W. T. Grant Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 5, 1969174 N.L.R.B. 999 (N.L.R.B. 1969) Copy Citation W T. GRANT CO. 999 W. T. Grant Company and Retail Clerks Union, Local 1557, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-3092 March 5, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On November 18, 1968, Trial Examiner David London issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended the dismissal of these allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiners Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein, and hereby orders that the Respondent, W. T Grant Company, Nashville, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified: Add the following as paragraph 2(c) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, and reletter the following paragraphs accordingly (c) "Notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces " TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID LONDON, Trial Examiner. Upon a charge, and an amended charge, filed on June 5 and July 5, 1968, respectively, by Retail Clerks Union, Local 1557, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO (the Union), the General Counsel of'the Board on July 5, 1968,' issued the complaint herein, subsequently amended, alleging that W. T Grant Company (Respondent), had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act) In substance, the complaint alleges that Respondent by specifically described conduct interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act, and that on or about May 29, 1968, discharged its employee Jean Rittenberry because she had been engaged in activities protected by the Act By its answer, Respondent denied that it had discharged Rittenberry and further denied the commission of any unfair labor practice. The hearing herein was held before the Trial Examiner at Nashville, Tennessee, on August 14, 1968. The General Counsel and Respondent appeared by counsel and were given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to offer relevant evidence Since the close of the hearing, briefs received from the General Counsel and Respondent have been fully considered Upon the entire record in the case and my observation of the witnesses I make the following FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a Delaware corporation with a retail store and place of business, known as store No 136, located at 6th and Church Streets in Nashville, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the retail sale of variety merchandise. During the year preceding the filing of the complaint herein, Respondent's Nashville store No. 136 had a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000. During the same period of time, it purchased goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of Tennessee Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein Respondent was, and is, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act Ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein the Union was , and is , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Early in February 1968, Robert K Lee, the Union's business agent, received a call from an employee of Respondent whom he subsequently met and to whom he gave cards designating the Union as collective-bargaining representative. About 2 weeks later, this employee, 'Unless otherwise indicated, all reference to dates herein are to the year 1968 174 NLRB No 144 1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD otherwise unidentified, "brought back signed authorization cards," following which Lee, on or about February 20, called a meeting of the employees that had signed such cards On March 6, Lee, from his office in Nashville, sent a letter by mail, with "certified return receipt requested," to Burnis Grubbs, manager of store No. 136 located at Church Street in Nashville, Tennessee, advising him that 13 named employees, including Jean Rittenberry, the alleged discriminatee, were the "voluntary organizers" for the Union Though Grubbs testified that he did not receive this letter until March 12,2 Respondent, in its brief admitted, presumably because of the facts next related, that "it is clear from the record that at least by Thursday, March 7, Store Manager Grubbs knew (from the Charlotte Avenue literature) that the Union was seeking to organize the employees in [his] store " A similar campaign to organize Respondent's employees was carried on by Lee at Respondent's Charlotte Avenue store in Nashville Grubbs testified that he became aware of the Union's activities at his Church Street store during the evening of Thursday, March 7, while visiting Respondent's Charlotte Avenue store at which time the manager of that store showed him a letter passed out at that store during the previous afternoon. The letter was signed by the "W. T. Grant Organizing Committee" and advised employees that a majority of the Church Street store had designated the Union as their representative and that their manager, "through a certified letter," had been told that they "were the Retail Clerks Union organizing committee " The letter invited the employees to attend a Union meeting on the following Tuesday evening On March 15, the Union filed a petition with the Board (Case 26-RC-3139) seeking certification as collective-bargaining representative of a unit of Respondent's employees at the Church Street store On April 10, the parties entered into a stipulation for certification upon a consent election scheduled for May 10 On May 9, the Union withdrew its petition aforementioned "with 6 months prejudice " Grubbs testified that, commencing early in March, he held "as many as two employee meetings a week - in connection with the Union organizational campaign " During that period, Respondent had approximately 100 employees and meetings with them were generally conducted in groups varying in size from 15 to 25. The first meeting, however, took place pursuant to a previously posted notice requiring all the employees to be present one hour before the store opened on the following day During this meeting of the entire group, Rittenberry asked Grubbs why the meeting was not being held on Respondent's time, remonstrating that the employees had not "clocked in" and were not getting paid for that hour Grubbs answered that he had told Louise Fuller, Respondent's personnel supervisor, to tell the employees to clock-in, but she apparently failed to do so. Rittenberry also complained to Grubbs that the employees