Wabeek Country Club

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 12, 1991

301 N.L.R.B. 694 (N.L.R.B. 1991)

694
301 NLRB No. 101
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 In agreeing with the judge that deferral to arbitration is inappropriate, we
find it unnecessary to rely on her finding that the arbitration award is repug-
nant to the Act and her discussion in connection with that finding.
We further note, in adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s fail-
ure to provide information was unlawful, that the purpose of the Union’s pay-
roll audit was to investigate possible violations of the parties’ contractual
checkoff and union-security provisions, while the subsequent union informa-
tion request focused on different information, i.e., names and hire dates of em-
ployees, dates and hours worked, and their employment status, in order to as-
sess the Respondent’s compliance with other contract provisions relating to
hours of work, wage rates, transportation, seniority, and other working condi-
tions insofar as such provisions distinguish among different types of employ-
ees.
There were no exceptions to the judge’s failure to resolve the complaint al-
legation that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining work rule
14.
2 We shall modify par. 1(c) of the judge’s recommended Order so as to re-
quire the Respondent to cease and desist from enforcing or applying a rule
prohibiting its employees from making or publishing false statements that are
related to or part of protected concerted activity—regardless of when or where
such statements are made or published.
Wabeek Country Club and Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union,
Local 24, AFL–CIO and Detroit Club Man-
agers Association. Cases 7–CA–29200–1 and 7–
CA–29200–2
February 12, 1991
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On March 20, 1990, Administrative Law Judge
Arline Pacht issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed answer-
ing briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent,
Wabeek Country Club, Bloomfield, Michigan, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(c).
‘‘(c) Enforcing or applying a rule prohibiting its em-
ployees from making or publishing false statements
that are related to or part of protected concerted or
union activities.’’
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any of you for filing charges with the National
Labor Relations Board or for engaging in protected
concerted activities on behalf of the Hotel Employees
and Restaurant Employees International Union, Local
24, AFL–CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT enforce or apply a rule prohibiting
our employees from making or publishing false state-
ments that are related to or part of protected concerted
or union activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in
an appropriate unit, by failing to furnish it with re-
quested information that is relevant to administering its
collective-bargaining agreement with us.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Susan Olson immediate and full rein-
statement to her former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make her
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits re-
sulting from her removal from the steady extra sched-
ule, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL notify Susan Olson that we have removed
from our files any reference to her removal from the
work schedule and inform her that this removal will
not be used against her in any way.
WE WILL furnish to the Union, in a timely manner,
the information requested in its letter of February 1,
1989, which is needed to properly administer the col-
lective-bargaining agreement.
WABEEK COUNTRY CLUB
Tina Pappas, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Karl Bennett Jr., Esq. (Stringari, Fritz, Kretger, Ahearn,
Bennett & Hunsinger), for the Respondent.
Russell Linden, Esq. (Miller Cohen, Martens & Ice), for the
Charging Party.
695WABEEK COUNTRY CLUB
1 Exhibits offered into evidence by counsel for the General Counsel will be
referred to as G.C. Exh. followed by the exhibit number; Respondent’s exhib-
its will be cited as R. Exh. l.
2 ‘‘Steady-extra’’ is a term of art defined in the parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement as ‘‘an extra employee whose name appears on a written list main-
tained by the Club, and who is called to work directly by the Club. . . . There
shall be no set schedules for steady-extra employees, but the club will endeav-
or to notify them of the schedule prior to the beginning of the work week.’’
(G.C. Exh. 3 at 7–8.)
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARLINE PACHT, Administrative Law Judge. On charges
filed April 25, 1989, as amended on May 5, a consolidated
complaint issued on June 7, 1989, alleging that the Respond-
ent, Wabeek Country Club, violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), (4),
and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The
Respondent answered on June 7, 1989, denying that it had
committed any unfair labor practices.
The case was tried before me in Detroit, Michigan, on
September 13 and 14 and October 16, at which times the
parties had full opportunity to examine witneses, introduce
documentary proof, and argue orally. Taking the witnesses’
demeanor into account, and on the entire record, including
posttrial briefs submitted by the parties, pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ISSUES
Based on the pleadings and the entire record in this case,
the following issues are presented in the order in which they
are resolved1
(1) Whether deference is owed to an arbitral award finding
that Respondent effectively discharged Olson for just cause.
(2) Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(4) by refusing to schedule employee Susan Olson for
waitressing work because she allegedly violated a workrule
prohibiting employees from ‘‘making or publishing false, vi-
cious, or malicious statements’’ about other employees or su-
pervisors, served as a vigorous union steward, complained to
the Union about various employment practices and filed a
charge with the Board.
(3) Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by promulgating and maintaining the above-quoted
workrule.
(4) Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
by failing to furnish the Charging Party with requested infor-
mation.
II. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent, a Michigan corporation, with its only office
and place of business in Bloomfield, Michigan, is a private
golf and country club engaged in the business of providing
recreational facilities and the retail sale of meals to members
and guests.
At all material times, Respondent has been, and is now,
an employer-member of the Detroit Club Managers Associa-
tion, an organization composed of employers engaged in op-
erating private recreational clubs, which exists for the pur-
pose, inter alia, of representing its employer-members in ne-
gotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements
with various labor organizations, including the Charging
Party, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees, Local 24.
During the calendar year ending December 21, 1988, a
representative period, Respondent, in the course and conduct
of its operations, derived gross revenues in excess of
$500,000, not including dues and initiation fees. During the
same period, Respondent purchased and caused to be trans-
ported to its facility alcohol and related products valued in
excess of $50,000 from the Michigan Liquor Control Com-
mission, which received these products directly from points
outside the State.
