Waffle House, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 1, 2016

363 NLRB No. 104 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 104
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Waffle House, Inc. and Carrie Harris. Case 10–CA–
121178
February 1, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND HIROZAWA
Upon a charge filed January 24, 2014, by Carrie Har-
ris, the General Counsel issued a complaint and notice of
hearing on April 29, 2014, alleging that the Respondent
has been violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by at all
material times maintaining and enforcing an Arbitration
Agreement containing a “No Consolidated, Collective, or
Class Action Arbitrations” provision.
On December 12, 2014, the Respondent, the Charging
Party, and the General Counsel filed a joint motion to
waive a hearing and decision by an administrative law
judge and to transfer the proceeding to the Board for a
decision based on the stipulated record. On June 18,
2015, the Board granted the parties’ joint motion.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed
briefs, and the Respondent also filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
On the entire record and briefs, the Board makes the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Georgia corporation with a head-
quarters and place of business in Norcross, Georgia, is
engaged in the operation of retail restaurant facilities
located throughout the United States. During the 12-
month period ending on December 12, 2014, the Re-
spondent, in conducting its business, derived gross reve-
nue in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received at
its Georgia facilities goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly from points outside the State of Georgia. The
Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Facts
The Respondent operates over 970 retail restaurant lo-
cations in 9 states in the United States. The Respond-
ent’s employees are not represented by a labor organiza-
tion at any of its locations.
Since about December 31, 2007, the Respondent has
maintained an Arbitration Agreement (Agreement),
which contains the following provisions:
2. Claims covered by this Agreement. . . . Waffle
House and I will resolve by arbitration all claims and
controversies . . . past, present, or future, whether or not
arising out of my employment or termination from em-
ployment, that I may have against Waffle House . . . or
that Waffle House may have against me. The claims
that are arbitrable:
 are those that, in the absence of this Agree-
ment, would have been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction under applicable state
or federal law[ ] . . . .
****
Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, both
Waffle House and I agree that neither of us shall initi-
ate or prosecute any lawsuit or administrative action
(other than an administrative charge to the EEOC,
NLRB, or a similar government agency) in any way re-
lated to any claim covered by this Agreement.
****
9. No Consolidated, Collective, or Class Action Ar-
bitrations. Neither party shall be entitled to: (i) join or
consolidate claims in arbitration by or against other
employees, (ii) arbitrate any claim against the other
party as a representative or member of a class action or
collective action, or (iii) arbitrate any claim in a private
attorney general capacity.
Since at least July 24, 2013, the Respondent has re-
quired each of its employees to become a party to the
Agreement as a mandatory term and condition of em-
ployment. The Agreement states that if an individual
does not become a party to the Agreement, he or she
“would either not be employed or remain employed” by
the Respondent. The Agreement also provides that an
employee may revoke his or her agreement “at any time
within 7 days of . . . signing this Agreement, but such
revocation” will result in the employee’s “immediate
termination, demotion and/or denial of consideration for
employment or in the loss of [his or her] ownership of
certain stock or stock options awarded to [him or her] by
Waffle House in consideration of [his or her] execution
of this Agreement, as the case may be.”
On October 28, 2013, the Respondent hired employee
Carrie Harris to work as a salesperson at its Port Went-
worth, Georgia restaurant. The Respondent presented
Harris its Agreement, provided her with an opportunity
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
to review it, and required her to sign it as a term and
condition of her employment. Harris signed the Agree-
ment on October 28, 2013.
B. Discussion
In D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), enf.
denied in relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), re-
affirmed in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72,
slip op. at 2 (2014), enf. denied in relevant part Murphy
Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015),
the Board held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act “when it requires employees covered by the
Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an
agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or
collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other
working conditions against the employer in any forum,
arbitral or judicial.” D. R. Horton, Inc., above, slip op. at
1. 1
Here, we find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by maintaining the Agreement.2 Like the policies
at issue in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, the Respond-
ent’s Agreement requires employees, as a condition of
their employment, to submit their employment-related
legal claims to individual arbitration, thereby compelling
employees to waive their Section 7 right to pursue such
claims through class or collective action in all forums,
arbitral or judicial. See D. R. Horton, above, slip op. at
1; Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 8–9 (“Insofar as an arbi-
tration agreement prevents employees from exercising
their Section 7 right to pursue legal claims concertedly . .
. the arbitration agreement amounts to a prospective
waiver of a right guaranteed by the NLRA.”).3