were not given any definite break during the course of the workday and that the employees "needed a union to help [them] so [they] could get breaks and everything " The Union designation cards were discussed at this and subsequent 'Lee testified that, upon inquiry , he was informed by a post office employee that his certified letter of March 6 was first refused for acceptance Accordingly , on March 12, he sent a telegram to Grubbs containing all the information found in his letter of March 6 meetings and the employees were told by Grubbs that they did not have to sign such cards. The complaint, as amended, alleges that on or about March 15, Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, "changed its policies with regard to break periods and reporting time . because its employees engaged in, and gave assistance or support to the Union." The only testimony pertaining to such a change was offered by Rittenberry The General Counsel, in his brief, summarizes that testimony as follows "At the first store meeting called by Grubbs, Rittenberry brought up the subject of breaks and reporting time Rittenberry told Grubbs that the employees clock-in 10 minutes before time to go to work and said that they should get a 10-minute break sometimes during the day Grubbs responded that the employees were supposed to have a break, and, thereafter, according to the testimony of Rittenberry, the employees were given a 10 to 15 minute break Prior to this time, Rittenberry stated that she had not been advised that she was entitled to a break but that she had excused herselt through the supervisor to go `downstairs ' After the meeting with Grubbs, Rittenberry stated that she was allowed a 15 minute break although, again, she was required to check with her supervisors first." The testimony establishes that before the Union's organizing campaign, during that campaign, and ever since, employees were given break periods of 10 to 15 minutes. During all these three periods, however, the employees were required to obtain clearance from the supervisor before taking their breaks, a requirement which the General Counsel, in his brief, characterizes as an "understandable requirement " Rittenberry's complaint was that there was "no certain time to go on a break " In view of the nature of Respondent's business, a retail 5-10 cent store, with customers always present, the failure to assign and maintain a certain time for that break is, indeed, "understandable " On the entire record I find that the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent on or about March 15 changed its policy with respect to break periods in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act With respect to the allegations in the complaint that on or about March 15 Respondent changed its policy with regard to reporting time, Rittenberry testified that prior to the Union's organizational campaign it was Respondent's practice to ring the bell, the signal to "clock-in," 10 minutes before the store opened for public business, but that at an undisclosed time "after the union activity," employees clocked-in 5 minutes before the store opened.' According to Rittenberry, the 10 minute clock-in time was mentioned only indirectly at the first meeting in connection with the demand for a definite break period Louise Fuller, Respondent's personnel supervisor, and Grubbs, both testified that at all times the bell rang 5 minutes, and never 10 minutes before the store opened. The burden resting on the General Counsel to establish the alleged change, it is significant that he failed to call as a witness Patty Chastine, the employee who manually rang the bell ° Nor is there any testimony that Respondent ever announced any change in the clock-in time On the 'It was undisputed that on or about February 1, Respondent, together with a number of other Nashville merchants , changed their store opening hours from 9 30 a in to 10 a in 'The Union 's letter of March 6 to Grubbs heretofore described , identifies Patty Chastain as one of the organizers for the Union W. T. GRANT CO. 1001 entire record I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent on or about March 15 changed its policy with respect to reporting time The complaint unequivocally alleges that on or about March 8, Respondent "granted wage increases to certain of its employees" thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It cannot, however, be contended that mere grant of the increase, standing alone and without consideration of the motive or reason that prompted such increase, is proscribed by the Act It is only if that increase was conceived or accelerated to counteract the Union's organizational campaign, or to induce the employees to withhold or withdraw their support of the Union, that Respondent's grant of the increase can be held to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) Divco-Wayne Industries, inc , 154 NLRB 974, 977 The testimony establishes that, effective March 8, Respondent granted wage increases to 41 of its approximately 100 employees, including seven of the 13 members of the Union's organizing committee Eighteen were granted an increase of 10 cents per hour and 23 were raised 5 cents The increases were granted following a rating of all the employees' work performance This rating process is engaged in twice a year, "around the first of the year and then again about in the fall " The rating process for the March 8 increases was begun by Fuller on January 29 when she prepared the necessary forms for the supervisor who "rates the girls" and returns the forms to Fuller Thereafter, 6-8 employees were called to Grubbs' office where, together with Fuller, the rating,, were discussed Employee Ruby Anderson and Fuller testified that the Anderson interview was held February 21, at which time she was told she would be given the raise An unspecified number of other employees were also notified of their March 8 raise on February 21 Christine Kersha, a member of the Union's organizing committee, testified that she "believed it was in March" that she was called to Grubbs' office where he and Fuller informed her that she was getting a merit increase of 10 cents an hour Ada Catherine Breedlove testified that about 2 weeks before March 8, Fuller told her that she would be getting a 5-cents increase. As previously indicated, the increase under attack was granted to only 41 of the approximately 100 employees in the store. If, as the General Counsel contends, the raise was awarded to