Based on these facts, the Respondent admits, and I find,
that Wabeek Country Club is now and has been at all times
material, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Charging Party, Local 24 (the Union) is now and has
been at all material times a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The 8(a)(3) and (4) Allegations
1. Background: Olson’s first discharge
As a member of the Detroit Club Managers Association,
Wabeek Country Club was party to a collective-bargaining
agreement with Local 24, which represents a unit of Re-
spondent’s employees including, among others, servers, bar-
tenders, and kitchen employees.
Susan Olson, the alleged discriminatee, first worked as a
server at the Wabeek Country Club from April 1986 to April
22, 1988, when Respondent removed her name from its list
of ‘‘steady extra’’ employees, an action tantamount to dis-
charge.2 The circumstances leading to her dismissal and
eventual reinstatement are as follows.
In July 1987, Olson was elected shop steward. In that po-
sition, she became a staunch advocate of employee rights, fil-
ing a number of grievances to protest Respondent’s alleged
breaches of the collective-bargaining agreement. For exam-
ple, under her stewardship, grievances were lodged protesting
shortages in overtime payments, the inequitable distribution
of gratuities, the refusal to promote steady extra employees
to steady positions, employment of minors, and the manner
in which discipline was imposed on employees.
Olson was discharged in April 1988 and promptly filed a
grievance attributing Respondent’s action to her activities as
a steward. A month later, she filed a charge with the Board
alleging that she had been terminated for discriminatory rea-
sons.
Subsequently, in a conversation with union business rep-
resentatives, Carol Bronson and Jack Mohr, Respondent’s at-
torney, Karl Bennett, asked why Olson had lodged the NLRB
charge, chided them for failing to advise her against doing
so, and requested that they persuade Olson to withdraw it.
During the same time period, Respondent’s general man-
ager, Wayne Russell, acknowledged to Bronson that Olson
had been an outstaning server and employee, but that ‘‘all
the problems had started’’ after she became shop steward.
In late September 1988, Bennett again asked Mohr to per-
suade Olson to withdraw her NLRB charge. He added that
696 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 The grievance regarding overtime payments had been settled, but Respond-
ent’s counsel inadvertently forgot to advise Russell about it.
4 Undisputed evidence shows that Burkure scheduled employees for work,
directly supervised the waiting staff, issued disciplinary warnings, sent em-
ployees home when work was slack, effectively recommended their hiring and
firing, and on occasion, directly discharged employees. Together with Russell,
she also met with the union agents as a representative of management. On this
record, I find that Burkure was a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11)
of the Act.
5 For example, the registers contained reports of monthly and quarterly
taxes, check reconciliation statements, gross payroll accounts, wage details,
and quarterly earnings.
Olson was a ‘‘pain in the ass’’ and that her outspokenness
always was getting her into trouble with management.
On October 13, Olson entered into a settlement with Re-
spondent in which she agreed, inter alia, that in return for
reinstatement as a steady extra, she would forfeit backpay,
resign as shop steward, and withdraw her unfair labor prac-
tice charge.
2. The present case: Olson’s second discharge
On returning to work on October 28, Olson’s coworkers
again began sharing their concerns about working conditions
with her. They discussed a variety of matters including the
terms of her settlement, a pending grievance as to overtime
pay, and tips. Respondent’s alleged failure to abide by the
contract with respect to the union-security clause for new
employees and the payment of medical insurance benefits. In
early November, Olson also learned that the employees had
not received a 10-cent-an-hour wage increase retroactive to
May 1.
Olson reported the employees’ complaints about overtime
pay to Union Agents Mohr and Bronson. They assured her
that the problem had been grieved and settled. However, they
pursued the matter with the Country Club’s manager, Rus-
sell, who responded to their inquiries by asking, ‘‘Who want-
ed to know, Sue Olson?’’ In an effort to shield Olson, the
union representatives suggested that several employees had
called them, but Russell persisted in suggesting that Olson
was their source.3
In early November, Olson asked Russell if she could con-
vert to a full-time steady position. When Russell told her
there were no openings, Olson pointed out that Respondent
was employing two steady extras rather than one steady as
required by the collective-bargaining agreement. Olson sub-
sequently submitted a written request to Russell for a steady
post but received no reply.
Shortly after Olson reduced her request to writing, Mohr
and Bronson broached the same issue with Russell, stating
that they heard he was denying employees steady jobs. Rus-
sell immediately named Olson as the probable complainant
and then remarked: ‘‘We haven’t talked so much on the
phone until Sue Olson has returned to this club.’’ He further
commented that since her return, ‘‘all these problems . . . all
of a sudden are arising.’’
Olson soon contacted the union representatives again, in-
forming them that some employees had asked her about their
status as union members and eligibility for medical benefits,
since union dues told had not been deducted from their pay-
checks. Mohr and Bronson met with the unit employees at
the club on November 16 and discussed these matters with
them. Just after their group meeting concluded, the union
agents met with Russell and club hostess, Laurie Burkure, to
convey the employees’ concerns.4 Russell again blamed
Olson for agitating the employees. He told the union agents
bluntly that ‘‘none of this would have happened’’ were it not
for Olson’s intervention. He further stated that he thought
that the Respondent’s settlement with Olson meant that on
her return to work, she was not to act as shop steward. Echo-
ing Russell, Burkure stated that she, too, thought that the set-
tlement prohibited Olson from serving as shop steward and
that ‘‘none of this shit has been happening until Sue Olson
came back.’’ Burkure added that Olson was misinforming the
employees and was not entitled to give them certain types of
information.
