limits a major life activity.<6> Further,

there is no persuasive evidence that complainant has a record of such

substantially limiting impairment. Although, the record indicates that

the agency has provided complainant with a special keyboard at work,

this does not in and of itself indicate that complainant was regarded

as being substantial limited. Therefore, the Commission finds that

complainant failed to show that she is an individual with a disability.

Accordingly, we find that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination.

Racial, Sex and Reprisal Discrimination

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Cen. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. United States

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28,

1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Here, in response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency

argued that complainant's allegations of continued ridicule and issuance

of a notice for consideration of disciplinary action by her supervisor

were to correct complainant's insubordination. The Commission finds that

the record supports the agency's argument. Therefore, we find that the

agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action.

Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate

that the agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Complainant attempted to show pretext by arguing that her supervisor

favored male and Black employees.<7> Upon a review of the record, we

find that complainant has failed to show pretext by preponderant evidence.

Therefore, the agency's determination that complainant failed to establish

that she was discriminated against was correct.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE

FILED WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR

DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Feb. 1, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________ ________________________________

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where

applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended,

may also be found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2 On April 28, 1997, complainant alleged that her first-line supervisor

stated that she must have had a field day on the previous Friday because

complainant had allegedly made some negative comments regarding her

supervisor to co-workers while her supervisor was on leave.

3 The agency applied the principals expressed in United States Postal

Serv. Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (holding that where

management establishes a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for

its actions, whether or not complainant establishes a prima facie case

is not relevant) in order to adjudicate these complaints.

4 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: WWW.EEOC.GOV.

5 See Investigative File, p. 69-73 (physical and mental evaluations

produced by complainant's hand surgeon and clinical neuropsychologist,

respectively).

6 Complainant's surgeon did not note anything remarkable in his report

and noted that she did feel some pain which will improve. Also,

complainant's neuropsychologist stated that complainant indicates a

significant amount of anxiety which was linked to her job but the level

of anxiety did not appear to be substantially limiting one or more major

life activities.

7 Complainant alleged in her affidavit that other employees were

treated differently from her. Complainant alleges that other male, Black

employees were granted early departures while her requests were denied.

See Complainant's Affidavit, p. 4. Another example she offered was that

other males were permitted to eat at their consoles while she was scolded

at by her supervisor for sucking on a candy cane. See Complainant's

Affidavit, pp. 7-8.