influence 41 employees to reject the Union, it seems more reasonable to infer that, by failing to grant an increase to the remaining approximately 59 employees, Respondent increased the likelihood that these approximately 59 employees would enlist the Union in an effort to secure similar increases Indeed, in the only cases cited by the General Counsel, N L.R B v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U S 405, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc , 162 NLRB 110, in support of his contention that the 41 "wage increases constituted interference in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act," the benefits bestowed and which were held to be violative of the Act were bestowed "across-the-board" to all the employees in the units involved And, completely unlike the two cases relied upon, the record here is devoid of any testimony or suggestion that the Union or its campaign was even mentioned to any of the employees at the time they were told about or received their increases Nor is there any contention that individual increases were unusual in the course of Respondent's operations. Thus, Kersha, who received such an increase on March 8, had, in the preceding 4-1/2 years, received nine similar merit increases On the entire record I find that it has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the March 8 increases granted by Respondent to a number of its employees was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act At the suggestion of a supervisor, Kersha went to Grubbs' office on or about March 11 and talked to Grubbs According to her undenied testimony, Grubbs asked her why she did not come to him and tell him what her complaints were instead of going for outside help He stated that he was sure he could help straighten the matter out and was sorry that she had done "this." He also inquired of her if she thought "we" [the Union] had enough cards signed to hold an election On or about May 1, after an employee meeting which Rittenberry attended and at which Grubbs and Herman Byrne, Respondent's district manager, were also present, Byrne told Rittenberry he would like to talk to her In his office, he asked her why she had to go to a union to get a raise instead of asking Grubbs She replied that "it wouldn't do any good" because she had already made such a request to Fuller. On the entire record I find that by Grubbs' interrogation of Kersha and Byrne's interrogation of Rittenberry heretofore found, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company, 156 NLRB 841, 845; Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R B, 402 F 2d 299 (C A 4). Rittenberry was first employed by Respondent in its candy department on September 14, 1962 and continued in that capacity until July 1966 when she voluntarily terminated that employment. On or about August 12, 1967, she called Fuller and asked if she would like to have her return to work Fuller replied affirmatively and that she would be glad to have Rittenberry do so. Rittenberry explained, however, that she could not return to work unless she was paid $1.50 an hour and would not have to work at night. Fuller replied that she would call her back after talking to Jones who was then Respondent's merchandise manager Fuller called Rittenberry about 10 minutes later, told her she would be paid the requested wage and that she would not have to work at night. Rittenberry reported for work on the following day and continued in that employment as candy department manager until May 27, 1968 when she was discharged.5 On February 12, 1968, an otherwise unidentified employee in Respondent's camera department of the Church Street store, asked Rittenberry whether she wanted to sign a Union designation card and help the employees "get more wages and everything " She replied affirmatively, signed the card, and returned it to the employee Rittenberry obtained other similar cards, gave them to the girls employed in the store during the lunch hour and received 4-5 such cards_ bearing their signature Shortly after the Union's organizational campaign began, Rittenberry attended a store meeting attended by about 25 employees During that meeting, which began at about 2 p.m and was attended by Grubbs, Byrne, and one of the Respondent's attorneys, there was a discussion concerning the full effect of the union designation cards Grubbs, or one of his associates, stated that by signing the card the signer "automatically belonged to the Union " Rittenberry challenged the statement and produced a card which she laid on a table in front of the three employer representatives The attorney read the card but still 'The parties stipulated that department managers, of whom Grubbs testified there were 30 in number, are not supervisors within the meaning of the Act 1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD maintained that if an employee "signed one of those authorization cards you automatically belong to the Union if it came in "6 After this meeting with the employees was concluded, Byrne told Rittenberry he would like to talk to her They "discussed a contract" in effect at a store owned by Respondent in Gadsen, Alabama, where, it was represented to Rittenberry, the girls were only receiving a $1 40 an hour under a union contract Rittenberry "couldn't see how they were still making $1 40 when the minimum wage was $1.60" and asked to see the contract. They went to Grubbs' office, where Grubbs took a contract from his desk and read an undisclosed portion thereof to her. Though the testimony abundantly establishes that this conference continued until the store closed, the record provides little more than a modicum of evidence pertaining to what transpired during that period. Rittenberry testified that they "dust talked about everything" and that Byrne told her that "if [she] was as strong for the Company as [she was] for the Union, [Respondent would] have a good girl on their side " Byrne testified that "from [his] discussion with Mrs Rittenberry it was rather obvious that she was very much for the Union," and admitted that he told her that he "wished she was working on their side of the project, as hard for [Respondent] as she was for the other side " In its brief, Respondent admits that "through several all-store meetings, it had been made clear to the Employer that Rittenberry was the most vocal union adherent " Early in the morning about a week or 10 days before the election then scheduled for May 10, Rittenberry was engaged