Bronson defended Olson by advising Russell and Burkure
that any employee was free to engage in such discussions
with fellow workers. Apparently unassuaged, Russell sug-
gested that the employees ought to turn to their elected stew-
ard. The meeting ended after the union agents advised Rus-
sell that they needed to audit Respondent’s payroll records
in order to investigate the questions raised by the employees
regarding dues checkoffs.
As agreed, Bronson and Mohr returned to the country club
on November 22 to conduct an audit. Advised by Russell
that the union auditors were interested in materials reflecting
dues checkoffs, Respondent’s office manager, Karen Collins,
provided the agents with two massive bound volumes con-
taining computer-generated reports dealing with various em-
ployee payroll records for the first three-quarters of 1988.5
Collins testified that after generally explaining the nature of
the documents in the registers, she did not remain with them
during the 2 to 3 hours they spent examining the records.
Bronson and Mohr testified consistently that because their
purpose was to determine whether union dues was being de-
ducted properly, they limited their audit to certain documents
titled ‘‘payroll registers’’ which contained the employees’
names, departments, job classifications, hours worked, gratu-
ities received and deductions, including union dues for each
payroll period in 1988. As Bronson explained, they spent
several hours cross-checking data contained on the payroll
registers against a union-checkoff list which identified the
dues paid or owed for each union member. Whenever pos-
sible, they also noted employees names which appeared on
Respondent’s payroll registers but which were not listed on
the Union’s checkoff list.
Several weeks later, on December 13, Mohr wrote to Rus-
sell that based on its audit, the Union had determined that
the Respondent had violated the collective-bargaining agree-
ment by failing to pay dues or initiation fees for enumerated
employees. In addition, the letter stated that as a result of the
Union’s meeting with employees on November 16, other
contract violations were uncovered regarding the club’s fail-
ure to supply the employees with an account of their earn-
ings for special functions and its refusal to offer steady posi-
tions to steady extra servers rather than hire from the outside.
On or about December 17, Olson and several other wait-
resses were discussing whether they had received the correct
amount of tips for serving at a large club function. After
Olson suggested that they examine a gratuities record kept in
the club’s business office, the employees approached Office
Manager Collins and asked her to review the bar bill for the
function in question. Although Collins complied with their
request, she voiced irritation with Olson, stating she was
tired of Olson accusing her of cheating employees and telling
697WABEEK COUNTRY CLUB
6 No transcript of the arbitration proceeding was offered into evidence in the
instant trial. Further, although the parties agreed that the arbitrator’s summary
was not inaccurate as far as it went, they also agreed that it was not a ver-
batim recordation of the witnesses’ testimony.
7 According to the summary of Burkholder’s testimony, Olson used more
sexually explicit language than indicated here.
them they were being deprived of insurance benefits. At this
point, Burkure joined the group and warned Olson: ‘‘If
you’re off the schedule next week . . . it’s not my . . .
doing.’’
Shortly after this incident, Club Manager Russell tele-
phoned Mohr and in effect, complained that Olson had no
right to inspect the gratuities book or to dispute the tips paid
to other servers. He again reminded Mohr that Olson was re-
instated on condition that she not act as shop steward. Mohr
countered that any employee had a right to verify his or her
tips.
Olson’s troubled relations with management flared up on
still another occasion in mid-December. She and several
other coworkers were instructed to remain after hours to pre-
pare table settings for the next day. One of the employees,
Linda Wallis, testified that she asked Olson whether they
were required to do this work under the union contract.
Olson answered she understood that servers were not re-
quired to perform such duties. Wallis then repeated Olson’s
answer to Burkure. At this, according to Wallis’ and Olson’s
uncontroverted testimony, Burkure told Wallis, ‘‘Don’t listen
to Susan Olson. She’s in enough shit with the Labor Board
and going through her Union charges.’’
On December 19, Olson attended an employee Christmas
party at the club sponsored by the Respondent. A private
party followed at the home of one of the employees. Olson
testified in the instant proceeding that during the course of
the evening, she spoke with the club’s golf course super-
intendent, Ken DeBusscher, telling him about her discharge
and subsequent reinstatement 6 months later with no back-
pay. Olson also testified that during the private party, she
commented to Assistant Office Manager Debbie Burkholder
that her superior, Karen Collins, had changed since she be-
came office manager.
After the Christmas holiday, Olson telephoned Burkure
asking for her next week’s work assignment. Burkure an-
swered that Russell had instructed her not to schedule Olson
for work, although she was unaware of the reason for his de-
cision. Olson called several more times and finally, Burkure
told her that Russell had simply referred to the club’s
workrule 14 which provided that an employee was subject to
immediate discharge for ‘‘making or publishing false, vi-
cious, or malicious statements concerning any employee, su-
pervisor, the company or its food, beverages or services.’’
The Union promptly filed a grievance protesting Respond-
ent’s adverse action against Olson. Shortly thereafter, in
early January, Union Agent Bronson asked Respondent’s
counsel why Olson had been discharged. Bennett replied,
‘‘It’s the same stuff . . . Sue’s out at the club running her
mouth, giving advice. Same old Sue with the big mouth
. . . . She went to a party and she ran her mouth to the em-
ployees about her arbitration, her Board charge and also
about Wayne Russell.’’ Bennett then suggested that if
Bronson could promise that Olson would keep her mouth
shut, he ‘‘could probably get her put back on the schedule’’
although he would have to consult with the manager first.
3. The arbitrator’s opinion and award
An arbitration hearing was held on Olson’s grievance on
March 24 and April 3, 1989. In a decision dated April 11,
the issue as initially framed by the arbitrator was, in sub-
stance, whether Respondent denied Olson further work for
engaging in union activities as Local 24 claimed, or for vio-
lating a workrule prohibiting false, vicious, or malicious
statements by making certain remarks at Christmas parties, as
the Respondent contended. The arbitrator denied the griev-
ance, concluding that several grounds justified Respondent’s
decision to reject Olson for further work.6
Before reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator summarized
the evidence presented by the opposing parties. He turned
first to Golf Superintendent DeBusscher who testified to a
conversation with Olson at the club’s Christmas party. Ac-
cording to DeBusscher, Olson raised the subject of her dis-
charge and reinstatement, admitted to him that she felt bitter
and resentful about her treatment, and adding that, now that
she was back, she would ‘‘make it rough on them.’’
DeBusscher further related that Olson called the club man-
ager an ‘‘asshole’’ who ‘‘did not give a shit about anyone
at the club.’’ According to the arbitrator’s description,
DeBusscher opined that Olson’s conversation with him was
‘‘filled with malicious comments and bad language.’’ He tes-
tified that he reported her remarks to the club manager that
same evening, and at Russell’s request, prepared a written
statement the following day. (R. Exh. 1 at 5–7.)
Assistant Office Manager Burkholder also was called as a
witness by the Respondent at the arbitration hearing. Accord-
ing to Arbitrator Brown’s summary, Burkholder stated that
during the private Christmas party, Olson commented that
Office Manager Collins was ‘‘in cahoots’’ with management
and suggested that if Burkholder wanted to move into a high-
er positions, she would have to engage in oral sex with the
manager.7
The arbitrator also noted that Burkholder had heard em-
ployees call the manager vile names before without suffering
any adverse consequences. However, he reported that
Burkholder indicated the name-calling was said in passing
and to her knowledge management had not heard about the
use of such profanity.
In recounting Russell’s testimony, the arbitrator stated that
the club manager agreed to Olson’s resignation as steward as
a condition of the settlement because ‘‘she was overzealous’’
and ‘‘not able to sort out the employees’ unfounded com-
plaints and concentrate on their legitimate grievances.’’ He
also believed that she gave the employees ‘‘bad advice,
spread rumors and created bad will in the unit.’’ (R. Exh. 1
at 11.)
In addition, Russell testified that he learned of Olson’s
malicious statements about him on December 20 and deter-
mined, without getting Olson’s side of the story, that she had
engaged in such conduct ‘‘to demean his reputation and to
destroy his image in the eyes of the employees under his di-
rection.’’ He acknowledged asking other employees who had
attended the Christmas parties for statements, but they had
either heard nothing relevant or ‘‘less damaging’’ remarks.
Lastly, he conceded that this was the first time he had in-
voked workrule 14, but only because he had no occasion to
do so heretofore.
698 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8 29 U.S.C. § 157.
In reviewing Olson’s testimony, the arbitrator first focused
on the terms of her settlement, including her resignation as
steward. He then noted that notwithstanding her resignation,
Olson continued to advise her fellow employees and pursued
grievances about management policies after her return to
work. Thus, apparently referring to the incident in which em-
ployees’ questioned their tips, the arbitrator pointed out that
shortly before the Christmas party, Olson had been involved
in a dispute which led to a confrontation with the office
manager. He also referred to Olson’s role in contacting the
Union about the club’s failure to pay union dues which led
to an audit of the club’s records and payment of additional
initiation and insurance fees.
Olson acknowledged at the arbitration proceeding that she
had talked with the golf superintendent, but only at the pri-
vate Christmas party. She recalled telling him, as well as
other employees who asked, about her settlement and re-
marked that her return to work without backpay was not a
victory. She also recalled that all the employees were com-
plaining about their small Christmas bonuses; that others
were ‘‘cutting down’’ the club manager, and that when she
was urged by her fellow workers to give an opinion of Rus-
sell, she said, ‘‘He is a son of a bitch who screws us out
of nickels and dimes while he makes thousands.’’ (R. Exh.
1 at 17.)
The arbitrator also referred to testimony offered by Union
Business Agent Bronson, who confirmed that Olson called
her regularly about union matters after her reinstatement and
that her complaints had led to an audit of the club’s records.
Based on the record as described above, the arbitrator
found just cause for Olson’s removal as a steady extra. In
so finding, he brushed aside claims that the Respondent’s
true motivation was to retaliate against Olson for her union
activities, stating without analysis and in conclusory terms,
‘‘[t]he grievant did not prove these charges.’’ (R. Exh. 1 at
38.) He concluded that:
She was on final warning and yet she went beyond all
reasonable limits, even though off duty, with the vi-
cious and malicious remarks she had made about mem-
bers of management at the club. In light of these re-
marks the grievant could not be expected to ever work
effectively again at the club. She apparently would con-
tinue to function as the union steward even though she
had promised to resign that position. She would also
continue to be bitter and to spread her rancor at the
club. For all of these reasons the club has shown just
cause for its rejection of the grievant for further work
as a steady extra employee. (R. Exh. 1 at 39.)
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING FINDINGS
A. Deferral is not Warranted
1. The Spielberg-Olin standards
The Respondent contends, by way of an affirmative de-
fense, that under Board precedent, the arbitral award in
Olson’s case is entitled to deference. I disagree.
Pursuant to the mandate expressed in Section 203(d) of the
Act, the Board has long regarded arbitration as an effective
forum for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. At the
same time, Section 10(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part
that the Board’s power to prevent unfair labor practices
‘‘shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment . . .
that has been established . . . by agreement, law or other-
wise.’’ While the Supreme Court encourages adherence to ar-
bitration, it has admonished the Board that it may not abdi-
cate its statutory responsibilities in favor of awards which are
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. See Carey v. Wes-
tinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
In resolving the tension between Sections 10(a) and
203(d), the Board held in its seminal decision, Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955), that it will defer to an
arbitral award where the arbitration proceedings appeared to
be fair and regular, all parties to the arbitration had agreed
to be bound, the arbitrator’s decision was not clearly repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the Act and the arbitrator
considered the unfair labor practice issue.
More recently, in Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984), the
Board explained that the arbitrator has adequately considered
the unfair labor practice issue if this issue is factually parallel
to the contract issue, the arbitrator was presented generally
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice;
and the award is not ‘‘palpably wrong,’’ that is, the decision
is ‘‘susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.’’
Although the Board stated in Olin, supra at 574, that it
would ‘‘not require an arbitrator’s award to be totally con-
sistent with Board precedent’’ it subsequently ruled that it
would not defer where the arbitrator’s decision was totally
inconsistent with case law. See Sherwood Diversified Serv-
ices, 288 NLRB 341 (1988) (arbitrator’s opinion that union
waived right to financial data held repugnant to Act where
Board found no clear and unmistakeable waiver).
2. The award is repugnant to the Act
In substantial concurrence with the positions of the Gen-
eral Counsel and Charging Party, I agree that Arbitrator
Brown’s award is not entitled to deference because one of
the grounds on which it rests is palpably wrong. Arbitrator
Brown specifically ruled that Respondent’s rejection of
Olson for further work was justified in part by her continuing
‘‘to function as the union steward even though she had
promised to resign that position.’’ By this, the arbitrator
could only be referring to Olson’s continuing to discuss
working conditions with her fellow employees and reporting
possible breaches of the collective-bargaining agreement to
the Union after she was reinstated.
In concluding that Olson continued to function as a stew-
ard, the arbitrator evidently assumed, as did the Respondent,
that when Olson agreed to resign from that position as a con-
dition of her settlement, she also waived any entitlement to
engage in protected concerted activity. Consequently, he ap-
parently reasoned (sub silentio) that by persistently engaging
in such activities after her reinstatement, she breached a term
of her settlement and thereby provided the Respondent with
just cause to dismiss her.
Olson simply resigned as steward. Contrary to the arbitra-
tor’s assumption, this did not mean that she also forfeited a
fundamental right guaranteed to all employees under the Act
to engage in ‘‘concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.’’8 Thus, the
arbitrator’s conclusion that the Respondent was justified in
699WABEEK COUNTRY CLUB
9 Sec. 8(a)(4) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer ‘‘to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.’’
10 The arbitrator seemed to believe that because Olson had withdrawn the
charge as part of the settlement, he had no authority to consider whether it
contributed to Respondent’s motives in dismissing her. Instead, he suggested
that her recourse was to seek reinstatement of the charge with the Board.
discharging Olson in part for having exercsed her Section 7
rights is palpably wrong.
Deferral to arbitration is a legally sound and efficient way
to resolve labor disputes as long as the Spielberg-Olin stand-
ards are observed. However, where, as here, the arbitrator re-
lies on a ground that is repugnant to the Act, deferral is not
appropriate.
Immediately after ruling that Olson was continuing to
function as a steward, the arbitrator then concluded that
Olson was justly discharged because she continued ‘‘to be
bitter and to spread her rancor at the club.’’ (R. Exh. 1 at
39.) In characterizing her conduct in this manner, he did not
state which of Olson’s acts he had in mind. If the arbitrator
was referring to Olson’s complaints to the greens super-
intendent about the terms of her reinstatement, or the size of
her bonus, to her request for a steady position, or to her con-
tretemps with the office manager over the size of tips, then
he would again be in error for faulting conduct which clearly
came within the orbit of protected, concerted activity. How-
ever, since the focus of the arbitrator’s remarks is unclear,
I hesitate to draw conclusions about them.
3. The 8(a)(3) and (d) allegations are intertwined
In order to protect the integrity of rights guaranteed to em-
ployees solely under the statute, the Board holds that it will
not defer to arbitration where alleged violations of Section
8(a)(4) are involved. Filmation Associates, 227 NLRB 1721
(1977).9 For similar reasons, the Board declines to defer to
arbitration where the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(3)
and (4) are closely intertwined. Grand Rapids Die Casting
Corp., 279 NLRB 662 (1986), enfd. 831 F.2d 605 (6th Cir.
1987); International Harvester Co., 271 NLRB 647 (1984).
Paragraph 17 of the complaint in the instant case alleges,
inter alia, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(4) of the Act by discharging Olson both because she en-
gaged in union activities and previously filed a charge with
the Board. Clearly, these allegations are closely intertwined.
Consequently, Arbitrator Brown’s opinion could not and, in
fact, did not address the effect that Olson’s unfair labor prac-
tice charge had on Respondent’s decision to discharge her.10
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully decline to defer to
the arbitral award denying Olson’s grievance.
4. The arbitrator’s reliance on workrule 14 was
not improper
The General Counsel also contends that deference is not
due because the arbitrator found the Respondent was justified
in dismissing Olson under a workrule which employed lan-
guage identical to that which the Board has found to be per
se unlawful in other cases. The precedents cited by counsel
to support this contention are inapposite when applied to evi-
dence adduced at the arbitration hearing.
Thus, American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126
(1978), one of the cases cited by the General Counsel, posed
a different set of facts from those presented to Arbitrator
Brown. The complaint in that case alleged that the employer
violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining workrules which pro-
hibited making or distributing false, vicious, or malicious
verbal or written statements, and applying those rules to pro-
hibit distribution of a pamphlet prepared by an employee
committee because it contained accusations about the em-
ployer’s hiring practices, id. at 1129–1130. The administra-
tive law judge’s analysis started with ‘‘The Board rule . . .
that within the area of concerted activities, false and inac-
curate employee statements are protected so long as they are
not malicious.’’ Expressly finding that the statements in the
committee pamphlet were not malicious, the judge correctly
found the rules to be per se unlawful for two reasons: first,
because they were overly broad, forbidding utterances made
in the course of protected concerted activity off working time
and off the employer’s property, and second, because they
punished the merely false, as opposed to the malicious and
vicious. Id. at 1131. Accord: St. Joseph Hospital Corp., 260
NLRB 691 fn. 2 (1982). See Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB,
889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989).
In the arbitration at issue here, several of Respondent’s
witnesses testified that Olson made remarks both at the club
and private Christmas parties which the arbitrator character-
ized as malicious. He then concluded that these remarks jus-
tified Respondent’s reliance on workrule 14 to remove Olson
from the work schedule.
To the extent that the arbitrator ruled that Olson was dis-
ciplined pursuant to a rule which proscribed malicious state-
ments, his opinion and award is consistent with the Board
precedents cited above holding that such conduct is unpro-
tected. Consequently, in declining to defer to Arbitrator
Brown’s award, I rely on the reasons set forth in section I,B,
and C of this decision, but not on his finding, based on evi-
dence before him, that Olson could be disciplined pursuant
to a workrule which prohibited malicious speech.
V. OLSON’S DISCHARGE VIOLATED SECTION
8(A)(3) AND (4)
Having concluded that deferral is unwarranted, the next
issue to be resolved, based solely on evidence presented in
the unfair labor practice proceeding, is whether Olson was
discharged for engaging in protected, concerted activities and
for filing a charge with the Board, as the General Counsel
contends, or for violating workrule 14, as the Respondent
maintains.
Because the parties assign motives for Olson’s discharge
which are either lawful or illegitimate, the task of assessing
the true reason for Respondent’s actions requires analysis
under the standards announced in Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1980); enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied
455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under Wright Line, the General Coun-
sel bears the initial burden of proving that the employees
were engaged in protected concerted activity which was a
dominant factor prompting the employer’s disciplinary deci-
sion. If the General Counsel succeeds in establishing a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the Respondent to prove af-
firmatively that its adverse action would have been the same
even in the absence of the employee’s protected conduct.
On applying these standards to the present case, I have not
the slightest doubt that the General Counsel has met his bur-
den. The record in this proceeding is replete with
uncontroverted evidence that Olson was deeply engaged in
700 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
11 Although, as found above, Burkure clearly served as a supervisor, for un-
explained reasons, she also was included in the bargaining unit. However, the
record indicates that employees were not misled by that fact and that she was
regarded as an arm of management. Accordingly, I find that her statements
are ‘‘admissable as evidence of . . . [her] employer’s motivation in dis-
charging individuals.’’ Montgomery Ward, 115 NLRB 645, 647 (1956), enfd.
242 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 829 (1957).
12 The arbitral award was received as an exhibit in this case to establish
what the arbitrator decided and whether deferral was warranted. See John Sex-
ton & Co., 213 NLRB 794, 795 (1974). It was not admitted as evidence of
what Respondent’s witnesses said in that hearing.
Respondent attempted to incorporate testimony from the arbitration hearing
into the record in this case through Club Manager Russell. However, Russell
merely confirmed that testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses in the un-
fair labor practice proceeding was consistent with their testimony at the arbi-
tration.
protected concerted activities after she returned to work. She
testified without contradiction that discussions with her co-
workers about conditions in the workplace were virtually
daily occurrences from the day she returned to work. Fre-
quently, questions raised by other employees prompted her to
contact the union business agents who, in turn, brought these
matters to management’s attention.
Respondent’s knowledge of Olson’s union activities is not
an issue in this case. Without being told, Club Manager Rus-
sell identified Olson on more than one occasion as the
Union’s informant. Moreover, Olson made no attempt to
conceal her interest in compelling Respondent to comply
with the collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, she ap-
proached Russell to request a steady position and contended
that the contract required that one steady server be hired in-
stead of two steady extras. She prompted the employees to
ask the club hostess to review the tips allocated to the serv-
ers and challenged Respondent’s right to require servers to
set up tables. Olson’s efforts were not without cost to the
Respondent. As a consequence of her actions, Respondent
was called on to checkoff dues for new employees, to com-
ply with an agreement for a retroactive pay raise and over-
time pay, and to submit to an audit. It is safe to infer that
Olson’s union activities did not endear her to the Respond-
ent.
But it is unnecessary to rely on inference for unrefuted tes-
timony establishes that club officials openly expressed antag-
onism towards Olson’s union activism. When Bronson and
Mohr asked Russell about a grievance settlement regarding
overtime or about hiring steady servers, the manager reacted
in an accusatory manner, asking rhetorically whether it was
Olson who wanted to know. On November 16, when the
union agents met with Russell and Burkure about the dues-
checkoff situation, they errupted with similar expressions of
animosity toward Olson.11 They both questioned her right to
act as a steward and suggested that she was to blame for
raising all the problems which surfaced only after she re-
turned to work. Olson was singled out for reproof even when
she was only one of a group holding Respondent to account.
Thus, when a number of employees questioned the amount
of their tips, Collins berated only Olson for accusing her of
cheating. Russell, too, held Olson responsible in the contre-
temps with Collins, for in a call to Mohr, he asked what
right Olson had to question the tips paid to others.
Respondent’s hostility toward Olson was not only based
on her union activities—uncontradicted evidence indicates
that Respondent’s agents also resented the fact that she had
filed an unfair labor practice charge and did not forgive her
for doing so even after she retracted it. On several occasions
in 1988 Respondent’s counsel asked why Olson had taken
such a step and urged Mohr and Bronson to persuade her to
withdraw it. In December, not long before Olson was dis-
charged for the second time, Burkure told employee Wallis
to ignore advice Olson had given her because she was ‘‘in
enough shit with the Labor Board and going through her
Union charges.’’ Then, in January, when the union agents
asked why Olson had been taken off the work schedule, Ben-
nett candidly answered that Olson had been ‘‘running her
mouth’’ at the Christmas party to employees about her ‘‘arbi-
tration, her Board charge, and about Wayne Russell.’’ Based
on Burkure’s and Bennett’s remarks, it is clear that Olson’s
recourse to the Board contributed in some measure to Re-
spondent’s desire to be rid of her.
In addition to the foregoing evidence, there is another
damaging statement made by a member of management
which indicates that Respondent had decided to terminate
Olson prior to the Christmas party. I refer to Olson’s undis-
puted testimony that several days before the party, Burkure
forewarned her, ‘‘If you’re off the schedule next week, I just
want you to know that it’s not my fault and it’s not my
doing.’’
Based on the showing here of Respondent’s unremitted
hostility toward Olson for continuing to engage in protected
concerted activities and invoking the Board’s processes by
filing a charge, I conclude that the General Counsel has more
than adequately satisfied the requisites of a prima facie case.
The Respondent Failed to Present a Defense
Testimony pertaining to Bennett’s January 1989 telephone
conversations with the union agents, Olson’s acknowledge-
ment that Respondent told her she was removed from the
work schedule for violating rule 14, and Russell’s brief state-
ment that workrule 14 was applied for the first time in
Olson’s case, provide the only evidence in the record before
me of Respondent’s asserted reason for its disciplinary deci-
sion.
Apparently, Respondent decided to rely entirely on its ar-
gument that the Arbitrator’s award was entitled to deference.
Consequently, Respondent chose not to call a single witness
on its behalf in the instant trial and thereby failed to provide
an evidentiary basis to support Russell’s claim that he dis-
missed Olson for violating workrule 14. Respondent made
this tactical decision notwithstanding my advice that if defer-
ral was not conferred, then the arbitral opinion had no effect
whatsoever in a de novo unfair labor practice trial.12
In the absence of testimony from Respondent’s witnesses,
the only evidence of Olson’s comments at the Christmas
prties comes from Olson herself. In this regard, she admitted
telling DeBusscher and other employees that she had filed a
charge over her previous dismissal, that the terms of her set-
tlement were unsatisfactory, and that her bonus was nig-
gardly. She also acknowledged that when asked, she called
Russell ‘‘a son of a bitch’’ who cheated the employees out
of nickels and dimes. In addition, she told Burkholder that
Collins had changed since becoming office manager. I find
that these remarks ‘‘fell woefully short of the malicious tone
that would have been necessary to justify discharge.’’ Golden
Day Schools v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 1981).
Moreover, I find that by enforcing a rule which failed to dis-
701WABEEK COUNTRY CLUB
13 Pars. 13 and 21 of the complaint alleges that the Respondent unlawfully
promulgated and maintained rule 14. Since Russell testified without
controversion that the rule first was published in 1982 and was maintained in
effect with out protest from the Union, a challenge to the legality of its pro-
mulgation is untimely under Sec. 10(b) of the Act. Consequently, although I
find that the rule was improperly applied in Olson’s case, I do not find that
the rule was promulgated unlawfully.
14 One of Respondent’s attorneys did assure the Union’s counsel in late Feb-
ruary 1989, that the information would be forthcoming. It is not clear whether
that commitment led the Union to expect that the Respondent would cull the
underlying computer records itself or simply allow the Union to retrieve the
information as it did during the November 22 audit. However, questions re-
garding the manner and form in which the information will be presented can
be resolved during the compliance stage of this proceeding.
tinguish between merely false utterances and those which
were malicious or vicious and which forbid conduct beyond
the Club’s property and working hours, Respondent coerced
and restrained its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., supra at 1131.13
In light of the foregoing considerations, I conclude that
Respondent has failed to meet its burden under Wright Line
that it would have terminated Olson even if she had not en-
gaged in protected, concerted activity and filed a charge with
the Board. It follows that by removing Olson from the steady
extra schedule, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(4) of the Act.
VI. RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTION 8(A)(5)
As desribed above, Bronson and Mohr reviewed payroll
register records on November 22 to determine whether dues
were being checked off for unit members. During the course
of their audit, they noted whenever possible, the name of em-
ployees that appeared in Respondent’s registers but were not
listed in the Union’s records.
By letter dated February 1, 1989, counsel for the Union
wrote to Respondent’s attorney requesting the following in-
formation to assess the club’s compliance with articles 3, 4,
7, and 13 of the collective-bargaining agreement:
The name and hire date of each person who has worked
or works as a server during the period March 1, 1988
to date and, for each person, the dates of his or her em-
ployment as a steady, steady-extra or extra server and
a specification of the dates and hours worked by each
in each work week during the March 1 to date period.
At the end of February, having received no reply to this
letter, Local 24 counsel, Russell Linden, telephoned an attor-
ney for the Respondent, Patricia Nemeth, who assured him
that the information would be forthcoming shortly. However,
when the promised material did not arrive, Linden sent an-
other copy of the February 1 letter to Karl Bennett.
The Respondent denies that it has withheld information
contending (1) that since the same information was provided
to the union agents during their November 22 audit, it has
no duty to supply the same information again, and (2) the
information is not relevant to any contractual dispute since
no grievances or complaints were pending. The Respondent’s
arguments are unpersuasive.
Well-established law requires an employer to supply the
exclusive bargaining agent with requested relevant informa-
tion which is reasonably necessary to the Union’s perform-
ance of its duties, including its efforts to administer the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967). Taking a broad view of relevance, neither the Board
nor the Courts insist that the information sought must be nec-
essarily tied to an existing controversy. NLRB v. Whittin Ma-
chine Works, 217 F.2d 593, 595 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied
349 U.S. 905 (1955). Accordingly, the Respondent’s argu-
ment that the materials sought were unrelated to a grievance
or complaint and therefore, irrelevant, is lacking in merit.
In the present case, the Union asked for the name, dates
of hire, job classifications and hours worked by servers in
various categories and cited certain provisions of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement which address those matters. At
the bottom of the Union’s inquiry was a desire to investigate
employee complaints that union dues was not being checked
off by the Respondent in accordance with the contract. A
second motive was to obtain information relevant to Olson’s
complaint that the Respondent was employing steady extra
rather than steady servers. Such an investigation is plainly
tied to the Union’s duty to police Respondent’s possible non-
compliance with the collective-bargaining agreement and,
therefore, is presumptively relevant. Stephen Oderwald, Inc.,
288 NLRB 277, 279 (1988).
The Respondent contends that since all the material re-
quested in the February letter was furnished to Mohr and
Bronson during their November 22 audit, the Union has no
right to reexamine its records. The facts do not support Re-
spondent’s contention.
The union agents do not deny that the Respondent’s office
manager provided them with bound volumes containing volu-
minous reports during their November 22 visit. However,
they testified credibly that the only documents which they
examined on that occasion were the payroll registers to deter-
mine whether the Respondent was deducting dues for current
union members. Since Collins did not remain with them dur-
ing their audit, she was in no position to contradict their tes-
timony in this regard. Moreover, their task required them to
sort through weekly payroll data covering a 6-month period.
It is easy to understand that they did not take additional time
to examine a separate question; that is, whether dues were
being paid for many new employees.
The Respondent further asserts that its willingness to co-
operate with the Union’s audit on November 22 demonstrates
that its records were always available to the Union; that it
had no intent to withhold information in bad faith. However,
Respondent’s counsel made these assertions in a somewhat
casual manner; at no time did Respondent officially answer
the Union’s letters of December 13, February 1, and May 30
and promise to supply the data requested on a date certain.14
By failing to provide the requested information in a timely
manner, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material, the Union has been the exclusive
bargaining representative of employees in a unit described
below, which is appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
702 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of ap-
peals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.’’
All employees set forth in schedules ‘‘A’’ through
‘‘G’’ of the 1987 to 1990 collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Union and the Detroit Club Managers
Association.
4. By removing Susan Olson from the work schedule list
on or about December 18, 1989, and thereafter refusing to
schedule her for work as a steady extra server because she
filed a charge with the Board and actively engaged in union
activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of
the Act.
5. By enforcing a workrule which prohibited employees
from making or publishing a false statement about an em-
ployee, the club, or its food, beverages or services, without
regard to whether such statement was a part of concerted ac-
tivity, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By failing to provide the Union with information re-
quested in its letter of February 1, 1989, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that
it be required to cease and desist therefrom, and take certain
affirmative actions designed to effectuate the purposes of the
Act, including posting the notice attached to this decision as
an appendix.
Specifically, having concluded that Susan Olson’s removal
from the work schedule constituted a wrongful discharge, I
shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to offer her im-
mediate and full reinstatement to her former position or, if
it no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from date of dis-
charge to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net
interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Also, I shall
recommend that Respondent be ordered to remove from its
records any reference to Olson’s unlawful discharge, provide
her with written notice of such expungement and advise her
that its unlawful conduct will in no way be used for further
personnel actions against her.
Further, I shall recommend that the Respondent be di-
rected to provide the Union with the information requested
in its letter of February 1, 1989.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended15
ORDER
The Respondent, Wabeek Country Club, Bloomfield,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Removing from its work schedule or otherwise dis-
criminating against an employee because he or she has filed
a charge with the National Labor Relations Board or engaged
in protected, concerted activities.
(b) Refusing to bargain with the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union, Local 24, AFL–
CIO, by failing to provide requested information needed to
administer the collective-bargaining agreement.
(c) Enforcing or applying any rule prohibiting its employ-
ees when they are on nonworking time and nonwork areas
from making or publishing false statements which are related
to or a part of concerted, protected or union activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Susan Olson immediate and full reinstatement to
her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to seniority or
any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as
a result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful re-
moval of Susan Olson’s name from its steady extra schedule
and discharge will not be used against her in any way.
(c) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the informa-
tion requested in its letter dated February 1, 1989.
(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its Detroit, Michigan facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’16 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.