1 The Respondent argues that D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil were
wrongly decided and should be overruled. We disagree and adhere to
the findings and rationale in those cases. Further, for the reasons fully
stated in Murphy Oil, we reject the Respondent’s contentions that D. R.
Horton was not decided by a validly appointed Board, 361 NLRB No.
72, slip op. at 2 fn. 10, and that its reliance on the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is flawed. Id., slip op. at 10.
2 Although the complaint alleged that the Respondent also unlawful-
ly enforced its Arbitration Agreement, there is no evidence or claim of
any enforcement action. See generally Logisticare Solutions, Inc., 363
NLRB No. 85, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2015).
3 We note that the Respondent does not contend that the 7-day opt-
out provision of its Agreement places it outside the scope of the prohi-
bition against mandatory individual arbitration agreements under Mur-
phy Oil and D. R. Horton. This is probably because, unlike many other
opt-out provisions, see, e.g., CPS Security (USA), Inc., 363 NLRB No.
86, slip op. at 1 fn. 2, 8 (2015); Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 363 NLRB No.
77, slip op. at 2 fn. 3, 6 (2015); On Assignment Staffing Services, 362
NLRB No. 189, slip op. at 3 (2015), the Respondent’s does not permit
an employee who opts out to remain employed. In any event, the
Board has rejected this argument, holding that an opt-out procedure still
imposes an unlawful mandatory condition of employment that falls
squarely within the rule of D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, On Assign-
ment Staffing Services, above, slip op. at 1, 4–5, even when opting out
does not automatically terminate an employee’s employment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that requires employees, as a condition of employment,
to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions
in all forums, the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act and has thereby engaged in unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and

The Respondent and our dissenting colleague do, however, argue
that the Agreement is voluntary because employees could decline em-
ployment at Waffle House and choose an employer that does not re-
quire them to agree to individual arbitration as a condition of employ-
ment. We disagree. Because refusing to sign the Agreement or opting
out of the Agreement would result in “immediate termination, demotion
and/or denial of consideration for employment,” acceptance of the
Agreement was a condition of employment and not a voluntary choice.
See Countrywide Financial Corp., 362 NLRB No. 165, slip op. at 2 fn.
4 (2015). Moreover, an arbitration agreement that precludes collective
action in all forums is unlawful even if entered into voluntarily because
it requires employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 rights to en-
gage in concerted activity. See On Assignment Staffing Services,
above, slip op. at 1, 5–8.
The Respondent also argues that its Agreement includes an exemp-
tion allowing employees to file charges with administrative agencies,
including the Board, and thus does not, as in D. R. Horton and Murphy
Oil, unlawfully prohibit employees from collectively pursuing litigation
of employment claims in all forums. In support of its argument, the
Respondent cites Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–
1054 (8th Cir. 2013), in which the court stated, in dicta, that the arbitra-
tion agreement in that case did not bar all concerted employee activity
in pursuit of employment claims because the agreement permitted
employees to file charges with administrative agencies that could file
suit on behalf of a class of employees. We reject the Respondent’s
argument for the reasons set forth in SolarCity Corp., 363 NLRB No.
83, slip op. at 2–4 (2015).
Our dissenting colleague observes that the Act does not “dictate”
any particular procedures for the litigation of non-NLRA claims, and
“creates no substantive right for employees to insist on class-type
treatment” of such claims. This is all surely correct, as the Board has
previously explained in Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2,
and Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 & fn. 2 (2015). But
what our colleague ignores is that the Act “does create a right to pursue
joint, class, or collective claims if and as available without the interfer-
ence of an employer-imposed restraint.” Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at
2 (emphasis in original). The Respondent’s Agreement is just such an
unlawful restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the
Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to “refrain
from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy Oil,
above, slip op. at 18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 3. Nor is he
correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the Board to permit
individual employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to en-
gage in concerted legal activity. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 17–
18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2.
WAFFLE HOUSE, INC. 3
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, we shall
order the Respondent to rescind or revise its mandatory
arbitration agreement and to notify employees that it has
done so. Finally, because the Respondent utilized the
Agreement on a corporate-wide basis, we shall order the
Respondent to post a remedial notice at all locations
where the Agreement was in effect.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Waffle House, Inc., Norcross, Georgia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that requires employees, as a condition of employment,
to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions
in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all
of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear
to employees that the arbitration agreement does not con-
stitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise become bound to the man-
datory arbitration agreement in any form that it has been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Norcross, Georgia facility and at all other facilities
where the unlawful arbitration agreement is or has been
in effect copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consec-
utive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other elec-
tronic means, if the Respondent customarily communi-
cates with its employees by such means. Reasonable

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since July 24, 2013.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 10 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., February 1, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting.
In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondent’s
Arbitration Agreement (the Agreement) violates Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or
NLRA) because the Agreement waives the right to par-
ticipate in class or collective actions regarding non-
NLRA employment claims. I respectfully dissent from
this finding for the reasons explained in my partial dis-
senting opinion in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.1

1 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was recently denied enforce-
ment by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA,
Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
The Respondent contends that its Agreement is voluntary, notwith-
standing that signing it is a condition of employment. I agree. Charg-
ing Party Harris voluntarily signed the Agreement, even though the
Respondent was willing to hire her or continue her employment only if
she entered into the Agreement. By definition, every agreement sets
forth terms upon which each party may insist as a condition to entering
into the relationship governed by the agreement. Thus, conditioning
employment on the execution of a class-action waiver does not make it
involuntary. For my colleagues, however, the voluntariness of such a
waiver is immaterial. They believe that even if a waiver is
nonmandatory, it is still unenforceable. See On Assignment Staffing
Services, 362 NLRB No. 189, slip op. at 1, 4–5 (2015) (finding class-
action waiver agreement unlawful even where employees are free to opt
out of the agreement); Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45 (2015) (find-
ing class-action waiver agreement unlawful even where employees
must affirmatively opt in before they will be covered by a class-action
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted”
activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a
claim asserted under a statute other than the Act.2 How-
ever, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in
the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining
to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act
render unlawful agreements in which employees waive
class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the con-
trary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”3 This aspect of Section

waiver agreement, and where they are free to decline to do so). Need-
less to say, I disagree. See Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2–4 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting).
Although the Agreement contains an opt-out provision that permits
an employee to revoke his or her agreement in writing “at any time
within 7 days” after signing the Agreement, it does not necessarily
permit an individual to remain employed after revoking the Agreement.
Rather, the Agreement states that revocation “will result in my immedi-
ate termination, demotion and/or denial of consideration for employ-
ment or in the loss of my ownership of certain stock or stock options
awarded to me by Waffle House in consideration of my execution of
this Agreement, as the case may be” (emphasis added). Therefore, on
the stipulated record currently before us, which requires an evaluation
of the foregoing language on its face, it is not clear that any person will
be afforded the option of remaining employed following revocation of
the Agreement. Moreover, as my colleagues have indicated, the Re-
spondent has not argued that the 7-day opt-out provision separately
warrants a finding that the Agreement is voluntary. In these respects, I
believe this case materially differs from Nijjar Realty, Inc. d/b/a Pama
Management, 363 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 3–5 (2015) (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting), where the opt-out provision reinforced my
view that the class-action waiver was voluntary and lawful under Sec.
8(a)(1). Consequently, my view that the Agreement is lawful does not
attach any weight to the Agreement’s opt-out provision.
2 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5
(2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting). Here, there is no allegation
that Charging Party Carrie Harris ever pursued any non-NLRA claim
against the Respondent in a class or collective action, let alone that she
sought the support of any other employee regarding any potential
claim. Accordingly, the record fails to establish that Harris engaged in
protected concerted activity. See Beyoglu, above (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting) (finding that employee’s individual act of filing a collective
action was not concerted activity).
3 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or select-
ed for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of
non-NLRA claims;4 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class-waiver agreements;5 and (iii)
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).6 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province

vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
4 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D. R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
5 The Fifth Circuit has twice denied enforcement of Board orders
invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-type
treatment of non-NLRA claims. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
above; D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelming majority
of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise rejected it.
See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member John-
son, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Patterson v. Raymours
Furniture Co., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v.
Adecco USA, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to
certify for interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal.
June 30, 2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., No. 1:12–cv–
00062–BLW, 2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting
reconsideration of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration
agreement violated NLRA).
6 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49–58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
WAFFLE HOUSE, INC. 5
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.7
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 1, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

7 Because I disagree with the Board’s decisions in Murphy Oil,
above, and D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), enf. denied
in pert. part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and I believe the NLRA does
not render unlawful arbitration agreements that provide for the waiver
of class-type litigation of non-NLRA claims, I find it unnecessary to
reach whether such agreements should independently be deemed lawful
to the extent they “leave[ ] open a judicial forum for class and collec-
tive claims,” D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184, slip op. at 12, by per-
mitting the filing of complaints with administrative agencies that, in
turn, may file class- or collective-action lawsuits. See Owen v. Bristol
Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires our employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to waive the right to maintain class or collec-
tive actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement
in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make
clear that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a
waiver of your right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms that
the arbitration agreement has been rescinded or revised
and, if revised, WE WILL provide them a copy of the re-
vised agreement.
WAFFLE HOUSE, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/10-CA-121178 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.