in conversation with Kersha concerning an alleged "run-in" that Kersha had with Supervisor Harrison Rittenberry told her not to pay any attention to Harrison, to do her job, to "tell them [she was]- not going to quit and they'll leave [her] alone " When she completed her conversation with Kersha, Rittenberry discovered that, unbeknown to her, Grubbs was standing behind her After the bell rang that morning, Grubbs called Rittenberry to his office where, in the presence of Supervisors Jones and Griffin, Grubbs told her that she "was dust a troublemaker . and shouldn't be in the girls' room discussing things like that " On either the first or second day following the Union's withdrawal of its representation petition on May 9, Supervisor Griffin criticized Rittenberry for having an empty box on top of a caramel machine Loud talk was exchanged between them during which Griffin pointed his finger into her face and invited her "to dust go on downstairs and clock-out and quit." Rittenberry replied that she was not going to quit and that the only way he could get rid of her was to fire her Grubbs approached and Rittenberry told him what had happened and what she had told Griffin Grubbs replied that they did not want her to quit, nor were they going to fire her, that they needed her and all the other employees On Friday, May 24, Rittenberry secured the signatures of nine employees to cards designating the Union as their representative. During the same day, Grubbs came to her candy counter and told her she would have to start working at night She replied that she did not know whether she could do so and would have to get her husband's approval, that she did not have a car or transportation, and that it would require a $3 cab fare to 'G C Exh 2, the only Union card offered in evidence, merely designated the Union as collective-bargaining representative It made no reference to membership in the Union get to her home at night About 30 minutes later, Rittenberry was called to Fuller's office where she was told that Grubbs had instructed her to increase Rittenberry's working hours and that she would have to work the two nights that the store was open during every week Rittenberry replied that, before doing so, she would have to ask her husband On the following day, Saturday, Fuller asked Rittenberry whether she had talked to her husband and Rittenberry replied that she had been instructed by him not to work nights. Fuller made no comment On the following Monday, May 27, at about 3 p m , Fuller asked Rittenberry when she was going for supper and she replied that she did not need to go out for supper because she had on the previous Saturday informed her that she could not work at night Fuller thereupon told her that her schedule required her to work until 9 p m on Monday and Friday Rittenberry remonstrated that she had never been required to work nights since she was in Respondent's employment, and that she could not work nights Fuller said nothing but just walked away A little later, Griffin also told her that she would have to work nights and asked when she was going for supper When Rittenberry repeated what she had told Fuller, Griffin merely shrugged his shoulders and told her that her schedule called for her to work until 9 p m and that he had "checked it out " Rittenberry clocked out at 5 p m and met Grubbs who asked her whether she was going to supper She replied that it was 5 o'clock and that she was going home and that she had told Fuller that she could not stay until 9 p.m. because she had no car and would have to pay a cab fare Grubbs replied that if she did not work until 9 p in there would be "no use in coming back, that she would be without a job, and no card to clock-in on." Grubbs testified that she told him that she was "not going to quit, [he would] dust have to fire [her] " Because Tuesday was her regular day off, she told Grubbs she would be there Wednesday morning and that if she was fired, for him "to have everything ready " When Rittenberry came to the store on Wednesday morning there was no card for her in the cardrack She went to Fuller, asked why there was no card for her, and was told that she did not have a job She was then given her vacation check, one day's severance pay, and a separation slip stating she was "discharged; reason for leaving, could not work hours scheduled "' Respondent, in its brief, asserts that Rittenberry's "discharge came about for failure to work her job schedule She sought special treatment which was no longer warranted by the condition of her department " Rather than seeking "special treatment," all that Rittenberry sought on May 27 was continued adherence by Respondent to the agreement reached with it when she was reemployed in August 1967 - that she would not be required to work nights In light of that agreement and the continued adherence thereto, any unilaterally imposed departure therefrom by Respondent over Rittenberry's vehement objection becomes, to say the least, extremely suspect In any event, I find no credible evidence in the record that the "condition of her department" deprived 'Several witnesses testified in behalf of Respondent , presumably in support of the denial in its answer that it had discharged Rittenberry, that at several employee meetings she had stated that she would quit if the Union "didn ' t come in " That pleaded denial , however , was abandoned at the hearing where Respondent tacitly admitted that she had been discharged W. T. GRANT CO. Rittenberry of the same "special treatment" that Respondent accorded other department managers as will hereafter appear Instead, I find that Grubbs imposed a condition upon Rittenberry which he knew she could not accept, would require her defiance, and provide Respondent with a plausible pretext for her discharge I further find that this pretextual situation was created to cover Grubbs' true motive for imposing that condition - to rid Respondent of the "troublemaker" who, "through several all-store meetings, made [it] clear to the Employer that [she] was the most vocal union adherent "" Grubbs testified that on May 23 he was in the candy department and made the comment to R ittenberry "that the work was certainly getting behind to which, he testified, she said "it just took more time than she was putting in." When she informed him that she was working 30 or 31 hours a week, he told her that she had to put in more time to keep her work "up to date . and [he] would check with Mrs. Fuller and see if [they] couldn't get her scheduled to put in more time " Grubbs checked with Fuller and instructed her to make Rittenberry's "schedule up so she could work full time like the other department managers to keep her work up "' If, however, all that Respondent was concerned about was the need for increasing the number of Rittenberry's working hours, no explanation was offered why consideration was not given to asking or requiring her to work on Tuesday, her day off. Instead, it arbitrarily imposed a condition which, both Grubbs and Fuller knew, Rittenberry would be required to reject. Contrary to the "special treatment" of abstention from night work denied to Rittenberry, the testimony is undisputed that this special treatment was granted to at least six employees, including five department managers, Juanita Powers, Virginia Wallace, Thelma West, Betty Osburn, and Eva Richardson. With respect to Richardson, Fuller testified that "she was hired for six days a week and exempted from night work, . . she works six days a week, she lives out in the country " Wallace, Fuller testified, "has a long ways to walk from the bus line and this is the reason that she can't work nights." By reason of all the foregoing, I find and conclude that the alleged reason given by Respondent for Rittenberry's discharge was pretextual in nature and that the real cause or reason for her discharge was Respondent's desire to rid itself of the Union's most vocal adherent. By that conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent's activities set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with Respondent's operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free now of commerce Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire record in the case, I make the following 'Respondent 's brief, pp 11, 15 'In the portion of its brief entitled " Rittenberry Discharge - Analysis and Conclusions ," Respondent completely ignores this need for additional worktime as the reason for changing her work schedule CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1003 I By coercively interrogating its employees concerning their union membership or activities, Respondent interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(I) thereof 2 By discriminating in regard to the tenure, terms, and conditions of employment of Jean Rittenberry, and by discharging her because of her union membership or activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act 4. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent, on or about March 15, 1968, unlawfully changed its policies with regard to break periods or reporting time, or that on or about March 8, 1968 it unlawfully granted wage increases to certain of its employees THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designated to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Jean Rittenberry, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to offer her immediate and full reinstatement without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings that she may have suffered from the time of her discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement The backpay shall be computed in accordance with the formula approved in F W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest computed in the manner and amount prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co , 138 NLRB 716, 717-721. It will also be recommended that Respondent be required to preserve and make available to the Board or its agents, on request, payroll and other records to facilitate the computation of backpay due. As the unfair labor practices committed by Respondent are of a character striking at the root of employee rights safeguarded by the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R B v Entwistle Mfg Co., 120 F.2d 532, 5 36 (C A. 4) RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent, W. T. Grant Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, be required to 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning their union membership or activities (b) Discouraging membership in Retail Clerks Union, Local 1557, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating 1004 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD against them in regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, because they have engaged in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in any other concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities 2 Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act (a) Offer Jean Rittenberry immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, as provided in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy " (b) Make Rittenberry whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy " (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary or useful in analyzing the amount of backpay due and the right to reinstatement and employment under the terms of this Recommended Order. (d) Post at its stores in Nashville, Tennessee, copies of the notice attached hereto as an "Appendix "10 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall, after having been duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material (e) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing , within 20 days from the date of this Recommended Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith." IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges any unfair labor practice, other than as herein specifically found "in the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words " a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " "in the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Retail Clerks Union, Local 1557, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other union, by discharging or otherwise discriminating against our employees because of their union or concerted activities. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees concerning their union sympathies, membership, or activities WE WILL NOT in any other manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities WE WILL offer Jean Rittenberry immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of our discrimination against her All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Retail Clerks Union, Local 1557, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization W T. GRANT COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) NOTE We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation